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SUMMARY 
 
Continuous reforms of pension systems of countries of the world remain significant 
considering the fact that many countries, including South Africa, face challenges of 
how to adequately provide for their ageing populations. South Africa’s retirement 
system takes a formal three-pillar approach; comprising the state old-age pension, 
occupational funds, and private savings. Pension provision (occupational) takes the 
form of retirement funds which are mostly established by employers, administered by 
insurance companies, and regulated by the state through legislation. South Africa 
does not have a public fund and relies solely on the private retirement system. Many 
workers in South Africa retire with no income or with insufficient benefits and end up 
relying on the state for support. The reasons for this include a general lack of a 
culture of saving, the absence of a public fund, the voluntary nature of the system, 
leakages that exist within the system, a lack of mandatory preservation of benefits, 
risks with lump-sum cash payments, and the fact that the system focuses more on 
those in formal employment. This raises the question whether the system is in line 
with what is guaranteed by section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 that everyone has a right to have access to social security. The right 
guarantees “everyone” access to some form of income (protection) during 
retirement, which makes retirement provision an important social security 
component. Thus, pensions play an important social security role as they protect the 
elderly from falling into poverty. Benefits received from retirement savings serve as 
income replacement in retirement and should therefore receive adequate protection, 
and they must be able to provide adequate protection to the beneficiaries – beyond 
mere survival. Over the years South Africa has embarked on many reform processes 
to find ways to improve its retirement system. This study determines the adequacy of 
South Africa’s occupational retirement system along social security objectives. It 
describes the nature of the system, considers proposals made for reform purposes, 
examines international law, (including systems in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom for a comparative study), identifies weaknesses in the system, and 
makes some proposals to improve coverage and protection of benefits.  
 
KEY WORDS 
 
iv 
 
KEY WORDS 
 
Retirement fund, occupational, pension, provident, preservation, annuity, old-age, 
social security, benefit, dependants 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................................ I 
DECLARATION ......................................................................................................................................................... II 
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................. III 
KEY WORDS............................................................................................................................................................ IV 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... XIII 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 THE OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM A SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE ... 2 
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................... 6 
1.3.1 OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.3.2 OUTLINE ................................................................................................................................................. 8 
1.3.2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 8 
1.3.2.2 International instruments on the right to social and retirement security .................................. 8 
1.3.2.3 Social and retirement security in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom ............. 9 
1.3.2.4 The origin and historical development of the social and retirement security system in South 
Africa ........................................................................................................................................ 14 
1.3.2.5 South Africa’s social and retirement security system ............................................................... 15 
1.3.2.6 South Africa’s occupational retirement system ....................................................................... 18 
1.3.2.7 Summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations ...................................................... 20 
1.4 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................................... 20 
1.4.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................................................................. 20 
1.4.2 APPROACH ............................................................................................................................................ 23 
1.5 SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT 
PROVISION .................................................................................................................................................. 23 
 
CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 25 
2.2 THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE AFRICAN UNION ON   THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND 
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ................................................................................................................. 28 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
vi 
 
2.3 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT 
SECURITY ..................................................................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 30 
2.3.2 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY TREATY, 1992 .................................................................... 31 
2.3.3 CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS, 2003 ...................................................................................... 32 
2.3.4 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY CODE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 2008 ......................................... 34 
2.4 UNITED NATIONS (UN) ON SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY ............................................................... 36 
2.4.1 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, 1945 ............................................................................................................ 36 
2.4.2 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948 .................................................................................... 36 
2.4.3 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 1966 ............................................ 38 
2.5 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT 
SECURITY ..................................................................................................................................................... 43 
2.5.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 43 
2.5.2 THE NATURE OF ILO INSTRUMENTS ............................................................................................................ 44 
2.5.3 THE PURPOSE OF SETTING MINIMUM CORE-CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ................................. 45 
2.5.4 THE ILO CONVENTIONS’ BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL REQUIREMENTS .......................................................... 45 
2.5.5 ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY ....................... 47 
2.5.5.1 Social Security (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1952 ........................................................... 47 
2.5.5.2 Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967 ................................................. 49 
2.5.5.3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979 ............ 50 
2.5.5.4 Income Security Recommendation, 1944 ................................................................................. 50 
2.5.6 ENFORCEMENT OF ILO STANDARDS ............................................................................................................ 50 
2.6 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION ..................................................................................................................... 52 
 
CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 58 
3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, 
THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ...................................................................................... 60 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 60 
3.2.2 BISMARCKIAN, BEVERIDGE, AND THE WORLD BANK APPROACHES TO PENSION PROVISION .................................... 63 
3.2.2.1 The Bismarckian approach ....................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.2.2 The Beveridge system............................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.2.3 The World Bank ........................................................................................................................ 65 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
vii 
 
3.3 SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION PROVISION IN BELGIUM ......................................................................... 68 
3.3.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 68 
3.3.2 THE BELGIAN PENSION SYSTEM .................................................................................................................. 72 
3.3.2.1 Guaranteed Minimum Old-Age Income ................................................................................... 73 
3.3.2.2 Occupational pensions ............................................................................................................. 75 
3.3.2.3 Private pension/individual insurance plans .............................................................................. 82 
3.3.2.4 Dispute resolution .................................................................................................................... 82 
3.4 SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION PROVISION IN THE NETHERLANDS.......................................................... 83 
3.4.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 83 
3.4.2 THE NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) PENSION SYSTEM ............................................................................................. 86 
3.4.2.1 The state pension ..................................................................................................................... 88 
3.4.2.2 Occupational pensions ............................................................................................................. 91 
3.4.2.3 Private pension/individual pension plans ................................................................................. 96 
3.4.2.4 Dispute resolution .................................................................................................................... 97 
3.5 SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION PROVISION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ................................................... 98 
3.5.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 98 
3.5.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM PENSION SYSTEM................................................................................................... 101 
3.5.2.1  State pensions ........................................................................................................................ 102 
3.5.2.2 Occupational pensions ........................................................................................................... 109 
3.5.2.3 Private pension/individual insurance plans ............................................................................ 117 
3.5.3 DISPUTE RESOLUTION ............................................................................................................................ 117 
3.6 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION ................................................................................................................... 119 
3.6.1  BELGIUM ............................................................................................................................................ 119 
3.6.2  THE NETHERLANDS ............................................................................................................................... 121 
3.6.3  THE UNITED KINGDOM .......................................................................................................................... 122 
 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE AND 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS)  
4.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 125 
4.2 DEVELOPMENTAL PERIODS FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ......................................... 127 
4.2.1 PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD ........................................................................................................................... 127 
4.2.2 COLONIAL PERIOD ................................................................................................................................. 127 
4.2.3 THE APARTHEID PERIOD ......................................................................................................................... 130 
4.2.4 THE EARLY 1990S................................................................................................................................. 135 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
viii 
 
4.2.5 DEMOCRATIC PERIOD ............................................................................................................................ 135 
4.3 THE NATURE OF RETIREMENT SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA ..................................................................... 139 
4.3.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 139 
4.3.2 THE STATE OLD-AGE PENSION .................................................................................................................. 140 
4.3.3 OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT FUNDS ......................................................................................................... 146 
4.4 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION ................................................................................................................... 155 
 
CHAPTER 5: SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 157 
5.2 A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................ 160 
5.2.1 THE RIGHT TO HAVE ACCESS TO SOCIAL SECURITY ......................................................................................... 160 
5.2.1.1  Very general provisions proclaiming the state as a “social state” ......................................... 161 
5.2.1.2  Provisions merely confirming the existence of social security, social insurance, or social 
assistance ............................................................................................................................... 163 
5.2.1.3  Fundamental social rights ...................................................................................................... 163 
5.2.2 ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY ...................................................................................... 173 
5.2.3 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ................................................................................................................. 176 
5.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK........................................................................... 178 
5.4 NON-CONTRIBUTORY STATE PENSIONS .................................................................................................... 179 
5.4.1 DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 179 
5.4.2 ADMINISTRATION AND REGULATION ......................................................................................................... 186 
5.5 CONTRIBUTORY OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SCHEMES ........................................................................ 188 
5.5.1 DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 188 
5.5.2 ADMINISTRATION AND REGULATION ......................................................................................................... 191 
5.6 VOLUNTARY PROVISIONS .......................................................................................................................... 194 
5.6.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 194 
5.6.2 RETIREMENT ANNUITY FUND .................................................................................................................. 195 
5.6.3 DEFERRED COMPENSATION SCHEME ......................................................................................................... 197 
5.6.4 STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES .............................................................................................................. 197 
5.6.5 UNIT TRUSTS ....................................................................................................................................... 198 
5.6.6 ADMINISTRATION AND REGULATION ......................................................................................................... 199 
5.7 INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... 200 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ix 
 
5.7.1 DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 200 
5.7.2 REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION ......................................................................................................... 201 
5.8 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION ................................................................................................................... 203 
 
CHAPTER 6: SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 207 
6.2 THE NATURE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM .............................................. 209 
6.3 THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................ 221 
6.3.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 221 
6.3.2 PENSION FUNDS ACT 24 OF 1956 ........................................................................................................... 222 
6.3.3 THE INCOME TAX ACT 58 OF 1962 ......................................................................................................... 225 
6.3.4 OTHER STATUTES .................................................................................................................................. 226 
6.3.4.1  Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 ................................................................................. 226 
6.3.4.2  Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 ................................................... 226 
6.3.4.3  The Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 80 of 1998 .......................................................... 227 
6.3.4.4  Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act 37 of 2002 ...................................... 227 
6.4 THE TYPES OF RETIREMENT FUNDS .......................................................................................................... 228 
6.4.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 228 
6.4.1.1  Retirement annuity fund ........................................................................................................ 228 
6.4.1.2  Preservation fund ................................................................................................................... 229 
6.4.2 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PENSION FUND AND A PROVIDENT FUND ............................................................ 232 
6.4.3 DEFINED-BENEFIT PENSION AND PROVIDENT FUNDS ..................................................................................... 236 
6.4.4 DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION PENSION AND PROVIDENT FUNDS ........................................................................... 237 
6.4.5 OTHER TYPES OF FUNDS ......................................................................................................................... 238 
6.4.5.1  Umbrella funds ....................................................................................................................... 238 
6.4.5.2  Industrial funds ...................................................................................................................... 240 
6.4.5.3  State-controlled funds ............................................................................................................ 240 
6.5 THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE ......................................................................................................................... 241 
6.6 THE TYPES OF BENEFITS ............................................................................................................................ 250 
6.6.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 250 
6.6.2 RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND PAYMENT OF MINIMUM BENEFITS ....................................................................... 251 
6.6.3 WITHDRAWAL BENEFITS AND PRESERVATION OF BENEFITS ............................................................................ 254 
6.6.4 RISK BENEFITS ...................................................................................................................................... 262 
6.6.4.1 General ................................................................................................................................... 262 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
x 
 
6.6.4.2 Payment of death benefits and protection of dependants .................................................... 263 
6.6.4.3 Payment of benefits due to disability or ill health .................................................................. 275 
6.6.4.4 Challenges with risk benefits .................................................................................................. 277 
6.7 PROTECTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS .................................................................................................. 279 
6.7.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 279 
6.7.2 SECTION 37D EXCEPTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 282 
6.7.2.1 Housing loans ......................................................................................................................... 285 
6.7.2.2  Damages caused to the employer by the employee .............................................................. 287 
6.7.2.3 Maintenance .......................................................................................................................... 290 
6.7.2.4 Pension sharing on divorce .................................................................................................... 291 
6.8 MANAGEMENT OF RETIREMENT FUNDS AND THE PROTECTION OF MEMBERS’ INTERESTS AND  
RIGHTS....................................................................................................................................................... 296 
6.8.1 THE POWERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................. 296 
6.8.2 TRUSTEES’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND MEMBERS’ RIGHTS .................................................................................. 297 
6.8.2.1 General ................................................................................................................................... 297 
6.8.2.2 The duty to take all reasonable steps to protect the interests of members in terms of the rules 
of the fund and the provisions of the Act ............................................................................... 305 
6.8.2.3 The duty to act with due care and diligence .......................................................................... 306 
6.8.2.4 The duty to act in good faith .................................................................................................. 307 
6.8.2.5 The duty to avoid conflict of interests .................................................................................... 316 
6.8.2.6 The duty to act impartially in respect of all members and beneficiaries ............................... 317 
6.8.3 TRUSTEE LIABILITY ................................................................................................................................. 321 
6.9 REMEDIES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION ..................................................................................................... 324 
6.9.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 324 
6.9.2 THE PENSION FUNDS ADJUDICATOR ......................................................................................................... 327 
6.9.3 THE COURTS OF LAW ............................................................................................................................. 339 
6.10 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION ................................................................................................................... 340 
 
CHAPTER 7: THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM: SUMMARY 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 SUMMARY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM ............................................................ 346 
7.2 SUMMARY OF SOCIAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT FUNDS ......................... 349 
7.3 SUMMARY OF THE SHORTCOMINGS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM ........... 351 
7.4 IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION ................................................................................... 359 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
xi 
 
7.4.1 PRIMARY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................. 359 
7.4.1.1  Universal coverage ................................................................................................................. 360 
7.4.1.2  Secure and adequate retirement benefits .............................................................................. 361 
7.4.1.3  Shared responsibility .............................................................................................................. 362 
7.4.1.4  Pooled assets .......................................................................................................................... 362 
7.4.1.5  Payouts only at retirement ..................................................................................................... 362 
7.4.1.6  Pension payments .................................................................................................................. 363 
7.4.1.7  Voluntary savings ................................................................................................................... 364 
7.4.1.8  Efficient regulatory framework .............................................................................................. 364 
7.4.2 RECENT RETIREMENT REFORMS IN SOUTH AFRICA ...................................................................................... 365 
7.4.2.1 The Taylor Committee Report ................................................................................................ 365 
7.4.2.2 National Treasury: The First Discussion Paper ....................................................................... 367 
7.4.2.3 National Treasury: The Second Discussion Paper ................................................................... 369 
7.4.2.4 National Treasury: Strengthening retirement savings (an overview of proposals announced in 
the 2012 budget) .................................................................................................................... 371 
7.4.2.5 National Treasury: Preservation, portability, and governance for retirement funds ............. 373 
7.4.3 OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE WORLD BANK375 
7.4.3.1 Belgium .................................................................................................................................. 376 
7.4.3.2 The Netherlands ..................................................................................................................... 378 
7.4.3.3 The United Kingdom ............................................................................................................... 380 
7.4.3.4 The World Bank’s approach ................................................................................................... 384 
7.4.4 LESSONS AND OBLIGATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS .................................................................. 384 
7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXTENDING COVERAGE AND BENEFITS ......................................................... 390 
7.5.1 OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................................... 390 
7.5.2 A BROADER SAFETY-NET ......................................................................................................................... 392 
7.5.3 THE STATE OLD-AGE PENSION .................................................................................................................. 394 
7.5.4 A MANDATORY CONTRIBUTORY (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) SYSTEM FOR ALL THOSE WHO ARE WORKING ...................... 394 
7.5.5 THE MANDATORY PRESERVATION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS .......................................................................... 396 
7.5.6 RESTRICTING PARTICIPATION IN PROVIDENT FUNDS AND COMPULSORY ANNUITISATION OF BENEFITS ..................... 399 
7.5.7 THE LEVEL OF BENEFITS .......................................................................................................................... 400 
7.5.8 MINIMUM CONTRIBUTION RATES ............................................................................................................. 401 
7.5.9 THE CAPPING OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ................................................................................................... 401 
7.5.10 VOLUNTARY SAVINGS ............................................................................................................................ 402 
7.5.11  REMEDIES OR DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS ...................................................................................... 403 
7.5.12  RETIREMENT FUNDS REGULATION ............................................................................................................ 403 
7.5.13  THE RECOGNITION OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS ...................................................................................... 404 
7.5.14  AN INTEGRATED APPROACH ................................................................................................................... 406 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
xii 
 
7.6 PROPOSED APPROACH .............................................................................................................................. 407 
7.7 CONCLUSION AND IMPORTANT POINTERS FOR CONTINUOUS POLICY CONSIDERATION ........................ 410 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................................... 413 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABW National Assistance Act (Algemene Bijstandswet) 
AIPF Associated Institutions Pension Fund 
AKW General Child Benefit Act (Algemene Kinderbijslagwet) 
ANC African National Congress 
ANW General Surviving Relatives Act (Algemene Nabestaandenwet) 
AOW General Old Age Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet) 
AU African Union 
BCEA Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
BER Bureau for Economic Research 
CCMA Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
COIDA Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 
DNB Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) 
FAIS Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
FANRPAN Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network 
FSB Financial Services Board 
GEP Government Employees Pension 
GEPF Government Employees Pension Fund 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
IES Institute for Employment Studies 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
JSA Jobseekers’ Allowance 
LISV National Institute for Social Security (Landelijk Instituut Sociale 
Verzekeringen) 
MPNP Multi-Party Negotiating Process 
NASASA National Stokvel Association of South Africa 
NEST National Employment Savings Trust 
NPO National Pension Office 
NSF National Savings Fund 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OCMW-CPAS Public Welfare Centre 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPB Occupational Pensions Board 
OPF Dutch Association of Company Pension Funds 
OP-ICESCR Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
OPRA Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
xiv 
 
PP Private Pensions 
PVK Pension and Insurance Authority (Pensioen en Verzekeringskamer) 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme 
REBECA Research on Social Benefits in Collective Agreements 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
RSVZ-INASTI National Institute for the Social Security for the Self-employed 
RSZ-ONNS National Office for Social Security 
S2P State Second Pension 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SARS South African Revenue Services 
SASSA South African Social Security Agency 
SERPS State Earnings-related Pension Scheme 
SMME Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises 
TW Supplementary Benefits Act (Toeslagenwet) 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UVW Administration of Employees’ Insurance Scheme (Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekeringen) 
WAO Disablement Benefits Act (Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering) 
WB World Bank 
WVB Mandatory Pension Act for Professional Groups (Wet Verplichte 
Beroepspensioenregeling) 
WVPS Equalisation of Pension Entitlements after Separation Act (Wet Verevening 
Pensioenrechten bij Scheiding) 
WW Unemployment Benefits Act (Werkloosheidwet) 
WWB Work and Social Assistance Act (Wet Werk en Bijstand) 
WW II Second World War 
ZW Sickness Benefits Act (Ziektewet) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Providing retirement1 or old-age income security has been and still is a huge 
challenge for countries of the world, and even more so for developing countries. 
Many countries have a high number of people who retire either without or with 
inadequate income support,2 either due to a failure to save money or not saving 
enough for retirement while still working and earning a salary, or as a result of 
leakages that occur between joining a retirement scheme and retiring. Provision for 
retirement comes in different forms, which include formal and informal arrangements, 
but many countries, including South Africa, mainly rely on formal arrangements.  
                                            
 
1
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Pension Funds Act of 1956) defines “retirement” 
as the period commencing on the member’s retirement date. This definition was inserted with effect 
from 1 November 2008 in terms of section (1)(g) of Act 22 of 2008. The Pension Funds Act of 1956 
defines “retirement date” as the date on which a member becomes entitled in terms of the rules of the 
fund to the grant of an annuity or the receipt of a lump-sum payment on account of age, ill health or 
retrenchment of staff. In SA Metal & Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd v Gamaroff [2010] 2 BLLR 136 (LAC), the 
respondent’s services were terminated on the basis that he had reached his retirement age. He 
challenged the dismissal alleging he faced unfair discrimination on the basis of age. Evidence 
indicated that in terms of the fund rules, the retirement age was 65 (at par 11). In terms of section 
187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for 
the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee directly or indirectly, on 
any arbitrary ground, including age. Section 187(2)(b) states that despite subsection (1)(f), a dismissal 
based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons 
employed in that capacity (see in this regard Karan t/a Karan Beef Feedlot v Randall [2012] 11 BLLR 
1093 (LAC) at paras 19 and 20). The Labour Appeal Court in Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Browne (2006) 27 ILJ 281 (LAC) at par 26, held that the question of normal retirement age only 
applies where there is no agreed retirement age between the employer and employee. See also 
regarding retirement age, Adams L “Retiring beyond the Normal or Agreed Age” September 2013 
DEREBUS at 39, where it is stated that there must be an express agreement between the employer 
and employee about retirement age. Where there is no agreement, the employee will retire at the 
company’s normal retirement age. This can be deduced from the employer’s policy or from a long-
established practice that has been applied consistently over many years.  
2
 James E “Income Security for Old Age: Conceptual Background and Major Issues” (Working Paper, 
Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development, Country Economics Department, The 
World Bank) September 1992 at 1; Olivier MP, Okpalupa MC, Smit N, Thompson M, Du Toit AM, 
Greyling E, Van Rensburg J, Liffmann R, Ogunronbi SO, and Porter I Social Security: General 
Principles 1999 at 104 (hereafter, Olivier et al Social Security: General Principles). 
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Informal arrangements are in the form of survival means developed by individuals or 
communities to provide financial and social support to one another, families, 
extended families, and members of the community at large.3 Formal arrangements 
take the form of state-provided support such as social assistance measures, for 
example social grants funded by the government through taxes; and state-regulated 
social insurance measures, for example income replacement and compensation 
funds such as the unemployment insurance fund and retirement funds, financed 
through contributions made by employers and employees who are members of those 
funds.4  
 
This study considers both formal and informal arrangements with special attention 
placed on the formal arrangements of providing for old-age income security through 
occupational (private) retirement schemes. The terms pension fund, pension 
scheme, retirement fund, or retirement scheme are used interchangeably in this 
study to refer to funds established with the purpose of providing a retirement benefit 
at retirement. 
 
1.2 THE OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 
A SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19965 (the 
Constitution), guarantees everyone the right to social security and social assistance. 
In terms of section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, everyone has the right to have 
access to social security, including social assistance, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants.  
                                            
 
3
 See generally Dekker AH Informal Social Security: A Legal Analysis (Doctoral Thesis) April 2005 at 
6 (hereafter, Dekker Informal Social Security). 
4
 Strydom EML, Le Roux PAK, Landman AA, Christianson MA, Dupper OC, Myburgh P, Barker FS, 
Garbers CJ, Basson AC, Dekker A and Esselaar V Essential Social Security Law 2006 2ed at 6-10 
(hereafter, Strydom Essential Social Security Law). 
5
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter, the Constitution). 
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On the other hand, section 27(2) gives the state the duty to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to social security and social assistance.6  
 
This obligation should be understood to include extending coverage to those who are 
currently not covered by South Africa’s retirement system and those who are not 
adequately covered. This would include reforming the system by, among other 
things, changing applicable laws and policies to create a framework for improved 
inclusivity and adequacy of the system.  
 
Social security in South Africa is a guaranteed right that comprises measures aimed 
at providing both financial and social support to protect people from falling into the 
poverty trap and to lift those who are already experiencing financial hardships out of 
poverty. Social security is aimed at providing support to people who are confronted 
by social and financial hardships as a result of factors such as unemployment, 
sickness, disability, and old-age or retirement.7 Its objectives include the promotion 
of social and economic equality by, among other things, redistributing available 
resources to those in need and by putting in place a policy framework within which 
people (who can) are allowed to protect themselves against certain economic and 
social risks by making contributions to schemes that will compensate them should a 
risk they are protected against occur.8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
6
 Section 27(1)(c) and (2) of the Constitution is discussed in more detail under paragraph (par) 5.2 in 
Chapter (Ch) 5.  
7
 For example, by making regular contributions into special funds meant for those social risks. See in 
this regard East R Social Security Law 1999 at 1 (hereafter, East Social Security Law).  
8
 East (ibid) at 1; Olivier et al Social Security: General Principles op cit note 2 at 31. 
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Contributory social security schemes are insurance based9 and people who 
contribute to these schemes are entitled to receive protection in the form of benefits 
when they are no longer working; for example due to old-age. When employed 
people become old, they stop working and retire from work. They no longer earn a 
salary and need some form of income to replace the salary they were receiving when 
they were still working. In this way, retirement benefits can be considered to serve an 
income replacement purpose. Retirement benefits also have a broader societal 
function, in that they contribute towards the improvement not only of fund members’ 
standard of living, but also that of the member’s dependants (or family) and indirectly 
that of the community they are living in.10   
   
The system in South Africa takes a formal three-pillar approach, comprising poverty 
relief, in the form of the state old-age pensions; retirement savings through 
occupational retirement funds in the form of either a pension or provident fund; and 
private savings through retirement annuity funds and individual or collective 
investment schemes and insurance policies.11 Retirement provision for workers 
mostly takes the form of private retirement schemes.12 As these schemes are 
established specifically for a particular employer’s employees or for employees 
within a particular sector, the benefits they offer are only restricted to employee 
members and their dependants in certain circumstances.13 Contributions to these 
schemes are made by both employees and employers.14  
                                            
 
9
 Contributions are generally made by the employer deducting (in terms of section 13A of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956) the amount of the contribution from employees’ salaries and paying it to a 
retirement fund (and the employer paying its own share of contribution to the fund), as a form of 
insurance premium to protect the employee from the risk of old-age.  
10
 East Social Security Law op cit note 7 at 39-40. 
11
 National Treasury, South Africa Retirement Fund Reform (A Discussion Paper) December 2004 
(The Three Pillars of Retirement Funding System) at 1 (hereafter, South Africa Retirement Fund 
Reform: First Discussion Paper). Among other things, this paper proposes the introduction of a 
National Savings Fund (at 20) which is intended to extend coverage of retirement security systems for 
people who are presently excluded.  
12
 The Pension Funds Act of 1956, in this regard. 
13
 See generally, Kaplan and Another NO v Professional and Executive Retirement Fund and Others 
1999 (3) SA 798 (SCA), which dealt with the distribution of death benefits (to deceased members’ 
dependants) in terms of section 37C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
14
 Fund rules are discussed under par 6.2 in Ch 6. 
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It is usually compulsory for every employee in the workplace who qualifies to be a 
member of the fund to join where the employer or sector has established a fund.15 It 
should, however, be noted that in South Africa it is currently by law not compulsory 
for employers to establish retirement funds for their employees, except in the sectors 
where the Minister has issued a sectoral determination for the establishment of a 
fund for all the employees in the sector to participate in that fund.  
 
An employer who establishes a retirement fund is generally also at liberty to decide 
which categories of employees are eligible to join the fund and which are not,16 as 
long as the employer does not unfairly differentiate or discriminate against any 
employee or employees on the basis of one or more of the grounds listed in section 
9(3) of the Constitution. Those grounds include race, gender, sex, marital status, 
sexual orientation, age, and disability. Generally, where the employer has 
established a fund and decided on the categories of employees to join the fund, all 
new and future employees eligible to join must do so as a condition of employment.17  
 
There are two types of occupational retirement funds; namely “pension” and 
“provident” fund.18 The term “pension fund” is usually used to refer to both, even 
though the two do not necessarily mean the same thing.19 A pension is a retirement 
fund in which a member may take only up to one-third of the retirement benefit as a 
lump-sum cash payment, with the balance having to be paid out in the form of a 
pension over the rest of that member’s life.20 A provident fund, on the other hand, 
can be described as a retirement fund in which the member may take up to 100% of 
the retirement benefit as a lump-sum cash payment.21  
                                            
 
15
 Strydom et al Essential Social Security op cit note 4 at 28.  
16
 Strydom (ibid) at 27; Olivier et al Social Security: General Principles op cit note 2 at 289; South 
Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper (Access, Compulsion, and Preservation) op 
cit note 11 at 1.  
17
 Strydom et al Essential Social Security op cit note 4 at 28.  
18
 Discussed under par 6.4 in Ch 6. 
19
 Discussed under par 6.4 in Ch 6.  
20
 Sephton B, Cooper DI, and Thompson C A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds Legal and Policy 
Considerations 1990 (Glossary of Terms Used) at (x). 
21
 Sephton (idem). Both defined-benefit and defined-contribution funds are described under paras 
6.4.3 and 6.4.4 in Ch 6. 
INTRODUCTION 
6 
 
However, they can both take the form of either a “defined-benefit” or a “defined-
contribution” fund.22 The question with these two types of retirement funds is whether 
they can both be considered appropriate to achieve social security objectives. This 
study shows in Chapter 6 that provident funds by their nature are open to many risks 
and are therefore not necessarily promoting social security objectives.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.3.1 Objectives 
 
The study provides a critical description of South Africa’s retirement system by 
looking at coverage provided by the system to workers in the country, the adequacy 
of the benefits provided by retirement schemes, the protection of benefits before and 
after the retirement date, and the remedies the system offers to beneficiaries in case 
of disputes or complaints. It considers social and retirement security provisions in 
various international instruments and obligations they create on member states and 
the international community.23 It further looks at retirement provisions in other 
jurisdictions; namely Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,24 and 
provides an analysis of South Africa’s retirement security system in comparison to 
systems in these three countries. In other words, the study presents a non-critical 
analysis of the systems adopted and followed in these three countries in comparison 
to the system followed in South Africa. The approach taken by the World Bank is 
also considered. The origin and historical development of social and retirement 
security in South Africa are described to determine how the system has evolved over 
the years.25 South Africa’s retirement security system is also analysed and its nature 
and content described.26  
                                            
 
22
 Discussed under par 6.4 in Ch 6. 
23
 Discussed in Ch 2. 
24
 Discussed in Ch 3. 
25
 Discussed in Ch 4. 
26
 Discussed in Ch 5. 
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The South African occupational retirement system27 is described and shortcomings 
are highlighted; proposed reforms are considered; conclusions are drawn; a number 
of recommendations are made; and at the end, a new model is proposed.28  
 
The following fundamental questions form the basis of this study: 
 
 Does South Africa’s current retirement system provide adequate coverage to 
all those who are employed in the country? 
 Do the coverage and benefits offered by the system satisfy social security 
objectives and principles; and if not, what needs to be done? 
 Does the system provide adequate remedies/dispute resolution mechanisms 
suitable for social security complaints? 
 How can the weaknesses found in the system be addressed? 
 
The aim of this study is to find ways in which South Africa’s current retirement 
system can be reformed to provide adequate coverage to all the workers in the 
country. The study encourages the culture of saving in this country, in particular 
retirement saving, in response to the government’s concern about the decline in the 
number of people who are saving. The general lack of saving has unfortunately 
meant an increase in state reliance by the majority of the people; including those 
who had the ability to save when they were still working. The study emphasises the 
fact that a system must be developed which is suitable to the needs of the workers in 
South Africa, which leans towards the approach advocated by the World Bank, and 
which incorporates important features from systems in other jurisdictions,29 instead 
of following any particular system.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
27
 Discussed in Ch 6. 
28
 Discussed in Ch 7. 
29
 Discussed in Ch 3.  
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The scope of the study does not include the following: 
 
 A discussion on the taxation of retirement funds 
 An in-depth discussion of administration and governance of funds 
 Costs 
 Investment issues 
 Developments which took place after October 2015 
 
1.3.2 Outline 
 
1.3.2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the research subject, objectives and outline, approach, and 
methodology of the study. 
 
1.3.2.2 International instruments on the right to social and retirement security 
 
International bodies that play a role in the development of the right to social and 
retirement security in the international community are considered and their functions 
are described. Important provisions in various international instruments and the 
influence they have on the development, protection, and promotion of the right to 
social and retirement security in the countries of the world, including South Africa, 
are discussed.30 It should be noted that South Africa’s present social security has its 
roots in section 27 of the Constitution – which gives everyone the right to have 
access to social security, comprising social assistance, for those who do not have 
means of support or any form of income and social insurance, by creating a 
framework within which those who are able to save money for their retirement can do 
so.31  
 
                                            
 
30
 Discussed in Ch 2. 
31
 Discussed in more detail under par 5.2 in Ch 5. 
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The discussion also covers international standards set by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in the area of social security, including old-age coverage and 
benefits. It further illustrates the fact that social and retirement security is an 
internationally recognised human right which needs to be realised by everyone 
without discrimination, through systems that provide adequate coverage and benefits 
at the level that meets acceptable standards.  
 
Programmes must be modelled in such a way that they will be able to achieve 
comprehensive social protection and provide coverage or aim to progressively 
provide coverage to those not currently covered by existing schemes and to 
progressively increase the level of coverage to those not adequately covered.32  
 
1.3.2.3 Social and retirement security in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom 
 
Countries33 of the world follow different approaches in their social security and 
retirement security provision; depending on factors that may include the political and 
socio-economic situations in those countries. The discussion illustrates the fact that 
providing for social security and retirement is a universal problem. The challenges 
are not only constant but are also unique to each country, hence there are regular 
reforms to systems in many countries. 
 
  
                                            
 
32
 See ILO Social Security: A New Consensus, 2001 Report, accessed from 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/secsoc/downloads/353sp1.pdf, last visited 07 May 2015.  
33
 Systems in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are discussed in Ch 3. 
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Even though there are countries with systems that can be regarded as being 
amongst the best in the world, those systems are not without shortcomings, as will 
be seen with the systems in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, 
which are discussed in Chapter 3. It therefore remains the responsibility of each 
government to constantly work on improving their systems with the aim of providing 
the best possible social security and retirement coverage and benefits for all who live 
in those countries. The pension systems in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom are also different and unique.34  
 
These three countries are found in Europe and form part of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.  
 
As it stands, Europe has no uniform social security and pension system as some of 
the countries follow the Beveridge approach,35 while others follow the Bismarckian 
approach36. Most of the countries under the OECD use the three-pillar approach, 
even though each country has its own way of applying these pillars. The three pillars 
are state-provided pension, occupational plans, and voluntary individual pension 
schemes or private savings.37  
 
Coverage in most of the countries which are members of the OECD is mandatory for 
most workers.38 The question is whether there are any lessons South Africa can 
learn from these three countries that can help in extending retirement security 
provision to all the workers in South Africa.  
   
                                            
 
34
 Discussed in Ch 3. 
35
 Discussed under par 3.2.2.2 in Ch 3. 
36
 Discussed under par 3.2.2.1 in Ch 3. 
37
 Gillion G, Turner J, Bailey C, Latulippe D Social Security Pensions: Development (International 
Labour Office Geneva) 2000 at 576-578 (hereafter, Gillion et al Social Security Pensions).   
38
 Ibid at 582-583. 
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1.3.2.3.1  Belgium 
 
Belgium39 follows the Bismarckian approach, which makes it compulsory for all 
people to be insured. This applies in respect of both Belgian nationals and non-
nationals. People who are working make contributions to social insurance schemes 
in order to qualify for benefits when they retire. Those who are not working and have 
no income that will enable them to contribute to the retirement schemes are afforded 
social assistance by the state. With this approach, everyone in Belgium is covered 
by some form of social security and has a basic standard of living.40 
 
The Belgian pension system comprises three pillars; namely a guaranteed minimum 
old-age pension, occupational pensions, and private pension schemes.41  
The country has special pension schemes for the self-employed and for private-
sector employees.42 Occupational-defined benefit pension plans target retirement 
replacement rates of between 60% and 75%. A high number of sectoral pension 
schemes take the form of defined-contribution schemes.43 It is unfortunately difficult 
to determine how Belgium fares against other countries of the world as it has not 
been included in the list of countries considered in the 2014 Melbourne Mercer 
Global Pension Index, which is used to show how some of the countries of the world 
(both developed and developing countries) are faring in their pension provision.44  
                                            
 
39
 Discussed under par 3.3 in Ch 3. 
40
 Social Security Benefits in Belgium accessed from http://www.uclouvain.be/en-4976.html, last 
visited on 12 November 2012; see also http://brussels.angloinfo.com/countries/belgium/socsecurity. 
asp# pensions, last visited 07 May 2015. 
41
 De Gallatay E and Turtelboom B Pension Reform in Belgium (International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper) July 1996 at 5.  
42
 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Pension Country Profile: Belgium (Extract from the OECD Private 
Pensions Outlook 2008) at 169, accessed from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/53/42565572.pdf, 
last visited on 07 May 2015. 
43
 Idem.  
44
 The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index is used to compare pension systems around the 
world. It objectively compares the retirement income systems in different countries of the world. See 
regarding the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report: 
http://globalpensionindex.com/2014/melbourne-mercer-global-pension-index-2014-report.pdf, last 
visited 07 May 2015 (hereafter, Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report). Countries 
examined include Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America.      
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1.3.2.3.2  The Netherlands 
 
The social security system in the Netherlands45 focuses primarily on providing 
financial support for citizens who do not have any means of income.  
 
The country’s pension system comprises three pillars; namely the state pension 
scheme, which covers everyone in the Netherlands; funded occupational pension 
plans; and private pension insurance.46  
 
Although there is no statutory obligation for employers to offer a pension scheme to 
employees, industrial relations agreements have mostly been used to extend 
coverage to the majority of the workers. Thus the system is quasi-mandatory in 
nature.47 Most pensions take the form of “defined-benefit” schemes.48  
 
Occupational retirement schemes aim to supplement the statutory old-age pension 
by an amount which is related to the last earned income and the duration of the 
employment relationship with the employer.49 Supplementary occupational pensions 
promise to supplement the statutory old-age pension by up to 70% of the last earned 
wages, on condition that workers have been insured for 40 years.50 According to the 
Mercer Global Pension Index findings of 2014, the Netherlands has a sound 
structure with a “B+” grade. A “B+” grade means that the system has a sound 
structure with many good features with areas of improvement differentiating it from 
an “A” grade system. An “A”-grade system is that which has a first class and robust 
retirement income system that delivers good benefits, is sustainable, and has a high 
level of integrity.51  
 
                                            
 
45
 Discussed under par 3.4 in Ch 3.  
46
 Meyer T, Bridgen P, Riedmüller B Private Pensions versus Social Inclusion – Non-State Provision 
for Citizens at Risk in Europe 2007 at 79-80.  
47
 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies across OECD Countries 2005 at 152, accessed from 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/34816545.pdf, last visited 07 May 2015. 
48
 See the discussion under par 6.4 in Ch 6. 
49
 Pennings F Dutch Social Security Law in an International Context 2002 at 175. 
50
 Ibid at 191.  
51
 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 44 at 7 and 26. 
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1.3.2.3.3  The United Kingdom 
 
The social security system in the United Kingdom52 has its foundation in the 
Beveridge Report.53 The United Kingdom’s pension system is complex when 
compared to the systems of other countries. The system comprises three broad 
categories of social security provisions; namely non-contributory, contributory, and 
income-related; and its pension system has three pillars. The first pillar provides for a 
mandatory public pension. The benefits under this pillar include the Basic State 
Pension and the Pension Credit comprising the Guaranteed Income Top-Up and 
Savings Credit. 
 
The pillar has a second tier, which is also mandatory. This tier is based on the so-
called contracting-out method. It comprises occupational funds established at 
employer or company level and individual funds. The third pillar is managed by 
private insurance companies.54  
 
Since 2002, the United Kingdom has had a statutory state pension system made up 
of a flat-rate Basic Pension and an Earnings-related additional pension, and the 
State Second Pension that reformed the previous State Earnings-related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS). What makes the United Kingdom pension system unique is that it 
allows members of funds to contract-out of the additional state pension. In order to 
contract-out, a person must be a member of an occupational or personal pension 
scheme providing equivalent or better benefits than the Earnings-related component 
of the statutory scheme. Occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom take 
three forms; namely State Occupational Pension Schemes, Private Occupational 
Pension Schemes; and Personal and Stakeholder Schemes. Occupational pensions 
are in the form of “defined-benefit” schemes or “defined-contribution” schemes.55  
                                            
 
52
 Discussed under par 3.5 in Ch 3. 
53
 Beveridge approach is discussed under par 3.2.2.2 in Ch 3. 
54
 Natali D “Pensions in Europe, European Pensions: The Evolution of Pension Policy at National and 
Supranational Level” (P.I.E Peter Lang 2008) “Work and Society” No 64 at 134-141. 
55
 Discussed under par 3.5.2 in Ch 3.  
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The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index of 2014 gave the United Kingdom a “B” 
grade, which means the system is rated just below that of the Netherlands – which 
received a “B+” rating.56  
 
The United Kingdom, just like Canada, Chile, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and 
Singapore, has a system that has a sound structure with many good features, but 
also has some areas which need improvements.57 
 
1.3.2.4 The origin and historical development of the social and retirement 
security system in South Africa 
 
Pension provision in South Africa58 has a very long history. Even though modern 
social security in South Africa started with the advent of colonial rule, indigenous 
African societies always had some kind of social security provision; in the form of 
informal arrangements, through which individuals, families, and communities 
received support.59 Initially, people were to provide for themselves and their families, 
but over the years a system developed whereby welfare services were delivered by 
a combination of government bodies and the voluntary welfare sector.60 When formal 
social security was introduced in South Africa, particularly during the apartheid 
period,61 the services were meant for whites only, but were at a later stage also 
gradually extended to other racial groups even though disparities with regard to the 
level of benefits continued.62  
 
                                            
 
56
 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 44 at 7. 
57
 Ibid at 7 and 20. 
58
 Discussed in Ch 4. 
59
 Maqubela NT The Administration of Social Welfare in South Africa: A Study of its Origins, 
Development and Rationalisation (MAdmin-Thesis, Unisa) January 1997 at 10. 
60
 Lund F “State Restructuring Welfare” Transformation 6 (1988) at 22-25 accessed from 
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/transformation/tran006/tran006003.pdf, last 
visited on 07 May 2015. 
61
 Apartheid was a form of discrimination introduced by the Afrikaner National Party which took over 
control of South Africa in the 1940s.   
62
 Van der Berg S “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” Vol 14, No 4, Dec 
1997 Development Southern Africa at 481 (hereafter, Van der Berg “South African Social Security 
under Apartheid and Beyond”). 
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The South African social security system now has two main components; namely 
social insurance, which provides for private retirement schemes, and social 
assistance, which provides grants such as the state old-age pension.63 The system 
developed from the country’s unique history of colonialism, apartheid, and 
inequalities. Its evolution has in recent years been influenced by democratic values 
and fundamental human rights enshrined in the Constitution.64  
 
Social security in this country is at the moment approached from a rights-based 
perspective. The social welfare policy framework embraces the principle of equality, 
which promotes equitable distribution of services and benefits to redress previous 
inequalities.65  
 
While coverage by social insurance schemes is limited due to the high 
unemployment rate and the large informal sector; on the other hand, social 
assistance measures cover millions of elderly people and is generally recognised as 
contributing enormously to poverty alleviation in this country.66  
 
1.3.2.5 South Africa’s social and retirement security system 
 
The South African system67 relies more on private arrangements than the systems 
applicable in many other countries, making this country’s retirement system closer to 
that proposed by the World Bank system.68 The system comprises the separation of 
poverty relief in the form of state old-age pension and private savings in the form of 
occupational retirement funds and insurance policies.69 The World Bank 
recommends a multi-pillar system that places greater emphasis on saving and which 
utilises a combination of public and private management, full funding, and pay-as-
                                            
 
63
 Ibid at 484-485. 
64
 Patel L Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa 2005 at 98. 
65
 Ibid at 100. 
66
 Makino K “Social Security Policy Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa – A Focus on the Basic 
Income Grant” (Centre for Civil Society Research Report No.11, this paper was first presented at 19
th
 
IPSA World Congress in Durban in July 2003) January 2004 at 8. 
67
 Discussed in Ch 5. 
68
 The World Banks’ approach is discussed under par 3.2.2.3 in Ch 3. 
69
 South Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11 at 1. 
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you-go financing. According to the World Bank, a mandatory pillar that is privately 
managed is ideally suited for handling people’s savings, but a publicly managed tax-
financed pillar is needed for redistribution, and a third pillar, which is voluntary, is 
needed by people who want additional old-age security.70  
 
By moving towards the World Bank’s approach, the South African government 
recognises the advantages of a multi-pillar approach to retirement funding, in which 
income protection is primarily promoted through social assistance and social security 
arrangements, and additional savings or insurance are encouraged through 
occupational and individual insurance schemes.71 
 
In South Africa, a high number of people employed in the formal sector are members 
of occupational retirement funds.72 South Africa has always relied on three pillars 
and never had a public or national scheme. Unfortunately this has resulted in the 
exclusion of the majority of workers who are not in formal employment. A public or 
national scheme is, however, proposed in the First and Second Discussion Papers 
for Retirement Reform.73  
 
Coverage offered by the system is, at the moment, clearly not adequate as the 
majority of people are excluded and these people are as a result forced to rely on the 
state old-age pension for survival. The system uses social insurance primarily to 
protect those in formal employment, while social assistance is meant to protect the 
poor who are without any form of support. Social insurance is used to protect the 
income of people who are vulnerable to social risks that threaten their income-
earning capacity, which include not being able to work and earn a salary due to old-
age or retirement. Categories of workers who are not covered under the system 
include the self-employed, those earning low salaries, and those employed in the 
                                            
 
70
 James E “Protecting the Old and Promoting Growth: A Defence of Averting the Old Age Crisis” 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No: 1570) January 1996, at 3. 
71
 National Treasury, South Africa Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper 
(Republic of South Africa (National Treasury)) February 2007 at 7. 
72
 Strydom et al Essential Social Security Law op cit note 4 at 28. 
73
 Discussed under par 4.3.3 in Ch 4.   
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informal sector as the system gives priority to the formal employment sector. Private 
provision is mostly encouraged and common in the country.74  
 
A more comprehensive approach needs to be developed in line with the Taylor 
Committee recommendations for a “comprehensive social protection” instead of a 
system which follows a narrow approach. The concept of “social protection” rather 
than social security should be embraced in developing countries such as South 
Africa where large numbers of people depend on the informal economy for their 
livelihood. A sound social and retirement security system should be able to bring all 
the categories of workers into the national system, covering everyone whom it could 
possibly cover – regardless of the type of employment sector they find themselves 
in. 
 
A primary social security and retirement reform objective for this country according to 
the Task Team for Social and Retirement Reform is to provide basic income 
protection for all South Africans through a combination of social assistance and 
contributory savings. The aim of the reforms is to close the gap between those who 
have the means to provide for themselves during retirement and those who do not 
have the means.75 
 
The country’s policies and national legislation should promote a progressive 
realisation76 of universal protection for the whole society where immediate coverage 
is not possible for everyone. Every working individual qualifying in terms of the salary 
threshold to be set by the relevant Minister should be accommodated under a 
compulsory system which will be complemented by a social assistance system which 
provides a safety-net to all who qualify to receive a state pension. A universal system 
will provide a basis on which individuals and families can build some form of income 
                                            
 
74
 Van der Berg “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” op cit note 62 at 488-
489. The nature of South Africa’s retirement security system is discussed in more detail in Ch 5. 
75
 South Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11 at 4. 
76
 As required by section 27(2) of the Constitution, which obliges the state to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of 
each of the rights in section 27. 
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security. It can also promote equality77 and human dignity78 as it will promote social 
protection, which does not only provide for mere survival, but which also ensures 
social inclusion and therefore the realisation of equality and human dignity. 
 
South Africa was included in the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 
Report for the first time.79 The South African system, which comprises a means-
tested state pension and voluntary schemes, was interestingly given a “C” grade. A 
“C” grade is for a system that has some good features, but also has major risks or 
shortcomings which need attention. If these shortcomings are not addressed, they 
will continue to affect the efficacy and long-term sustainability of the system. South 
Africa is in this category with countries such as Austria, Brazil, France, Poland, and 
the United States of America.80 The question is whether this is an indication that the 
system is adequate as it is, as it compares favourably with the countries of the world, 
including developed countries, or not.   
 
1.3.2.6 South Africa’s occupational retirement system 
 
South Africa’s occupational retirement system81 is well developed but only within the 
formal sector of the economy to the exclusion of the informal sector, which is a 
worrying factor. The system provides various benefits for those who are employed in 
the formal sector.82  
 
  
                                            
 
77
 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
78
 Section 10. 
79
 In total five new countries were included in the 2014 Report, namely Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
and South Africa. See the Merlbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 44 at 16. 
80
 Idem at 7. 
81
 Discussed in Ch 6. 
82
 It was reported in the South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11 
at 5, that coverage of employees in the formal sector is 60%, which according to the Discussion 
Paper is comparatively high considering the fact that participation in this country is not yet 
compulsory. This was considered to reflect the extent to which membership of occupational funds is 
accepted as an obligatory condition of employment, especially to those employed in the formal sector.  
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The study examines South Africa’s occupational pension system to determine if it is 
in line with internationally recognised social security principles and standards. Focus 
is placed on the nature of the system, the types of retirement schemes, the 
regulatory framework, the scope of coverage, types of benefits, protection of 
benefits, the duties of retirement fund trustees, the rights of members (beneficiaries) 
of retirement funds, and legal remedies available to members and/or beneficiaries.  
 
Social protection in the case of retirement schemes, as with other branches of social 
security, has the following three aspects:83 
 
 Range of protection provided; 
 Level of protection provided; and  
 Categories of people covered.  
 
Through these three legs of social protection it should be possible to determine 
whether South Africa’s occupational retirement system provides adequate protection 
to workers at the time of retirement. The majority of workers in this country belong to 
occupational funds, while others make supplementary retirement provision through 
the use of individual retirement funds called “retirement annuities”, in addition to 
being members of employer-established retirement funds. It is estimated by South 
Africa’s National Treasury in the First Retirement Reform Discussion Paper of 2004 
that approximately 50% of the economically active population provides for their 
retirement through occupational and voluntary saving arrangements.84   
 
Even though the system is voluntary, it can be considered to be quasi-mandatory as 
those who are employed by employers which have already established retirement 
funds for their employees will generally be obliged to join those funds and for the fact 
that there are sectors for which the Minister has issued sectoral determinations for 
the establishment of the funds and for compulsory participation of all the workers in 
those sectors. The rules of the funds provide for benefit structure and retirement 
                                            
 
83
 Gillion et al Social Security Pensions op cit note 37 at 193. 
84
 South Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11 at 7-12. 
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age.85 Benefits that are provided include retirement benefits and other risk benefits 
such as death, retrenchment, and disability benefits.86  
 
The primary challenge for the system is to provide an adequate retirement 
framework to accommodate those not covered and also for the system to provide 
adequate protection of benefits.87  
 
1.3.2.7 Summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
 
The findings of the study are summarised and an attempt is made to address the 
questions raised under paragraph 1.3.1 above. Recommendations are made and a 
new four-pillar model is proposed. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY  
 
1.4.1 Problem statement 
 
South Africa has a high number of people in formal employment who are members 
of occupational retirement funds.88 However, the majority of people in this country 
still reach retirement age with insufficient retirement benefits relative to what they 
earned when they were still employed or with no benefits at all. Workers in the 
informal sector are not covered under the current system and as a result remain 
unprotected and vulnerable. Also, not all workers in the formal sector are covered. 
For example, categories such as contract workers and part-time workers are not 
covered.89 The system mainly caters for the middle and high earners, to the 
exclusion of the most vulnerable low-income earners. 
                                            
 
85
 International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) Country Profiles 2007: South Africa, at 3, 
available at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/S3_Hennessy.pdf, last accessed on 05 May 2015. 
86
 Discussed under par 6.6.4 in Ch 6.  
87
 Van Zyl E “Old age Pensions in South Africa” International Social Security Review Vol 56, No 3-4 
July–December 2003 at 118. 
88
 Strydom et al Essential Social Security Law op cit note 4 at 6-7. 
89
 See generally, South Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11. In 
terms of the changes brought about by the 2014 amendments to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 
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Thus, even though occupational retirement funds have existed in South Africa for 
many years90, there is still a problem of lack of coverage, while in cases where there 
is coverage; some people retire with inadequate benefits.91 The fact that participation 
in a retirement fund is at the moment generally voluntary, also creates problems as 
some employers may not feel obliged to establish retirement schemes for their 
employees.  
 
The majority of employees who are members of retirement funds often find that they 
will not be able to retire at the set age because of insufficient or inadequate benefits, 
hence their heavy reliance on the state’s old-age pension.92 The same is true about 
workers who belong to provident funds who receive lump-sum cash benefits when 
they retire, squander all the money, and are left with no income in their retirement. 
On the other hand, benefits are also often reduced as a result of leakages that occur 
prior to the actual retirement date; for example, when people change jobs or if they 
are retrenched.93 
 
Even though the development of occupational pension funds in this country has 
been reasonably good, the system is nevertheless still characterised by many 
weaknesses, which include those highlighted above.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
section 198B(8)(a) of the Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 6 of 2014 now provides that an 
employee employed in terms of a fixed-term contract for longer than three months and earning less 
than the threshold determined by the Minister (in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997), which is at the moment R205 433 per annum, must not be treated less 
favourably than an employee employed on a permanent basis performing the same or similar work, 
unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. The same applies to part-time employees 
employed for more than three months and who work more than twenty-four hours a month for an 
employer (section 198C(2) and (3)(a)). This implies that employers will be required to provide fixed-
term contract employees and part-time employees falling under the threshold and who are employed 
for more than three months with the same benefits afforded to permanent employees, including 
retirement benefits. 
90
 The historical development of South Africa’s pension system is discussed in Ch 4. 
91
 See generally, South Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11 at 4. 
92
 In South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper (idem) at 12, the number of 
economically active population that provide for their retirement through occupational and voluntary 
savings arrangement was estimated to be at 50%.  
93
 Ibid at 16. 
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These shortcomings have prompted the government to establish various 
commissions and committees94 over the years, to investigate ways in which the 
system could be improved with the aim of extending coverage to those who are 
currently not covered and also to improve the benefits offered by the system. In 
2004, the government started with another process that will see the whole retirement 
system in this country reformed.95  
 
With this initiative, government wants to, among other things: 
 
 Encourage individuals to provide adequately for their own retirement and the 
needs of their dependants; and 
 Use social assistance to cater only for those elderly people who are without 
any form of income;96 either because they were never employed or because 
they were not able to save enough for their retirement due to factors such as 
low salaries and irregular employment.  
 
  
                                            
 
94
 The commissions established by the government for this purpose include: The Mouton Committee: 
the Committee of Investigation into a Retirement Provision System for South Africa, was appointed in 
1988 (hereafter, The Mouton Committee Report); The Katz Commission: The Commission of Inquiry 
into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, 1994 (hereafter, The Katz Committee 
Report); The Smith Committee: The Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of Retirement 
Provision in South Africa, 1995 (hereafter, The Smith Committee Report); and The Taylor 
Commission: Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, March 2002 (hereafter, The Taylor 
Committee Report). The findings of these committees together with some of their important 
recommendations are discussed under par 4.3.3 in Ch 4. 
95
 The Inter-Ministerial Committee (comprising representatives from the following national 
departments: National Treasury, the Department of Social Development, the Department of Labour, 
the Department of Transport, the Department of Health, and the Department of Public Services 
Administration) on social security and retirement reform was established in 2007 to implement some 
of the recommendations of the Taylor Commission, in establishing a comprehensive system of social 
security for the country. 
96
 South Africa Retirement Funds Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 11 at 4. 
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1.4.2 Approach 
 
The study comprises a critical literature review of information on social security and 
retirement provision as it relates to occupational retirement funds in South Africa, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  
 
The sources consulted include books, journals, case law, reports, legislation, papers, 
international instruments, and the Internet.  
 
1.5 SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND RETIREMENT PROVISION 
 
The right to social security, and in particular retirement security (provision), 
guarantees a person some form of income or a basic standard of living when that 
person is no longer able to provide for himself or herself by working and earning a 
salary due to old-age.  
 
People who are working and earning a salary should protect themselves against the 
social risk of old-age by participating in retirement schemes which will pay out 
benefits to them when they retire. A benefit will come in the form of either a lump-
sum cash payment or monthly pensions with the latter being more preferable for 
social security purposes. In other words, a retirement scheme protects people 
against the social risk of old-age or retirement which would otherwise have left them 
without any form of income.  
 
The benefits offered serve an income-replacement role97 and therefore contribute 
towards the reduction of poverty within the families of the retired fund members and 
in some cases even in the communities in which they live.98 Retirement provision is 
an important element of every social security system as it protects elderly people 
against poverty and other social and economic risks. It is therefore the basis of this 
                                            
 
97
 East Social Security Law op cit note 7 at 15-6. 
98
 Ibid at 39-40. 
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study that all those who are working, in both the formal and informal sector of the 
economy, who can afford to pay contributions for their retirement, should do so. On 
the other hand, it is important for these schemes to provide adequate benefits and 
protection to their members in order for the benefit to achieve the intended purpose 
in a person’s life. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
 
25 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND 
RETIREMENT SECURITY 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the role played by international bodies in the development of social 
and retirement security in the world is described and international instruments 
promoting the right to social and retirement income security as a fundamental human 
right are analysed. 
 
Social security is considered to be an internationally recognised human right which 
must be respected, protected, promoted, and fulfilled by all the governments of the 
world. The concept of social security is described in the International Labour 
Organisation’s 2001 Report, entitled Social Security: A New Consensus, as:1 
 
“A basic human right and a fundamental means for creating social cohesion, thereby helping 
to ensure social peace and social inclusion. The aim of recognising social and retirement 
security as fundamental human rights is to ensure that all human beings have access to the 
resources and services needed for an adequate standard of living when they retire from work 
or when they are in old age. It is an indispensable part of government social policy and an 
important tool to prevent and alleviate poverty. It can, through national solidarity and fair 
burden sharing, contribute to human dignity, equity and social justice.”  
 
A number of international bodies contribute to the development of social security and 
social protection in Africa and the rest of the world.  
 
                                            
 
1
 See International Labour Organisation Social Security (ILO): A New Consensus, 2001 Report at 1, 
accessed from http://ssreform.treasury.gov.za/Publications/Social%20Security-%20A%20New%20 
Consensus%20(%20ILO,%202001).pdf, last visited 07 May 2015. 
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These institutions include the former inter-governmental body for the African 
Continent, previously known as the Organisation of African Unity2 (OAU), which was 
later replaced by the African Union (AU); the United Nations (UN), the operations of 
which are governed by the United Nations Charter;3 and the International Labour 
Organisation4 (ILO).  
 
South Africa is a constitutional democratic country which is committed to 
international laws and standards. This commitment is apparent from the inclusion of 
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which has 
provisions that affirm the country’s position with regard to international law. For 
example, section 39 of the Constitution requires the courts, tribunals, and other 
forums in this country to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.5  
 
The courts are further required by section 233 of the Constitution to prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law, while on the 
other hand, section 232 gives recognition to customary international law provided it 
is consistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
  
                                            
 
2
 The Organisation of African Unity (the OAU) was founded in 1963 in terms of the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity. The Charter affirms its commitment to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), which has provisions on social security and socio-economic rights (see the 
preamble to the OAU Charter).  
3
 The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion 
of the United Nations Conference on International Organization. The UN Charter came into force on 
24 October 1945.  
4
 The International Labour Organization (ILO) was created by the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919 
alongside the League of Nations. The International Labour Organization was created to promote 
social progress, which would in turn influence economic and social development. The ILO in Geneva 
is the permanent secretariat of the Organization – International Labour Office. See in this regard, ILO 
and the World of Work Geneva (ILO Publication) (1974) at 29 (hereafter, ILO and the World of Work). 
5
 The following decisions are examples of cases where the South African Constitutional Court 
considered the binding effect of international law: Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46; Coetzee v Government of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC); S v Williams 
1995 3 SA 632 (CC); Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC); and Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 
751 (CC). 
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South Africa has already ratified a number of international conventions and 
instruments (relevant to the right to social security) in line with the provisions of 
section 234 of the Constitution, which permits Parliament to adopt Charters of Rights 
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution to deepen the culture of democracy 
established by the Constitution. The instruments ratified by South Africa include, 
among others, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, ratified on 9 July 
1996; the United Nations’ Convention of the Rights of the Child, ratified on 16 June 
1995; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, ratified on 15 December 1995; and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), ratified on on 18 January 2015. It 
should be noted that South Africa is in terms of section 39(1)(b) also bound by 
instruments not yet ratified by Parliament.6 International law is important for South 
Africa because most of the social security instruments are couched as standards 
which provide the benchmarks against which the country’s policies and legislation 
can be measured. These benchmarks come in different forms, which include general 
responsibility of the state, periodicity and the type of benefits, financing of the 
system, basic statutory protection, equal treatment of men and women, distinguished 
roles of social insurance, social assistance, supplementary or voluntary schemes, 
and respective responsibilities of the state and other actors.7 
 
                                            
 
6
 In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par 35 (hereafter, Makwanyane), the Constitutional 
Court stated that public international law includes binding as well as non-binding law. South African 
courts are therefore not only confined to international instruments that are binding. 
7
 See generally in this regard the following instruments: articles 22 and 25 of Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948, which provide (respectively) that everyone has a right to social security and to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family; articles 14, 15, 
and 17 of the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967, which provide 
(respectively) that member states must provide periodic old-age benefits to persons beyond the age 
of not more than 75 or higher; article 2 of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 102 
of 1952, obliges member states to cover at least three of the following contingencies: health, 
sickness, unemployment, family, disability, maternity, and survivors; while on the other hand articles 
71 and 72 (respectively) require social security systems of member states to meet certain standards 
to qualify as acceptable systems for the purposes of ratifying the convention; article 11(1)(e) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, obliges state 
parties to eliminate discrimination against women with regard to the right to social security; article 7 of 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, 1990, sets out standards with regard to the protection of migrant workers’ rights.   
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2.2 THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE AFRICAN UNION ON   
THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 
 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which has been replaced by the African 
Union,8 was the principal intergovernmental body for the African continent. Thus, 
South Africa is a member of the African Union.   
 
The Organisation of African Unity became the African Union in 2002.9 Its aims 
included, among others, to coordinate and intensify cooperation among African 
states and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa, to give due regard 
to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 194810 (UDHR), and to coordinate and harmonise members’ political, diplomatic, 
economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical, and defence 
policies.11  
 
The objectives of the African Union include to:12 
 
 Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the African 
continent; 
 Promote and protect people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights and other human rights instruments; and 
 Promote sustainable development at the economic, social, and cultural levels, 
as well as the integration of African economies.  
 
                                            
 
8
 The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU on 11 
July 2000, but the Organization of African Unity was only disbanded on 9 July 2002 – accessed from 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm, last visited on 07 May 2015. 
9
 The African Union (AU) was established in terms of article 2 of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union.  
10
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 10 December 1948. See in this regard http://everything.explained.at/Universal_ 
Declaration_of_Human_Rights/, last visited on 07 May 2015. 
11
 Olivier MP, Smit N and Kalula ER (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 1ed (2003) at 548-549 
(hereafter, Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis). 
12
 Organization of African Unity/African Union (History and Present Status), accessed from 
http://www.dfa.gov/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm, last visited on 07 May 2015. 
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One of the organs of the African Union is the Executive Council, which is composed 
of the Ministers designated by the governments of the member states. The Council 
decides on matters such as foreign trade, social security, food, agriculture, and 
communications.13  
 
The Organisation of African Unity Charter did not have any provision directly relevant 
to social security. However, the Charter affirmed its commitment to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which contains provisions on social security and socio-
economic rights.14  
 
There is also the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, generally known as 
the Banjul Charter. South Africa is bound by the provisions of this Charter as it 
ratified the Charter on 9 July 1996.15 The Banjul Charter contains several provisions 
on socio-economic rights. Article 16 is about health rights; and article 22 is about 
economic, social, and cultural development. Article 22 provides that all people shall 
have the right to their economic, social, and cultural development with due regard to 
their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of 
mankind.16 The Charter, however, does not provide any sanctions where a state 
party violates its provisions. In article 47, the Charter enables state parties to police 
one another. Where one state has a good reason to believe that another state party 
has violated the provisions of the Charter, that state may draw the violating state’s 
attention to the matter in writing and the latter must respond within a period of three 
months. If the issue is not settled within a period of three months, the complaining 
state shall have the right to refer the matter to the African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights in terms of article 48. Article 49, however, allows for direct 
referrals of violations to the Commission.  
                                            
 
13
 Idem. 
14
 See the preamble to the OAU Charter. 
15
 The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into 
force on 21 October 1986. See in this regard http://www.justice.gov.za/policy/african%20charter/afr-
charter03.html, last visited 07 May 2015. 
16
 Article 22(2) of the Charter. 
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The Commission shall, after considering the matter, send its report to the states 
concerned and also to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The 
Commission is empowered by article 52 of the Charter to make recommendations to 
the Assembly as it deems useful. The Charter does not specify the types of 
recommendations the Commission can make.    
 
2.3 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) ON THE 
RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
 
2.3.1 General 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established under 
article 2 of the Declaration and Treaty of Southern African Development 
Community.17 The countries that fall under the Southern African Development 
Community share a similar legacy in that they were all at some stage colonised. 
Most of these countries were, as a result of colonisation, characterised by 
discrimination on the basis of race and this brought about the existing social, 
economic, and political imbalances within the region.18 Its main objectives as set out 
in its founding Treaty include the promotion of economic growth, the alleviation of 
poverty, the enhancement of the quality of life of the people of Southern Africa, and 
the provision of support to the socially disadvantaged, through regional integration.19 
The Treaty commits member states to the fundamental principles of sovereign 
equality of members, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law, equity, balance, and mutual benefit.20  
 
 
                                            
 
17
 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the SADC Treaty. 
18
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 11 at 661. 
19
 Article 5(a) of the SADC Treaty. 
20
 Article 4. 
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However, at the moment the SADC has not concluded any social security 
agreement,21 which is quite alarming considering the levels of poverty which affect 
the welfare or social security provision to the majority of poor people within the 
region. SADC instruments on the right to social and retirement security are 
discussed next. 
 
2.3.2 Southern African Development Community Treaty, 1992 
 
This Treaty is the founding document of the SADC.22 Its objectives include regional 
integration for purposes of supporting sustainable and equitable economic growth 
and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the 
ultimate objective of poverty eradication. The Treaty aims to enhance the standard 
and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and to support the socially 
disadvantaged.23 In terms of article 11(b), the Council of Ministers oversees the 
implementation of the policies of the SADC and the proper execution of its 
programmes. Interestingly, however, this body does not have powers to make 
binding decisions as all its actions must be reported to the Summit.  
 
The Tribunal, which was suspended in 2010, was responsible for making sure that 
the provisions of the Treaty were adhered to and that they were well interpreted. The 
Tribunal had not yet been reinstated at the time this study was completed, which 
means no cases of violation of the Treaty could be referred to the Tribunal.24  
 
 
                                            
 
21
 Kulke U “Filling the Gap of Social Security for Migrant Workers: ILO’s Strategy” at paragraph (par) 
(I) (2006) accessed from http://www.social-
protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowRessource.action?ressource. ressourceId=1490, last visited on 07 May 
2015. 
22
 The SADC Treaty was signed in Windhoek, Namibia, on 17 August 1992. 
23
 Article 5(a) of the SADC Treaty.  
24
 See generally in this regard Saurombe A “The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC 
Treaty Provisions Dealing with Regional Integration” (2012) PER/PELJ Vol 15 (2) at 467 (hereafter, 
Saurombe “The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration”). 
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2.3.3 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 2003 
 
The Charter promotes adequate social protection in the region. It reiterates some of 
the objectives set out in the SADC Treaty; namely the achievement of economic 
growth, the alleviation of poverty, the enhancement of the standard and quality of life 
of the people of region, and the provision of support to the socially disadvantaged 
through regional integration. However, whether this is happening at the moment is 
debatable.  
 
Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights provides as follows: 
 
SADC member states shall create an enabling environment such that every worker in the 
SADC region shall have a right to adequate social protection and shall, regardless of status 
and the type of employment, enjoy adequate social benefits. Persons who have been unable 
to either enter or re-enter the labour market and have no means of subsistence, shall be able 
to receive sufficient resources and social assistance. 
 
Unfortunately, this seems to have to date remained a dream as most of the countries 
in the region are experiencing fiscal constraints. As a result, adequate social 
protection for residents in this region seems unaffordable.25 The Charter requires 
equal treatment for men and women in all the areas, including the area of social 
protection.26 It is also important to indicate that SADC member states are 
undertaking through the Charter to create an enabling environment, in accordance 
with the arrangements applying in each country, in order to protect the elderly. 
Protection is both for those who are working and the unemployed.27 Article 8 of the 
Charter stipulates that every worker in the region must, at the time of retirement, be 
able to enjoy resources affording him or her a decent standard of living, as well as 
equity in post-employment security schemes.28   
                                            
 
25
 See generally, Sibanda LM, Kureya T and Kalibwani F “Vulnerable yet, Viable: Social Protection 
Policies for Households Affected by HIV and AIDS” (Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy 
Analysis Network (FANRPAN)) Policy Brief Series 02/05, August 2005, accessed from 
http://www.fanrpan.org/documents/d00121/Policy_brief_02-05_Social_Protection_Aug2005.pdf, last 
visited 07 May 2015. 
26
 Article 6 of the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 2003. 
27
 Article 8(b) of the Charter. 
28
 Article 8(a). 
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The Charter further requires member states to take appropriate action to ratify and 
implement ILO instruments and to give priority to the ratification of the core ILO.29 
This is a firm indication that the SADC is committed to the promotion and respect of 
everyone’s right to social and retirement security. However, commitment on paper 
without any enforcement mechanisms will not assist the poor people of this region. 
The responsibility for the implementation of the Charter lies with the national tripartite 
institutions and regional structures.  
 
These institutions and structures30 have the duty to promote social legislation and 
equitable growth within the SADC region and to prevent the non-implementation of 
the Charter. In order to monitor the progress made by member states, countries are 
required to submit regular progress reports to the Secretariat.31 Cases of violation of 
human rights could be referred to the SADC Tribunal,32 which is currently 
                                            
 
29
 Article 5. 
30
 These would include the Summit, comprising, all SADC Heads of State and/or Government; Organ 
on politics, defence, and security; Tribunal, established in 2000 and entrusted with the responsibility 
to ensure adherence to, and proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments, and to adjudicate upon disputes, referred to it; Council of Ministers which consists of 
Ministers from each member state, its functions include overseeing the functioning and development 
of the SADC and ensuring that policies are properly implemented; the SADC National Committees, 
which must comprise key stakeholders, notably government, private sector, and civil society in each 
member state. Their functions are to provide inputs at the national level in the formulation of regional 
policies, strategies, the SADC Programme of Action, as well as to coordinate and oversee the 
implementation of these programmes at the national level; Standing Committee of Senior Officials 
consisting of one Permanent/Principal Secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each member 
state to serve as a technical advisory committee to the Council of Ministers; the SADC Secretariat is 
the principal executive institution of SADC responsible for, inter alia, the strategic planning and 
management of SADC programmes, implementation of decisions of SADC policy organs and 
institutions such as the Summit, Council and the Troikas – the SADC leadership takes place in the 
Troika system consisting of the Chair, Incoming Chair, and Outgoing Chair. The SADC institutions 
were established by article 9 of the SADC Treaty (see articles 10-16, which set out the functions of 
the SADC institutions). See also generally on SADC institutions and their functions, Van der Vleuten 
A and Hulse M “Governance Transfer by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)” 
(SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No 48, December 2013) at 16-20, accessed from 
http://www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen/working_ papers/wp48/SFB-Governance-Working-Paper-
48.pdf, last visited on 07 May 2015 (hereafter, “Governance Transfer by the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)”); Saurombe “The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC 
Treaty Provisions Dealing with Regional Integration” op cit note 24 at 454-569. 
31
 Article 16 of the SADC Charter. 
32
 The SADC Community Tribunal was established by article 9 of the SADC Treaty in 1992 but was 
only inaugurated on 18 November 2005. Its functions are set out in article 16 of the SADC Treaty. The 
tribunal was, however, suspended since 2010. See in this regard Van der Vleuten “Governance 
Transfer by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)” op cit note 30 at 10 and 19. 
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suspended. The Tribunal had the duty to ensure that member states comply with the 
Southern African Development Community Treaty and subsidiary instruments.33 
 
2.3.4 Southern African Development Community Code on Social Security, 
2008 
 
Article 4 of the SADC Code on Social Security34 provides that everyone in the SADC 
has the right to social security. It also encourages every member state to establish 
and maintain a system of social security in accordance with the provisions of the 
Code and article 10 of the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. The Code 
gives member states the duty to maintain their social security systems at a 
satisfactory level at least equal to that required for the ratification of the International 
Labour Organisation Convention (No. 102) Concerning Minimum Standards of Social 
Security, 1952.35 Every member state must progressively raise its system of social 
security to a higher level, which should include achieving the meaningful coverage of 
everyone under the system – bearing in mind the realities and level of development 
in the particular member state. The Code states that everyone in the SADC region 
who has insufficient means of subsistence to support themselves and their 
dependants should be entitled to social assistance, in accordance with the level of 
socio-economic development of the particular member state.36  
  
                                            
 
33
 Article 16 of the SADC Treaty. 
34
 The SADC Code on Social Security was signed on 1 January 2008. 
35
 See article 2 of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952, which states that in 
order to ratify the Convention, an ILO member state is obliged to comply at the time of ratification with 
at least three of the following Parts of the Convention: medical care, sickness benefits, unemployment 
benefits, old-age benefits, workers’ compensation, family, disability, maternity, and survivors’ benefits. 
From the risks mentioned, at least one provision concerning unemployment, old-age, workers’ 
compensation, disability or survivors’ benefits must be accepted. 
36
 Article 5 of the SADC Code on Social Security. 
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It further provides that each member state should establish social insurance 
schemes and should progressively expand the coverage and impact of these 
schemes. Social insurance should extend coverage to the entire working population. 
Member states are expected to provide and regulate social insurance mechanisms 
for the informal sector and to encourage and regulate private and public sector 
participation, with the private sector participation being either occupational based or 
of an individual or group nature.37 
 
In terms of article 10, dealing with retirement and old-age, member states should aim 
to create an enabling environment that provides universal coverage for old people, 
through social assistance, social insurance, or social allowances. Member states are 
further urged to work towards the establishment of a minimum and maximum 
retirement age that takes into account the need to ensure an appropriate retirement 
benefits, as well as country-specific considerations such as life expectancy, the 
HIV/Aids pandemic, and economic development. In affording their citizens social 
security and social assistance, member states are required to aim to achieve 
equality of access to all.38 
 
However, the Code does not provide any formal enforcement mechanisms of its 
provisions. In terms of the Code, member states and the relevant SADC structures 
should establish mechanisms both at the national and regional levels to monitor 
progressive compliance with the provisions of the Code. The Integrated Committee 
of Ministers of Member States should establish an Independent Committee of 
Experts that will monitor compliance with the Code.39 
  
                                            
 
37
 Article 6. 
38
 Article 10. 
39
 Article 21. 
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2.4 UNITED NATIONS (UN) ON SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
 
The United Nations (UN) was officially established on 24 October 1945.40 The United 
Nation’s interest in the economic and social rights protection comes from its interest 
in the relationship between protecting rights and maintaining world peace.41 Its 
instruments are discussed next. 
 
2.4.1 United Nations Charter, 1945 
 
The preamble of the Charter42 has the following as one of its objectives: 
 
“To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”
43
  
 
The Charter also aims to promote social progress and better standards of living. It is 
further committed to achieving international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian nature, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction on the basis of race, sex, language, or religion.44  
 
2.4.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights45 (UDHR) was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1948.  
 
                                            
 
40
 South Africa was one of the founding members of the United Nations. However, the United Nations 
Security Council instituted sanctions against South Africa in the late seventies in protest against the 
then apartheid policies – accessed from http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-
resources/articles_papers/south-africa-un.htm, last visited on 07 May 2015.  
41
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 11 at 534-535.  
42
 The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco. 
43
 See the preamble to the UN Charter. 
44
 Article 1(3) of the UN Charter. 
45
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly 
Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
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South Africa was one of the eight countries that abstained from voting at the time 
when the Declaration was adopted; the other seven countries were Byelorussian 
SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, and Saudi Arabia.46 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights recognises socio-economic rights as human rights.47  
 
In terms of the Declaration, everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international 
cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each state, of 
the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable for his or her dignity and the 
free development of his or her personality.48 The Declaration further affords 
everyone the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself or herself and of his or her family. 
 
The relevant provision of article 25 provides as follows: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and the 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond control. 
 
This article, among other things, refers specifically to everyone’s right to security in 
the event of old-age, unemployment, sickness, disability, and widowhood.  
  
                                            
 
46
Information accessed from http://www.milestonedocuments.com/documents/view/universal-
declaration-of-human-rights/, last visited on 07 May 2015. 
47
 Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
48
 Article 22 states that “everyone”, as a member of society, has the right to social security. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
 
38 
 
2.4.3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966  
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights49 (ICESCR) is a 
multilateral Treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 
December 1966, but it only came into force on 3 January 1976. South Africa has, 
after a very long time, ratified this Treaty on 18 January 2015 with the enforcement 
date being 12 April 2015.  
 
The Treaty will have a significant effect on the country’s national laws and policies. 
South Africa has, however, not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR),50 which was adopted in 
December 2008 and came into force on 5 May 2013. The Protocol protects 
international human rights and gives victims of violations of economic, social, and 
cultural rights access to justice and appropriate redress. Victims of violations of 
international human rights can bring their complaints to the Protocol when domestic 
procedures are not effective. Complaints can only be lodged with the Protocol 
against states which are parties to the Protocol.51 At the moment the Protocol cannot 
deal with any complaints against South Africa, as it has not yet ratified the Protocol. 
The discussion of the ICESCR is, however, very important as it provides details on 
what is promised by the Convention and also on what is required by the Convention 
from member states. 
 
Article 9 of the Convention contains provisions on the right to social security. This 
article recognises both the public and private components of the right to social 
security. It enjoins state parties to recognise the right of everyone to social security, 
                                            
 
49
 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR).  
50
 See generally on Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Biglino I, Golay Christophe “The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights” Academy in-Brief No.2 (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights) July 2013, at 55, accessed from http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/The%20optional%20protocol%20In%20brief%202.pdf, last visited on 
07 September 2015. See also on South Africa’s ratification of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, https://www.escr-net.org/node/365752, last visited on 07 
September 2015. 
51
 Idem. 
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including social insurance. According to the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the concept of “social security” implicitly covers all the risks involved 
in the loss of means of subsistence for reasons beyond a person’s control.52 The 
Convention obliges state parties to undertake to ensure equal enjoyment of the right 
to social security by both men and women.53  
 
In addition to article 9, article 11 requires member states to guarantee an adequate 
standard of living to everyone. According to Lamarche,54 the right in article 11 may 
be interpreted to mean that a state must at the very least provide social assistance 
and other needs-based forms of social benefits in cash or in kind to anyone without 
adequate resources. The rights in articles 9 and 11 are similar to the other rights in 
the ICESCR qualified by article 2(1), which provides that these rights are to be 
implemented only progressively and to the maximum of available resources.55  
 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides as follows: 
 
Each State Party to the present Convention undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particulalrly the 
adoption of legislative measures. 
  
                                            
 
52
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 6 – The Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons (Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 13
th
 Session, 1995, at par 26.  
53
 Article 3 of the ICESCR.   
54
 Lamarche L (Social Security as a Human Right) in Brand D and Russell S (eds) Exploring the Core 
Content of Socio-Economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives 2002 at 126-127 
(hereafter, Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights: South African and 
International Perspectives). 
55
 Similar to the provisions of section 27(2) of the Constitution, which provide that the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights. Section 27(2) provisions are discussed under par 5.2.1 in Ch 5. 
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The provisions of this article are almost similar to the provisions of section 27(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which provides as follows: 
 
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
 
It can be accepted that the provisions of section 27(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 have their roots in article 2(1) of the Convention; even 
though section 27(2) in addition also mentions that the legislation and measures 
must be reasonable.  
 
The rights in the Convention are enforced through the reporting system which 
requires state parties to the Convention to report to the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights56 on a regular basis.57  
 
This Committee is more in favour of the minimum state obligation formulation than 
the core-content of the right approach.58 The purpose of the minimum state 
obligations approach is to ensure that states do what the Convention requires them 
to do. In this way countries are allowed to make use of available resources and 
where they are not in a position to provide the necessary protection, states are 
required to show the extent to which they are able to provide such protection or 
relevant programmes. In other words, the ICESCR does not require member states 
to fund all the programmes at once where resources do not allow for that.  
 
                                            
 
56
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the body of independent experts that 
monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
by its state parties. This Committee was established under the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985 to carry out the monitoring functions assigned to the 
United Nations’ Economic and Social Council in Part IV of the Covenant, accessed from 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/, last visited on 07 May 2015. 
57
 Idem. 
58
 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “General Comment 3: The 
Nature of States Parties Obligations” (1990) ICESCR 5
th
 Session 1990, accessed from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument, 
last visited on 07 May 2015. 
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The Convention considers resources available within a particular society, coming 
from both the private sector as well as the public sector. However, it remains every 
member state’s responsibility to ensure that resources are made available even 
though those resources do not come directly from state revenue. In terms of the 
ICESCR, states have the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the rights in this 
Covenant.59 This is the approach that was also adopted by the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, in section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights.60  
 
The obligation to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights.  
Providing for these rights is cost-free because they merely require the state not to 
take any action. On the other hand, the state may not act in a way that will violate 
these rights.61 This obligation further requires the state to respect existing public and 
private social security arrangements.62   
 
The obligation to protect also requires states to prevent violations of social security 
rights by third parties. This obligation can sometimes be cost-free because it is a 
negative obligation which does not allow third parties to violate rights. States meet 
their obligations by creating and implementing the necessary policy, legislative, 
regulatory, judicial, inspection, and enforcement frameworks. In order to create and 
operate these systems, human, financial, and other resources are required. 
Therefore, they are not entirely cost-free.63  
  
                                            
 
59
 Article 1(3) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1996.   
60
 Section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the state to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights. 
61
 Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Right op cit note 54 at 14.   
62
 Langford M (Social Security and Implications for Law, Policy and Practice) in Riedel E Social 
Security as a Human Right 2006 at 36 (hereafter, Riedel Social Security as a Human Right). 
63
 Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights op cit note 54 at 14.   
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The state must make sure that existing social security arrangements are not 
interfered with by third parties and must make it possible for individuals to organise 
themselves in finding ways to provide for themselves using alternative 
arrangements.64 
 
The obligation to fulfil requires states to take appropriate legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial, and other measures towards the full realisation of such rights. 
The obligation can also encompass the duties to facilitate, promote, and provide, or 
to create appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial, and other measures.65  
 
According to Malcolm Langford, this would include the following:66 
 
 Reviewing legislation and policy to ensure consistency with the right to social 
security; 
 Adopting and implementing appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
ensure the provision of social security with effective participation of potential 
and current beneficiaries; 
 Ensuring progressive realisation of the right to social security over time as 
resources permit; and 
 Ensuring a minimum essential level of social security immediately. 
 
These activities form part of states’ minimum obligation under the ICESCR. The 
obligation to fulfil is seen as a positive obligation requiring a state to ensure that the 
essence of the right is provided to its people. People can pay the cost themselves, 
either directly or through taxes. A state can also require private sector actors to pay 
the costs, if and when necessary. It therefore follows from states’ obligation to 
respect, protect, and fulfil the right to social security, that there is a great deal that 
can be considered part of a state party’s minimum obligations under the ICESCR.67   
                                            
 
64
 Riedel Social Security as a Human Right op cit note 62 at 36. 
65
 Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights op cit note 54 at 118. 
66
 Riedel Social Security as a Human Right op cit note 62 at 59. 
67
 Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights op cit note 54 at 14-20.  
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2.5 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) ON THE RIGHT 
TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
 
2.5.1 General 
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the tripartite United Nations’ agency 
that brings together governments, employers, and workers of its member states in 
common action to promote, among other things, employment creation, rights at work, 
social protection, and social dialogue. It was created to promote social progress 
which would bring about economic or social development.68  
The Organisation has played an important role in relation to social security 
development. Its prime concern is the formulation of international policies and 
programmes to improve working and living conditions.69  
 
The ILO uses the following complementary methods to do its work:  
 
 Sets international standards and supervise their observance; 
 Extends technical cooperation in the field to member states; and  
 Conducts research, and collects and disseminates information. 
  
                                            
 
68
 ILO and the World of Work op cit note 4 at 9. 
69
 Idem. One of the principal ways in which the ILO does this is through International Labour 
Conventions, the drafting of which involves the ILO secretariat in extensive studies and discussions, 
and in the examination of existing laws and practices throughout the world. A Convention is conceived 
as a set of firm criteria for preparing national legislation. When a Convention has been adopted by the 
annual International Labour Conference, member states of the ILO are required by the Constitution to 
bring the Convention to the notice of their legislative authorities. In due course, if the standards which 
have been set are embodied in national laws, the states concerned will be in a position to ratify the 
Convention. Not every state which follows the Convention necessarily ends up ratifying it, but the 
influence of the ILO setting standards is effective regardless of the formal procedures involved.  
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The standards set by the Organisation take the form of Conventions and 
Recommendations, which are adopted by the Conference.70 When a member state 
ratifies a Convention, it commits itself to apply its terms and provisions. Once 
member states have ratified a Convention, their governments are expected to make 
regular reports to the ILO on its application.71 
 
2.5.2 The nature of ILO instruments  
 
The ILO, through its International Labour Conference, has been able to adopt over 
200 Conventions and Recommendations.72 However, one of the criticisms 
concerning the ILO Conventions, according to Frans Pennings, is that they do not 
provide any definition for the concept “social security”.73  
 
This is indeed a problem as each member state may have its own interpretation, 
approach, and definition of social security and this will not be proper as countries will 
not have anything to measure their systems against. There is therefore a need for a 
comprehensive definition of social security with clear obligations to the member 
states. The definition should also have an enforceable legal meaning with 
reasonable levels or standards of protection which member states must meet.  
  
                                            
 
70
 Idem at 12.The member states of the ILO meet at the International Labour Conference in June of 
each year in Geneva. Two government delegates, an employer delegate, and a worker delegate 
represent each member state. The Conference establishes and adopts International Labour 
Standards and is a forum for the discussion of key social and labour questions. 
71
 ILO and the World of Work op cit note 4 at 16. 
72
 Pennings F Between Soft and Hard Law – The Impact of International Social Security Standards on 
National Social Security Law 2006 at 1-2 (hereafter, Pennings Between Soft and Hard Law). 
73
 Ibid at 43. 
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2.5.3 The purpose of setting minimum core-content of the international 
instruments 
 
The minimum core-content refers to the nature or essence of a right. It is an 
essentialia of a right without which a right loses its substantive importance as a 
human right and in the absence of which the state party should be considered to be 
in violation of its international obligations. It is also described as a floor below which 
conditions should not be permitted to fall.74 
 
The approach that seems to be favoured is the minimum state obligations as it 
manages to avoid or at least reduce some problems with the minimum core-content 
approach. However, many human rights activists are not in favour of defining 
minimum core-content, fearing that many countries will strive to do as little as 
possible. The fear is that if state parties realise how little they are required to do in 
order to comply with their obligations, they will do that minimum and nothing more.75  
 
2.5.4 The ILO Conventions’ basic principles and general requirements  
 
The ILO Conventions have a considerable influence on the development of social 
security throughout the world. As a result, social security schemes comprising all 
nine branches covered in the Social Security (Minimum Standard) Convention 10276 
are now found in almost all of the developed countries and in the Constitutions of 
some of the developing countries, even though most social security schemes 
established in the developing countries have limited scope and do not provide 
universal coverage.  
 
The Conventions established by the Organisation set out basic principles and 
requirements that must be followed by different countries when making national laws 
for purposes of consistency.  
                                            
 
74
 Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights op cit note 54 at 15. 
75
 Ibid at 14-20. 
76
 These branches are medical care, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, 
workers’ compensation, family, disability, maternity, and survivors’ benefits. 
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Pennings and Schulte77 have summarised these basic principles and requirements 
as follows:78 
 
 Any benefit in cash should be a periodical payment provided “throughout the 
contingency”; 
 The benefit should be a prescribed benefit replacing previous income to a 
certain extent or establishing a guaranteed minimum; 
 The costs of the benefits and administration should be borne collectively by 
way of insurance contributions or taxation, which excludes schemes based 
simply on employers’ liability with an exception of Convention 121 concerning 
employment injury benefits and Convention 183 concerning maternity 
protection; 
 The insurance contributions payable by employees should not exceed 50% of 
the total costs of the scheme, except for those schemes financed entirely by 
employees; 
 The state has to assume at least general responsibility for the due provision of 
the benefits and for the proper administration of the social security institutions; 
and 
 Representatives of the persons protected have to participate in the 
management of a scheme, or at least be associated with it in a consultative 
capacity in all cases in which the administration is not entrusted to an 
institution regulated by public authorities or a government department. 
 
Member states are required to adhere to these requirements and anything above 
these will depend on each individual country. The aim of setting the minimum level is 
to ensure minimum coverage.  
Even though the Conventions allow for a wide variety of methods of calculating 
benefits, they do not allow for methods that are unable to ensure, for example, that 
                                            
 
77
 Pennings F (ed) and Schulte B (Chapter 1: International Social Security Standards: An Overview) in 
Pennings Between Soft and Hard Law op cit note 72.  
78
 Ibid at 13-14. 
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persons protected by a scheme receive adequate replacement income in the event 
of loss of earnings due to specific contingencies.79 
 
2.5.5 ILO Conventions and Recommendations on the right to social and 
retirement security 
 
2.5.5.1 Social Security (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1952 
 
The Social Security (Minimum Standard) Convention 102 was adopted in 1952. In 
order to ratify the Convention, a member state is obliged to comply at the time of 
ratification with at least three of the following Parts of the Convention: medical care, 
sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, workers’ compensation, 
and family, disability, maternity, and survivors’ benefits.80 From the risks mentioned, 
at least one provision concerning unemployment, old-age, workers’ compensation, 
disability, or survivors’ benefits must be accepted.81 Each Part of the Convention 
provides specific standards aimed at guaranteeing the benefit of social protection to 
protected classes of persons, as well as a certain level of benefits.82  
 
In all instances, a ratifying member state must comply with certain general parts of 
the Convention, including Part XI, which provides for periodic payments of social 
security.83   
  
                                            
 
79
 Idem at 14-15. 
80
 Article 2 of Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952. 
81
 Article 2(1)(ii). 
82
 See Parts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VII, IX and X. 
83
 Pennings Between Soft and Hard Law op cit note 72 at 14-15.   
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
 
48 
 
In the case of old-age benefits, the Convention requires that persons covered shall 
comprise prescribed classes of employees: 84 
 
 Constituting not less than 50% of all employees; or  
 Prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not less 
than 20% of all residents; or 
 All residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits.  
 
These alternatives are intended to facilitate the ratification of the Convention by 
member states, regardless of the type of social security system they may have. The 
level of benefits is dependent on the category of the population covered. For 
example, article 29 which deals with old-age benefits provides for a benefit based on 
certain conditions of contributing periods that provide the right to the benefit, of 40%, 
either of previous wages or of the average wages of skilled or unskilled workers, 
depending on how the protected classes of persons are determined.85  
 
Articles 71 and 72 of Convention 102 list the conditions a national social security 
scheme must meet in order to qualify as an acceptable system for the purpose of 
ratifying the Convention. Article 71(1) requires that the costs of benefits and 
administration be borne collectively through insurance contributions or taxation in a 
manner that avoids hardship to persons of limited means. Article 71(2) provides that 
the total of insurance contributions borne by employees must not exceed 50% of the 
total of a protected employee’s financial resources. Article 71(3) requires member 
states to accept general responsibility for the due provision of benefits, while article 
76 requires all member states to include in their annual report full information 
concerning the laws and regulations by which effect is given to the provisions of this 
Convention.  
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 Article 27 of Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952. 
85
 Brand Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights op cit note 54 at 116. 
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Member states are required to provide information on social security based on all 
nine of the categories of benefits used in ILO Convention 102.86 According to Frans 
Pennings,87 member states are responsible for the proper functioning of their social 
security systems. This entails the provision of an appropriate legal framework for the 
social security system, as well as the proper administration of the resulting 
institutions – whatever system is chosen – in order to guarantee the protection 
envisaged by the Conventions.  
 
The responsibility of the member state also covers the provision of benefits. 
Irrespective of the method of financing adopted, the competent authorities are under 
an obligation to take all necessary measures to ensure that benefits are duly 
provided – whatever the system.88  
 
2.5.5.2 Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967 
 
In terms of article 14 of the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention 
128 of 1967, each member for which Part III (old-age benefit) of the Convention is in 
force, shall secure to the persons protected the provision of old-age benefits in 
accordance with the following: the contingency covered shall be survival beyond a 
prescribed age; the prescribed age shall not be more than 65 years or such higher 
age as may be fixed by the competent authority with due regard to demographic, 
economic, and social criteria, which shall be demonstrated statistically;89 if the 
prescribed age is 65 years or higher, the age shall be lowered, under prescribed 
conditions, in respect of persons who have been engaged in occupations that are 
deemed by national legislation, for the purpose of old-age benefit, to be arduous or 
unhealthy;90 and lastly, the old-age benefit shall be a periodical payment.91 
 
                                            
 
86
 Article 76(1)(a) of Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952. 
87
 Pennings Between Soft and Hard Law op cit note 72 at 29. 
88
 Idem. 
89
 Article 15 of the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention 128 of 1967. 
90
 Article 16. 
91
 Article 17. 
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2.5.5.3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 1979 
 
The Convention obliges states parties to eliminate discrimination against women in 
the field of employment, and to ensure equal rights between men and women; in 
particular the right to social security, more especially in cases of retirement, 
unemployment, sickness, invalidity, and old-age and other incapacity to work, as well 
as the right to paid leave.92 
 
2.5.5.4 Income Security Recommendation, 1944 
 
One of the principles of social security emanating from Income Security 
Recommendation 67 is that of universal coverage through social assistance.93 It 
provides that social insurance should afford protection, in the contingencies to which 
they are exposed, to all employed and self-employed persons, together with their 
dependants.94 In terms of Recommendation 67, the income security schemes should 
relieve want and prevent destitution by restoring, up to a reasonable level, income 
that is lost by reason of inability to work or to obtain remunerative work by reason of 
the death of a breadwinner.95  
 
2.5.6 Enforcement of ILO standards 
 
After adopting a Convention, the ILO Conference must present it to the authorities of 
member states for the enactment of implementing legislation within one year.96 
Member states must report to the Director-General of the Organisation on whether or 
not they are going to ratify the Convention.  
 
                                            
 
92
 Article 11(1)(e) of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), 1979. 
93
 See paras 28-30 of the Income Security Recommendation 67 of 1944.  
94
 See par 17. 
95
 See par 1. 
96
 Article 19(5) of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO Constitution). 
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The report has to show the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to 
be given, to any of the provisions of the Convention by legislation, administrative 
action, collective agreements or otherwise, and state the difficulties which prevent or 
delay the ratification of such a Convention.97  
 
Article 19(5) of the ILO Constitution empowers the Governing Body to request 
reports from member states on the position both of their law and legal practice with 
regard to matters dealt with in non-ratified conventions; while, on the other hand, 
article 19(6)(d) requires member states to report on their law and practice relating to 
ratified Conventions.  
 
Periodical reporting is required from member states after a Convention has been 
ratified.98 However, time periods on which reports are required are not the same for 
all the Conventions.99 In terms of article 23(2) of the ILO Constitution, member states 
are required to communicate to representative organisations of employers and 
workers the reports they send to the Director-General and comments made by those 
organisations must be taken into consideration by the Organisation’s supervisory 
bodies in their evaluation of government reports. The report by member states on 
their compliance with the Conventions is presented to the Committee of Experts on 
the Application of International Organisation Conventions and Recommendations. 
The drafting of the reports gives member states an opportunity to check the 
consistency of their national law and legal practice with the contents of the 
Convention concerned. The thinking behind the reporting duties is that, in addition to 
the possible direct effect of comments made by the experts, the discussion of these 
comments by the national actors may put additional pressure on member states that 
do not abide by their international obligations.100 Every member state has the right to 
file a complaint if it is not satisfied that another member state is effectively complying 
with any Convention which they have both ratified.101  
                                            
 
97
 Article 19(5)(e). 
98
 Article 22. 
99
 Pennings Between Hard and Soft Law op cit note 72 at 17.  
100
 Ibid at 17-18. 
101
 Article 26(1) of the ILO Constitution. 
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The ILO Governing Body may appoint a Commission of Inquiry to consider the 
complaint and if the member state which lodged the complaint is not satisfied with 
recommendations made by the Commission, it may refer the matter to the 
International Court of Justice.102 Employers and employees’ organisations can also 
file a complaint with the ILO Governing body, if they are not satisfied that a member 
state is securing the effective observance of any Convention which both have 
ratified. The Governing body will then refer the complaint to a Commission of 
Inquiry.103 The ILO Constitution is, however, silent with regard to the type of 
sanctions that may be imposed against the member states which fail to comply. 
 
2.6 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
 
The right to social security is an internationally recognised human right, as it has 
been seen from the international instruments mentioned and discussed in this 
chapter. Thus, international instruments play an important role in the development of 
social security systems of the countries of the world. Countries measure the 
progress they have made in providing social security to their citizens against what is 
stipulated in international instruments such as treaties and conventions they are 
parties to. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, together with the United Nations Charter, all 
provide for social security and socio-economic rights, social progress, and the 
standard of living adequate for the well-being of individuals and their families.104 
These instruments, however, do not have specific provisions on what would 
constitute adequate levels or standards. This makes it difficult to use them in 
determining whether individual countries have systems that meet acceptable levels. 
They also mainly focus on social insurance and not on the combination of social 
insurance and social assistance.   
 
                                            
 
102
 Article 29(2). 
103
 Article 26. 
104
 Article 22 and 25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; articles 16 and 22 (respectively) of the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; the preamble to the UN Charter.  
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Within the SADC region, the right to social security is recognised in the SADC 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights and the SADC Code on Social Security. The 
latter recognises every worker’s right to social protection when they retire,105 while 
the former recognises everyone’s right to social security and social assistance and 
obliges member states to progressively raise the levels of cover to everyone.106 As 
good as this may sound, it remains a challenge to measure the progress made by 
member states as there is no instrument availed by both the Charter and the Code to 
determine compliance or adequacy. There are no direct sanctions that defaulting 
countries receive and this can result in member states not taking their provisions 
seriously. It is, however, good that the Charter encourages member states to 
progressively raise the levels of cover to everyone. 
  
The ICESCR recognises everyone’s right to social security and it requires member 
states to guarantee an adequate standard of living to all.107 ILO Social Security 
Convention 102 provides a list of contingencies which must be covered by every 
social security system and it also requires all member states to cover at least three 
of them in order to ratify the Convention.108 The Convention further lists the 
conditions a national social security scheme must meet in order to qualify as an 
acceptable system for purposes of ratifying the Convention.109 In terms of this 
provision, coverage for old-age benefits must not be less than 50% of all employees 
of that member state. Cearly the Convention sets the targets of coverage very low. A 
target for coverage of three contingencies out of nine is quite low and not 
encouraging at all. It is submitted that the target should have at least been placed at 
not less than six risks considering the number and nature of risks recognised.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
105
 Articles 8 and 10 of the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. 
106
 Articles 4 and 5 of the SADC Code on Social Security. 
107
 Articles 9 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
108
 Article 2 of Social Security (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1952. 
109
 Articles 71 and 72. 
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One other disappointing observation is the fact that the Convention is aiming for 
coverage of at least half of the working force, considering the fact that not half but 
almost each and every worker would need some form of income security in his or her 
old-age. 
 
The Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention 128 requires each 
member state for which Part III (old-age benefit) of the Convention is in force, to 
secure to the persons protected the provision of old-age benefit, which covers the 
contingency for survival beyond a prescribed age – which shall not be more than 65 
years or such higher age as may be fixed by the competent authority with due regard 
to certain factors.110 The Convention requires the benefit to be in the form of 
periodical payments.111 This Convention is in favour of employees receiving 
retirement benefits in the form of regular pensions instead of lump-sum cash 
payments. This is a positive indicator because a person who receives periodical 
payments is better off than one who receives a lump-sum payment. 
  
Such a person faces the risk of squandering the money and could be left with 
nothing to support himself or herself in retirement. Periodical pension payments 
promote social security objectives as the receiver receives income for the rest of his 
or her life in retirement. The person who receives a lump-sum cash payment might 
be tempted to use the benefit on other things, for example to go on a long holiday or 
buy expensive items such as cars and jewellery – only to be left with nothing for the 
remaining years of his or her life.  
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
1979, requires state parties to eliminate discrimination against women with regard to 
the right to social security.112  
 
                                            
 
110
 Article 14 and 15 of Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967. 
111
 Article 17. 
112
 Article 11(1)(e) of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
1979. 
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The Convention is against differentiating women from men in social security 
provision. Social security should be afforded to both men and women equally. For 
example, providing social security for men and women at different ages would 
amount to unfair discrimination on the basis of gender and age.113 
 
ILO Recommendation 67 promotes universal coverage through social assistance,114 
and further provides that social insurance should afford protection, in the 
contingencies to which they are exposed, to all employed and self-employed 
persons, together with their dependants.115 Income security schemes should relieve 
want and prevent destitution by restoring, up to a reasonable level, income which is 
lost by reason of inability to work or to obtain remunerative work because of the 
death of a breadwinner.116 However, the question is what would qualify as a 
reasonable level. It could assist member states if the Recommendation stipulates the 
benefit level considered to be reasonable. 
 
The nature and extent of a state’s obligations in respecting, promoting, protecting, 
and fulfilling the right to social security depends on the international instrument that 
is binding on that state as the extent of state parties’ obligations varies from one 
instrument to another.117 For example, the ICESCR requires state parties to take 
steps to the maximum of their available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in them by all appropriate 
means – including adoption of legislative measures.118  
 
 
                                            
 
113
 Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of a number of grounds 
including sex, gender, and age. 
114
 See paras 28-30 of Recommendation 67.  
115
 See par 17. 
116
 See par 1. 
117
 Human Rights Resource Centre of the University of Minnesota “Circle of Rights: Economic and 
Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource, Module 11, Social Security as a Human Right”, 2000 
(contents of section 5) accessed from http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/ 
module11.htm, last visited on 07 May 2015 (hereafter, University of Minnesota “Circle of Rights: 
Economic and Cultural Rights Activism”).  
118
 Article 2 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
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This provision acknowledges and appreciates the fact that some of the rights in this 
Convention may be difficult to achieve in a short period of time due to states’ 
resources constraints, but at the same time the provision requires states to do their 
best within available means.  
 
Thus, although article 2 of the ICESCR affords the state some latitude in achieving 
full realisation of the right, each state should nonetheless be in a position to 
demonstrate its willingness to achieve full realisation of the right by putting in place 
measures that will assist it to achieve that goal.119 
 
International instruments play a vital role in shaping countries’ social security 
systems. In South Africa the courts, tribunals, and forums are encouraged to 
consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.120 The courts are also 
required when interpreting any legislation to prefer interpretation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.121 Customary international law is also regarded as law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.122 
South Africa has already indicated its willingness to be party to and to be legally 
bound by the obligations imposed by international agreements by ratifying some of 
the international conventions pertaining to social security.123 International 
instruments, and in particular the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on social 
security, provide a measure against which the systems of the countries of the world 
can be compared.  
 
 
                                            
 
119
 See generally, University of Minnesota: “Circle of Rights: Economic and Cultural Rights Activism” 
op cit note 117. 
120
 Section 39(1) of the Constitution. See also the following Constitutional Court decisions: 
Grootboom; Coetzee; Williams; Ferreira; and Bernstein (supra note 5). 
121
 Section 233 of the Constitution. 
122
 Section 232. 
123
 See international treaties applicable to social security rights that have been ratified by South Africa 
included in footnote 7 (op cit). 
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Even in those instances where South Africa has not yet signed or ratified certain 
treaties, the South African courts and other bodies entrusted with the duty of 
interpreting the fundamental rights will be compelled by section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.124 
International supervisory bodies also play an important role in assisting countries 
such as South Africa to implement international socio-economic rights, including the 
rights related to retirement security.125  
 
It is worrying, however, to notice that international instruments generally do not have 
enforcement mechanisms, or where such mechanisms exist they have no serious 
sanctions that can be imposed against defaulting member states. 
 
The next chapter considers social and retirement security provision in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The systems in these three countries are 
used to present a picture of how other countries of the world approach retirement 
provision. 
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 See the case of Makwanyane supra note 6 at par 35.   
125
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 11 at 649. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 3 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE 
NETHERLANDS, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines social security and pension provision in three European 
countries; namely Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.1 The systems 
in these countries are described to see how far they have advanced and to 
determine the adequacy of the South African system in relation to the developments 
in these countries. The systems in these countries are regarded as some of the good 
examples of countries with well-developed retirement security systems and further- 
 
 Belgium had a number of collaborations with South Africa on a number of 
social security projects and it will be interesting to see what influence, if any 
has Belgium had in the development of South Africa’s retirement security 
provision. 
 The Netherlands is regarded as a country with one of the best pension 
systems in the world,2  and therefore serves as the best example when 
coming to retirement security provision. 
                                            
 
1
 The United Kingdom consists of four semi-autonomous regions; namely England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales. However, the discussion in this Chapter reviews the law that applies in the 
whole United Kingdom. See in this regard 
http://www.cilex.org.uk/about_cilex_lawyers/the_uk_legal_system. aspx, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
Pension Credit in Great Britain is administered by the Department of Works and Pensions (England, 
Wales, and Scotland) and the Department for Social Development (Northern Ireland), accessed from 
http://www.ehow.com/how_6900179_apply-pension-credit.html#ixzz2KluHE093, last visited on 12 
May 2015.  
2
 It has been found that in the Netherlands, many retirees are able to replace close to 100% of their 
pre-retirement income through earnings-related defined-benefit plans, which cover more than nine in 
ten workers, plus the country’s flat-rate public scheme, which covers all residents. Most of the 
employer-sponsored defined-benefit plans replace 75% of a workers’ final pay, meanwhile public-
pension plan replaces 30% of a worker’s average pay. See Powell R and Jones D “Retiring: 
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 The United Kingdom offers an advanced system with some unique features. It 
should also be noted that the development of social security provision in 
South Africa has to a certain extent followed developments in the United 
Kingdom.3 For example, before the introduction of the regulatory system in 
South Africa, through among other things the introduction of the Pension 
Funds Act 24 of 1956, pension funds in this country took the form of trusts (as 
it is still the case in the United Kingdom) and further the functions of the office 
of the Pension Funds Adjudicator (South Africa) are similar to those of the 
United Kingdom’s Pensions Ombudsman. 
 Interestingly, South Africa was for many years colonised by both the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands colonised South Africa 
from the mid-17th century to the early 18th century, and the British took over 
the Cape colony in 1814 during the Napoleonic Wars.4 South Africa was first 
colonised by white settlers under the Dutch East India Company in 1652. 
Domination by the English over the Dutch brought about the establishment of 
the new colonies of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal by the Dutch.5  
 It is also generally accepted that most African countries’ approaches to social 
security have been largely influenced by the Western systems,6 as Africa was 
under the control of some of the Western countries for many years.7 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Netherlands, Australia Offer Better Pension Benefits” September 23, 2009, accessed from 
http://www.globalaging.org/pension/world/2009/retiring-aus.htm, last visited on 12 May 2015 
(hereafter, Powell “Retiring: Netherlands, Australia Offer Better Pension Benefits”). Netherlands has 
also been rated as one of the countries which have one of the best pension systems in the world by 
the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report using the adequacy, sustainability, and 
integrity index. See in this regard http://www.mercer.com/referencecontent.htm?idContent=1359260 
at 72-74, last accessed on 12 May 2015 (hereafter, Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 
Report). 
3
 Marx GL, Hanekom K The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits 
2009 Vol 1 at 2. 
4
The Napoleonic Wars took place between 1799 and 1815. See in this regard 
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_napoleonic.html, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
5
The History of Apartheid in South Africa, accessed from http://www-cs-
students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs 201/apartheid.hist.html, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
6
Kaseke E “The Challenges of Extending Social Security to the Poor: An African Perspective” (Paper 
delivered at the Global Conference on Poverty, Social Welfare and Social Development Challenges 
for 21
st
 Century, 29
th
 ICSW – International Conference on Social Welfare, Cape Town, South Africa, 
23-27 October 2000), accessed from http://www.icsw.org/global-conferences/challenges-
extending.htm, last visited on 12 May 2015.  
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3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT 
SECURITY SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM  
 
3.2.1 Introduction  
 
It is believed that social security was introduced to the world for the first time by 
Bismarck and that it was later given a new look by the Beveridge social security plan 
in 1942.8 It should, however, be noted that the countries of the world today follow 
different approaches in their social security provision. Thus, even though these three 
countries are all European, each one has a different system and follow a different 
approach.  
  
                                                                                                                                       
 
7
For example, South Africa received its independence from Britain in 1910, Botswana in 1966, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was colonised by Belgium until 1960, Lesotho was colonised by Britain 
until 1966, and Namibia was under South African control until 1990. See in this regard Chronological 
List of African Independence, accessed from http://africanhistory.about.com/library/timelines/ 
blIndependenceTime.htm, last visited on 12 May 2015.  
8
 Jehoma S “Social Security and Retirement Reform” (Presentation made at Pension Lawyers’ 
Association 2012 Conference), February 2012 (unpublished), accessed from 
http://www.pensionlawyers.co.za/resources/downloads/2012-downloads/, last visited 12 May 2015. 
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Most of the countries in the centre of Europe, which include Germany, Italy, France, 
and Belgium, follow the Bismarckian approach,9 even though the Belgian social 
security system has some elements of the Beveridge approach and has 
progressively become more and more redistributive in nature.10 Countries towards 
the north, such as Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, follow the Beveridge 
approach.11 Countries towards the east follow the World Bank’s approach, and these 
countries include, among others, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The 
Netherlands also follows the World Bank’s approach,12 albeit with Beveridgean and 
Bismarckian elements.13  
 
This is an indication that countries take different approaches to social security 
provisions which are influenced by different factors. It is for this reason that South 
Africa should also follow its own approach based on the country’s unique history and 
the socio-economic needs of its people, and only follow other countries where 
necessary.14 
 
                                            
 
9
 See generally, Crankshaw E Bismarck 1981 and Ludwig E Bismarck: The Story of a Fighter 1881-
1948 (first printed in English in 1927) regarding who Bismack was and his rise to prominence. Otto 
von Bismarck, also known as the Iron Chancellor, was born in 1815. He was the chancellor of 
Germany from the 1860s to 1890. He was the founder of the German Empire (accessed from 
http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/bismarck.htm, last visited on 12 May 2015). The Bismarckian 
approach is discussed in paragraph (par) 3.2.2.1. 
10
 Jousten A, Lefébvre M, Perelman S, Pestieau P “Social Security in Belgium: Distributive Outcomes” 
(Discussion Paper No. 1486, Institute for the Study of Labor) February 2005, at 1, accessed from 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp1486.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015.  
11
 Beveridge W Social Security and Allied Services, (Report by Sir William Beveridge: Presented to 
Parliament by Command of his Majesty) November 1942) (hereafter, Beveridge The Beveridge 
Report). The Beveridge approach is discussed in par 3.2.2.2. William Henry Beveridge was a British 
economist and social reformer. He was the founder of Britain’s welfare state.  
12
 The World Bank is a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries 
around the world. See the role the World Bank plays in pension reform in Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG) “Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An Evaluation of World 
Bank Assistance” (The World Bank) 2006 (hereafter, Independent Evaluation Group “An Evaluation of 
World Bank Assistance”). 
13
 Guardiancich I “The Netherlands Current Pension System: First Assessment of Reform Outcomes 
and Output” (Research Project “Assurer Une Pension Adéquqte Dans Un Contexte Européen”, 
Supported by the Belgian Federal Public Service Social Security) May 2010, accessed from 
http://www.ose.be/files/publication/2010/country_reports_pension/OSE_2010_CRpension_TheNetherl
ands.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015 (hereafter, Guardiancich “The Netherlands Current Pension 
System”).  
14
 The history of South Africa’s social security provision is discussed in Ch 4.   
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These countries are also members of the European Union15 and of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development16 (OECD) countries respectively. 
Social protection in the European Union is a national benefit, which means that 
citizens are provided for by their own countries which follow their own individual 
approaches. Therefore, the European Union has little influence on social policy and 
welfare provision. Member states are free to decide on the type and level of social 
protection they deem affordable and adequate17 for their citizens.  
 
The OECD assists governments to fight poverty through economic growth and 
financial stability.18 Countries falling under the Organisation provide a safety-net 
aimed at alleviating poverty for the elderly,19 and most of the countries use a three-
pillar approach even though their application might differ.20 The OECD offers what is 
called “derived pension rights” as a pension policy issue. The benefits include 
spousal benefits, benefits for divorced spouses, and survivor’s benefits for 
widow(er)s and orphans. These benefits are normally calculated as a percentage of 
the participating worker’s rights and it is only in rare occasions, for example, that a 
widow is entitled to the full benefit of her deceased husband.21  
 
                                            
 
15
 The following countries make up the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
16
 The following countries make up the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The membership of the OECD is 
currently 24. OECD is a forum where governments of member countries work together to address the 
economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. See in this regard 
http://www.oecd.org/about/, last visited 12 May 2015. 
17
 Kvist J and Saari J The Europeanisation of Social Protection 2007 at 1 (hereafter, Kvist The 
Europeanisation of Social Protection). 
18
 See generally on the OECD: http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/, last visited on 12 May 
2015. 
19
 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies across OECD Countries 2005 at 22. 
20
 Gillion C, Turner J, Bailey C, Latulippe D Social Security Pensions: Development (International 
Labour Office Geneva) 2000 at 576-578.   
21
 Choi J “The Role of Derived Rights for Old-age Income Security of Women”, at 6 (OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 43, OECD Publishing), accessed from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/350882777255, last visited on 07 September 2015.   
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3.2.2 Bismarckian, Beveridge, and the World Bank approaches to pension 
provision  
 
3.2.2.1 The Bismarckian approach 
 
The Bismarckian approach was introduced in the 1880s by Bismarck to the German 
Empire. In terms of this approach, eligibility for state-provided social protection is 
based more directly on those who are in employment; hence provision and 
entitlement to benefits are determined by contributions paid during the period a 
person is still working. Eligibility for benefits depends on whether the person has 
worked or is presently working, with the objective being to maintain an individual’s 
income levels over a period of time. In this regard, the role of the state as a social 
security provider is limited. People are expected to rely on private social security 
provisions and other voluntary savings arrangements for support when they retire.22 
The problem with this system is that it does not provide for universal coverage. The 
system can also exclude those members of the community who are not employed 
and are without a salary.23 Thus, the system is very limited and exclusionary in 
nature and overlooks the poor and the unemployed who are in fact the most 
vulnerable members of society. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Beveridge system 
 
The Beveridge system resulted from an inquiry led by Sir William Beveridge and set 
up by the British Government to examine the country’s social insurance and allied 
services in June 1941. The Beveridge Report was issued in 1942.24 Its proposals 
formed the basis of the 1945-1951 Labour Government’s radical reforms, which 
created the social security framework adopted after the Second World War.25  
 
                                            
 
22
 East R Social Security Law 1999 at 51 (hereafter, East Social Security Law).  
23
 Ibid at 42-43. 
24
 Beveridge The Beveridge Report op cit note 11. 
25
 East Social Security Law op cit note 22 at 22-43. 
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The Report recommended the adoption of a contributory social security system 
which would protect all citizens against sickness, unemployment, and old-age. The 
system would require employees, employers, and the state to make contributions to 
social insurance schemes. Where necessary, benefits would be unlimited in duration 
but they would be subject to certain conditions. The system would cover all social 
risks until a person dies. Beveridge identified the following, which he called the five 
“Giant Evils”: want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness – which could, 
according to him, only be cured by the general reform to the system of welfare in the 
United Kingdom.26  
 
The Report further identified the following six categories of persons as those in 
actual or potential need: employees, the self-employed, housewives, aged people 
not gainfully occupied (including the unemployed), the sick and the disabled, and 
those below working age and those retired due to old-age.27 The Report suggested 
the following seven different kinds of cash benefits to cover the identified groups: 
unemployment and sickness benefits, the self-employed who suffered a threat of 
bankruptcy, special provision for the needs of married women, disability benefits 
which would embrace industrial injuries, funeral benefits, family allowances, and old-
age pensions.28  
 
All these benefits would be flat-rate and would not depend on income when a person 
is employed as they would be calculated on the basis of subsistence. The schemes 
would be contributory at a flat-rate irrespective of means and based on the principle 
of insurance. Thus, the eligibility for benefits would be based on contributions paid 
when a person is working.29 However, there would be provision for a means-tested 
benefit for those people who are not covered by contributory schemes.30  
                                            
 
26
 Beveridge The Beveridge Report op cit note 11 at 6. 
27
 Ibid at 10, 122, and 124-127. 
28
 Idem. 
29
 Idem at 11.  
30
 Idem at 141.  
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The system would provide for a fixed and minimum universal pension which may not 
provide a pension comparable to the standard of living the majority of people 
enjoyed during their working life;31 hence supplementary schemes were later 
developed to deal with this shortcoming.32 
 
What is commendable about this approach is that, unlike the Bismarckian approach, 
the system caters for all the people – including those working, the unemployed, the 
self-employed, poor members of society, and children – against numerous social 
risks. The system provides for supplementary schemes which can be used as top-
ups by those who have joined employer-established schemes but who would like to 
add on to what they already have in order to increase their benefits. 
 
3.2.2.3 The World Bank 
 
The World Bank (WB) has over the years supported a wide range of pension 
reforms.33 Between 1984 and 2004, the Bank had already assisted 68 countries with 
reforms to their pension systems through more than 200 loans and credits. In 
addition, the Bank has issued many papers and publications on pension reform,34 
which can be used as a point of reference by the countries of the world.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
31
 Idem at 121-122.  
32
 East Social Security Law op cit note 22 at 43-44. 
33
 It does this through analytical and advisory services, and lending operations. See in this regard, An 
Independent Evaluation Group: An Evaluation of World Bank Assistance op cit note 12 at ix. 
34
 Ibid at xv. 
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The World Bank promotes self-sufficiency,35 and advocates for a multi-pillar system 
for the provision of old-age income security.36 The first pillar comprises a mandatory 
publicly managed pillar that aims to be redistributive in nature;37 the second pillar is a 
mandatory privately managed pillar focused on saving38 (here, self-sufficiency is 
again encouraged and may even be forced upon citizens); and the third pillar is a 
voluntary pillar also aimed at savings, and personal and occupational plans that are 
fully funded.39 The system places greater emphasis on saving and the utilisation of 
both public and private arrangements, full funding, and pay-as-you-go financing.40  
 
The World Bank’s recommended multi-pillar system can be summarised as follows:41 
 
The World Bank’s Multi-pillars 
1st Pillar 
A public pillar, backed by government through tax revenue, with a limited 
objective of reducing poverty in old-age and co-insuring against a multitude of 
risks.  
2nd Pillar 
A mandatory pillar comprising personal saving accounts or, in some cases, 
occupational plans. It is fully funded and privately managed, but publicly 
regulated, and it links benefits closely to costs because it carries out the 
income-smoothing or saving function. 
3rd Pillar 
A voluntary pillar which can take the form of either occupational or personal 
saving plans which provide additional protection for people who want more 
protection or benefits. 
 
 
                                            
 
35
 Ibid at ix (foreword).  
36
 World Bank: Averting the Old Age Crisis – Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth (A World 
Bank Policy Research Report) (Oxford University Press) 1994 at xiii (hereafter, World Bank: Averting 
the Old Age Crisis). 
37
 World Bank: Averting the Old Age Crisis (ibid) at 10.   
38
 World Bank (idem). It involves income smoothing over a person’s lifetime: people postpone some 
consumption when they are young and their earnings are high so that they can consume more in their 
old-age than their reduced earnings would permit. It takes the form of social insurance. 
39
 World Bank (idem). These arrangements take an insurance form.  
40
 James E “Protecting the Old and Promoting Growth: A Defence of Averting the Old Age Crisis” 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No: 1570) January 1996 at 3 (hereafter James 
“Protecting the Old and Promoting Growth”).  
41
 World Bank: Averting the Old Age Crisis op cit note 36 at 238-239. 
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The World Bank is in favour of a mandatory pillar that is privately managed as ideally 
suited for handling people’s savings, a publicly managed tax-financed pillar for 
redistribution, and a third pillar, which is voluntary, for people who want additional 
old-age security.42 The Bank’s desired goal is to see each country’s old-age security 
system providing for all the three pillars; with the state playing a different role in each 
one of them.43  
 
It is further recommended by the Bank that any approach chosen by a particular 
country should have basic goals of helping the old and helping the broader economy; 
that old-age programmes should be both a social safety-net and an instrument for 
growth.44 The Bank’s approach is generally followed in most countries of the world, 
including South Africa, even though South Africa does not follow it in its totality. 
Another important factor with the World Bank’s approach is the fact that it advocates 
for a mandatory second pillar (occupational pensions).  
 
It should be noted here that even though South Africa follows the World Bank’s 
approach (to a great extent), the country has still  yet made participation compulsory, 
except in the sectors where the Minister has issued a sectoral determination to that 
effect. Unfortunately this has created a system which is exclusionary in nature.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
42
 James “Protecting the Old and Promoting Growth” op cit note 40 at 3. 
43
 World Bank: Averting the Old-Age Crisis op cit note 36 at 10. 
44
 Ibid at 233. 
45
 See the discussion of the World Bank’s approach to pension provision under par 3.2.2.3 and a 
discussion on the nature of South Africa’s pension system in Ch 5. 
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3.3 SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION PROVISION IN BELGIUM 
 
3.3.1 General 
 
Belgium is a federal state which consists of three geographical regions comprising 
three communities, namely Flemish, French, and German-speaking communities – 
each with its own regional authorities established in terms of articles 1-3 of the 
Belgian Constitution, 1994. However, social security in Belgium is organised at a 
national level;46 meaning that all the three Belgian communities follow the same 
social security system with the same rules and regulations.47 Its pension system is 
that of a unitary state. However, there have been conflicts among the different 
regions with regard to the provision of social security, mostly as a result of the 
different socio-economic conditions in the three communities. They include the 
complaint by the Flemish community that they were paying more contributions to 
support the people of Wallonia (French-speaking southern region of Belgium) that 
were considered to be lazy and wasteful. This perception was, however, clarified by 
subsequent studies which showed that the causes of the inequalities and imbalances 
that characterise the Belgian communities emanated from, among other things, the 
past experiences of heavy industries in the southern region, the fact that the 
Wallonian population is old, less healthy, and has low employment; while on the 
other hand, the Flemish community has a high employment rate.48 
 
                                            
 
46
 Van Vugt PA, Peet JM (eds) Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union: Facts, 
Evaluations, and Perspectives 2000 at 15 (hereafter, Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the 
European Union).  
47 Pieters D Introduction into the Social Security Law of the Member States of the European 
Community 1990 at 21 (hereafter, Pieters Introduction into the Social Security Law of the Member 
States of the European Community). 
48
 See in this regard Marier P Institutional Structure and Policy Change: Pension Reforms in Belgium, 
France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Doctoral Thesis: Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts 
and Sciences in partial fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy: 
University of Pittsburgh 2002) at 151 (hereafter, Marier P Institutional Structure and Policy Change: 
Pension Reforms in Belgium, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). See also footnote 160 in 
which the author states the views of Vaes B’s article “Un divorce de la sécurité sociale?” Où va la 
Belgique? Ed. Marco Martiniello and Marc Swyngedouw. Paris: Editions L'Hartmattan, 1998 at 174. 
The thesis was accessed from http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/10309/1/MarierDiss.pdf, last visited on 10 
September 2015.  
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
69 
 
Social security legislation and social services were introduced in Belgium at the end 
of the 19th century. However, it was only in 1903 that the country saw the 
introduction of the first compulsory insurance, which evolved from a basic insurance 
to a guarantee for subsistence security for everyone in Belgian by 1974.49 Pension 
legislation was only introduced in 1924.50 
 
It is compulsory for everyone living in Belgium to be insured and entitlement to 
benefits depends on contributions made to social security funds. The 
systemprovides a number of social security arrangements, which include assistance 
to the unemployed, and social security for employees, civil servants, and the self-
employed.51 
 
The Belgian system is mostly influenced by the Bismarckian social insurance 
approach, but also has elements of the Beveridge approach.52 Belgium is also said 
to have been greatly influenced by the French pension system53 as it was at some 
stage occupied by the French prior to its independence. As a result, the two systems 
share many similarities.54   
 
 
 
                                            
 
49
 Van Massenhove F (Chief Publisher) “Social Security: Everything you have Always Wanted to 
Know” (Federal Public Service Social Security), February 2012 at 8, accessed from 
http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/docs/en/alwa2012_en.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015 (hereafter 
Van Massenhove “Social Security: Everything you have Always Wanted to Know”). 
50
 Marier P Institutional Structure and Policy Change: Pension Reforms in Belgium, France, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom op cit note 48 at 136. 
51
 Pieters Introduction into the Social Security Law of the Member States of the European Community 
op cit note 47 at 21. 
52
 Van Massenhove “Social Security: Everything you have aways Wanted to Know” op cit note 49 at 
8-9. 
53
 The French pension system is a government mandatory system that covers all private sector 
workers by providing a means-tested minimum pension and work-related pensions as defined 
benefits. Mandatory work-related supplementary plans provide about one-third of the pension benefits 
received by an average retiree. See in this regard Muir DM and Turner JA (eds) Imagining the Ideal 
Pension System: International Perspectives 2011 at 8. 
54
 Marier P Institutional Structure and Policy Change: Pension Reforms in Belgium, France, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom op cit note 48 at 132. 
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Employers and employees pay contributions to the National Social Security Office to 
finance social security. It is the employers’ duty to ensure that their employees are 
covered by the national social security system, regardless of whether the person is a 
Belgian citizen or not. This is good as coverage is extended to every person residing 
and working in Belgium. The social security fund provides for, among other benefits, 
the following: family benefits, unemployment benefits, incapacity benefits, accidents 
in the workplace, occupational illness, pensions, and annual paid holidays.55 The 
benefits are determined according to the cost of living and the financial situation of 
the beneficiary at that particular time.56 
 
Social security benefits in Belgium are provided through national institutions with a 
small number of private institutions administering certain benefits; for example, 
unemployment benefits are administered by unions.57  
 
The Belgian system caters for salaried persons, self-employed persons, and civil 
servants. Provision for salaried persons is the largest of the three. The National 
Office for Social Security (RSZ – ONSS) is responsible for collecting both the 
employers’ and employees’ social security contributions. However, payments of 
benefits are made by institutions called semi-public institutions or parastatals. Self-
employed persons join and pay social contributions to a social insurance fund for 
self-employed people or to the National Auxiliary Fund for Social Insurance of the 
Self-Employed, which is controlled by the National Institute for the Social Security for 
the Self-employed (RSVZ-INASTI). Civil servants are divided into local and provincial 
authorities and that of other administrators.58 Social assistance is administered by 
the Public Welfare Centre (OCMW-CPAS) found in every municipality.59 
 
                                            
 
55
 Social Security in Belgium, accessed from http://www.belgium.be/en/family/social_security_in_ 
belgium/, last visited on 12 May 2015.  
56
 Jousten “Social Security in Belgium: Distributive Outcomes” op cit note 10 at 3. 
57
 Van Vugt “Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union” op cit note 46 at 15-16. 
58
 Van Massenhove “Social Security: Everything you have Always Wanted to Know” op cit note 49 at 
9. 
59
 Idem. 
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Belgium has a legal structure called the Organization for Financing Pensions which 
offers pension funds at a very flexible management structure. All existing pension 
funds had to switch to this structure by January 1, 2012. Pension funds receive tax 
advantages when they change to the Organization for Financing Pensions. The main 
aim of this organisation is to create a prudent and coherent management model in 
which investments are aligned with the characteristics of the plan.60    
 
The Belgian Constitution protects the right to lead a life in conformity with human 
dignity. This right encompasses, among other rights, the right to social security.61 
The Constitution further provides that the rights and freedoms recognised for Belgian 
people should be ensured without discrimination.62  
 
Belgium also has the Charter of the Socially Insured, which came into force on 
January 1, 1997. The Charter contains the rights and obligations of the socially 
insured (the population of Belgium) in their dealings with the social security 
institutions. The aim of the Charter is to protect the population through a set of rules 
which regulate social security institutions.63 Belgium’s social security schemes are 
regulated in terms of statutory law. Social security for employees is founded on the 
Social Security Act of 1944, which was replaced by the Social Security Act of 27 
June 1969. Social security for the self-employed is regulated under the Social 
Security Act of 1967.64  
 
 
                                            
 
60
 Perrin T “Belgium: New Law on the Supervision of Pension Funds” (Global Benefits and 
Compensation Issues) May 2007 (Towers Perrin, HR Services), accessed from 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=HRS/USA/2007/200705/gist_belgium_51720
07.pdf, last visited on 20 November 2014.  
61
 Article 23(2) of Tile II (titled “the Belgians and their Rights”) of the Belgian Constitution. See also 
Crabb JH The Constitution of Belgium and the Belgian Civil Code (as amended to September 1, 
1982) 1982 at 4. 
62
 Article 11 of the Belgian Constitution. 
63
 Van Massenhove “Social Security: Everything you have Always Wanted to Know” op cit note 49 at 
9. 
64
 Van Vugt “Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union” op cit note 46 at 14. 
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The Supervision of Occupational Retirement Institutions Act, 2006 (La loi relative au 
contrôle des institutions de retraite professionnelle) regulates pension funds and the 
Complementary Pensions Act, 2003 (La loi sur les retraites complémentaires), sets 
out a framework for occupational pension provision. The Self-Employed 
Complementary Pensions Act, 2003 (La loi sur les pensions complémentaires des 
travailleurs indépendants), regulates supplementary pension provision for the self-
employed.65 
 
3.3.2 The Belgian pension system 
 
Pension provision in Belgium is determined on the basis of the following three 
elements: profession, salary, and family circumstances.66 All Belgian pensioners 
receive their benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. In terms of this approach, 
contributions of people who are currently employed are used to pay for the pensions 
of current beneficiaries. This approach is problematic and unsustainable in countries 
which are experiencing high levels of unemployment as the pool from which benefits 
should be paid depends on contributions made by those who are working and 
earning a salary. Such an approach will also experience challenges in situations 
where systems are often called upon to pay lots of death benefits resulting from 
deaths emanating from sicknesses and diseases such as HIV/Aids. In such cases, 
the number of those working and paying contributions will be reduced by the levels 
of deaths resulting from a pandemic.  
 
 
                                            
 
65
 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Country Profile: Belgium (Extract from the OECD Private Pensions 
Outlook 2008) (OECD 2009) at 171, accessed from http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-
pensions/42565572.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015 (hereafter, OECD Pensions at a Glance: Country 
Profile: Belgium). 
66
 European Commission: Adequate and Sustainable Pensions – A Synthesis Report 2006 (August) 
(European Commission – Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
(Unit E.4)) at 151, accessed from http://www.gender.sachsen-anhalt.de/uploads/tx_nwcitavilist/files/ 
European%20Commission_(2006)_Adequate%20and%20sustainable%20pensions.pdf, last visited 
on 12 May 2015 (hereafter, European Commission Adequate and Sustainable Pensions). 
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Thus, the smaller the number of people who are paying contributions, the smaller the 
amount that will be available in the pool. 
 
Belgium has private retirement schemes which are limited in size,67 and a welfare 
scheme providing for a minimum old-age pension.  
 
The old-age pension is used to supplement the social insurance schemes available 
to employees.68 Thus the Belgian pension system comprises three pillars, namely a 
guaranteed minimum old-age pension; occupational pensions; and private pension 
schemes. These pillars are individually discussed below. 
 
3.3.2.1 Guaranteed Minimum Old-Age Income  
 
Social assistance is regarded as a relatively minor part of social security. However, 
the number of people receiving social assistance has increased over the last two 
decades.69 Social assistance is aimed at ensuring that people’s right to a minimum 
income and to access basic social services are realised, and that everyone has a 
dignified life.70 The Guaranteed Minimum Old-Age Income was introduced in 1946 
and was extended to take its current form in 1969.71  
                                            
 
67
 De Gallatay E and Turtelboom B “Pension Reform in Belgium” (International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper) July 1996 at 5.   
68
 De Gallatay (idem). Similar to South Africa’s state old-age pension. 
69
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 25. In 2005, the 
number of people of Belgian descent who had a poverty risk, was estimated at 12% (See De Witte L 
and Vanassche S “The Effectiveness of Social Assistance Benefits among Elderly Immigrants in 
Belgium-Draft” at 1, accessed from http://epc2014.princeton.edu/papers/140828, last visited on 12 
May 2015). 
70
 Criel B, Van Damme W, Meessen B and Por I “A Comparative Analysis of Public Social Assistance 
Systems in Belgium and Health Equity Funds in Cambodia: An Overview of Lessons Learned” 
(Studies in HSO&P), 23, 2008 at 348, accessed from http://www.itg.be/itg/Uploads/ 
Volksgezondheid/povill/A% 
20comparative%20analysis%20of%20public%20social%20assistance%20systems%20in%20Belgium
%20and%20health%20equity%20funds%20in%20Cambodia%20-%20an%20overview%20of%20 
lessons%20learned.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015. According to Kazepov Y and Sabatinelli S 
“Minimum Income and Social Integration: Institutional Arrangements in Europe” (Working Paper, 
Geneva, International Labour Office, 2006) at 2-3 (accessed from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_ 
secsoc_8916.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015), social assistance arrangements (provision) have 
become very important in all European countries due to the growth of unemployment and the 
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The fund is fully financed by the state through tax revenue. The benefit is means-
tested.72 It serves as a subsistence minimum granted to the elderly.73 Elderly people 
receive a guaranteed income if they have reached the required pension age.74  
 
Men received the pension benefit at the age of 60, while women were eligible for the 
grant at the age of 62.75 The eligibility age for men and women has since been 
equalled at 65 from 2009 in order to bring parity to the rules governing men’s and 
women’s retirement age and to remove unequal treatment of men and women.76 In 
principle, social assistance is available to any qualifying person residing in 
Belgium.77  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
weakening of family ties. The high rate of unemployment after the end of the seventies and long-term 
unemployment forced many people to resort to social assistance schemes when their insurance 
benefits were depleted. The high rate of divorce, single households, and single parents reduced 
reliance on relational resources in developing strategies to cope with economic breakdowns. 
71
 Pieters Introduction into the Social Security Law of the Member States of the European Community 
op cit note 47 at 51. Becquaert H (Expert and Advisor to the Belgian Minister of Social Affairs and 
Pensions) “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension System” (Washington, DC, 
07/27/2001) at 4 (hereafter, Becquaert “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension 
System”); Pesteau P, Stijns J “Social Security and Retirement in Belgium” Working Paper 6169 
(National Bureau of Economic Research) September 1997 at 11. The publication can also be 
accessed from http://www.nber.org/papers/w6169, last visited on 12 May 2015 (hereafter, Pesteau 
“Social Security and Retirement in Belgium”). 
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 Pieters Introduction into the Social Security Law of the Member States of the European Community 
op cit note 47 at 51. 
73
 Becquaert “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension System” op cit note 71 at 4; 
Pesteau “Social Security and Retirement in Belgium” op cit note 66 at 11. 
74
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 26; Becquaert 
(idem); Eardley T, Bradshaw J, Ditch J, Gough I and Whiteford P “Social Assistance in OECD 
Countries: Country Reports” (Department of Social Security Research Report No. 47) 1996 at 58-60 
(hereafter, Eardley et al “Social Assistance in OECD Countries”); see also generally, Lewis DK 
(International Staff, Office of Research and Statistics) “Social Security Abroad: Guaranteed Income 
for the Aged in Belgium” Bulletin, September 1969, at 30-32, accessed from 
http://ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v32n9/v32n9p30.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
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 Eardley et al “Social Assistance in OECD Countries” (ibid) at 58. 
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 Pestieau P and Stijns J “Social Security and Retirement in Belgium” in Gruber J and Wise DA (eds) 
Social Security and Retirement Around the World (National Bureau of Economic Research_University 
of Chicago Press) January 1999 at 40, chapter accessed from 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7248.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015 (URL (for the book): 
http://www.nber.org/books/grub99-1 (hereafter Gruber Social Security and Retirement Around the 
World). 
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Belgium has no official poverty line.78 The amount of the benefit is determined 
according to the applicant’s personal situation; for example, occupational status, 
gross salary, number of years worked, and family circumstances.79 The amount 
payable varies depending on the type of pension; namely household retirement 
pension, single retirement pension, survival pension, or the combination of 
retirement pension with a survival pension.80 The state pension is there to ensure 
that every needy person living in Belgium receives a minimum income.81 This is 
similar to South Africa’s state old-age pension offered to both men and women from 
the age of 60 after passing the means-test. South Africa, just like Belgium, used to 
provide old-age pension to men and women at different ages, but this has since 
been corrected.82 The state old-age pension is primarily meant for the poor. 
 
3.3.2.2 Occupational pensions 
 
Belgium has three types of occupational pension plans; namely company schemes, 
sectoral plans (industry-wide), and individual pension schemes. Occupational 
pensions can be provided for by a pension fund, a group pension insurance policy 
administered through a life insurance company, or a collective pension savings 
account administered by a collective investment institution. Company pension plans 
cover all or specific categories of company employees. The terms for the sectoral 
pension plans are laid down in the collective bargaining agreement for the sector. 
Employers in the sector concerned are obliged to join the plan unless the agreement 
allows them to opt-out. Those who decide to opt-out are obliged to put in place a 
plan providing benefits at least similar or equal to those of the sectoral plan.83  
                                            
 
78
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 25. 
79
 Becquaert “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension System” op cit note 71 at 4. 
80
 Consolidating the Future of Pensions (Extract of the Green Paper: National Conference on 
Pensions) at 3, accessed from http://socialsecurity.fgov.be/eu/docs/agenda/06-
08_09_10_extract_GP_pensions_ BE_en.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
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 Becquaert “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension System” op cit note 71 at 4. 
82
 See the discussion under par 5.4 in Ch 5. 
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 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Country Profile: Belgium op cit note 65 at 168. 
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The Belgian system has historically used both the defined-benefit plans and the 
defined-contribution plans; with defined-contribution plans becoming more popular in 
recent times. Pension funds take either the form of a special purpose entity with legal 
personality, for example a foundation, trust or corporate entity or a legally separated 
fund managed by a pension management company or other financial institution.84 
Private-sector employees represent by far the most important category in terms of 
the overall benefits and the number of pensioners.85 In Belgium, disability benefits 
are paid to a maximum age of 65 – in line with the normal retirement age in the 
country.86 
 
In 2013, it was estimated that 2.8 million people were covered under this pillar, with 
2.5 million employees covered by pension plans established by employers or 
sectors, and another 307 000 self-employed people covered under supplementary 
pension plans. Employers and employees contribute to the scheme.87  
 
Occupational funds can be instituted by collective agreement or by other special 
procedures. In the case of collective agreement, all workers covered by the 
agreement must benefit from the plan. Employers may offer their employees, 
individual pension savings plans to supplement a collective pension savings plan. 
Such plans can be put in place at any time up to three years before a beneficiary’s 
retirement. However, there may not be different pension schemes for workers falling 
under one category. Where an employee changes his or her job within the same 
sector, the employee may choose either to transfer the benefit to the new employer 
or leave it in the former fund.88  
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 Gruber Social Security and Retirement Around the World op cit note 76 at 46. 
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 See in this regard Jousten A, Lefebvre M, Perelman S “Disability in Belgium: There is More than 
Meets the Eye” (Working Paper 17114, National Bureau of Economic Research) 2011, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17114, last visited on 07 September 2015. 
87
 Berthon J, Davydoff D, Gabaut L, Klages M, Prache G, Rossi M, Rutecka J, Struwe K and Viver JM 
“Pension Savings: The Real Return” 2014 edition (A Research Report by Better Finance for all) at 37-
38. 
88
 See in this regard OECD Pensions at a Glance: Country Profile: Belgium op cit note 65 at 169-170 
and Trampusch C, Eichenberger P, de Roo M, Bartlett RR, Bieri I, Scmid L, Steimlin S (eds) “Pension 
in Belgium” REBECA (Research on Social Benefits in Collective Agreements). Database, Part 2 
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Occupational retirement schemes in South Africa are also generally established by 
employers for their employees. Participation in these schemes is not compulsory per 
se but can be considered to be quasi-mandatory in that employers who establish 
retirement funds also make participation in the fund part of the employment 
contract.89 South Africa also has funds for different economic sectors in which 
employees in those sectors must participate.90  
 
In Belgium, pensions for public sector employees, which previously covered civil and 
ecclesiastical pensions, now cover civil servants in the federal government and in the 
regional and local authorities, as well as employees in certain public enterprises.91 
Pensions for public-sector employees are paid from the general federal budget.  
 
These pensions are considered to be deferred income and not as insurance for old-
age or retirement.92 The mandatory retirement age is 65 for both men and women. 
However, it is possible to take an early retirement for an incomplete career and retire 
at the age of 60. Public-sector pensions are automatically indexed to salaries.93 This 
scheme is similar to South Africa’s Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), 
in which all government employees participate.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
‘Social Benefits in Collective Agreements’. SNF-Project No.100012-119898. (Institute of Political 
Science, University of Berne) at 6-7, available at http://www.rebeca.ipw.unibe.ch., last visited 12 May 
2015. 
89
 Discussed under par 6.2 in Ch 6. 
90
 Discussed under par 6.3.2 in Ch 6. 
91
 Gruber Social Security and Retirement around the World op cit note 76 at 48.  
92
 Ibid at 47. 
93
 Ibid at 48.  
94
 The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is discussed under par 6.4.6.3 in Ch 6.  
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
78 
 
There is also pension for the self-employed95 in Belgium. This is in the form of a 
compulsory insurance system which requires proportional contributions, which give 
the right to a fixed pension based on the number of years worked. This pension, 
which was introduced in 1956, was replaced in 1984 by one calculated proportionally 
on actual earnings.96 The pension regime for the self-employed occupies a special 
position within the Bismarckian system. Contributions are regressive and benefits 
are usually at a flat rate.97 Full benefits are payable at the age of 65. If the self-
employed want to retire early, they are required to exit through some private 
retirement-income arrangement, which can either be a formal pension scheme or a 
savings plan.98 South Africa does not have a fund specifically established for this 
category of workers. The self-employed in South Africa have the option to either use 
retirement annuity funds or make use of other forms of savings vehicles offered by 
insurance companies or other financial institutions such as banks.99 
 
In Belgium, employee pensions were organised in the private sector much later than 
in the public sector, with a compulsory funded scheme for the private sector only 
being introduced in 1926. This system was replaced after World War II, first by a 
mixed system, then by an exclusively pay-as-you-go system in 1967. Private-sector 
pensions are financed mainly by payroll taxes and marginally by government 
transfers. There is no limit on contributions. The pension is based on the salary 
earned during the entire career, the length of the career, and an accrual factor that 
depends on one’s marital status when retired.100 
                                            
 
95
 The Royal Decree No. 38 of July 1967 defines a “self-employed worker” and “assistant” as follows: 
A “self-employed worker” is a natural person who exercises professional activity in Belgium under 
which they are not committed to an employment contract or status and, “assistant” is any person who 
assists or replaces a self-employed worker in the exercise of his/her profession in Belgium without 
being bound to the worker by an employment contract. 
96
 Gruber Social Security and Retirement around the World op cit note 76 at 48. 
97
 Overbye E, Kemp PA Pensions: Challenges and Reforms (International Studies on Social Security) 
Vol 9 2004 at 134 and 142 (hereafter, Overbye Pensions: Challenges and Reforms). 
98
 Gruber Social Security and Retirement around the World op cit note 76 at 48-48. 
99
 Discussed under par 5.6 in Ch 5. 
100
 Gruber Social Security and Retirement around the World op cit note 76 at 47. See also OECD and 
G20 Indicators: Pensions at a Glance 2013 at 218, accessed from 
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/public-pensions/OECDPensionsAtAGlance2013.pdf, last visited 12 May 
2015 (hereafter, OECD and G20 Indicators: Pensions at a Glance 2013). 
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Even though not compulsory at the moment, in South Africa those who work in the 
private sector belong to retirement funds which are mostly established by the 
employers and can also make additional savings by joining retirement annuity funds 
and other available savings vehicles.101 
 
In Belgium, both men and women have to prove at least 30 years out of the standard 
45 years of salaried service for a full career.102 The 30 years are not limited only to 
time spent as a Belgian resident, as the time spent in different countries will also be 
taken into account when pension is calculated. Pension accumulated outside 
Belgium will be calculated according to the regulations in that particular country and 
forwarded to the National Pension Office (Office National des Pensions/Rijksdienst 
voor Pensioenen/Landespensionsamt, NPO).103  
 
A person may not combine a pension with a professional activity, but a person may 
combine a pension with an activity as long as the prescribed financial limit is not 
exceeded.104 Pensions are calculated differently for salaried employees, public 
sector employees, and for self-employed persons. It is also possible for a person’s 
pension to be composed of pensions from different sectors, if one has worked in 
several sectors during one’s career.105 A person may also receive pension from two 
different countries if he or she worked in more than one country.106  
Pension benefits are subject to tax. However, retirees qualify for tax rebates. Flat-
rate tax is used for lump-sum payments.107 In order to qualify for a survivors’ 
                                            
 
101
 Discussed under par 6.4 in Ch 6. 
102
 Becquaert “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension System” op cit note 71 at 4. 
103
 The National Pension Office (Office National des Pensions/Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen/ 
Landespensionsamt, NPO) is responsible for administration of pensions in Belgium; and see 
generally, Van Massenhove “Social Security: Everything you have Always Wanted to Know” op cit 
note 49 at 9.  
104
 Becquaert “Social Security and Pension Reform: the Belgian Pension System” op cit note 71 in     
Part I. 
105
 Idem.  
106
 See in this regard the Belgian case of Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen and Robert Engelbrecht 
26.9.2000-Case C-262/97, where Mr Engelbrecht had worked in Belgium and the Netherlands and 
was entitled to pension from the two countries. 
107
 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Pension Country Profile: Belgium (Extract from the OECD Private 
Pensions Outlook 2008) op cit note 65 at 169-170. 
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pension, a person must have reached the age of 45, must have been married to the 
deceased, and the marriage should have lasted for at least one year or a child 
should have been born in the marriage (this, however, is not compulsory in the case 
where the spouse died as a result of an accident or an occupational disease that 
took place after the marriage).108 
 
There is also a benefit for childcare, where a person spends a period of three years 
caring for children. It is called “tijdskrediet”, a right for employees in the private sector 
which allows them to suspend their labour activities or half-time reduction of labour if 
the person has worked over three-quarters of full time for 12 months (before the start 
of “tijdskrediet”). A person must have worked for the same employer for over a year, 
15 months prior to the application for the “tijidskrediet”. Where a person is 
unemployed, the periods on unemployment insurance benefits are credited under 
the pension system. There is no restriction on the number of years to be credited, 
even though a smaller number of years would lead to a lower pension benefit. 
However, note should be taken that unemployment above the age of 62 or after 42 
years of a career does not qualify for the pension bonus.  
 
Those pensioners with low earnings or part-time work receive a minimum annual 
credit aimed at improving the benefits. A person needs at least 15 years’ insurance 
for an equivalent of at least one-third of a full-time employment to qualify for the 
minimum credits. Pensioners who meet the full contribution of 45 years qualify for a 
minimum earnings-related pension.109  
                                            
 
108
 Van Massenhove “Social Security: Everything you have Always Wanted to Know” op cit note 49 at 
38. 
109
 See generally De La Puente M (Associate Commissioner for Research, Evaluation and Statistics) 
“Social Security Programs Through-out the World_ Belgium” September 2014 at 50, accessed from 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2014-2015/europe/ssptw14europe.pdf, last visited on 
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The retirement replacement rate of occupational defined-benefit pension plans, 
including state-pension benefits, is targeted between 60% and 70%. The benefit paid 
can either take the form of lump-sum payment or annuities.110  
 
In order to guard against declining worker-to-retiree ratios, the effects of early 
retirement and income adequacy issues, the Belgian government set the following 
three priorities for reform:111 
 
 The modernisation of the financial safety-net for the elderly and elimination of 
poverty among the elderly; 
 The creation of a demographic reserve called the “Silver Fund” to safeguard 
the financing of the pay-as-you-go system; and 
 Universal access to employer-sponsored private pension plans (these 
pension plans have to meet social criteria and transparency in investment 
practices in order to qualify for tax relief).112 
 
These will go a long way in assisting Belgium to provide for its elderly citizens. For 
example, if everyone in the country participates in some form of retirement savings 
schemes, all the people will have an income when they retire, even though the 
adequacy thereof will still depend on the levels of contributions made and the period 
for which those contributions have been paid. Universal access to employer-
established retirement schemes will also ensure that no one working in Belgium is 
left without protection. 
 
 
 
                                            
 
110
 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Pension Country Profile: Belgium (Extract from the OECD Private 
Pensions Outlook 2008) op cit note 65 at 169.  
111
 Miranda E, Rudolph GP and Steuerle CE Social Security in Nine European Countries: A Portrait of 
Reform, February 2002 at 8, accessed from http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310424.pdf, last 
visited on 12 May 2015. 
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3.3.2.3 Private pension/individual insurance plans 
 
Personal-pension saving schemes are in the form of pension insurance and pension-
savings fund or may even take the form of life insurance. These schemes enable 
people to build up capital in a fiscally advantageous manner by the time they retire. 
The savings vehicles are available to people between 18 and 64 years of age. The 
saver and scheme provider must agree on the contribution level. Benefits are paid 
from the age of 60, but the saver can access the funds earlier with the payment of a 
penalty.113 These savings vehicles are similar to retirement annuity funds and other 
savings schemes available that people who would like to save for their retirement 
can use in South Africa. People who have joined employer-established funds can 
also use these schemes to supplement the benefits they will receive from the funds 
when they retire. Self-employed employees also generally use them. Retirement-
annuity benefits are payable at the age of 55 and not at the age of 60 as it is the 
case in Belgium.114 
 
3.3.2.4 Dispute resolution 
 
Any disputes arising from social security benefits fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Labour Court, in which labour unions, employers, and the government are 
represented.115 There is also the Office of the Federal Ombudsman, which deals with 
complaints concerning social security institutions – except for pensions which are 
handled by the Pension Ombudsman.116  
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 OECD Pensions at a Glance: Pension Country Profile: Belgium (Extract from the OECD Private 
Pensions Outlook 2008) op cit note 65 at 170. 
114
 Discussed under par 5.5.2 Ch 5. 
115
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 24-25. 
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The Federal Ombudsman investigates complaints where the federal administration 
has acted incorrectly and to the complainant’s disadvantage, or where the 
complainant has waited for a long time to receive a response from the administration 
and has sent several reminders without receiving any help, or where an official of the 
administration has treated the complainant in an unprofessional 
manner.117Complaints about statutory pensions are handled by the Pension 
Ombudsman. The complaints must be about maladministration or the quality of 
services provided by pension offices.118 The Ombudsman deals with complaints 
relating to pensions for salaried persons, self-employed persons, and civil 
servants.119 Pension disputes in South Africa are dealt with by the Office of the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator. Some of the characteristics of the Belgian Pension 
Ombudsman can be found in South Africa’s Pension Funds Adjudicator. However, 
the Adjudicator does not have jurisdiction over social security matters.120  
 
3.4 SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION PROVISION IN THE NETHERLANDS  
 
3.4.1 General 
 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands dates back to 1813. The country’s first written 
Constitution was introduced in 1814.121 The Constitution introduced the monarchy 
and established the States General, consisting of one Chamber, which exercised 
legislative power together with the monarch. Ministerial responsibility was only 
introduced in 1848.122  
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 Information about the Federal Ombudsman accessed from http://www.federalombudsman.be/how-
to-introduce-complaints, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
118
 The Pensions Ombudsman: http://www.ombudsmanpensioenen.be/en/which/which.htm, last 
visited on 27 July 2015.   
119
 Information about Pensions Ombudsman accessed from http://www.ombudsmanpensions.be/en/ 
missions/missions.htm; http://www.ombudsmanpensions.be/, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
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 Discussed under par 6.10.2 in Ch 6. 
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 Even though there was a complete revision of the Constitution in 1983, not much has changed in 
the content of the Constitution since 1948. See in this regard, Constantijn AJM, Kortmannand P, 
Bovend’Eert PT Dutch Constitutional Law 2000 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers) at 17-19 
(hereafter, Constantijn Dutch Constitutional Law). 
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The National government comprises the Monarch, the Council of Ministers, and the 
States General. The Council of Ministers is responsible for planning and 
implementation of government policy.123 
 
The country’s social security system focuses more on providing income for citizens 
who do not have any means of income due to risks that include, among others, 
sickness, disability, unemployment or old-age. Citizens may also claim a 
supplementary income if their income, either from work or from social insurance 
benefits, is insufficient to meet the general costs of living, or in the event of 
exceptional costs. Thus, the system is aimed at preventing people from becoming 
destitute as a result of the hardships that come either through disability, 
unemployment, and/or old-age.124  
 
The main responsibility for decision making on social security in the Netherlands 
rests with the legislature, which determines the extent of social security, financial 
resources involved, and the way in which it is financed. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment governs social security in the country.125 The government 
previously regulated occupational schemes through the Pension and Insurance 
Authority (Pensioen en Verzekeringskamer, PVK) and the Dutch Central Bank (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, DNB). In 2004, the Pension and Insurance Authority merged 
with the Central Bank and the new body is called the Pension Chamber 
(Pensionkamer).126 Social partners that include employees and employers’ 
organisations take part in preparing, formulating, and implementing social policy. 
Some of these responsibilities have increasingly been shifted towards employers.127 
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 Information about the Kingdom of the Netherlands accessed from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
3204.htm, last visited on 12 May 2015. 
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 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 143. 
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The National Institute for Social Security (Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen 
(LISV)) was responsible for employed persons’ insurance. This changed in 2002 
when the Administration of Employees’ Insurance Scheme was introduced 
(Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, UVW). This body makes decisions 
on the right to benefits, payment of benefits, collection of contributions, and 
administration of the benefit funds.128 The Social Security Agencies are responsible 
for the self-employed persons insurance.129 
The first Chapter of the Constitution is devoted to fundamental rights.130 Section 20 
of the Constitution recognises the population’s right to social security and through 
this provision the authorities are given the duty to secure the means of subsistence 
to the population and to enact the law that will regulate benefit entitlements.  
 
The Netherlands did not have a statutory social security system prior to the Second 
World War, as Parliament was of the view that the country had no legal basis for a 
compulsory insurance scheme. Most communities were organised on a religious 
basis and were taken care of by religious groups. Although the Netherlands was a 
member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) from its establishment, the 
conventions adopted by this organisation did not change its approach towards social 
security.131 A change of attitude towards social security only came after the Second 
World War. This change of attitude could be attributed to the influence of the 
Beveridge Report.132 The Netherlands established a legal basis in terms of which the 
state was responsible for social security and freedom from want for all its citizens, 
provided that they take reasonable steps to be responsible for their own income.133  
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 Pennings F Dutch Social Security Law in an International Context 2002 at 19-20 (hereafter, 
Pennings Dutch Social Security Law).  
129
 Social Security in the Netherlands, accessed from http://www.erva.nl/dutch-security.htm, last 
visited on 12 May 2015 (hereafter, Social Security in the Netherlands). 
130
 Constantijn et al Dutch Constitutional Law op cit note 114 at 27-29. 
131
 Pennings Dutch Social Security Law in an International Context op cit 128 at 86. 
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 See the discussion of the Beveridge approach under par 3.2.2.2. 
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 Pennings F Between Soft and Hard Law – The Impact of International Social Security Standards 
on National Social Security Law 2006 at 86 (hereafter, Pennings Between Soft and Hard Law). 
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Social security in the Netherlands is now embodied in a number of statutes. The 
statutes include the Disablement Benefits Act (Wet op de 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, WAO); the Unemployment Benefits Act 
(Werkloosheidwet, WW); the General Old Age Act of 1957 (Algemene 
Ouderdomswet, AOW); the General Surviving Relatives Act (Algemene 
Nabestaandenwet, ANW); the General Child Benefit Act (Algemene 
Kinderbijslagwet, AKW);134 the Pensions and Savings Funds Act of 1952, which has 
since been replaced by the Dutch Pension Act of 2007; the Mandatory Pension Act 
for Professional Groups (Wet Verplichte Beroepspensioenregeling, WVB); the 
Equalisation of Pension Entitlements after Separation Act of 1994 (Wet Verevening 
Pensioenrechten bij Scheiding, WVPS); Sickness Benefits Act (Ziektewet, ZW); 
National Assistance Act (Algemene bijstandswet, ABW); Supplementary Benefits Act 
(Toeslagenwet, TW); and the Work and Social Assistance Act of 2004 (Wet Werk en 
Bijstand, WWB). 
 
3.4.2 The Netherlands (Dutch) pension system 
 
The pension system comprises three pillars; namely the state pension scheme 
(AOW), which covers everyone starting from the age of 65;135 funded occupational 
pension plans; and private individual pension plans.136  
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 In 2012, Parliament passed a Bill (The Bill was approved on 26 March 2015 by the Dutch House of 
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Madrid, 02-03 July 2013 at 1-2. See also generally Pension Country Profile: Netherlands (Extract from 
the OECD Private Pensions Outlook 2008) at 243-246, accessed from 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/42574973.pdf, last visited on 12 May 2015; Meyer T, 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
87 
 
All these pillars are considered when determining the amount of pension benefit a 
person must receive at the time of retirement.137 The system also has what is known 
as the Minimum Income Scheme (social assistance allowance), which is regulated 
by Work and Social Assistance Act. The Act grants a minimum income to anyone 
legally residing in the Netherlands and who has insufficient means to support himself 
or herself. The income assistance plays a top-up role where a person is receiving 
benefits or income from paid work. It does not look at the work history, but it is 
related to minimum wage. People who apply for assistance must be registered as job 
seekers; do the utmost to support themselves; apply for all kinds of generally 
acceptable labour; accept generally acceptable labour; cooperate with any support 
the municipality offers, for example job application training; cooperate with home 
visits and psychological and medical examinations where necessary; and provide the 
municipality with correct information, such as when a recipient start living together 
with another person or other people.138  
 
The benefit is stopped if the person refuses to cooperate in finding a job. Thus, this 
is a form of a social assistance measure. It is financed from tax revenue.139 People 
aged 65 and above who have not been able to build a full state old-age pension 
(AOW) can receive a supplement under the Work and Social Assistance Act of 2004, 
but only up to the level of the net AOW pension.140 The Netherland’s three pillars are 
discussed below.  
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 Reichert The Dutch Pension System (ibid) at 7-8; Meyer Private Pensions versus Social Inclusion 
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3.4.2.1 The state pension 
 
The public old-age pension was established by the General Old Age Law of 1957 
(Algemene Ouderdomswet, AOW) which came into force on 1 January 1957. The 
introduction of the AOW saw the means-test which formed part of the original old-
age pension decree of 1947 being done away with as it was suspected of 
discouraging private savings.141 Its objective was to guarantee adequate income 
(basic income) to all persons aged 65 and above. Since 1980, the level of social 
security benefits has been linked to the statutory minimum wage. A person can 
receive a benefit from the first pillar, or both the first and second pillar, or from the 
first and third pillar, or from all three pillars – depending on that person’s personal 
situation. It is estimated that 2.7 million people were receiving the state pension by 
the end of 2007.142 Its main objective is to lift all those in old-age above social 
assistance level. It is available to everyone who is of old-age without means-
testing.143 The pension has to be claimed in writing from the Social Insurance Bank, 
which has regional offices throughout the country. A benefit is payable on a monthly 
basis and almost all the beneficiaries have their pensions paid into their bank 
accounts.144 
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The state pension covers, in principle, the entire population of the Netherlands, 
irrespective of nationality.145 Eligibility to this pension is based on a period of 50 
years of residency, from age 15 to 65. Thus, a person will only receive a full pension 
after having been covered for 50 years.146 In order to qualify for this pension, the 
claimant must have been insured before the qualifying age.147 The state pension is 
funded by contributions paid by people younger than 65 and additional funding 
comes from government public funds. It is therefore a pay-as-you-go system. This is 
a problem taking into account the fact that a declining working force has to cater for 
the ever-increasing aging population.148   
 
If a person is receiving any other social security benefits, then the benefits end at the 
first day of the month in which the person turns 65. If a person is late in claiming the 
old-age pension, the pension can be paid retrospectively with the maximum effect of 
one year. For example, a person who continues to work until he is 68 can only 
receive a back payment of one year and not three years. Only in exceptional 
circumstances can a person be paid for a longer period. These may include where a 
person cannot be blamed for the late application; for example because of mental 
defects the person was not able to apply for the benefit in time. However, the period 
that is paid for in special situations is usually not more than three years; the statutory 
maximum period is five years. The Social Insurance Bank has discretionary powers 
in deciding whether or not to pay a benefit retroactively and for how long.149    
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People residing illegally in the Netherlands are excluded from benefiting. If a 
pensioner resides or stays for more than three months outside the Netherlands, he 
or she receives a pension at the rate of a married person, which is 50% of the 
statutory minimum wage. This means that a single person or single parent residing 
outside the country receives a lower rate than single persons residing in the 
Netherlands. The rule applies unless an international convention provides 
otherwise.150 An individual accumulates 2% of the pension benefit every year. 
Likewise, 2% of the pension benefit is lost for every year an individual lives and 
works outside the country. Those who have not reached the social minimum age of 
65 may claim means-tested General Social Assistance.151 
 
The benefit and the supplement are reduced for the years during which the claimant 
was not insured or deliberately failed to pay the required contributions for the old-age 
pension, except where a person was exempted from paying contributions as his or 
her income was below the contribution level. A person who falls short of the required 
years of contribution has to apply for a social assistance benefit to reach a social 
minimum income.152 The level of the public pension is politically defined as the social 
minimum.153 According to Bannink,154 the first pillar (the state pension: AOW) of the 
Dutch system provides sound protection to its beneficiaries and also plays a huge 
complementary role to the second pillar (occupational pensions), which has 
weaknesses in that it still excludes categories such as the unemployed and those 
employed in the informal sector.155  
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The Netherlands’ state pension is different from South Africa’s state old-age pension 
in that the former is in the form of an insurance scheme or a public fund. South Africa 
does not have a public fund, but provides for a means-tested state old-age social 
assistance pension. The Netherland’s public fund is insurance-based and the level of 
benefit depends on a number of factors; including the length of the period the person 
was insured. The benefit is used to assist those who fall short of the required years 
of contribution and those who have not yet reached the age of 65. It is not means-
tested while South Africa’s social assistance state old-age pension is means-
tested.156 South Africa needs a public fund which will fill the gap that exists whereby 
those with low earnings do not have a fund that suits their pockets and 
circumstances. 
 
3.4.2.2 Occupational pensions  
 
The history of old-age insurance in the Netherlands dates back to 1889. However, it 
was the introduction of the 1913 Invalidity Act which marked the beginning of 
compulsory old-age insurance in this country. Pension funds were established even 
before the Second World War to cover certain sectors of the industry; for example, 
the coal mining industry and the printing trades. The government appointed a 
Commission chaired by Van Rhijn in 1943. In its 1945 Report, the Commission was 
of the view that social insurance legislation should provide the entire population with 
social security and freedom from want. In 1948, a second Van Rhijn Commission 
Report was issued in favour of extending compulsory insurance to the self-
employed.157 
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Starting from 1945, it was possible to have agreements on pay and conditions of 
employment declared legally binding and this led to the introduction of legally binding 
pension schemes in several industries. The Netherlands saw an increasing number 
of company pension schemes immediately after the post-war period. Pension funds 
were generally invested in companies, and this brought about serious problems of 
companies failing to pay out if they ran into financial difficulties. As a result, the 
Pension and Savings Funds Act was introduced.158 A number of amendments were 
made to the Act over the years and this resulted in the introduction of the Dutch 
Pension Act 2007 as the former was no longer providing adequate regulation of 
pension schemes.159  
 
The occupational pillar consists of supplementary occupational pensions.160 Pension 
funds operate as the provider for collective pension schemes which find their source 
in insurance and investment instruments. Employers and employees pay 
contributions intended for their pensions to a pension fund. Pension saving is 
promoted by providing the maximum tax relief specified in the Wages and Salaries 
Taxes Act of 1964 (Wet op de Loonbelasting, 1964). Risks are shared among the 
generations.161 Similar to South Africa, pension funds in the Netherlands generally 
take the legal form162 of a foundation, managed by a governing board. Thus, pension 
funds are legally separate from companies. The board that governs the fund consists 
of representatives of employers and employees or employee organisations.163 
Occupational pensions take three forms; namely corporate arrangements (for a 
single company or a corporation); industry-wide pensions for sectors such as 
construction, civil service, hotel, catering or retail; and pension funds for independent 
professionals such as doctors.164 The pension for public servants is the largest.  
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In 2008 the country had more than 700 pension funds.165 Most of the pension funds 
take the form of defined-benefit schemes; the schemes are not necessarily 100% 
defined-benefit schemes, but rather hybrid schemes. Should a fund find itself in 
financial difficulties, all stakeholders (for example, employers, employees, 
pensioners) will contribute towards saving the fund.166 
 
In the Netherlands, just like in the South African retirement system, people are not 
legally bound to belong to a pension fund. However, the social partners of each 
sector are free to choose whether they want to make pension arrangements or not. 
Once the first employer in a sector enters an agreement, it is assessed for extension 
by the Minister of Social Affairs, and if approval is granted, all workers and 
employers in that sector are legally obliged to participate in the scheme as well. The 
government can also make participation in a pension scheme mandatory for the 
whole profession or sector,167 as it is the case in South Africa in instances where the 
Minister has issued a sectoral determination to that effect.   
 
Employers which do not participate in the mandatory schemes can either participate 
in a corporate pension fund or use an insurance company to manage their pension 
plans. The employer can opt-out of a sector fund if it starts a company fund which 
offers similar or better benefits than a sector fund. This framework offers extensive 
coverage.168 Only the self-employed generally do not participate in this pillar. In order 
to prevent a large-scale exclusion of women in particular, schemes are required to 
lower the level of the franchise for part-time workers.169     
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By the end of 2008, more than 90% of the working population was covered by 
occupational pension schemes.170 About 9% did not participate in the scheme and of 
that group, 2% were employed by employers that did not offer such schemes either 
because they were very small companies or were new companies in unorganised 
sectors. Seven per cent of the 9% were not eligible as they held small and/or 
temporary part-time jobs.171 
 
Occupational pension schemes often promise to supplement the statutory old-age 
pension by an amount which is related to the last earned income and the duration of 
the employment relationship with the employer.172 On the other hand, supplementary 
occupational pensions promise to supplement old-age pension by up to 70% of the 
last earned wages, usually on condition that the workers have been insured for 40 
years. In the Netherlands, the majority of retirees are able to replace almost 100% of 
what they were earning prior to retirement through defined-benefit plans. This is an 
example of a good system which offers beneficiaries adequate protection. Generally, 
the employer-established funds are able to replace 70% of the retiree’s final 
earnings, while the public-pension plan can replace up to 30% of a person’s average 
pay.173 Pension rights are transferred in full when a person changes jobs. Even 
though there is no compulsory retirement age, one can only claim the pension 
benefit at the age of 65. There are penalties if a person wants to take early 
retirement. People can work longer and retire after the age of 65.174  
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Occupational pension schemes offer a number of benefits, which include old-age 
pension, widows’ and widowers’ pension, partners’ pension (in case of enduring 
cohabitation), orphans’ pension, invalidity pension, bachelors’ pension (if the 
pensioner is single), temporary old-age pension (from the retiring age until the 
statutory age of 65), temporary survivors’ pension (until the age of 65 of the 
survivor), and a lump-sum disbursement.175  
 
Commutation of pensions or what is known as lump-sum payments is not allowed 
unless the annual amount is very small (€417.74 gross per annum in 2009). It is 
compulsory for defined-contribution scheme members to buy an annuity when they 
reach the age of 65. This is what is presently lacking in South Africa’s retirement 
system. This is an important element for every system that wants to make sure that 
people save money when they are working so that they can receive regular income 
when they are no longer working. In the Netherlands, people are allowed to transfer 
their pension from the previous employer to the new employer when they change 
jobs, or to leave the pension with the previous employer.176 The same applies in 
South Africa, even though it is not compulsory for people to transfer the pension from 
one employer to another, hence the majority of people take the pension benefit and 
use it for other needs.  
According to the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report, the 
Netherlands’ retirement income system comprises a flat-rate public pension, which is 
a quasi-mandatory earnings-related occupational pension established through 
industrial agreements. The majority of employees in the Netherlands are members of 
occupational schemes, which take the form of defined-benefit schemes.177 The 
Netherlands is said to have a system that has a sound structure, with many good 
features. However, the system has some areas that need improvement.178 
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The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report rated the adequacy sub-
index179 for the Netherlands at 75% (Australia comes first with 81%), the 
sustainability sub-index at 76% (Denmark comes first with 86%), and the integrity 
sub-index at 90% (Finland is first with 97%).180 
 
The following recommendations were made by the Melbourne Mercer Global 
Pension Index towards the improvement of the country’s system:181 
 
 Introducing a minimum access age so that it is clear that benefits are 
preserved for retirement purposes; 
 Raising the level of household saving; 
 Increasing the labour force participation rate amongst older workers; and 
 Providing greater protection of members’ accrued benefits in the case of 
fraud, mismanagement, or employer insolvency. 
 
3.4.2.3 Private pension/individual pension plans  
 
The third pillar is made up of individual pension schemes. Similar to South Africa, 
private savings are generally used by the self-employed and by employees who do 
not have a collective pension scheme within their sectors. Any taxpayer who can 
prove that they are confronted with a pension deficiency can make tax-deductible 
contributions to this third-pillar pension.182  
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Article 45 of General Old Age Act gives those who have non-insured years the 
opportunity of voluntary insurance. A person can join a voluntary insurance plan after 
the termination of the compulsory insurance scheme; for example when a person 
starts to work or resides abroad. People who are insured may also buy years-
preceding compulsory insurance. For persons residing abroad, voluntary insurance 
is limited to a maximum period of ten continuous years. Long-term insurance is not 
possible for a person who does not reside in the Netherlands.183  
 
3.4.2.4 Dispute resolution 
 
People who are not happy with the decisions taken by a social security benefit 
administrator or where the benefit administrator fails to make a decision at all, must 
first request reconsideration from the issuing body. If the person is still not satisfied 
with the decision of that body, he or she can appeal to the District Court.184 
Decisions of the District Courts can be taken to the Central Appeals Court on 
appeal.185  
 
A complaint must first go through a review procedure before it can be followed by an 
appeal to a court of law. Only interested parties have the right to apply for a review 
or an appeal. The dispute resolution process is regulated by Algemene Wet 
Bestuursrecht (AWB, General Law on Administrative Law). Social security 
complaints are dealt with in the same manner as other administrative law 
complaints.186 
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In South Africa, disputes relating to pension matters are dealt with by courts of law 
and by various bodies, including the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator. The 
Adjudicator has similar powers as the civil court, and once he or she has made a 
determination on the dispute, the determination is forwarded to the High Court which 
has the jurisdiction to enforce the determination. However, the Adjudicator does not 
handle matters that are purely social-security related.187  
 
3.5 SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION PROVISION IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
 
3.5.1 General 
 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is commonly referred to 
as the United Kingdom (UK), and it is a sovereign island country comprising 
England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland all under one social security 
system.188 It has a constitutional monarch and a parliamentary democracy. However, 
the legislative power is vested in Parliament, while the executive power lies with the 
Cabinet, headed by the prime minister.189 The United Kingdom has been closely 
associated with the International Labour Organisation since its creation in 1919.  
 
The first draft of the ILO Constitution was written in London as part of a joint French-
British initiative, and the United Kingdom is one of the countries with a permanent 
seat in the International Labour Organisation’s Governing Body.190 The United 
Kingdom has three broad categories of social security benefits; namely contributory, 
a public pension aimed at poverty prevention, and income-related.191  
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A contributory scheme is based on the principle of social insurance financed by 
contributions made when people are working for later in their life when they are no 
longer working, due to a number of factors, including unemployment, sickness, and 
old-age. Non-contributory schemes are funded out of general tax revenue with 
eligibility depending on a means-test.192 Their main objective is poverty alleviation as 
they provide a basic income or a top-up for low wages.193  
 
The publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942 constituted a major turn-around in 
the development of the United Kingdom’s social security system. The 
recommendations made in this Report formed the basis of radical reforms that 
created the framework for the country’s social security system after the Second 
World War. The Report had, among other things, recommended the adoption of a 
contributory social security system which was aimed at improving the system by 
protecting all citizens against risks that included sickness, unemployment, and old-
age. This proposed system would take the form of a social insurance scheme. 
Beveridge also investigated how a unified, universal insurance system could be 
established to cover all groups in actual or potential need. The scheme would be 
contributory – based on the insurance system. However, the Labour Government 
only started with the implementation of the recommendations of the Beveridge 
Report in July 1945.194 The principal features of the United Kingdom’s social model 
are summarised by Kvist as follows:195 
 
 It is based on individual responsibility and choice; 
 It provides flexible, competitive markets, through which social objectives can 
be achieved; 
 It protects the vulnerable; and 
 It assists individuals in need with their transition into active members of the 
economy. 
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The responsibility of the development of social security policy rests with the 
Department of Social Security. From the 1980s, the system was administered by six 
“New Steps” agencies. One of the reasons for the creation of these agencies was to 
improve the efficiency with which public services were provided. The principal 
agencies included the Benefits Agency, which administers benefits payments; the 
War Pensions Agency; the Child Support Agency; and the Contributions Agency, 
which was responsible for the National Insurance Scheme. In April 1999, the 
Contributions Agency and responsibility for National Insurance policy was transferred 
to the Department of Inland Revenue.196  
 
The United Kingdom does not have a single Constitutional document providing social 
security rights. Courts in the United Kingdom recognise Acts of Parliament as the 
highest source of law. Therefore, all statutes passed by Parliament are regarded as 
part of the Constitution.197 The nature of the United Kingdom’s constitutional statutes 
was described as follows in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council:198  
 
“Constitutional statutes are pieces of legislation which condition the legal relationship between 
citizen and state in some regard, an overarching manner, or which enlarge or diminish the 
scope of what might be regarded as fundamental constitutional rights.” 
 
The United Kingdom’s law has the following as its sources: common law, European 
Union law, the European Convention on Human Rights, legal treaties, law and 
customs of Parliament, the royal prerogative, and case law.199 The hereditary 
monarch is the head of state. However, the monarch has to act on the advice of the 
ministers.200 The legislative power is vested in Parliament. However, in order for 
legislation to be approved by Parliament to become law, royal assent is required.201   
 
                                            
 
196
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 186-187. 
197
 Leyland The Constitution of the United Kingdom op cit note 188 at 19-20. 
198
 [2003] 3 WLR 247. 
199
 Leyland The Constitution of the United Kingdom op cit note 188 at 21-24. 
200
 Ibid at 65-70. 
201
 Ibid at 81. 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
101 
 
The law on social security consists of a complex network of interrelated statutes and 
secondary legislation.202 The Old-Age Pension Act of 1908 was passed to give those 
over 70 years of age a non-contributory means-tested pension. Then there was the 
Finance Act of 1921, which provided a statutory right to tax relief on contributions 
made to pension funds by employers and employees. The Finance Act of 1970 
established a new system of approval for occupational pension schemes. This Act 
was later consolidated and amended by the Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 
1988. The Social Security Act of 1973 was followed by the Pension Act of 1975, the 
Social Security Act of 1975, and the Pension Schemes Act of 1993. The Pensions 
Act of 1995 came into operation on 6 April 1997. Two other statutes, namely the 
Welfare Reform and Pensions Act of 1999 and the Pensions and Social Security Act 
of 2000, were introduced.  
 
In 2004, two new statutes were introduced; namely the Finance Act of 2004, and the 
Pensions Act of 2004. These two pieces of legislation were followed by the Pensions 
Act of 2007,203 which was followed by the Pensions Act of 2008 – which introduced 
automatic enrolment of workers to certain funds – and the Pensions Act of 2014. 
 
3.5.2 The United Kingdom pension system  
 
The system comprises three pillars. The first pillar provides for a mandatory public 
pension aimed at poverty prevention. The benefits under this pillar include the Basic 
State Pension and the Pension Credit comprising the Guaranteed Income Top-Up 
and the Savings Credit, which replaced the Minimum Income Guarantee. The 
Minimum Income Guarantee was a typical means-tested scheme providing higher 
protection than the Basic Income Pension. The first pillar is publicly provided and it is 
paid on a pay-as-you-go basis.204  
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This pillar has a second tier which is also mandatory. This tier is based on the so-
called contracting-out method. In terms of this second tier, employees have a choice 
to join a pension scheme into which they want to make contributions.205 The second 
pillar comprises occupational funds organised at company level or individual funds. 
The third pillar is managed by private insurance companies. In 2002, the government 
introduced a new private Stakeholder Pension, similar to a personal pension plan. 
The employer is not compelled to contribute to this plan. The Stakeholder Pension is 
targeted at middle and low-income earners. It is fully funded, with low management 
charges and no taxes. In 2003, the government introduced the new Pension Credit, 
which is an income-related benefit for people aged 60 or over, targeted at low-
income pensioners. It provides more help to workers with low contribution records, 
and is aimed at avoiding inactivity traps.206 The United Kingdom has a very complex 
system which aims to provide coverage to everyone taking into account the 
circumstances or situation a person finds himself or herself in. These three pillars are 
discussed below. 
 
3.5.2.1  State pensions 
 
The United Kingdom started looking after its needy citizens as early as 1597 with the 
introduction of the Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601. However, during the Victorian Age, 
government policy was influenced by the belief that poverty was a result of idleness. 
Poverty was regarded as a moral failing to be despised and condemned. This 
influenced government policy for most of the 19th century. For instance, the Poor 
Law Reforms of 1834 were designed to relieve temporary distress but not to end 
poverty. In 1885, the government appointed a committee to suggest the best system 
of national provident insurance against pauperism.  
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In 1893, the Royal Commission on Poor Law Relief and People Destitute from Old 
Age was appointed to consider whether any alterations in the system of poor-law 
relief are desirable in the case of persons whose destitution is occasioned by 
incapacity for work resulting from old-age or whether assistance could otherwise be 
afforded in those cases. Another committee under the chairmanship of Lord 
Rothschild was appointed in 1899. The committee had the task of finding the best 
means of improving the conditions of the aged deserving poor. The committee 
recommended that a non-contributory system of old-age pensions should be 
established. The introduction of state pensions eventually came when the Old-Age 
Pensions Act was passed in 1908. The Act provided financial aid to those who were 
already old and unable to support themselves.207  
 
In 1925, the Conservative Government, being no longer prepared to finance a non-
contributory pension scheme, passed the Widows’, Orphans’, and Old-Age 
Contributory Pensions Act. The Act was to apply to all people over the age of 65 
years. In 1942, the Beveridge Report, among other things, recommended that social 
benefits should not only be provided universally, but also that they should be 
sufficient without further resources to provide the minimum income needed for 
subsistence in all normal cases. The Beveridge Report had a very limited role for a 
non-contributory, means-tested benefit.208  
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The Basic State Pension, which took the form of a means-tested benefit, was 
introduced by the National Assistance Act of 1948. This benefit came to play a 
central role in social security, providing the necessary financial support to those who 
were not eligible for any national insurance benefit. By 1950 Britain had a unified and 
coordinated system providing for state pensions at the subsistence level along the 
lines of the Beveridge Report. The national assistance was replaced with 
supplementary benefit during the Labour Government’s tenure in 1964 to 1970, and 
was regulated under the Supplementary Benefit Act 1966. The Social Security 
Pensions Act of 1975 introduced a supplementary state pension scheme called the 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS).  
 
A general pension was established consisting of a basic pension and an additional 
pension related to a person’s earnings. The Social Security Act of 1979 made 
amendments to certain sections of the Social Security Act of 1975. The Conservative 
Government’s Social Security Act of 1980 made further miscellaneous amendments 
to the existing law on social security. The Supplementary Benefit Act was later 
replaced by Social Security Act of 1986, which replaced the supplementary benefit 
with income support.209  
 
Income support was a non-contributory, means-tested benefit paid to those who 
were not employed full time and who were not required to register for work. The role 
of income support was substantially reduced by the introduction of the jobseeker’s 
allowance (JSA) in October 1996, since all those who were required to register for 
work no longer benefited from it.210 The income support was renamed the Minimum 
Income Guarantee in 1999, and was replaced by the Pension Credit as from October 
2003. Pension Credit has two parts; namely the Guaranteed Income Top-Up and the 
Savings Credit.211  
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3.5.2.1.1 Pension Credit (Guaranteed Income Top-Up and Savings Credit) 
 
Guaranteed Income Top-Up is for those who have reached the minimum qualifying 
age, while the Savings Credit is for those aged 65 and above. The age from which 
one can receive Guaranteed Credit is gradually increasing from 60 to 65 and will 
then increase to 66 years between 2010 and 2020. It guarantees a minimum income 
by topping up a person’s weekly income. The amounts will increase if the person is 
disabled have caring responsibilities, or certain housing costs, such as mortgage 
interest payments. The age from which a person qualifies for the Savings Credit is 
65 or above and that person must have made savings towards his or her 
retirement.212 
 
3.5.2.1.2 Basic State Pension 
 
The major part of state provision for pensioners in the United Kingdom is the Basic 
State Pension, which was also introduced in 1948.213 The Basic State Pension was 
intended to provide a basic subsistence level of income for those in retirement.214 
Contributions go into the National Insurance Fund, from which current benefits are 
paid. The pension scheme is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.215 
 
  
                                            
 
212
 East Social Security Law op cit note 22 at 5. See also OECD and G20 Indicators: Pensions at a 
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The Basic State Pension is a contribution-based benefit which is payable to all 
individuals who have reached state pension age and have made sufficient National 
Insurance Contributions.216 Membership of the Basic State Pension is compulsory for 
both employees and self-employed workers.217 In 2000, around ten million 
pensioners were in receipt of the Basic State Pension.218 The state pension age was, 
up to 5 April 2010, 60 for women and 65 for men. However, after this date, women’s 
qualifying age will gradually rise until it reaches 65 to be the same as that of men. 
The qualifying age will be increased from 65 to 66 for both men and women between 
2018 and 2020 and will again be increased to 67 by 2028.219 The National Insurance 
Contributions are paid by individuals and their employers, and are calculated on the 
basis of a formula dependent on weekly earnings. The periods during which a 
person is unemployed are credited to that person’s National Insurance Contributions 
record for the Basic State Pension.220  
 
This is similar to the National Savings Fund221 proposed by the two Discussion 
Papers on Social Security and Retirements Funds Reform in South Africa. The 
proposed public fund will accommodate all workers regardless of the sector in which 
they work. The self-employed will also be able to join and make contributions to this 
fund.  
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3.5.2.1.3 The State Earnings-related Pension Scheme  
 
The State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) was introduced by the 
Labour Government following the Social Security Act of 1975. It replaced what was 
known as the “Graduated Pension”. It was introduced to pave the way from a flat rate 
to an earnings-related contributory system.222 The employer was free to choose 
whether to set up an occupational scheme and also whether this was intended to 
replace the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme.223 The SERPS was primarily 
designed to provide earnings-related pensions for workers who were not in an 
occupational scheme.224 From 2002, no further pension rights accrued under the 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme as it was replaced by the State Second 
Pension.225   
 
3.5.2.1.4 The State Second Pension  
 
Even though the State Second Pension (S2P) was introduced by the Child Support, 
Pensions and Social Security Act of 2000, it was only effective from 2002.226 The 
State Second Pension is paid by the government in addition to the Basic State 
Pension.  
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It takes into account one’s earnings and considers time spent out of work for 
legitimate reasons such as sickness. It helps both those in employment and those 
who are unable to work either because they are currently incapable or because they 
are currently caring for others.227  
 
A person can contract-out of State Second Pension using a final salary. It is, 
however, no longer possible, as from 6 April 2012, to use a money purchase, 
appropriate personal pension, or stakeholder plan to contract-out of State Second 
Pension. It should also be noted that it will no longer be allowed to contract-out of 
State Second Pension using a final salary scheme starting from April 2016. 
Employers can opt-out of the State Second Pension and establish occupational 
pension schemes for their employees.228  
 
The State Second Pension protects people not in paid employment, and people who 
earn below the lower earnings limit and do not make any contributions to the system 
for periods of child care.229 
 
  
                                            
 
227
 Information about State Second Pension accessed from http://www.monetos.co.uk/pensions/state-
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3.5.2.2 Occupational pensions  
 
3.5.2.2.1 Background 
 
The first recorded occupational pension was given to a retired abbot of St 
Augustine’s, Canterbury, in 1294. He was given an ex gratia pension of ten marks 
(former monetary unit in England, Scotland, and Germany) per year for life after 
working for the monastery. The earliest recorded private occupational pension 
schemes were organised by the medieval guilds of artisans in order to provide for 
the old-age of members whose income ceased when they retired.230  
 
The first funded pensions to be established in the world are believed to be to 
wounded seamen of the Royal Navy of the Kingdom of England by the Chatham 
Chest in 1590.231 Private occupational schemes saw a major development in 1762, 
due to the growth of life-assurance companies. The earliest private-sector schemes 
to be based on life-assurance principles were those of the East India Company and 
the Bank of England.232    
 
Most occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom have been set up as 
pension trust funds under the Superannuation and Other Trust Funds (Validation) 
Act of 1927. The first company to assure pension funds in Britain was the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York, which in the 1920s began to 
organise the funds of British subsidiaries of American companies such as 
Woolworths and General Motors, which had similar schemes for their employees in 
the United States of America. The leading life companies involved in providing group 
pensions were Prudential, Legal and General, Eagle Star, Friends’ Provident, and 
Standard Life. By 1934, these five companies had sold group life pension schemes 
covering 120 000 workers. By 1956, when the Government Actuary undertook his 
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first survey of occupational pension schemes, there were about four million members 
in the private sector and 300 000 pensioners.233  
 
Various pieces of social security legislation affecting pension schemes were passed 
during the 1970s. They included the Social Security Act of 1973, which introduced 
provisions to protect members who left the service or opted out of the scheme before 
retirement. The Social Security Pensions Act was introduced in 1975. The Social 
Security Acts of 1985 and 1986 respectively, extended protection offered to early 
leavers and gave them the right to transfer their benefits to another pension scheme.  
 
The Acts that were passed in the 1970s and 1980s, together with the relevant 
provisions of the Social Security Act of 1990, were later consolidated into one statute 
called the Pension Schemes Act (1993). The Pensions Act of 1995, which came into 
force on 6 April 1997, was introduced to provide greater protection for employees. 
The 1995 Act was followed by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act of 1999 and the 
Pensions and Social Security Act of 2000.234 
 
The Pensions Act of 2004 introduced the Pensions Regulator, which replaced the 
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority.235 The Act also introduced the Board of 
the Pension Protection Fund236, which is responsible for holding, managing, and 
applying the Pension Protection Fund. This Fund is designed to give members of 
defined-benefit schemes a measure of protection when their employers are in 
financial difficulty or who have insufficient benefits and whose employers are 
insolvent. This arrangement is funded through levies (risk-based) paid to defined-
benefit schemes.237 Entitlement to state retirement provision is principally governed 
by the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act of 1992.238 Many public sector 
schemes, including the Local Government Pension Scheme and the National Health 
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Service Pension Scheme, are governed and administered almost exclusively by 
statutory instruments and are, to a certain degree, unaffected by other legislation.239 
In May and December 2006, the government proposed two White Papers which 
culminated in the Pensions Act of 2007 – which was later followed by the second 
Pensions Bill.240 
 
3.5.2.2.2 The nature of occupational pensions in the United Kingdom 
 
Occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom take three forms; namely 
State Occupational Pension Schemes, which comprise schemes for civil servants, 
schemes for local government officers, and schemes for other public-sector 
employees; Private Occupational Pension Schemes; and Personal and Stakeholder 
schemes.241  
 
Occupational pensions take the form of defined-benefit schemes or defined-
contribution schemes. Most schemes provide for a pension to members payable 
from the scheme’s normal retirement age, for the pension to be paid earlier or later 
than that age in certain circumstances, for a proportion of the pension due to be 
commuted into a lump-sum paid on retirement if the member so requests, for 
benefits to be paid if the member dies before the normal retirement age, and for a 
pension to be paid to a surviving spouse or other dependants.242  
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Pension plans are established by employers and operate as trusts under the general 
provisions of trust law, which lays the responsibility for good conduct of the trust on 
the trustees. This is different from South Africa where a pension fund acquires legal 
personality as soon as it is registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
Such a fund owns the assets of the fund.243  
 
In the United Kingdom there are no legal requirements regarding the composition of 
the trustees. In practice about 60% of the members of private sector plans are in 
plans where at least some of the trustees are elected or nominated as 
representatives of the members. The employer usually has the power to appoint the 
trustees. Trustees do not have the power to change the pension plan rules. 
However, their consent is usually required by the employer – who has such 
powers.244  
 
Trustees can be held liable where the fund suffers losses resulting from their 
negligent management decisions.245 Trustees have a duty to act with due care, 
diligence, and good faith, they must also avoid conflict of interests246, and they must 
act in the best interests of the beneficiaries247.  
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Membership of an occupational pension scheme can be regarded as voluntary.248 
However, in practice it is permissible for employees to be included automatically as 
members of their employer’s scheme, unless they specifically request to opt-out. 
Until 6 April 2006, membership of an occupational pension scheme was confined to 
the employees of employers participating in a scheme in order to obtain exempt 
approved status. As from this date, an occupational pension scheme need not 
restrict membership to its own employees, although it need not be open to all 
employees, or to any particular category of them.249  
 
Benefits are payable either on the death of a member or on the member’s retirement, 
whichever comes first. Benefits are usually calculated on the basis of the member’s 
normal retirement date under the scheme, which will generally be between age 60 
and 65. Benefits may not be paid before a member reaches normal minimum 
pension age, which was increased from age 50 to 55 as from 6 April 2010. The 
exception only applies in case of ill health.250 
 
In most schemes, the primary benefit provided is a pension payable at retirement 
age. There are two ways in which scheme trustees can provide a pension; either 
they can pay the amount due directly from the resources of the scheme, or an 
annuity can be purchased for the member in the name either of the trustees or of the 
member, which matches the scheme’s obligation to that member.251 
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Most schemes allow a proportion of the pension entitlement to be commuted into a 
lump-sum. Benefits of various kinds may be payable when the member dies before 
reaching retirement age. A lump-sum is payable on the death of a member. This 
lump-sum is invariably paid at the discretion of the trustees, rather than to the 
member’s estate as of right, since this allows the payment to be made promptly after 
the death of the member, and avoids any liability for inheritance tax on the payment. 
The payment of death benefits at the discretion of trustees is similar to the position in 
South Africa, where trustess are given powers by section 37C of the Pension Funds 
Act of 1956 to use their discretion in distributing death benefits. The provisions of this 
section are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 of this study. In the United 
Kingdom, a pension may also be payable for a child either under 18, or in full-time 
education, or to any other person financially dependent on the member – subject to 
an overriding limit that such pension should not exceed two-thirds of the member’s 
maximum prospective pension and the total should not exceed the amount of that 
maximum pension.252 A member’s entitlement or accrued right to a pension under an 
occupational pension scheme cannot be assigned, commuted, surrendered, 
charged, or set off. This is similar to section 37A of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 
1956. In terms of section 37A, pension benefits are not reducible, transferable, or 
executable. This is to protect pension benefits from creditors and to guard against 
the benefit being depleted prior to a member’s retirement. However, there are 
exceptions to this general rule – namely where the rules of the scheme allow that.253  
 
All members of pension schemes who have completed more than two years’ service 
and who leave the scheme; are entitled to a preserved pension payable from the 
scheme’s normal retirement age, or to transfer their accrued rights to another form of 
pension provision. Thus, preservation is mandatory except where membership has 
only been for two years or less when the person leaves his or her job. The value of 
accrued rights may be transferred from one occupational scheme to another, 
including from an earnings-related scheme to a money-purchase scheme or vice 
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versa, or from an occupational scheme to a personal pension, or to a special 
insurance policy.254 
 
Supplementary occupational pensions have been an important part of the United 
Kingdom’s pension system for a long time. This type of cover originated in the public 
sector, and grew in coverage during the 1950s and 1960s. Membership of an 
employer’s scheme had been voluntary since 1988. Employees had a choice 
between joining their employer’s scheme, joining the State Earnings-Related 
Pension Scheme, or joining the other major component of the United Kingdom 
private sector, or a personal pension. The option to opt-out of the State Earnings-
Related Pension Scheme into Private Pensions (PP) revolutionised private pension 
provision in the United Kingdom.255  
 
The Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) was set up in 1997 with 
wide-ranging powers to intervene in the running of occupational pension schemes.256  
 
The United Kingdom has since introduced other schemes through which people are 
encouraged to save for their retirement. After the introduction of the Pension Act of 
2008, employers now have a duty to provide their workers with access to workplace 
pension schemes that meet certain minimum requirements. The government 
introduced the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) in 2012, which is run by 
the government through the National Employment Savings Corporation. It takes the 
form of a defined-contribution scheme. This pension scheme was established by law 
to introduce the automatic enrolment of workers in the country. Any employer in the 
United Kingdom, regardless of the size, can use NEST for their workers. Employers 
can use NEST as the only scheme or use it along other existing schemes. Those 
who join NEST can manage their own savings, switch funds, and can even decide 
when to increase contribution levels or they can leave it to NEST to manage their 
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savings. A person who participates in NEST has one retirement account which he or 
she can use even if he or she changes jobs, becomes self-employed, or stops 
working. The charges are low, which means more money goes to the pension 
benefit. The National Employment Savings Trust provides online tools that can be 
used by savers or employers to enrol workers and to make contributions.257 
Employees from the age of 22 and above should be enrolled into the scheme. A new 
employee is automatically enrolled three months after commencing with his or her 
job, but they can ask to join earlier than that.258  
 
The scheme allows employees to opt-out. Employers should pay a minimum of 1% 
of the salary of every worker into this scheme. This contribution will increase to 3% 
by 2017. Workers pay 1% of their salary, which has to be at 4% by 2017. The 
intention with this scheme is to increase the number of people who save for 
retirement in the United Kingdom. The retirement age of 65 will be raised to 67 by 
2028.259 This scheme, however, does not cover the self-employed. Also, those who 
are already participating in a workplace pension fund will not be required to join.260  
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3.5.2.3 Private pension/individual insurance plans  
 
Personal pension schemes are available on a voluntary basis to the following 
people: 
 
 The self-employed; 
 Employees who are not members of an occupational scheme; 
 Employees who are members of an occupational scheme; and 
 Employees who are members of a scheme which only provides benefits on 
death in service. 
 
Employees could also, on a voluntary basis, join free-standing additional voluntary 
contributions schemes, in addition to occupational schemes, or pay into an additional 
voluntary contribution scheme under their occupational scheme – subject to the 
overall contribution limits for tax purposes.261 
 
3.5.3 Dispute resolution 
 
The United Kingdom’s social security system has an extensive system of 
adjudication of claims, which is done through specialised tribunals, with rights of 
review and appeal to the general courts. Tribunals are capable of hearing a wide 
range of appeals from decisions of local benefit officers, also known as adjudication 
officers.  
 
Separate processes of appeal and review apply to decisions concerning the 
incidence of social insurance contributions. The Social Security Act of 1998 
simplified and streamlined the way decisions and appeals are handled and 
maintained rights of appeal to an independent tribunal.262   
 
                                            
 
261
 Disney Pension Systems and Retirement Incomes across OECD Countries op cit note 220 at 11. 
262
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 211. 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
118 
 
However, in the United Kingdom pension disputes are dealt with by the Office of the 
Pensions Ombudsman263, which has the power to investigate and determine any 
complaints made in connection with any act or omission of trustees or managers of 
pension schemes.264 The Ombudsman investigates and makes rulings on complaints 
from pension scheme members, beneficiaries, employers, trustees, managers, and 
administrators.265  
 
The services of the Ombudsman are free.266 The Ombudsman does not have 
unfettered discretion to impose remedies which the court of law cannot impose, and 
an appeal to his or her decision is allowed only on a point of law.267  
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The complainant must lodge a complaint in writing with the Office of the Ombudsman 
within a period of three years from the date the dispute or course of action arose.268 
The Ombudsman does not deal with complaints about the marketing or selling of 
personal pension.269 The Pension Ombudsman operates in a similar way as the 
South African Pension Funds’ Adjudicator.270 
 
3.6 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
 
Social security and pension provision remains a challenge to all the countries of the 
world, including developed countries. The challenges are not only constant but are 
also unique for each country, hence there are continuous reforms to existing 
systems. It is clear that even the systems that are considered to be among the best 
in the world, have some shortcomings. All three countries considered follow a three-
pillar approach, even though the countries differ in how they apply these pillars; with 
the United Kingdom using a very complex system.  
 
3.6.1  Belgium 
 
The Belgian system aims to cover everyone. Almost everyone has some form of 
insurance cover. Separate pension schemes exist for public employees, private 
employees, and the self-employed. All Belgian pensioners receive their benefits on a 
pay-as-you-go basis. The contributions of people who are currently employed are 
used to pay for the pensions of current beneficiaries. This approach is problematic 
and unsustainable in countries which have high levels of unemployment, like South 
Africa. The pool from which benefits should be paid depends on contributions made 
by those who are working and earning a salary, and if the number of people who are 
working is small – what is deposited into the pool will also be small. The Belgian 
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system caters for those who are unemployed, those with low earnings, or in part-time 
employment. Belgium has separate pension provisions specifically for the self-
employed people. The country has, with this approach, managed to cover the 
majority of the workers in the country.  
 
Weaknesses271 in the sytems include the fact that the system is based on pillars that 
are very unequal; where the first pillar covers the majority of the people. The second 
pillar is considered to play a very small role as a source of income especially for the 
average Belgian worker as it is limited more to higher-income earners from the 
private sector.272 On the other, pensions for the self-employed are considered to be 
very low. Benefits for high income earners are also considered to be insufficient to 
maintain their former standard of living.273 Belgium’s income replacement target for 
occupational-defined benefit plans is between 60% and 70%.274  
 
It can be accepted, however, that the fact that Belgium is not included in the group of 
countries which the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index considered, makes it 
difficult to see how the country’s retirement system fares in the international 
community. Belgium’s retirement security system affords everyone legal protection 
against contingencies such as job loss and old-age. Social protection in Belgium 
plays a major role in preventing people from falling into poverty. The country may be 
considered to be doing very well with its social security provision as only 6% of the 
population could be considered poor in 2000.275 It has, however, been established 
that high-income earners’ pensions are generally insufficient to maintain their former 
standard of living.276   
  
                                            
 
271
 Gruber Social Security and Retirement around the World op cit note 76 at 43. 
272
 Idem. 
273
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46. 
274
 Overbye et al Pensions: Challenges and Reforms op cit note 97 at 142. 
275
 Van Vugt Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union op cit note 46 at 33. 
276
 Idem. 
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Another worrying factor is that the administration and payment of social security 
benefits is not centralised, hence the country has various bodies or institutions 
responsible for different schemes and benefits. Pension-related disputes are dealt 
with by the Office of the Pensions Ombudsman, which is a specialised body.277  
 
3.6.2  The Netherlands 
 
The social security system in the Netherlands focuses primarily on providing income 
to citizens who do not have any means of income. The Netherlands, just like South 
Africa, has not made it compulsory for workers to belong to retirement schemes 
except in limited circumstances. Almost every worker is covered under an 
occupational plan in the Netherlands system, which can be considered to be quasi-
mandatory. The protection offered by the system is considered to be among the best 
in the world.278  
 
The Netherlands follows a three-pillar approach. All these pillars are taken into 
account when determining the amount of pension benefit a person must receive. The 
state pension is available to everyone who is in old-age without means-testing, but it 
is based on 50 years of residency. The level of benefits is very high as the majority 
of retirees are able to replace almost 100% of their last earnings through defined-
benefit plans. On the other hand, employer-established funds promise to replace at 
least 70% of the retiree’s final earnings. Members are able to transfer full benefits 
when they change jobs. Pension benefits can only be claimed at the age of 65; 
excluding cases where a member wants to go on early retirement.  
 
The system offers other benefits in addition to retirement benefits. Lump-sum cash 
payments are not allowed unless the benefit amount is very small. Members of 
defined-contribution plans are obliged to buy an annuity when they reach the age of 
65. The system does not have a specialised tribunal or forum that specifically deals 
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 Pension matters dispute resolution is discussed in par 3.3.2.4. 
278
 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 2 at 35. 
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with pension or social security-related complaints or disputes. These disputes are 
handled by districts courts. This is one thing that the Netherlands has to reconsider, 
as the nature of the industry and the objectives thereof call for a specialised body to 
deal with such matters. The Netherlands has one of the best systems in the world as 
it was given a “B+” grading in the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 
Report. A “B+” depicts a system which has many good features. However, according 
to Guardiancich279, the weaknesses in the system include the following: inadequate 
protection of the self-employed, people employed in the informal sector, and people 
employed in other non-covered sectors.280  
 
3.6.3  The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom’s pension system follows a very complex three-pillar approach. 
Pension plans in the United Kingdom operate as trusts and are regulated by trust 
law. The system offers other benefits in addition to retirement benefits. Benefits can 
take the form of lump-sum cash payments or an annuity can be purchased for the 
member. A lump-sum can be paid at the member’s death, but this is at the discretion 
of the trustees. Almost all the plans have an opt-out option as long as a person can 
produce evidence that he or she has transferred to another suitable plan that offers 
similar or better benefits than the one he or she was participating in. The option to 
opt-out is what makes the United Kingdom pension system different from systems of 
other countries of the world. Workers have a choice to join alternative pension 
schemes organised at company level or even individual funds281, as long the scheme 
provides equivalent or better benefits than the former.282 All members of pension 
schemes who have completed more than two years’ service and who leave the 
scheme are entitled to a preserved pension payable from the scheme’s normal 
retirement age, or to transfer their accrued rights to another form of pension 
provision. Thus, preservation is mandatory except where membership has only been 
                                            
 
279
 Guardiancich “The Netherlands Current Pension System” op cit note 13.   
280
 Idem. 
281
 Natali “Pensions in Europe” op cit note 205 at 134-141. 
282
 European Commission “Adequate and sustainable pensions” op cit note 66 at 257.  
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for two years or less when the person leaves his or her job. However, 
investigations283 have found the system to be unable to deliver retirement free from 
social exclusion for most citizens.  
 
The state provision is considered to have failed to lift all individuals out of poverty 
because not all were protected by the first pillar against periods of out of paid work, 
where entitlement was secured pensions were too low, the self-employed and those 
in informal employment are not adequately covered, and private savings are 
unaffordable for some, while for others it was not clear that they offered a good 
investment.284  
 
Since 2012, the United Kingdom has introduced the National Employment Savings 
Trust (NEST), which has introduced an automatic enrolment of workers to the plan. 
The scheme is targeted mainly at employees on low to moderate incomes and who 
had no access to workplace pension schemes. The government is also planning to 
introduce automatic enrolment into workplace pension schemes.285 Pension disputes 
are handled by the Office of the Pensions Ombudsman, which functions in the same 
way as South Africa’s Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator286. The system, 
although complex, is considered to be among the best in the world as it was given a 
“B”-rating by the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report. Its adequacy 
sub-index has been scored at almost 70%, the sustainability sub-index at 52%, and 
the integrity sub-index at 80%.287 The United Kingdom is categorised under the 
countries which have systems that have some good features, but also have some 
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 Meyer et al Private Pensions versus Social Inclusion op cit note 136 at 65. 
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 Idem.  
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 Information about National Employment Savings Trust, accessed from http://www.dwp.gov.uk/ 
policy/pensions-reform/the-pensions-act-2008/, last visited on 12 may 2015; see also OECD and G20 
Indicators: Pensions at a Glance 2013 op cit note 100 at 359. See also generally on the United 
Kingdom’s pension system and previous reform initiatives, Blake D The UK Pension System: Key 
Issues (Discussion Paper PI-0107) (Pension Institute, Cass Business School, City University, London, 
United Kingdom), June 2002. 
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 Discussed under par 6.10.2 in Ch 6. 
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shortcomings which should be addressed. Without these improvements, its efficacy 
and long-term sustainability can be questioned.288   
 
According to the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index Report, the overall index 
value for the United Kingdom’s system could be increased by implementing the 
following:289 
 
 Raising the minimum pension for low-income pensioners; 
 Increasing the coverage of employees in occupational pension schemes; 
 Increasing the level of contributions to occupational pension schemes; 
 Raising the level of house-hold saving; and 
 Increasing the labour force participation rate at older ages. 
 
The next chapter considers the historical development of retirement provision in 
South Africa. 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 4 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT 
SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter considers the origins and historical development of social and 
retirement security1 in South Africa. The development of modern social and 
retirement security in South Africa before colonisation, during the colonial period, to 
the apartheid era2 and up to and beyond 1994,3 is described. The discussion also 
examines how old-age is and has been provided for in this country through formal 
arrangements influenced mostly by the Western European social security systems.4  
 
Even though the development of South Africa’s modern day social security started 
during colonisation, it should be clear that African families, societies, and 
communities have long had their own ways of support.5  
                                            
 
1
 Social security focuses on, among other things, income security (for example, the provision of 
income during retirement), attaining minimum living standards, and meeting the needs of the 
vulnerable members of the society – Patel L Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa 
2005 at 20 (hereafter, Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa). Retirement 
security aims to protect employees against the risk of old-age, which would have otherwise left them 
without any source of income when they retire. Retirement benefits serve an income replacement role 
when a person is in retirement. See East R Social Security Law 1999 at 15-16.  
2
 “Apartheid” means separateness in Afrikaans. It was a system of racial discrimination under the 
Nationalist Party. This system was done away with when democracy was introduced after the first 
democratic elections of 1994. See http://southafricaunderapartheid.blogspot.com/2009/03/homeland-
system.html, last visited on 29 July 2015. 
3
 The introduction of democracy brought with it a right-based approach which has since abolished the 
racial and discriminatory welfare system. The right to social security is now entrenched in section 27 
of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution).     
4
 See generally, Dekker AH Informal Social Security: A Legal Analysis (Doctoral Thesis), April 2005, 
at 20-49 (hereafter, Dekker Informal Social Security). 
5
 Maqubela NT The Administration of Social Welfare in South Africa: A Study of its Origins, 
Development and Rationalisation (MAdmin. Thesis, Unisa) January 1997 at 10 (hereafter, Maqubela 
The Administration of Social Welfare in South Africa). 
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Initially, African people relied on kinship support but later on a system developed 
through which welfare services were delivered by government bodies and voluntary 
welfare groups such as religious groups and churches.6 When formal social security 
was introduced in South Africa, particularly during the apartheid period,7 support was 
unfortunately only meant for white people, but was later also gradually extended to 
the other race groups.  
 
Social security in the form of social assistance benefits is now available to all those 
who qualify to receive it in terms of the requirements set out in the Social Assistance 
Act 13 of 2004, and social insurance has also been extended to most of the workers 
in the formal sector – without looking at race or colour.8 Thus, South Africa’s social 
security system has mainly taken the form of both formal arrangements comprising 
two main components; namely social assistance and social insurance.  
 
Social assistance includes in-kind assistance or cash benefits which come in the 
form of social grants. Social grants payable in this county at the moment include the 
child support grant, foster child grant, care dependency grant, disability grant, war 
veterans’ grant, and the state old-age pension, also known as the older persons’ 
grant, while social insurance includes contributory employment-based schemes such 
as retirement funds, compensation funds, and a scheme for the unemployed.9 
 
                                            
 
6
 See generally, Lund F “State Restructuring Welfare” Transformation 6 (1988) at 22-25 accessed at 
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/transformation/tran006/tran006003.pdf, last 
visited on 07 May 2015.  
7
 The Nationalist Party took control of South Africa in the 1940s. The National Party government 
introduced what is known as apartheid aimed at oppressing black people and taking control of both 
the social and economic system in the country. It fought for white domination. For example, the 
Population Act of 1950 required that all South Africans be racially classified into one of three 
categories: white, black, and coloured (included major subgroups of Indians and Asians), (see the 
History of Apartheid in South Africa, accessed from http://www-cs-
students.stanford.edu/cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html; last visited on 29 July May 2015).  
8
 Van der Berg S “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” Vol 14, No 4, Dec 1997 
Development Southern Africa at 481 (hereafter, Van der Berg “South African Social Security under 
Apartheid and Beyond”). 
9
 Ibid at 484-485. 
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4.2 DEVELOPMENTAL PERIODS FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM 
 
4.2.1 Pre-colonial period  
 
During the pre-colonial period, people and families received support through the 
kinship systems. Families were responsible for the economic and social support of 
individual members of the families. Those who could not participate in the activities 
such as farming and hunting, for example children, women, elderly people, the 
disabled, and the sick, received support within the family. This form of support also 
extended to the clan at large.10 In certain instances the source of support came not 
only from families, but also from the wider society. However, these methods of 
support were at a later stage, to a larger extent, affected and influenced by Western 
civilisation, which was brought about by colonisation.11 
 
4.2.2 Colonial period 
 
South Africa was colonised by the Dutch from the mid-17th century until 1806, when 
the British took over the Cape Colony. The country was first invaded in 1652 by 
White settlers under the Dutch East India Company led by Jan van Riebeeck. Jan 
van Riebeeck arrived in South Africa in 1652 to build a fort and he developed a 
vegetable garden for the ships on the Eastern trade route.12 The Colony of Natal was 
officially taken by Britain in 1843.13  
 
                                            
 
10
 Midgely J Social Security Inequality and the Third World 1984 at 103 (hereafter, Midgely Social 
Security Inequality). See also generally, on the kinship system, Ayisi EO An Introduction to the Study 
of African Culture 1979 at 36-45; Dekker Informal Social Security op cit note 4 at 139-140.  
11
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 66. 
12
 Thompson L A Short History of South Africa 3ed 2001 at 10-12. 
13
 See generally on the colonisation of Natal, Mahoney MR “How the British Stayed in Power in Early 
Colonial Natal” (Paper presented before the University of Natal, Durban, African Studies Seminar), 13 
June 2001 at 1-32 (Paper accessed from http://www.kznhass-history.net/files/seminars/Mahoney.pdf, 
last visited on 29 July 2015). 
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The English domination of the Dutch descendants resulted in the Dutch establishing 
the new colonies of Orange Free State, which is in the present day South Africa 
named the Free State province; and Transvaal, which today consists of Gauteng, 
Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and the North West provinces.14 The Dutch who settled in 
South Africa believed in predestination and were Calvinists15.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
14
 The Bantu Authority Act, 68 of 1951, provided for the creation of homelands and regional 
authorities; the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 46 of 1959, separated black people into 
different ethnic groups; the Black Homelands Citizenship Act, 26 of 1970 (renamed the Black States 
Citizenship Act of 1970 and the National States Citizenship of 1970), forced South African black 
people to live in homelands created for each ethnic group and the Natives Land Act, 27 of 1913, 
brought about black reserves and the idea of homelands. See about the legacy of the Natives Land 
Act of 1913, Hall R “The Legacies of the Natives Land Act of 1913” Scriptura 113 (1) 2014 at 1-13. 
The homelands were abolished when the new democratic government came into power in 1994 and 
new provinces were established by section 124 of the interim Constitution, the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993. 
15
 The Calvinists are those who follow the theological believes and practices of John Calvin. The 
Dutch were the first people from Europe to settle in South Africa permanently. These people brought 
with them the Christian faith developed by Calvin. The gospel reached other races, which also 
converted to Christianity. Because of factors such as language and social differences, eventually 
separate churches (Dutch Reformed Church/es) based on race were established. The union of South 
Africa was formed in 1910 and was followed by the National Party government in 1948, which 
strengthened racial segregation. These unfortunate practices were sadly based on the Christian 
theology called Calvinism (see in this regard, Naudé P “The Two faces of Calvin in South Africa: In 
Honour of the 500
th
 Commemoration of John Calvin’s birth” Part I Dutch Reformed Theological 
Journal 2009 Vol 50 at 606-607). See also Naudé (ibid) at 614-619, where the author describes 
another legacy of Calvin’s theology which puts across the view that Calvin was against the theology 
that made separateness a God-willed principle of creation. It is indicated in Loader JA “Calvin’s 
Election Mix in Small-Scale Theology” HTS Teologiese Studies/Thoelogical Studies 2009 at 3-4 that 
Calvin believed in predestination and that all had not been created equal; that there are some people 
who were pre-ordained to live forever, while others were predestined for everlasting damnation. 
According to Calvin’s theology, the whites, just as the Israelites of old, were the chosen people and 
they were meant to bring the heathen Africa to Christianity. Thus, according to the Calvinisists whites, 
just like Israel of old, they set themselves apart, separate from other races or ethnic groups. See 
generally on Calvinism, Calvin J Institutes of the Christian Religion (A New Translation by Beveridge 
H) Vol One 1949; Calvin J Institutes of the Christian Religion (A New Translation by Beveridge H) Vol 
Two 1949; Shepherd VA The Nature and function of Faith in the Theology of John Calvin 
(Dissertation Series Number 2) 1983; Dakin A Calvinism 1949. In this book, Dakin provides an 
exposition of the system of Calvinism and a critical analysis of certain respects. See also on 
Calvinism, Bouwsma WJ “Explaining John Calvin” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) Vol 3 (1) at 68-75; De 
Gruchy JW “John Calvin, Karl Barth and Christian Humanism” Dutch Reformed Theological Journal 
2010 Vol 51 at 370-378; Hoek J “Towards a Revitalisation of Calvinistic Eschatology” In die Skriflig 
37(1) 2003 at 95-113; Raath AWG “Law, Religion and the Covenanted Community: The Impact of the 
Zurich Reformation on the Early Cape Settlement, 1652-1708” Acta Theologica 2003 (1) at 150-174.   
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They regarded themselves as the “chosen people” and often used religion to support 
their racial conduct. They looked down upon African people and their attitude 
towards them was racist and discriminatory. The Dutch brought their own Western 
ways of support, which negatively affected the kinship system that was used by the 
African people. The colonial administrators changed the kinship system to their 
Western system to sustain conditions they deemed necessary for their economic 
activities. The African people had to compromise their traditional system of support 
to accommodate the interests of their colonisers.16 This unfortunately brought about 
a social welfare system characterised by racial discrimination and welfare policies 
that favoured only the whites. As a result thereof, South Africa today has a system 
that reflects elements of Western cultures and their social values.  
 
Many people left their homes in the villages and moved to urban areas in search of 
jobs after the discovery of minerals in 1860. The majority of black people left their 
homes in rural areas to become labourers in the mines. This, among other things, 
gave rise to inequalities that characterise the present day South Africa. 
Discrimination and unequal treatment by whites against blacks was enforced in the 
industrial sector through laws mainly after the establishment of Union of South Africa 
in 1910. Industrialisation further strengthened racial differentiation in the provision of 
social services. Thus, both industrialisation and urbanisation contributed to high 
levels of poverty in the rural areas where the kinship system was badly affected 
when people, especially strong, young men, left their homes and moved to cities in 
search for jobs17 in the mines and factories that were opened at that time. 
Discrimination in the provision of social security services was entrenched after the 
National Party took control in 1948.18  
 
 
 
                                            
 
16
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 66. 
17
 Ibid at 67-68. 
18
 ILO: Apartheid and Labour (International Labour Office, Geneva) A Critical Review of the Effects of 
Apartheid on Labour Matters in South Africa (1983) at 8-9. 
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4.2.3 The apartheid period 
 
Apartheid arose from a history of Dutch (the Netherlands) and British (the United 
Kingdom) colonialism. The apartheid regime took over from the colonisers and 
adopted their laws and policies. The legacy of apartheid has left devastating results 
especially on black communities due to the unequal distribution of wealth and 
income which were more in favour of the whites. The provision of social services 
also favoured white people, with black people receiving lower benefits. The majority 
of black people lived in rural areas where there was no development due to a lack of 
adequate funding and resources.19 Apartheid was enforced through discriminatory 
laws, which included the Population Registration Act of 1950.20  
                                            
 
19
 See the National Report on the Status of Older People: Report on the Second World Assembly on 
Aging (1994-2002), Madrid, Spain (April 2002) at 9 (hereafter, National Report on the Status of Older 
People); and see generally on the effects resulting from the creation of homelands McAllister PA 
“Reversing the Effects of “Betterment Planning” in South Africa’s Black Rural Areas” Africa Insight Vol 
21(2) 1991 at 116-119, Leistner GME “Homeland Development: A Critical Assessment” Africa Insight 
Vol 10 (3 & 4) 1980 at 109-115.  
20
 Other apartheid laws included the following: The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 55 of 1949, 
which prohibited marriages between whites and people of other races; the Immorality Amendment 
Act, 21 of 1950, which prohibited sexual relations between whites and blacks, the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act, 52 of 1951, which prevented swamping or squatting by blacks and migrants in towns, 
the Group Areas Act, 41 of 1950, which created residential segregation with blacks and whites living 
in separate areas, the Bantu Education Act, 47 of 1953, which made sure that blacks received more 
inferior education than their white counterparts, the Reservation of Separation Amenities Act, 49 of 
1953, which prohibited blacks from using the same facilities as whites, such as public toilets, parks, 
beaches and other public facilities/buildings; the Natives Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of 
Documents Act of 1952, which restricted the movement of blacks into white areas through pass laws 
(all African men (and women starting from 1956) had to carry a reference book called a “dompas”). 
See also generally on apartheid and its effects, Hutt WH The Economics of Colour Bar (Andre 
Deutsch, London) 1964 at 30, 44 and 81, who suggested that apartheid policies were the outcome of 
colour prejudice derived from a historical heritage in which blacks were viewed as more primitive than 
whites and perpetuated by Afrikaner and particularly Calvinist social psychology, which was based on 
a fatalistic respect for the heaven-ordained race and class structures and which was inherently 
opposed to what he called the capitalist spirit. On the other hand, Rhoodie NJ and Venter HJ 
Apartheid: A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea (HAUM, 
Cape Town) 1960 at 180, are of the view that colour was the criterion with which the standard of 
cultural and social development of an individual was judged. See on the effects of apartheid 
Lowenberg AD “An Economic Model of the apartheid State” Economic History of Developing Regions 
Vol. 29(2) 2014 at 146-169; Mariotti M and Fourie J “The economics of apartheid: An introduction” 
Economic History of Developing Regions Vol. 29(2) 2014 at 113-125; Lundahl M “Some Stepping 
Stones in the Economic Modelling of Apartheid” Economic History of Developing Regions Vol. 29(2) 
2014 at 126-145; Shefer T “Narrating Gender and Sex in and through Apartheid Divides” South 
African Journal of Psychology, 40(4) 2010 at 882-395; Donaldson R and Van der Merwe I “Apartheid 
Urban Development and Transitional Restructuring in Pietersburg and Environs” Historia 45(1) May 
2000 at 118-134. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
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This Act classified people into four racial categories; namely whites, Africans 
(blacks), coloureds, and Indians. Race was mostly used in the allocation of welfare 
resources and social welfare policies were created to protect the whites from social 
and economic distress.21  
 
It was towards the end of 1950 that separate departments were established to serve 
the four different racial groups. This was followed by the creation of six homelands 
(self-governing territories)22; namely KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, Gazankulu, 
KaNgwane, and Kwandebele, as well as four homelands (independent republics) 
with independence; namely Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda in 1959.23  
                                                                                                                                       
 
Apartheid, 1973, provides in its article 1 that state parties declare that apartheid is a crime against 
humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of racial segregation and 
discrimination, as defined in article 2 of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of 
international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and 
constituting a serious threat to international peace and security. In terms of article 2(c), the term 
“crime of apartheid” in article 1 includes “human acts such as legislative measures and other measures calculated to 
prevent a racial group or groups from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the 
deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying them basic 
human rights and freedoms, including the right to work,…(d) measures designed to divide the population along racial lines by 
creating separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups….” 
21
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 70-71. 
22
 The following pieces of legislation were responsible for the creation of black reserves and 
eventually, separate homelands: The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 established tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities which had advisory functions in the black reserves; The Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act, 46 of 1959; The Natives Land Act, 27 of 1913, which set aside black reserves as 
scheduled areas reserved for black ownership and occupation and prohibited blacks from buying land 
outside them. The apportionment of land to blacks was later increased by the Natives Trust and Land 
Act, 18 of 1936. The creation of homelands came from the recommendations of the Tomlinson 
Commission: Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of Bantu Areas within the Union of 
South Africa, 1955 (see in this regard: The Tomlinson Report, April 1956, accessed from 
http://www.patontrust.co.za/sites/default/files/CtApr56.2.pdf, last visited 29 July 2015). The 
Commission’s recommendations were, however, criticised by, among others, the Liberal Party, which 
challenged the impartiality of the Commission because it did not have a single African even though it 
was to report on the Native Areas. The Liberal Party did not agree with the recommendation that total 
separation was the solution. According to the Liberal Party, there was no urgent need for the 
implementation of the Commission’s recommendations of separating racial groups from one another. 
See also generally on homelands, Ntuli SH The Transformation of KwaZulu Homeland from a Primary 
Agrarian to a More Integrated Political and Socio-Economic Entity, 1972-1994 (Thesis: University of 
Zululand) 2006. The black people were put into homelands which were like countries. Homelands 
were created for every black tribe, for example, North-Sotho, South-Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, 
Xhosa, Tsonga, and Venda.   
23
 See Geldenhuys D South Africa’s Black Homelands: Past Objectives, Present Realities and Future 
Developments (Paper (Special study), written for the South African Institute of International Relations 
Affairs) August 1981, (accessed from http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/29893/ 
1/South%20Africa's%20black%20homelands.pdf?1, last visited on 29 July 2015). Geldenhuys lists 
the objectives of the homelands policy as advocated by those who were in support of the policy as 
follows: to safe-guard white rule (they claimed that it was to give the white man full control in his areas 
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Each of the ten homelands had its own Department of Social Welfare. However, in 
some instances, such a department would form part of the larger combined South 
African Department of Health and Welfare. This led to a situation whereby the 
country had a total of 17 governmental Departments of Welfare.24  
 
As a result of the discriminatory set-up, social security in South Africa has always 
been characterised by elements of discrimination, and fragmented and complicated 
administrative arrangements. The coloureds, Indians, and whites had “Own Affairs” 
Departments through their Houses of Representatives, Delegates and Assembly, 
respectively. Blacks in the common area of South Africa, on the other hand, were 
provided for through the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal 
provincial administrations. The blacks had to queue for their small pensions, while 
whites, coloureds, and Indians received social welfare benefits through the 
commercial banks.25  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
and to give the Bantu every opportunity to develop in their own areas); accommodate black 
nationalism (they claimed that it was to give the non-whites self-governance); to take cognisance of 
foreign pressure (the homelands were, among other things, created to blunt international criticisms of 
South Africa’s racial policies, but failed to receive any recognition or legitimacy from the international 
community and therefore failed to produce desired results); to conform to international norms (it was 
to give an impression that blacks would be able to enjoy their rights as they would have self-rule, but 
this also failed to impress the international community due to, among other reasons, that the policy 
was unilaterally introduced by the white minority, it denied blacks their political and civil rights in the 
country as a whole, the homelands comprised only 13.7% of South Africa’s land area, and the 
homelands’ territories were fragmented and generally under-developed); to reduce blacks’ numerical 
preponderance in white South Africa (to avoid the dominance of blacks in white areas); to pave the 
way to an eventual community of co-operating states (the idea was that the homelands would develop 
(constitutional development) and that there would be a relationship between the homelands and 
South Africa, which was similar to those in the Commonwealth (Britain) (at 7-24).  
24
 Lund F “State Social Benefits in South Africa” International Social Security Review (1993) at 6 
(hereafter, Lund “State Social Benefits in South Africa”).  
25
 Nicholson CR, Lyster RM and Keely AM “A Manual on Social Pensions in South Africa” (Legal 
Resources Centre (Durban)) 1987 at 12, accessed from http://www.amazon.com/manual-social-
pensions-South-Africa/dp/B0006EQ708, last visited 18 May 2015; Maqubela The Administration of 
Social Welfare in South Africa op cit note 5 (Chapter 1: Summary); Lund “State Social Benefits in 
South Africa” (idem). 
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Many of the working people relied mostly on mutual-aid schemes and self-help 
groups such as burial societies and stokvels26 which provided them with social and 
economic support.  
                                            
 
26
 The South African Reserve Bank describes a “stokvel” as “a formal or informal rotating credit 
scheme with entertainment, social, and economic functions which (i) fundamentally consists of 
members who have pledged mutual support to each other towards the attainment of specific 
objectives, (ii) establishes a continuous pool of capital by raising funds by means of the subscriptions 
of members, (iii) grants credit to and on behalf of members, (iv) provides for members to share in 
profits and to nominate management, and (v) relies on self-imposed regulations to protect the interest 
of its members.” See also Lukhele AK Stokvels in South Africa – Informal Savings Schemes by 
Blacks for the Black Community (1990) at 1-5, who describes a “stokvel” as “a type of credit union in 
which a group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common 
pool weekly, fortnightly or monthly”, (see also National Stokvel Association of South Africa: Corporate 
Information Brochure (1995) at 14 and par 1(b)(i)-(vi) of GN 2173 in GG 16167 of 14 December 1994 
for a definition of stokvel). This money or a portion of it may be drawn by members either in rotation or 
in a time of need depending on the rules governing a particular stokvel. Stokvels provide mutual 
financial assistance as their main purpose but can also have a social and entertainment functions. 
According to Lukhele, the term “stokvel” was derived from rotating cattle auctions or “stock fairs” of 
the English settlers in the Eastern Cape during the early 19
th
 century. The stock fairs were attended 
by black farmers and labourers who used these functions as economic and social get-togethers to 
exchange products and ideas. Gradually these get-togethers were organised on a regular basis, 
independently from cattle auctions. The concept was brought to the Transvaal by Cape blacks as they 
came to look for jobs in the mines after the discovery of the Main Reef in 1884 (See also generally 
Schulze WG “The Origin and Legal Nature of the Stokvel (Part 1) SA Merc Law Journal 18 (1997) at 
20-24). In Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 80, “stokvel” is 
defined as an informal group savings scheme whereby the members agree to contribute a fixed 
amount of money to a common pool on a regular basis. This money, or some of it, may be drawn by 
the members on a rotation basis or as needed. It is a member-driven association. Members set their 
own rules and define their purpose. Besides providing mutual financial assistance, they also provide 
valuable social networks, support, and recreation. According to Scott-Wilson (see Scott-Wilson P 
“Stokvel Power” May 1990 Market Mix at 11), stokvels originally took the form of tea parties attended 
by women with each member taking a turn to host the party. Other members who attended the party 
brought gifts for the hostess. Later, stokvels developed to serve as a vehicle for saving clubs, buy-
aids, burial societies, and money-lending organisations (See Thomas E “Rotating Credit Associations 
in Cape Town” in Preston-Whyte E & Rogerson C (eds) South Africa’s Informal Economy (1991) at 
292-293). A stokvel creates rights and duties for its members. It has to be registered as a company or 
friendly society for it to have legal personality. Thus, any action against the stokvel is against the 
members themselves (see Collair A A Review of the Stokvels Movement in Some RSA Townships 
with Reference to Financial Management Techniques Used in Them (unpublished Bcom (Hons) 
Report, University of Cape Town (1992) at 8). Stokvels have an element of solidarity in them. In the 
study by Moodley L “Three Stokvel Clubs in Urban Black Township of KwaNdangezi, Natal” 
(Department of Economics, University of Durban-Westville), 27 Feb 2008, accessed from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03768359508439821, last visited on 29 July 2015, it was discovered that 
deposits were made to meet specific future needs of the participants. The most important reasons 
mentioned for saving in a sample of 50 members were the following: to meet precautionary needs, to 
provide for unforeseen circumstances and sudden emergencies, and to meet specific large 
consumption needs at a regular time, such as Christmas expenses and school fees. One other 
reason for the formation of stokvels is the high transaction cost of depositing money in banks as 
stokvels split the costs among the members by pooling their savings and depositing their collective 
funds with banks. The stokvels studied fell into three groups: a rotating savings club and two fixed-
fund clubs; one of which also lent money at interest to members (at 362-363). According to Akwasi 
Arko-Achemfuor in the article “Financing Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs) in Rural 
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The names of the mutual-aid and self-help groups reflected the spirit of solidarity, 
togetherness, group identity, and cooperation.27 There were also many protests 
during the early 1980s in demand of a better living wage and other employee 
benefits such as maternity benefits, pensions, provident funds, and medical aid.28  
 
Thus, the anti-apartheid campaigns and protests played a huge role in ensuring that 
eventually all people, regardless of race or colour, received equal treatment and 
benefits.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
South Africa: An Exploratory Study of Stokvels in the Nailed Local Municipality, North West Province” 
(Naledi Local Municipality) J Sociology Soc Anth, 3(2) (2012), the stokvel system became a major 
source of saving for the majority of black people, especially women, as a result of the apartheid 
system which restricted blacks from doing legitimate business. The stokvel system is also used by 
people who operate in the informal sector who do not have access to credit and financial services (at 
129-130). The savings were mostly used for food, household equipment and consumer durables, 
paying school fees and debt, and various occasions and ceremonies. Most of the members of one 
stokvel indicated that they belonged to more than one stokvel (at 129-132). All stokvels are required 
in terms of the Banks Act ,94 of 1990, to register with the National Stokvel Association of South Africa 
(NASASA) or a similar body approved by the Registrar of Banks in writing. NASASA provides stokvels 
with a template of a Constitution (see http://www.nasa.co.za, last visited on 29 July 2015). NASASA is 
a self-regulatory body recognised by the South African Reserve Bank (in terms of Government Notice 
404 GG 35368 25 May 2012). See Calvin B and Coetzee G (eds) “A review of the South African 
Microfinance Sector” Vol II-Background Papers: section IV-Special Products (University of Pretoria: 
Centre for Microfinance) March 2010, accessed from 
http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/1/3841/ volumeiisectioniv specialproducts.pdf, 
last visited on 29 July 2015) at 1, record that in 2009 NASASA represented 150 000 individual 
members from 11 000 groups nationwide. 
27
 For example, Thushanang Club, which means “helping one another”; Tshwarishanang Club, which 
means “holding hands together” or “to help one another to carry the load”; and Ratanang Club which 
means “love one another”.  
28
 See generally on the industrial unrest resulting from demands for better lives for workers by the 
unions: Friedman S “Political Implications of Industrial Unrest in SA” (African Studies Seminar paper 
presented at Seminar at University of Witwatersrand in RW 319 on 14 September 1981) at 19-24; 
Friedman S Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970-1984 (1987) at 210-
229. 
29
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 81. 
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4.2.4 The early 1990s 
 
In the early 1990s things had still not changed that much. During that period, the 
South African society was characterised by unequal wealth distribution, poor human 
development, and a high level of unemployment. The challenge for the future 
democratic government was to develop laws and policies that would give everyone 
the same social services and benefits without considering colour or race. In its 
manifesto, prior to South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the African 
National Congress (ANC) introduced a programme called the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which, among other things, advocated a 
developmental approach to social security and social welfare. The aims of the RDP 
included, among others giving all the people of South Africa social welfare rights, 
reviewing policy and legislation that existed, and creating a single national social 
welfare system of which the objective was to create a safety-net for all vulnerable 
groups.30  
 
4.2.5 Democratic period 
 
The first South African democratic elections, which took place on 27 April 1994, 
marked the end of apartheid and the beginning of a democratic South Africa. This 
also brought about considerable changes to how social security was provided in this 
country, which culminated in the recognition of everyone’s right to have access to 
social security in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.31 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
30
 Ibid at 85-87. 
31
 Section 27 of the Constitution. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE 
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS) 
136 
 
South Africa’s (final) Constitution followed the interim Constitution32, which was a 
product of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP).33 The interim Constitution 
was adopted in 1993, but only came into force on 27 April 1994. It introduced, 
among other things, the following two important fundamental changes:34 
 
 For the first time in South African history, all citizens were given political and 
civil rights without considering race or colour. 
 Constitutional supremacy was introduced in the place of parliamentary 
sovereignty and a Bill of Rights was introduced to protect human rights.  
 
The interim Constitution was there to pave way for the final Constitution.35 The final 
Constitution was adopted in December 1996. In its founding provision, the 
Constitution recognises a common South African citizenship, universal adult 
suffrage, a multi-party democracy, and a free judicial review of government and 
legislation to ensure that the government operates within the framework of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
32
 The (interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993. 
33
 The Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) commenced work in March 1993 at the World Trade 
Centre. It convened 26 participating parties comprising political groupings, national and homeland 
government representatives, and traditional leaders. 
34
 De Waal J and Currie I The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed 2013 at 2 (hereafter, De Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook). 
35
 Ibid at 5. 
36
 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
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It further recognises South Africa as one, sovereign, democratic state founded on 
human dignity,37 the achievement of equality38, and advancement of human rights 
and freedoms.39 The Bill of Rights guarantees everyone certain rights, including the 
right of access to social security40 and other socio-economic rights.41 The 
Constitution also recognises international human rights in its Bill of Rights.42 
                                            
 
37
 The right to human dignity is entrenched in section 10 of the Bill of Rights. The section provides that 
everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. In S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), O’ Regan J said the following about the right to human dignity: 
“Recognising a right to dignity is acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be 
treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights” (at par 328). The Constitutional Court in Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) 
SA 1012 (CC) at par 31 stated that in its view, unfair discrimination mainly means treating persons 
differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently 
equal in dignity. Thus, treating every person with dignity is an important element towards achieving 
equality and eradicating unfair discrimination. This view was supported in President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at par 41, where the court stated that “the recognition that the 
purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be 
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups lies at the heart of the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination”. 
38
 The right to equality is entrenched in section 9 of the Bill of Rights. The section gives everyone the 
right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. The right to 
equality is based on the idea that persons possess equal human dignity (see De Waal J, Currie I, 
Erasmus G The Bill of Rights Handbook 6
th
 impression 2004 at 232). The apartheid social and legal 
system was based on inequality and discrimination. In order to address imbalances of the past, the 
“equality clause” was entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court has already heard a 
number of cases dealing with equality and the cases include, among others: in Harsken v Lane NO 
1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) the Constitutional Court outlined the stages of an enquiry into a violation of the 
equality clause the courts have to follow in order to determine whether a provision discriminates 
against people (at par 53); in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at par 62, it was held that one of the most important indications that the 
substantive conception of equality as envisaged by the Constitution is the declaration in section 9(2) 
that “equality” includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms; in Fraser v Children’s 
Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) at par 20, the Court remarked that equality lies at the 
heart of the Constitution. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC), 
the applicant claimed that he was discriminated against as he was denied emergency medical 
treatment. The court held that no discrimination occurred as the duty put on the state to give everyone 
access to social security was dependent upon resources available for such purpose (at par 11).   
39
With these provisions together with the wording of the preamble, the Constitution explicitly 
recognises the injustices of the past, which are now addressed through the recognition of everyone’s 
fundamental (human) rights in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. 
40
 Section 27 of the Constitution. 
41
 For example, sections 26, 27, 28, and 29 of the Constitution. 
42
 Some of the international instruments that were particularly pertinent to Constitution-making in 
South Africa were the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1950); the United Nations Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination against Women (1979); and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981).  
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Provision was also made for the Constitutional Court to interpret and protect the 
Constitution.43  
 
The Ministry for Social Welfare and Population Development was established in 
1994 to separate social services from the Health Ministry. In doing so, the 
government demonstrated its commitment to give the social well-being of its citizens 
some serious attention.44 Later on, other programmes were launched to strengthen 
the fight against poverty and to remove racial inequalities in social security 
legislation.45 The first step towards the reform of the apartheid welfare system saw 
the publication of the Welfare White Paper in 1997.46 The Taylor Committee47 was 
also appointed to look at ways in which a comprehensive social security system 
could be developed to extend social security protection to all who live in this country. 
The findings and recommendations of these initiatives, together with those of other 
Committees which were established to look at social security reform over the years, 
are discussed in more detail below.48 
 
The fundamental principles of the White Paper for Social Welfare, which was 
adopted in 199749, reaffirmed the government’s commitment to securing the welfare 
of the people of this country. The Paper describes the relationship between 
economic and social development, and further reveals how the development and 
welfare of people can depend on social investments.50  
 
                                            
 
43
 Section 167(7) of the Constitution provides that a constitutional matter includes any issue involving 
the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution. 
44
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 94-95. 
45
 The first Social Assistance Act (Act 59 of 1992) in a democratic South Africa was introduced in 
1992 and was repealed by the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004. The Social Assistance Act of 2004 
affords everyone who qualifies in terms of the Act, social assistance.  
46
 The White Paper for Social Welfare (GN 1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997 (Chapter 7)).  
47
 The Taylor Commission: Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, March 2002 
(hereafter, The Taylor Committee Report). However, the discussion is only limited to Chapter 9 of the 
Report.  
48
 Discussed in par 4.3.3.  
49
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 96. 
50
 Ibid at 99-103. 
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The Taylor Committee reported to Cabinet in March 2002.51 Its investigation covered 
all forms of social assistance, social insurance, and health insurance. Chapter Nine 
of the Report focuses on “retirement and insurance”. The objective of the 
investigation was to make sure that social policies relating to the provision of 
retirement and insurance benefits provide people with adequate protection in their 
old-age and other risks and contingencies that may befall them during their financial 
life cycle.52  
 
4.3 THE NATURE OF RETIREMENT SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
4.3.1 General 
 
The system is made up of the state old-age pension, occupational retirement funds, 
and privately arranged savings. South Africa has never had a public or national 
retirement fund. However, the country always had a well-developed private sector-
based occupational system.53 A South African Pension Fund, which would have 
been a national contributions scheme, was recommended by the Department of 
Social Welfare and Pensions in 1976, but never took off as it faced serious 
opposition. This would have had automatic enrolment for workers who did not belong 
to any other fund or who belonged to funds which offered inadequate benefits.54  
 
                                            
 
51
 Ibid at 93. 
52
 Idem. 
53
 The Mouton Committee Report: the Committee of Investigation into a Retirement Provision System 
for South Africa (1988) at 568-569, (hereafter, The Mouton Committee Report). The Committee 
rejected a contributory national scheme for the following reasons: the only people who could be 
effectively drawn into such a scheme were those who were in formal employment (the collection of 
contributions from the other sectors could be problematic); benefits for an individual seldom depend 
fully on the contributions paid by him, therefore there is scope for evading contributions without 
reducing the benefits; and in newly introduced contributory national schemes, the benefits are related 
to the number of contributions made, and during the period immediately following the introduction of 
the scheme, the benefits emerging are extremely low, meaning that the need for old-age assistance 
continues – not only for those who did not contribute to it, but also for those who have only 
contributed for a short period. 
54
 Human Awareness Programme (South Africa) State Pension Schemes and Private Pension Funds 
– How they Affect Black People in South Africa (Special Report - Pensions: An Assessment) No 4, 
June 1983 at 5-6. 
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The reasons why the government decided against introducing this Fund included, 
among others, resistance from the business community – which was of the view that 
it would remove investable income from the private sector; the method of funding 
was not clear; workers would frequently change jobs as there would be no long-term 
maximum pension holding them to their jobs; and there was a strong view that 
employers and workers should control pensions and not the state.55 As a result of 
the failure to introduce a public fund, the state old-age pension has become the 
primary form of income to many South Africans who are in old-age and who would 
have otherwise had no form of income.56 Thus, the old-age pension plays a much 
bigger role than merely serving as a safety-net as it is very often their only means of 
survival that is also shared by other members of the household.57 
 
4.3.2 The state old-age pension 
 
South Africa’s modern day social assistance dates back from the period 1910 to 
1933. Many new changes, which were foreign to South Africa in the area of social 
security provision, were introduced during that period.58 For example: the state old-
age pension was first introduced in 1928 after the recommendations of the Pienaar 
Committee in 1926. The pension was initially only meant for the white and coloured 
population to the exclusion of blacks and Indians. In terms of the Old-Age Pensions 
Act of 1928, all coloured and white males and females over 65 years of age were 
entitled to receive the pension.  
 
                                            
 
55
 Ibid at 5. 
56
 In the National Report on the Status of Older People op cit note 19 at par 3.1, the number of old 
people who rely on the old-age grant was estimated to be at 68%. The following Committees that 
were given the task of investigating how the system in South Africa could be improved recommended 
that the old-age assistance be retained to serve as a safety net for the elderly: The Joint Committee 
on Pension Benefits (1985) (hereafter The Joint Committee on Pension Benefits); The Mouton 
Committee Report op cit note 53; The Smith Committee: The Report of the Committee on Strategy 
and Policy Review of Retirement Provision in South Africa (1995) (hereafter The Smith Committee 
Report); The Taylor Committee Report op cit note 47. 
57
 Olivier MP, Smit N and Kalula ER (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 1 ed (2003) at 235. 
58
 Kruger JJ State Provision of Social Security: Some Theoretical, Comparative and Historical 
Perspective with Reference to South Africa (Master’s Thesis), University of Stellenbosch (1992) at 
159; Van der Berg “South African Social Security under Apartheid and beyond” op cit note 8 at 486.  
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In 1937, the age of eligibility was lowered to 60 for women but remained at 65 for 
men. The reason for the exclusion of rural Africans was that they could rely on 
kinship arrangements for support, and urban Africans were excluded because it was 
said that it would be difficult to differentiate them from those in rural areas.59 The War 
Veterans Pension Act was passed in 1941, but Africans who served in the Native 
Military Corps during the First World War were excluded. A Social Security 
Committee was appointed in 1943 to investigate the possibility of introducing 
pensions for black people.60 In 1944 the Committee proposed the following three-tier 
system for the black population: 
 
 Rural or Reserve Natives could receive a pension but could also apply for 
rural relief; 
 Native farm workers and Natives who lived in the Reserves but were under 
the contract of service (for example clerks, teachers) and had no option on 
land could be granted an option for pensions; and 
 Urbanised Natives who had passed a test of urbanisation would receive a 
pension.  
 
The following would be taken into account for purposes of conducting a “permanent 
urbanisation” test: 
 
 A person must have stayed in an urban area for more than five years (if a 
man had a wife in the urban area, the wife should have stayed there for not 
less than three years); 
 Whether the applicant was “allotted in a Native area or not”; and 
 Where the applicant’s family lived. 
 
                                            
 
59
 Bhorat H “The South African Social Safety Net: Past, Present and Future” Vol. 12, No. 4 
Development Southern Africa 1995 at 595-596 (hereafter, Bhorat “The South African Social Safety 
Net”); Kruger State Provision of Social Security (idem); Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in 
South Africa op cit note 1 at 127-129. 
60
 Van der Berg “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” op cit note 8 at 487.  
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These tests were designed to stop blacks from moving to urban areas to receive a 
pension. Pensions for Africans were administered by the Native Affairs Department. 
These pensions were financed under the Native Trust which failed to pay out the 
whole amount allocated to blacks.61 When the Disability Grants Act of 1947 was 
introduced, it extended disability grants to all racial groups. The year 1947 also saw 
the means-tested pension received by whites being five times what was paid to 
Africans, with coloureds and Indians receiving half of what whites were getting.62 In 
1955, nine areas were classified as cities, towns, and rural areas, and pensions were 
paid according to this categorisation; with those in rural areas receiving the lowest 
pension rate. In 1965, 70% of African pensioners living in the rural areas received 
the pension, and the distinction between city, town, and rural pensions was done 
away with to stop African people from moving to towns and cities in search of 
pensions.63  
 
In the early 1980s, eligibility for state pension was determined based on three basic 
criteria; namely age, citizenship, and income or assets. All men received the pension 
when they were 65 years and older, and women at 60 years and above. Persons 
receiving a state pension had to be resident in South Africa or South-West Africa 
(the modern-day Namibia, at the time it was colonised by the German Empire and 
later by South Africa); be a South African citizen or a citizen of independent or self-
governing homelands; had to have been resident in South Africa for five years; and 
must have been a tax payer or be exempted from paying tax in terms of section 
13(3)(a) of the Bantu Taxation Act of 1969.64  
 
A person qualifying for a state pension had to be indigent;65 and had to qualify on 
application for a means-test, which was not the same for different race groups. The 
following persons could not receive a pension from the state: those receiving a grant 
                                            
 
61
 Bhorat “The South African Social Safety Net” op cit note 59 at 598. 
62
 Ibid at 597. 
63
 Idem.  
64
 Act 92 of 1969. 
65
 The person’s ability to support himself or herself, and the ability of the person’s spouse to support 
him or her were some of the factors considered. 
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under the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act of 1973,66 Workman’s 
Compensation Act of 1941,67 and Military Pensions Act of 1976;68 those persons or 
dependants of those persons who were receiving treatment in any state-run or state-
aided institution; and the dependants of a beneficiary on his or her death. Where 
there was insufficient proof of the date of birth, the person had to name a historical 
event69 which he or she remembered. His or her birth date was estimated from that 
by the pension officer. Even though the budget allocation to blacks (in the 
homelands/Bantustans) was improved between 1981 and 1991, the different 
government departments and administrators continued to deliver poor services to the 
poor African people. Equal treatment between blacks and non-blacks was only 
established in the true sense in 1993, when African social pensions increased to 
85% of what their white counterparts received.70 
 
The democratically elected government, which took over in 1994, was faced with a 
number of challenges, which included a fragmented social security system, and 
inequalities and discrimination in the provision of welfare services and benefits. Prior 
to 1994, the country had 17 departments for different population groups and 
homelands which administered the welfare system. Each of these departments had 
their own procedures, priorities, and systems of operation. This resulted in 
fragmentation, duplication, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in providing adequate 
welfare services to the population of this country. There were also inconsistencies in 
the social welfare legislation.71  
 
The introduction of the new (final) Constitution in South Africa saw the entrenchment 
of the right to have access to social security in section 27 of the Bill of Rights. In 
terms of this section, the right to have access to social security and social assistance 
                                            
 
66
 Act 78 of 1973. 
67
 Act 30 of 1941. 
68
 Act 84 of 1976. 
69
 For example, the Anglo-Boer War (1899/1903); Bambata Rebellion (1906); Great War (1914/1918); 
and Swarms of Locusts (1932). 
70
 See generally, Bhorat “The South African Social Safety Net” op cit note 59 at 600. 
71
 Item 15 of the White Paper for Social Welfare (1997). 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE 
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS) 
144 
 
is constitutionally guaranteed in situations where people are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants.72 Previously, men received the pension when they 
reached the age of 65 and women at the age of 60. This was unconstitutional as 
men and women were treated differently. However, the position was correctly 
challenged in the case of Christian Roberts v The Minister of Social Development,73 
where section 10 of the Social Assistance Act of 2004 74 and Regulation 2(2) of the 
Regulations75 made in terms of section 32 of the Act faced constitutional scrutiny. 
The role played by the pension was considered and it was found that the pension 
has a two-fold effect in addressing poverty; namely that it reduces poverty and 
vulnerability among older persons as individuals, and that it also has an effect on the 
aggregate poverty because of the relationship between poverty and households with 
older people.76 The court held that there was no acceptable justification for the 
exclusion of eligible men between the ages of 60 and 64 from receiving the 
pension.77 Interestingly, the state did not even have any progressive plans to 
address the needs of vulnerable men in that age band and it could not even raise the 
lack of resources as its defence in unfairly differentiating between men and women 
in this regard.78  
 
The court found the differentiation to be a violation of section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution as the state has a duty not to create any situation in terms of which men 
falling within that age band would not be able to enjoy their right to have access to 
social assistance. This was further found to be a violation of section 9(3) of the 
Constitution, which prohibits any direct or indirect unfair discrimination by the state 
against anyone on one or more grounds that include age, sex, and gender. The court 
also found the differentiation to be in violation of the “human dignity” of eligible men 
                                            
 
72
 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
73
 Christian Roberts v The Minister of Social Development (Case No: 32838/05) (TPD), 17 March 
2010 (unreported). 
74
 Act 13 of 2004. 
75
 Published in the GG No. 27316 of 2 February 2005. 
76
 See the case of Christian Roberts supra note 73 at par 7. 
77
 Supra at par 21. 
78
 At paras 27-28. 
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who were excluded from benefiting.79 Even though the court in this case did not 
grant the applicants the relief they wanted (because they would have soon qualified 
for the state pension as they would have reached the age of 65 by the time the relief 
or order of the court was confirmed) the decision, as well as the reasoning of the 
court, is welcome as the previous position was indeed unconstitutional and 
unwarranted considering that South Africa is a constitutional and democratic state 
which should be seen to uphold the values of equality and human dignity. Presently, 
the state old-age pension is paid to the majority of qualifying persons, subject to a 
means-test, to both men and women of all races from the age of 60.80 The means-
test is applied to determine if the applicant qualifies to receive the pension. Thus, not 
all older persons of 60 years and above are eligible to receive the pension.  
 
A person is eligible to receive the pension if, in addition to satisfying the set age and 
means-test, he or she meets the following requirements: 
 
 Is a South African citizen or is permanently resident in the Republic;81 
 Has a valid identity document; 
 Is not a beneficiary of another social grant; and 
 Is not maintained in any one of the following state institutions or institutions 
funded by the state (e.g. a prison, state psychiatric hospital, state home for 
older persons, care treatment centre, or a treatment centre for drug 
dependants). 
 
                                            
 
79
 At paras 41-52. 
80
 The age of eligibility for men and women differed for many years. This was corrected and now both 
men and women receive the state old-age pension at the age of 60. This change is in line with the 
“equality clause” under section 9 of the Constitution. Section 9(1) of the Constitution guarantees 
everyone equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law. On the other hand, 
section 9(2) provides that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
The position prior to this change was clearly discriminatory against men on the basis of gender, sex, 
and age, and was therefore a contravention of section 9 of the Bill of Rights as it could not be justified.  
81
 It was decided in the case of Khosa supra note 39, that people with permanent resident status 
should be treated the same way as citizens of the country for purposes of qualifying for social security 
benefits. 
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The state old-age pension is provided for under the Social Assistance Act 13 of 
2004, which repealed the old Social Assistance Act, 59 of 1992, and it is regulated 
by the Regulations promulgated under the Act. A person in need of social assistance 
must apply in the prescribed manner82 and present himself or herself at the Social 
Security Agency83 office or designated place of the area in which he or she resides.  
 
The main objective of the state old-age pension is poverty relief and not the provision 
of income after retirement; hence the pension is means-tested. The pension is 
essentially meant to be redistributive in nature.84  
 
4.3.3 Occupational retirement funds 
 
Before the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, the work environment 
was different to what it is today. Employees then received care from their employers 
as businesses were not as big as they are now. Businesses mostly employed family 
members who were supported within the family. However, later on, the nature of 
employment changed and there came a need for other alternatives to support people 
who were no longer working; for example, due to old-age.  
 
Employers carried the burden of supporting former workers in their old-age until a 
time arrived when competition amongst businesses was high and employers were no 
longer able to do that due to a high desire to make profit. As a result, the majority of 
old people had to come up with alternative ways of support. Even though there were 
some sympathetic employers who were prepared to support their retired employees 
out of company profits, this was not always possible – especially at the time 
businesses were not doing well.  
 
                                            
 
82
 Section 11(3)-(4) of the South African Social Security Agency Act, 9 of 2004. 
83
 The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) was introduced by Chapter 2 of the Social 
Security Agency Act, 9 of 2004. The Agency was set up by the government to root out fraud and 
improve efficiency in the administration of the country's social grants. The objectives of SASSA are 
discussed under par 5.4 in Chapter (Ch) 5. 
84
 The Smith Committee Report op cit note 56 at 31. 
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There was a serious need for some form of provision that could provide guaranteed 
support to retired employees. Company retirement plans became an obvious 
solution to the problem. In terms of these company plans, employers would 
contribute a certain percentage to retirement funds to build up sufficient reserves 
over a period of time. The reserves would then be paid out to the employee in the 
form of pension benefits when the employee retired. The government also 
introduced tax concessions to encourage people to save for their retirement.85 
 
Even though the South African government started to formally recognise retirement 
funds in the early 1920s, history records that the first pension fund was established 
in 1882. This pension was not necessarily in the form of social insurance as we know 
it today and it was also not established or regulated by any legislation. The first 
formal regulation of pension funds in South Africa was in 1958 with the introduction 
of the Pension Funds Act of 1956,86 which came into effect on 1 January 1958. 
Initially, occupational pension funds were in the form of trusts or universitas 
personae and were not regulated by any legislation.87 Therefore the introduction of 
the Pension Funds Act of 1956, which has since seen many amendments, has also 
brought about the codification of the occupational retirement funding system in South 
Africa.88  
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 was, among other things, introduced to protect 
members of the funds who had paid contributions to their employers with the 
expectation of receiving benefits on retirement. The Act is there to ensure that the 
business of retirement funds is conducted in a way that funds would be sustainable.  
                                            
 
85
 Downie JAB Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa 2005 at 3-4 (hereafter, 
Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa). 
86
 Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
87
 The trusts deeds, which were entered into and exist separate from the pension fund, are required 
by PF Circular 79 of 1993 to be registered with the Financial Services Board and to form part of the 
rules of the fund. The Office of the Masters of the High Court still has founding trusts deeds of many 
pension funds. See with regard to pension funds as universitas personae (a voluntary association with 
corporate personality) Venter v Protektor Pension Fund [2000] 3 BPLR 340 (PFA) at 345, where the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator stated that common law pension funds are regarded as universitas 
personae. 
88
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 85 at 4.  
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE 
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS) 
148 
 
South Africa was the first country to have a comprehensive legislation in the form of 
the Pension Funds Act to regulate retirement funds as in other countries retirement 
funds were regulated through a number of laws and legal principles, such as the law 
of trusts, and not by any specific piece of legislation.89 
 
The provision of occupational pensions was unfortunately also initially racially biased 
towards the whites as black workers were excluded. Some employers started 
including certain categories of black workers, mainly skilled to semi-skilled coloured 
and Indian workers, during the early 1960s. Most African workers, who were at the 
time less skilled, were excluded from coverage and as such were without income in 
their retirement and had to depend on informal kinship arrangements when they 
were no longer working. Industrialisation, which took place between 1960 and 1970, 
saw more African people being covered, which led to the expansion of occupational 
retirement funds in South Africa. However, the inclusion of African people at that 
time did not necessarily mean that black people received the same level of coverage 
and benefits as their white counterparts. The system also did not include any 
provision for people working in the informal sector (such as farm (agricultural) 
workers, informal traders, the self-employed, domestic workers, and informal 
traders), the majority who were, and still are, blacks who mostly worked as farm and 
domestic workers. These people were and are still without any means of support in 
their retirement, except for the state old-age pension. This category of workers often 
earn too little to be able to make any contributions to formal insurance schemes, 
which generally require monthly contributions over a person’s work life.90 
                                            
 
89
 Idem. 
90
 Social grants have proved to be very effective in alleviating poverty in this country. See in this 
regard Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 136–137; National 
Treasury Committee Report No.7: Retirement and Old Age at 237, par 7.4.2, accessed from 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/ssrr/General%20Papers/Taylor%20Report%20%20Cha
p%207.pdf, last visited 29 July 2015. See Lund F “Social Security and the Changing Labour Market: 
Access for Non-standard and Informal Workers in South Africa” Social Dynamics 28(2) (2002) at 200, 
which mentions the fact that diversity that exists within the informal sector makes it difficult to work out 
appropriate measures that will accommodate everyone in the sector. See also Armstrong P and 
Burger C Poverty, Inequality and the Role of Social Grants: An Analysis Using Decomposition 
Techniques (A working paper of the Department of Economics and the Bureau for Economic 
Research (BER) at the University of Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 15/09) 
2009 at 1, accessed from http://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2009, last visited on 18 May 2015; Van 
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By the mid-1970s, the majority of black employees, comprising migrant and contract 
workers, were still not covered by the pension system; which at the time excluded 
hourly or weekly paid and lower paid employees. Those blacks who belonged to 
retirement funds did not fully benefit from the pension scheme because fixed-benefit 
schemes established long-term liabilities and required long-term investment and 
were therefore inappropriate for contract workers. Migrant workers only benefited 
after ten years of service, and although the number of racially exclusive schemes 
had diminished, migrant and contract workers were still subjected to discrimination 
by pension schemes. As a result, more black people had to rely on state old-age 
pensions for survival in their old-age.91  
 
Over the years South Africa has gone through a number of retirement reform 
processes with the objective of improving the country’s retirement system. Various 
Committees92 were established to investigate ways in which the retirement system 
could be improved. Some of the Committees’ recommendations were implemented 
and some were never implemented. 
 
The following are some of the Committees and their recommendations: 
 
▀ In 1976, the Minister of Social Welfare and pensions presented a report 
prepared by a departmental committee in which findings about an 
investigation into the possible institution of a national contributory pension 
scheme were published. The report also proposed that the preservation of 
pension rights be made compulsory. However, the proposals were never 
implemented. In 1978, an interdepartmental committee, the Louw Committee, 
                                                                                                                                       
 
der Berg S, Siebrits K and Lekezwa B Efficiency and Equity Effects of Social Grants in South Africa (A 
working paper of the Department of Economics and the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at the 
University of Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch Working Papers 15/10) 2010 at 4, accessed from 
http://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2010, last visited on 18 May 2015. 
91
 Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa op cit note 1 at 136-137.  
92
 For example, The Mouton Committee Report op cit note 53; The Katz Commission: The 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, 1994 (hereafter, The 
Katz Committee Report); The Smith Committee Report op cit note 56; and The Taylor Committee 
Report op cit note 47. 
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was established to address similar pension-related problems – the 
recommendations of which were also never implemented.  
 
▀ In 1986, the Select Committee was appointed to form part of the Joint 
Committee on Pension Benefits.93 The Committee was to enquire into the 
manner in which satisfactory pension benefits could be provided for or 
assistance could be given to that section of the public which had no or 
insufficient pension cover, the compulsory preservation of pension rights 
through transfers or other means, the commutation of a part of lump-sum 
benefits into annuities, and matters relating thereto. The recommendations 
were never implemented.  
 
▀ The Mouton Committee: the Committee of Investigation into a Retirement 
Provision System for South Africa was appointed in 1988 with a broad 
mandate to review the effectiveness of the retirement provision systems in 
South Africa and to propose guidelines for any changes that it would deem 
necessary to move towards the goal of providing all South Africans with 
adequate income in their old-age. The points of departure for the Committee 
included the eradication of discrimination in retirement provision based on 
race, colour, creed, or gender, that the state shall assist individuals to meet 
their basic subsistence needs in retirement or old-age, individuals shall have 
the responsibility to provide for their needs and those of their dependent 
spouses in retirement (if they wish to have more resources in old-age than 
can be provided by the state), the state shall encourage individuals by tax 
laws and other incentives to make provision for their own retirement needs, 
employers (including the state) shall be expected to facilitate and participate 
in retirement plans for their employees, and retirement provision system shall 
be adequately integrated with, and there shall be a good fit between, private 
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 The Joint Committee on Pension Benefits op cit note 56. 
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provision, state-provided old-age assistance, and other social assistance 
systems.94  
 
The Committee put forward guidelines which would be used for a proposed 
new dispensation of retirement provision for all people in the Republic of 
South Africa. The guidelines would provide guidance to those who had the 
responsibility for managing retirement funds. Among other things, the 
Committee proposed that each fund should have a board of trustees and a set 
of rules governing the functions of the board and the duties and 
responsibilities of the board, investment guidelines, guidelines on the use of 
funds to finance development and social projects, guidelines on benefits, 
member communication, and retirement provisioning systems (a four-tier 
system comprising social assistance and national schemes, occupational and 
employer-sponsored schemes, voluntary individual schemes, and other 
provision for retirement).95 Most of the recommendations of the Committee 
have been implemented. For example, the Pension Funds Act of 1956 has 
provisions on a number of issues highlighted by the Committee; including on 
investment of assets of the funds, constitution of boards of trustees, their 
duties and responsibilities, etc. South Africa, however, still has a three-tier 
system (comprising state social assistance, occupational retirement funds, 
and private savings) and it is also still without a national or public fund. 
 
Most of the recommendations of the Committee, even though couched 
differently, can be seen in the two published Discussion Papers for Social 
Security and Retirement Reform in South Africa, and it will be interesting to 
see if they are eventually implemented. These, among others, include the 
proposed National Savings Fund. 
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 The Mouton Committee Report op cit note 53 at 430-431 (Volume 2: Annexures). 
95
 Ibid at Annexures C2-E5. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE 
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS) 
152 
 
▀ The Katz Commission: the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the 
Tax Structure of South Africa was appointed on 22 June 1994. The 
Commission was to investigate the possibility of a comprehensive and 
systematic framework for tax reform in South Africa; which included, among 
others, retirement fund taxation. It completed its first Interim Report on 18 
November 1994. This Interim Report was followed by other Interim Reports, 
which were published in different years.96 Some of the recommendations of 
this committee have been implemented over the years, and it should be noted 
that retirement fund taxation reforms continue to form part of tax reform 
processes in this country.  
  
▀ The formation of the Smith Committee: the Committee on Strategy and Policy 
Review of Retirement Provision in South Africa was announced in 1995. This 
Committee was introduced after the democratisation of South Africa during 
the time transformation was affecting almost all aspects of society, and was to 
inquire into the efficiency of the then retirement arrangements and to make 
recommendations for improvements.97 The Committee was tasked with, 
among other things, assessing the appropriateness of the Mouton Committee 
Report and Recommendations in a changed or changing environment, the 
adaptation and improvement of the structure of the retirement system with a 
view of reducing the financial burden of the state regarding social pensions 
and of increasing pension coverage for those engaged in the informal sector 
and of modest means, and of how to achieve among the broad population a 
better understanding of pensions and the need for providing for old-age.98  
 
 
 
                                            
 
96
 The Katz Committee Report op cit note 92. 
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 The Smith Committee Report op cit note 56 at 3. 
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 Idem. 
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Among other things, the Committee recommended the following: that the old-
age pension be retained as an unfunded redistributive system of poverty relief 
for the aged; that urgent steps be taken to improve the effectiveness of 
management, administration, and payment systems of old-age pensions; that 
the long-term cost of old-age assistance be investigated; occupational 
retirement provision coverage be extended to all formal employment without 
requiring compulsory provision; preservation of personal provision be 
extended; people be encouraged to make personal provision of pension 
income in their retirement; and that retirement funds be permitted to provide 
loans for lifetime needs.99 The recommendations of the Committee can be 
seen in the present system and they also form part of the important features 
of the system. Clearly the implementation of the Committee’s 
recommendations has not brought much improvement to the system as there 
are still workers who are not covered, there is still poor preservation of 
retirement benefits as withdrawals are allowed prior to the retirement date, 
and the majority of people are still not saving for their retirement.  
 
▀ In 2000, The Taylor Committee: Transforming the Present – Protecting the 
Future was appointed to review a broad number of elements relating to social 
security. The Committee reported in March 2002. It recommended, among 
other things, the following in respect of retirement provision in South Africa: 
that all people employed in the formal sector must contribute a prescribed 
minimum percentage of their income for retirement saving, there must be 
compulsory preservation of benefits when people exit funds, there must be 
compulsory survivors’ and disability cover, that the principle of lay trustees 
with democratic accountability to the members be encouraged, the process of 
allocating benefits to dependants on death and divorce must receive high 
priority from the Financial Services Board to do away with problems that exist, 
the fiduciary duties of the trustees be monitored on a regular basis, that the 
tax structure be retained but that it be simplified, that the FSB must coordinate 
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a national initiative to find missing beneficiaries, and that the means-test 
applied for state old-age pension be done away with and the costs of paying 
the pension be recouped via the income tax system.100 Most of the 
recommendations of this Committee have not been implemented and they 
form part of the proposals made in the two Discussion Papers on Social 
Security and Retirement Fund Reforms. For example: not all workers in the 
formal sector are covered, there is still no complete compulsory preservation 
of benefits when members exit the funds prior to their actual retirement time, 
and distribution of death benefits in terms of section 37C is still problematic. 
 
▀ South Africa’s National Treasury Task Team101 was appointed in 2004 to 
investigate how coverage and benefits provided by the system can be 
improved. This reform process has already seen the publication of two 
Discussion Papers which put forward proposals aimed at improving retirement 
provision to the old in this country. The First Discussion Paper was published 
in 2004 and the Second Discussion Paper in 2007.  
 
The two Papers proposed a number of things which are captured in the 
Second Discussion Paper, which include a multi-pillar system comprising 
social assistance grants, funded from general government revenue, with a 
means-test reviewed, and providing a safety-net against poverty in old-age; 
mandatory participation in a national social security system, up to an agreed 
earnings threshold, providing basic retirement benefits, the aim being to close 
the gap between social assistance grants and private section retirement 
provision; additional mandatory participation in private occupational or 
individual retirement funds, for individuals with earnings above the threshold 
to ensure that individuals have adequate income replacement in their 
retirement; and supplementary voluntary savings.102  
                                            
 
100
 The Taylor Committee Report (Chapter 9: Retirement and Insurance) op cit note 47 at 93-98. 
101
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6.  
102
 National Treasury South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion 
Paper (Republic of South Africa (National Treasury)) February 2007, at 3-4.  
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The government is still working on the recommendations made by the 
Treasury in these Papers. Most of them, if implemented, will see South 
Africa’s retirement security system improving in coverage and benefit 
adequacy. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION  
 
Social security in South Africa has a very long history dating back to the pre-colonial 
period, where people mostly relied on the kinship system for support; while 
retirement security can be traced back to 1837, even though it was then not well 
structured and regulated. The process to formalise pension provision only started in 
the 1920s, although at that time it was generally biased towards whites. However, 
the actual formalisation and regulation of pension schemes only started in 1958 after 
the enactment of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
 
South Africa’s developmental approach to social security evolved from the country’s 
unique history of inequality and the violation of human rights as a result of 
colonisation and the apartheid system which continued the discriminatory and 
oppressive policies of the colonisers.  
 
The system was influenced by the social, cultural, economic, and political factors of 
the country. Consequently, social welfare reform in a constitutional dispensation was 
approached along the principles of equality, reconciliation, and healing the divisions 
of the past and promoting democratic values, social justice, and human rights. All 
these ideas are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996.103  
 
                                            
 
103
 See the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) and sections 1, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 26, and 27 of the Constitution; see also Patel Social Welfare & Social Development in South 
Africa op cit note 1 at 98. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM (STATE 
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS) 
156 
 
Social welfare provision in this country is now approached from a rights based 
approach in terms of which everyone is guaranteed access to social security and 
appropriate social assistance in cases where people are not able to support 
themselves or their dependants. The social security policy framework also embraces 
the principle of equity, which encompasses equal distribution of resources, services, 
and benefits to redress previous inequalities on the basis of race, gender, 
geographical areas, and sectors.104  
 
Social insurance is generally meant for employed people and mainly for those 
employed in the formal sector of the economy, to the exclusion of the majority of 
workers employed in the informal sector. On the other hand, social assistance in the 
form of state old-age pension covers millions of people and it has largely contributed 
and it is still contributing to poverty alleviation in this country.105  
 
The next chapter examines South Africa’s social and retirement security framework, 
which comprises state social assistance arrangements, occupational arrangements, 
and private savings plans.  
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 Makino K “Social Security Policy Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa – A Focus on the Basic 
Income Grant” (Centre for Civil Society Research Report No.11. This paper was first presented at the 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 5 
SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the nature of South Africa’s social and retirement income 
security. The contents of this chapter are premised on the understanding that when 
people who are employed stop working due to old-age, most of them face the future 
with no stable income or no income at all and will therefore need some form of 
income security to sustain them and their dependants.  
 
Societies and governments have developed mechanisms to provide income security 
for their elderly citizens as part of the social safety-net.1 These mechanisms are 
aimed at redistributing resources to those with low income or those who are without 
any means of income and to reduce poverty within the society. It is also generally 
accepted in today’s life that every state has the responsibility to introduce a social 
security system2 in order to protect its population against certain social risks. People 
who are vulnerable to consequences of poverty would, for example, need state 
support,3 in the form of social assistance4 measures.  
                                            
 
1
 World Bank: Averting the Old Age Crisis – Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth (A World 
Bank Policy Research Report) (Oxford University Press) 1994 at 1. This study contains a global 
examination of financial security for old-age. In the study, redistribution, saving, and insurance are 
identified as the three functions of old-age financial security systems.    
2
 The International Labour Organisation (ILO): Introduction to Social Security (ILO Publication) (1996) 
at 3.  
3
 International Labour Organisation: ILO and the World of Work (ILO Publication) (1974) at 29. 
4
 Social assistance provision in South Africa is regulated by the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004. 
Assistance is mainly in the form of monthly social grants (for example, the old-age grant (pension), 
disability grant, child support grant, and care dependency grant) and social relief. See in this regard 
Kaseke E “Social Security and Older People: An African Perspective” International Social Work 48(1), 
January 2005 at 92. According to the Minister of Finance (South African government) in his 2015 
budget speech, spending on social assistance has risen from R75 billion in 2008/2009 to R118 billion 
in 2014. The number of people receiving grants has increased from 13.1 million in 2009 to 16.4 in 
December 2014, http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/speech/speech.pdf, 
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On the other hand, those who have means of support or a stable source of income 
and are able to make contributions to social insurance schemes will need an 
enabling environment to do that.5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (the Constitution), guarantees everyone the right to have access to social 
security and/or appropriate social assistance and on the other hand, the state and 
private institutions (to the extent that it is applicable) are required to promote, 
respect, protect, and fulfil this right.6  
                                                                                                                                       
 
last visited 21 May 2015, (see also the Minister’s 2014 budget speech on budget speech accessed 
from: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/speech/speech.pdf, last visited 
21 May 2015). 
5
 Examples of social insurance schemes in South Africa are the following: the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund, regulated under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 63 of 2001 (UIA); the 
Occupational Diseases and Injuries Fund, regulated under the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act, 130 of 1993 (COIDA); and retirement funds, regulated under the Pension 
Funds Act, 24 of 1956. 
6
 Section 8(2) (read with section 7(2)) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution) states that a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if and to the 
extent that it is applicable; taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right. The case of Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) 
BCLR 1253 (CC) at paras 53-56 (hereafter, Certification case) highlights the objections made against 
the inclusion of the provisions of section 8(2) in the final Constitution and counters arguments to those 
objections. Objections included the following: that it would impose obligations on persons other than 
organs of state; that it will have a “horizontal application”, the horizontal application (this is the manner 
in which the Bill of Rights engages or applies to natural and juristic persons) of fundamental rights is 
not universally accepted; that in rendering the Bill of Rights binding on private persons, the new text 
(provision) was inconsistent with Constitutional Principle VI, which requires that there should be a 
separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; that horizontal 
application will allow the courts to tamper with the role of the legislature, as it would give them the 
power to change legislation and the common law; that section 8(2) would give the courts the duty of 
balancing competing rights and that this is not a proper judicial role; and that imposing obligations on 
individuals was a breach of Constitutional Principle II, which contemplates that individuals should be 
beneficiaries only of universally accepted fundamental rights and freedoms. These objections were 
countered as follows: that the latter argument fails to acknowledge the fact that courts have always 
had the role of developing the common law, that the courts have no power to change legislation, the 
courts’ role is to determine if legislation is inconsistent with the new text (provisions) or not and not to 
change it, that the argument that a “horizontal” application of the Bill of Rights will give the courts the 
powers to interfere with the responsibilities of the legislature was misconceived, that the fact that 
section 8(2) would give the courts the task of balancing competing rights failed to acknowledge the 
fact that even where organs of state are bound by the Bill of Rights, courts will still be required to 
balance competing rights; and lastly, that as long as the Bill of Rights binds the legislature, legislation 
regulating the relationships between private individuals will be subject to constitutional scrutiny. In 
Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boedery 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SCA), 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) at par 31, the court held that there will be 
circumstances where it can be expected that the right would be enforceable horizontally. In such 
cases, what will be important to consider is the context in which the breach of the said right occurred 
and the nature of the relationship affected parties are involved. Thus, it should be accepted that there 
might be instances where individuals or juristic persons through their conduct pose a threat in the 
exercise of power (in their private capacity). Also see in this regard generally, Rautenbach I 
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It can also be deduced from section 27(1) of the Constitution that South Africa’s 
social security system has both social assistance and social insurance components.  
 
Even though South Africa has a well-developed retirement system by developing 
countries’ standards, the system provides for a limited coverage as it mainly caters 
for those who are employed in the formal sector of the economy, to the exclusion of 
the masses of other people employed in the informal sector.7 The system has so far 
failed to provide comprehensive coverage and those who are not well covered or not 
covered at all are forced to rely heavily on the state old-age pension for survival. 
Previously, that is before formalised welfare support was introduced in South Africa, 
old-age support was provided through family support, mutual-aid societies, and other 
informal mechanisms. These arrangements were eroded by factors such as 
urbanisation and industrialisation as most people had to leave their homes (mostly in 
rural areas) to move to the cities in search of employment and a better life. Presently 
old-age support is more formalised and provided for in different ways and forms. 
However, the problem with the existing arrangements is that they do not always 
provide adequate protection and benefits. They are also not always sustainable, 
hence the need for regular reforms.8  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
“Constitution and Contract: The Application of the Bill of Rights to Contractual Clauses and their 
Enforcement Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd” (2011) THRHR at 510-520.    
7
 The sector is not fully regulated, not taxed; and includes farm workers, the self-employed, and 
domestic workers.  
8
 South Africa’s pension system has over the years gone through several reforms, some of which 
were undertaken by the following Committees: the Mouton Committee: the Committee of Investigation 
into a Retirement Provision System for South Africa (1988) (hereafter The Mouton Committee 
Report); the Smith Committee: The Report of the Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of 
Retirement Provision in South Africa (1995) (hereafter, the Smith Committee Report); and the Taylor 
Committee: Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, March 2002 (hereafter, the Taylor 
Committee Report). At the moment, there is a new retirement fund reform process underway. A 
number of Discussion Papers, namely the National Treasury South Africa Retirement Fund Reform (A 
Discussion Paper) December 2004 (The Three Pillars of Retirement Funding System) at 1 (hereafter, 
Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper) and National Treasury South Africa’s Social 
Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper (Republic of South Africa (National 
Treasury)) February 2007, at 7 (hereafter, South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: The 
Second Discussion Paper) refer. See also generally on retirement reforms James E “Protecting the 
Old and Promoting Growth: A Defence of Averting the Old-Age Crisis” (World Bank Policy Research, 
Working Paper No: 1570) January 1996 at 1-2 (James “Protecting the Old and Promoting Growth”). 
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The discussion that follows reviews the traditional retirement security provision 
considered to be based on the following three pillars: state-provided pensions, 
employment-based retirement schemes, and privately arranged savings. The other 
component, which is not formally recognised in South Africa, but which plays a 
supplementary role in addition to the other three pillars, is in the form of informal 
means of support.9 It is submitted that this form of support plays an important role 
both socially and ecomically as most people and families from the black communities 
rely on the support received from these arrangements. The discussion will start by 
laying a foundation from a social security rights perspective. This will be followed by 
a discussion of various forms of retirement security provision offered by the system. 
 
5.2 A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.2.1 The right to have access to social security 
 
The Constitution makes provision for the right to have access to social security in 
section 27 of the Bill of Rights. This right is an internationally recognised human right 
as seen in Chapter 210 of this study. The section gives everyone the right to have 
access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and 
their dependants, appropriate social assistance.11 Thus the section covers both 
social insurance and social assistance. Beneficiaries of social assistance are those 
who qualify in terms of policy and beneficiaries of social insurance are those who are 
insured in terms of legislation that establishes the scheme. Beneficiaries of social 
insurance schemes may also be chosen in terms of the rules of a particular scheme 
and are required to make regular contributions to the scheme.  
                                            
 
9
 The Mouton Committee Report (ibid) at 538-539. See also Olivier MP, Smit N and Kalula ER (eds) 
Social Security: A Legal Analysis 1 ed (2003) at 231 (hereafter, Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal 
Analysis).  
10
 Among international instruments that recognise the right to social security are the following: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; UN General Assembly Resolution 217(III) of 10 December 
1948; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN in 1966; 
the Social Security (Minimum Standards) ILO Convention 102 of 1952; the Equality of Treatment 
(Social Security) Convention 118 of 1962; the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention 157 
of 1982; and the Social Security (Seafarers) Convention 165 of 1987. 
11
 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
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For example, the rules of a retirement fund will specify categories of employees who 
are eligible to join the fund and would normally make it compulsory for these 
categories to join the employer established fund. According to Pieters, the 
constitutional provisions on social security can take either of the following forms:12 
very general provisions proclaiming the state as a “social state”; or provisions merely 
confirming the existence of social security, social insurance, or social assistance; or 
fundamental social rights.  
 
5.2.1.1  Very general provisions proclaiming the state as a “social state” 
 
This is where the constitution contains provisions, often found at the beginning, 
which describe the fundamental character of a state. These provisions would 
stipulate, among other things, that the state is a “social state”. Great importance is 
attached to such a constitutional “social-state-principle” by the country’s legal 
doctrine and jurisprudence.13 South Africa can be regarded as a “social state”. This 
can be deduced from the wording of the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996.  
 
The preamble states, among other things, that the Constitution is adopted as the 
supreme law of the Republic with the aim of healing the divisions of the past and 
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice, and fundamental 
human rights, and of improving the quality of life of all citizens and freeing the 
potential of each person. This, according to Olivier et al, means that the state wants 
to create a comprehensive social security system.14  
                                            
 
12
 Pieters D Social Security: An Introduction into the Basic Principles 2006 at 9-11 (hereafter Pieters 
Social Security: An Introduction into the Basic Principles).  
13
 Idem. 
14
 Olivier MP, Smit N, Kalula ER, Mhone GCZ Introduction to Social Security 2004 at 121. See also 
with regard to South Africa being a “social state”, De Wet E “Can the Social State Principle in 
Germany Guide State Action in South Africa in the Field of Social and Economic Rights?” (1995) 11 
SAJHR 36, and De Villiers B “Human Rights in Developing Countries: Some Crucial Issues” (1996) 
TSAR 694. The social injustices of the apartheid system were articulated in the Certification case 
supra 6 note at par 5, as follows: “South Africa’s past has been aptly described as ‘a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice’ which “generated gross violations of human rights … From the 
outset the country maintained a colonial heritage of racial discrimination: in most of the country the franchise was reserved for 
white males and a rigid system of economic and social segregation was enforced.” It was stated at par 7 that 
SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
 
162 
 
Thus, the provision of social security to all who live in South Africa not only ensures 
social justice for all, but also improves the quality of life of the people of this country 
and in particular those who were previously denied access to social security by the 
discriminatory laws and policies of the apartheid government.15 In ensuring that the 
aims set out in the preamble to the Constitution are realised, section 39(1)(a) of the 
Constitution requires courts, tribunals, and forums in this country to promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality, and freedom. In section 39(2), the Constitution further compels these 
institutions to promote the spirit, purport, and objectives of the Bill of Rights when 
interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law.    
 
  
                                                                                                                                       
 
fundamental to the apartheid system “was a denial of socio-political and economic rights to the 
majority of people in most parts of the country … Race was the basic, all-pervading and inescapable 
criterion for participation by a person in all aspects of political, economic and social life.” 
15
 According to Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 53, social security reform 
in South Africa should aim to redress injustices of the past and in particular poverty and inequality. 
This intention can be seen in the provisions of section 27(2) of the Constitution, which requires the 
state to ensure “progressive realisation” of the right to have access to social security. As stated by 
Olivier et al at 58, the duty to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the state’s 
available resources, to achieve progressive realisation of the right to have access to social security 
“constitutes a clear and unambiguous undertaking by the drafters of the Constitution to develop a 
comprehensive social security system, based on, among others, the right of access to social security 
for everyone, and financial viability”. While on one hand the state is given the duty to provide 
“universal access” to social security, on the other hand, the same state is given some latitude in that it 
should realise the right to have access to social security, progressively and must take reasonable 
measures according to available resources. This duty is placed upon all spheres of the state by 
section 8(1) of the Constitution. On the other hand, section 7(2) compels the state to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the right to have access to social security as it does with any other right in the Bill of 
Rights. 
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5.2.1.2  Provisions merely confirming the existence of social security, social 
insurance, or social assistance 
  
This is where the Constitution explicitly confirms the existence of social security, 
social insurance, and social assistance, without mentioning the contents for each 
one of them.16 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, provides in section 
27(1)(c) that everyone has the right to have access to social security, including if 
they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, and appropriate social 
assistance. This provision does not provide for anything more than access to social 
security and appropriate social assistance. The section does not specify what social 
security and social assistance mean and neither does it detail their content.   
 
5.2.1.3  Fundamental social rights 
 
Fundamental rights to benefits go a step further as they also promise beneficiaries 
that they can claim social protection. They warrant a certain social minimum. They 
are supported by a complete network of other constitutional arrangements. 
Provisions proclaiming basic social rights can often also be interpreted as 
institutional guarantees.17 For example, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, follows the “fundamental rights approach”. The right to have access to social 
security and to social assistance for those who are unable to support themselves18 
encompasses within it what may be called the right to “income security in old-age”. 
This section does more than just confirm the existence of the social insurance and 
social assistance. Section 27(1)((a)-(b)) mentions the contents of social security and 
in subsection 1(c), social assistance is provided to those who are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants.  
 
 
                                            
 
16
 Pieters Social Security: An Introduction into the Basic Principle op cit note 12 at 9-11. 
17
 Idem. 
18
 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
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Even though the section does not guarantee a certain social minimum, section 27(2) 
obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of the rights in 
section 27. It is important to note that the right to have access to social security and 
other socio-economic rights are justiciable and enforceable and can therefore be 
enforced by the courts of law.19  
 
Countries provide the legislative power with a central role in the shaping of their 
social security systems. The constitutional system of many countries will often 
require a social security scheme to be based on an Act of Parliament.20 In South 
Africa there are a number of statutes that provide both administrative and regulatory 
frameworks for different social security schemes and social assistance arrangements 
to give effect to section 27(2) of the Constitution, which requires the state to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right to have access to social security. For example, social assistance benefits 
are provided for in terms of the Social Assistance Act of 200421 and the Regulations 
thereto; unemployment benefits are provided for in terms of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act of 200122; retirement benefits are provided for and regulated in terms 
of the Pension Funds Act of 195623, and Regulations thereto and retirement funds 
rules; benefits and injuries suffered and diseases contracted at work are provided for 
in terms of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act of 199324. 
 
                                            
 
19
 See Certification case supra note 6 at paras 77-78. The fact that socio-economic rights are 
justiciable was reaffirmed in the following decisions: Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 at 60-61 (CC) at par 20 (hereafter Grootboom); and Minister of Health and 
Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at par 23-25 (hereafter 
TAC (2)). This can also be assumed from the provisions of section 2 of the Constitution, which 
provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. On the other hand, section 7(2) requires the 
state to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This can imply that socio-
economic rights are enforceable.  
20
 Pieters Social Security: An Introduction into Basic Principles op cit note 12 at 11. 
21
 Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004. 
22
 Unemployment Insurance Act, 63 of 2001. 
23
 Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956. 
24
 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 130 of 1993. 
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Some constitutions deal with social security to provide parliament with some 
guidelines which are in principle not meant to be legally enforceable and, as such, 
the impact of such provisions on social security is very limited, except in those cases 
where legal doctrine or jurisprudence have interpreted them as containing 
institutional guarantees or even fundamental social rights. It even happens 
sometimes that one and the same constitution contains several of these kinds of 
constitutional provisions.25 However, this is not the case with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa binds the 
executive; the judiciary and all organs of state, as well as natural or juristic persons, 
provided certain conditions have been met.26  
 
What this means is that the right to have access to social security, as well as other 
relevant rights such as the right to equality,27 human dignity,28 protection against 
arbitrary deprivation of property,29 and the right to just administrative action,30 among 
others, have to be realised and applied by private entities and all the functionaries 
mentioned in section 8 of the Constitution. This would include an institution regarded 
as private but which conforms to the definition of an organ of state and which acts as 
a functionary of the state;31 for example the Financial Services Board (FSB), which is 
the regulatory body for financial institutions and retirement funds.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
25
 Pieters Social Security: An Introduction into Basic Principles op cit note 12 at 11.  
26
 Section 8(2) of the Constitution. See also Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 
at 52-53. 
27
 Section 9 of the Constitution contains what is generally known as the “equality clause”. 
28
 Section 10 of the Constitution. 
29
 Section 25. 
30
 Section 33. 
31
 In terms of section 239(b)(ii) of the Constitution, “organ of state” means any other functionary or 
institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but 
does not include a court or a judicial officer.  
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Section 27 of the Constitution refers to the right to have “access to” social security. 
This wording means that the right to social security and other socio-economic rights 
are not items that must be handed out free of charge by the government to the 
people. The state’s role is to create an “enabling environment”, which makes it 
possible for people to gain access to these rights, remove obstacles in the way of 
people gaining access to the rights, and adopt measures to assist those without 
access to gain such access.32 The right to have access to social security is called a 
second-generation right.33  
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
32
 Liebenberg S and Pillay K A Resource Book: Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa October 2000 
at 27.  
33
 Second-generation rights include socio-economic and cultural rights. These rights are also referred 
to as the “red” rights. They are recognised in international law as they are embodied in articles 22-28 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, respectively. The second-generation rights require the state to 
respect, protect, promote, and fulfil them depending on the availability of resources. This is the reason 
why, for example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, guarantees everyone the 
right to access to adequate housing (section 26) and the right to have access to social security 
(section 27), and not a direct right to housing or social security. Both sections 26(2) and 27(2) on 
access to adequate housing and social security respectively confirm that the right to access in these 
instances is to be realised progressively and not immediately. Thus, the obligation upon the state is 
not an absolute one. See in this regard the case of Grootboom supra note 19 at paras 38, 45 and 46. 
According to the court in Grootboom supra (at par 94), despite the qualifications in section 26(2) 
(including available resources) of the Constitution, the state is obliged to give effect to the right to 
have access to adequate housing as obliged by the Constitution and this is an obligation that the 
courts can in appropriate circumstances, enforce (see also Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at par 36). In the Certification case 
supra note 6 at par 77, the Court held that the implications of the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights (second-generation rights) is the same as for first-generation rights (for example, rights to life, 
equality before the law, privacy, prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishments, freedom of speech, 
prohibition of slavery, forced labour, etc.). While the first-generation rights can be exercised 
independently and individually, second-generation rights such as the rights to social security, 
education, and freedom of association require institutional support and would require legislative 
intervention from the state to create institutional systems to give people access to, for example, 
education or retirement savings arrangements (see in this regard Cornescu AV The Generations of 
Human Rights (Bny Práva-2009-Days of Law: the Conference Proceedings, 1 edition. Brno: Masaryk 
University), accessed from https://www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/ 
dny_prava_2009/files/prispevky/tvorba_prava/Cornescu_Adrian_Vasile.pdf, last visited on 21 May 
2015).  
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It is a positive right which imposes obligations on the state to do or not to do 
something.34 In terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, the state has the duty to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil everyone’s rights. This duty gives the 
beneficiaries the right to require positive assistance or a benefit or service from the 
state.35 The duty to protect, promote, and fulfil places a positive duty on the state, 
and requires positive action from the courts. On the other hand, all fundamental 
rights require the state to protect citizens from political, economic, and social 
interference with their rights.36 The duty to respect requires the state to refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the rights. In other words, the state must not limit or 
take away people’s existing access to social security, without good reason and 
without following proper legal procedures.37 This duty also prohibits the state from 
acting in a manner that undermines the right to have access to social security and 
any other rights in the Bill of Rights.  
 
  
                                            
 
34
 De Waal J, Currie I and Erasmus G The Bill of Rights Handbook 6
th
 impression 2004 at 432 
(hereafter, De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook). 
35
 See the cases of Grootboom supra note 19 at par 20; TAC (2) supra note 19 at par 39. 
36
 De Vos P “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights: Social and Economic Rights in 
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution” (1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 83 (hereafter, De Vos “Pious Wishes or 
Directly Enforceable Human Rights”).  
37
 See for example Ngxuza and Others v The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government and Another 2001 (2) SA 609 (E); Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another v Ngxuza and Others 2001 (4) SA 1184 
(SCA), 2001 (10) BCLR 1039 (hereafter, Ngxuza); Maluleke v MEC, Health and Welfare, Northern 
Province 1999 (4) SA 367 (T) (hereafter, Mululeke); Mbanga v MEC, Health and Welfare, Eastern 
Cape and Another 2002 (1) SA 359 (SE), 2001 (8) BCLR 821 (SE) (hereafter, Mbanga); 
Mahambehlala v MEC, Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape and 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE), [2001] JOL 
8191 (SE) (hereafter, Mahambehlala). 
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The state can undermine people’s right to have access to social security in the 
following manner: 
 
 By arbitrarily or unreasonably denying people access to social security;38  
 By introducing legislation or policy which is a barrier for people to access 
social security;39 and 
 By introducing legislation or policy which promotes unfair discrimination 
towards certain sections of the society in accessing social security.40  
 
The duty to respect does not necessarily require the state to distribute money or 
resources to individuals, but requires a framework wherein individuals can realise 
these rights without undue influence from the state. In terms of this duty, the state is 
required to provide effective legal remedies to protect people against violations of 
their rights by other individuals or groups in society.41 The duty to protect requires 
the state to protect the existing enjoyment of rights, and the capacity of people to 
enhance their enjoyment of rights against third-party interference. For example, the 
state must regulate private retirement provision to protect people against exploitation 
by private institutions and must, through such regulation, provide effective legal 
remedies where such exploitation or other forms of interference occur.42  
                                            
 
38
 See the cases of Ngxuza; Maluleke; Mbanga and Mahambehlala (supra). 
39
 See in this regard Khosa & Others v Minister of Social Development & Others: Mahlaule & Another 
v Minister of Social Development & Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at par 98 (hereafter, Khosa), where 
the omission of words “or permanent resident” after the word “citizen” in sections 3(c) and 4(b)(ii) of 
the Social Assistance Act, 59 of 1992, was found to be inconsistent with the Constitution as the 
sections made it difficult for foreigners with permanent residence status to qualify for social assistance 
benefits in South Africa. 
40
 For example, the exclusion of men from the age of 60 from receiving the state old-age pension was 
unfair and discriminatory. This has, however, since been changed and now both men and women 
receive the state old-age pension at the age of 60 years. 
41
 For example, the law must effectively prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
race, gender, sexual orientation, and on any other ground in the private insurance industry. See 
Brand D and Heyns C Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 2005 at 9 (hereafter, Brand Socio 
Economic Rights in South Africa).   
42
 In Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School and 
Another; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School 
and Another 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC); 2014 (2) SA 228 (CC) at par 84 the court stated that the 
obligation to protect the rights in the Bill of Rights goes beyond a mere negative obligation not to act 
in a manner that would infringe or restrict the right. The court had previously held that there are 
instances where the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on the state and state organs to 
provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to afford such 
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The state must also develop the common law through the courts of law to strengthen 
existing remedies or develop new remedies for protection against private 
interference in the enjoyment of rights.43 
 
The duty to promote has been described as being inclusive of the duty to raise 
awareness of rights; that is, to bring rights and the methods of accessing and 
enforcing them to the attention of right holders and to promote the most effective use 
of existing access to rights.44 The beneficiary of social security benefits has the right 
to require positive assistance, or a benefit or service from the state. Section 27(2) 
qualifies the positive obligation of the state to realise the right to have access to 
social security by obliging it to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to have 
access to social security.45 The duty to fulfil requires the state to act; to adopt 
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other 
measures so that those who do not currently enjoy access to these rights can gain 
access and so that existing enjoyment of rights is protected.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
protection. See also in this regard Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
2011 (3) SA 347 (CC); 2011 (7) BCLR 651 at par 105; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); 2001 (10) BCLR 
995 (CC) at par 44; Minister of Safety and security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA (SCA) at par 20 
where the court stated as follows: “While private citizens might be entitled to remain passive when constitutional rights 
of other citizens are under threat, and while there might be no similar constitutional imperatives in other jurisdictions, in this 
country the state has a positive constitutional duty to act in the protection of the rights in the Bill of Rights.” It was held in 
the case of Glenister supra at par 107 that there many ways in which the state can protect the rights 
in the Bill of Rights. According to the court in casu, the Constitution gives the state freedom as to how 
to achieve this – depending on the nature of the right involved and the availability of resources. The 
obligation of the state with regard to socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 27 respectively, is to 
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, in order to achieve the 
progressive realisation of those rights (as required by sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution, 
respectively. Those who are aggrieved by the decisions of boards of pension funds may approach the 
courts of law or the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator created specifically to deal with 
complaints against pension funds. Alternatively, they can approach the Financial Services Board, a 
regulatory body for financial institutions, including pension funds. The Pension Funds Adjudicator is 
appointed to this office by the Minister of Finance in terms of section 30C of the Pension Funds of 
1956.  
43
 Brand Socio-economic Rights in South Africa op cit note 41 at 9.  
44
 Liebenberg S (The interpretation of socio-economic rights) in Chaskalson M et al Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2ed 2003 (Chapter 33) at 5.  
45
 It was held in the case of TAC (2) supra note 17 at par 28 that section 27(1) is not a self-standing 
right independent of section 27(2) which . See also Brand Socio-economic Rights in South Africa op 
cit note 41 at 239. 
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The duty to respect can be enforced through adjudication, while on the other hand, 
the positive duties to protect, promote, and fulfil would require the courts of law to 
interfere with decisions to budget allocations by the executive.46 The state’s duty to 
take reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right to have access to social security47 includes the adoption of 
enabling strategies to assist people to gain access to the rights through their own 
endeavours and initiatives, as well as more direct forms of assistance to groups in 
particularly disadvantageous or vulnerable circumstances.48 The state needs to take 
reasonable legislative measures together with well-directed policies and 
programmes; for example by making policies and law that would allow people to 
establish or participate in retirement schemes. These policies and programmes must 
be reasonable both in their conception and in their implementation.49 This would, for 
example, mean that retirement security legislation and policy should be construed 
and applied in such a manner that they sufficiently protect individuals against 
discrimination in acquiring membership and benefits. Social security objectives are 
also giving effect to the aims of the Constitution, healing injustices of the past, 
ensuring social justice, improving the quality of life, and freeing the potential of all 
citizens.50  
                                            
 
46
 In the Certification case supra note 6 at par 77, the court accepted the fact that the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights may call upon the courts to make orders that have direct 
implications for budgetary matters. The court stated that there could be instances where it is called 
upon to order the extension of state benefits to a class of people who were previously not 
beneficiaries of such benefits. However, in the case of Soobramoney supra note 33 at par 29, the 
court held that it will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political 
organ. This is an indication of the court’s reluctance to interfere with budgetary decisions of the 
executive. In the case of TAC (2) supra note 19 at paras 35 and 44, the court emphasised the fact 
that a purposive reading of the socio-economic rights in section 26 and 27 of the Constitution 
respectively, tells that those rights should not be interpreted to mean that everyone can demand a 
minimum core content, but that it is only required that the state must act reasonably in providing 
access to these rights on a progressive basis as required by subsections (2) of these rights. The 
reasonableness of government programmes was emphasised in the case of Grootboom supra note 
19 at par 35. See also generally the discussion of this issue in Brand Socio-economic Rights in South 
Africa (ibid) at 9-10.  
47
 Section 27(2) of the Constitution. See also The Taylor Committee Report op cit note 8 at 49. 
48
 De Vos “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights” op cit note 36 at 93-4; Olivier et al 
Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 35. 
49
 See the case of Grootboom supra note 19 at par 42; see also Strydom EML, Le Roux PAK, 
Landman AA, Christianson MA, Dupper OC, Myburgh P, Barker FS, Garbers CJ, Basson AC, Dekker 
A and Esselaar V Essential Social Security Law 2006 2ed 131-132 (hereafter, Strydom Essential 
Social Security Law). 
50
 See the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
 
171 
 
The right to have access to social security also protects and promotes an individual’s 
right to human dignity,51 which is also one of the founding values of the 
Constitution.52  
 
In promoting values underpinning the rights in the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional 
Court held in the case of Grootboom that:53 
 
“Those who do not have food, clothing or shelter are denied human dignity, freedom and 
equality. Giving people socio-economic rights will enable them to enjoy other constitutional 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Affording people these rights assist in achieving race and 
gender equality and will ensure that men and women equally achieve their full potential.” 
  
In other words, social security rights are there to protect human dignity and to 
promote the freedom and equality of the people in a society. Without human dignity, 
a person is excluded from society.  
 
The right to have access to social security is there to make sure that an individual is 
included in society through support measures, such as access to retirement funds 
and adequate benefits. Thus, social exclusion is prevented by giving people access 
to social security measures; the enjoyment of which maintains a person’s dignity or 
restores the dignity that would have been lost due to factors such as poverty or lack 
of income.54 
 
In this way, society is in “solidarity” to ensure the social protection of every member 
of the society. 
  
                                            
 
51
 The right to human dignity is entrenched in section 10 of the Constitution. 
52
 Section 1 of the Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, and 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, and non-racialism and non-sexism. 
53
 See the case of Grootboom supra note 19 at par 23. 
54
 Brand Socio-economic Rights in South Africa op cit note 41 at 235.  
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The White Paper for Social Welfare55 describes the importance of “solidarity” or what 
is in isiZulu56 called Ubuntu,57 as follows: 
 
“Each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed through his or her relationship with others 
and theirs in turn through the recognition of the individual’s humanity. Ubuntu means that 
people are people through other people. It also acknowledges both the rights and 
responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and societal well-being.” 
 
The respect for and promotion of the principle of Ubuntu can guarantee the success 
of a comprehensive social security system,58 as proposed in the Taylor Committee 
Report.59 Social security is seen as a means of reducing inequality and promoting 
human dignity. The principle of solidarity promotes the nature of sharing and the 
element of mutual support or interdependence. Social security systems are based on 
the principle of solidarity and Ubuntu, with the aim of providing support to those 
members of the society who are not able to support themselves and would as a 
result have their human dignity negatively affected.60  
                                            
 
55
 The White Paper for Social Welfare, General Notice 1108 Government Gazette 18166 of 8 August 
1997 at item 24. 
56
 IsiZulu is recognised in section 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of South as one of the official 
languages. 
57
 Ubuntu means “human kindness”. The term Ubuntu is expressed in the isiZulu saying “umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu”, which means that “a person is a person through other people”. This concept 
was given direct application for the first time in S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (hereafter, 
Makwanyane). At par 308 of the judgment, the court stated as follows: “Generally, Ubuntu translates 
as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it translates as personhood and morality. 
Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing its significance of group 
solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelopes the key 
values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms, and 
collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises 
respect for human dignity….” See also generally on the concept of Ubuntu: Afri-Forum and Another v 
Malema and Others 2011 (12) BCLR 1289 at paras 18, 108 and 111; Metz T “Ubuntu as a moral 
theory and human rights in South Africa” (2011) Vol 11, No 2, AHRLJ at 532-559; Mokgoro Y “Ubuntu 
and the law in South Africa” (1998) PER/PELJ Vol 1, No 1 at 16-32; Cornell JD and Van Marle K 
“Exploring Ubuntu: Tentative Reflections” (2005) Vol 5, No 2, AHRLJ at 195-220; Bennet TW “Ubuntu: 
An African equity” (2011) PER/PELJ Vol 14, No 4 at 30-61; Scott CD “Beyond Racism: Ubuntu and 
the Other” Skills@work, Theory and Practice  (2010) Vol 3 at 71-79; Le Granje L “Ubuntu as an 
Architectonic Capability” Indilinga-African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (2012) Vol 11(2) 
at 139-145; Dolamo R “Botho/Ubuntu: the Heart of African Ethics” Scriptura 112 (2013:1) at 1-10; 
Ngoenha SE “Ubuntu: New Model of Global Justice? Indilinga-African Journal of Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (2006) Vol 5(2) at 125-134; and Xulu M “Towards an Ubuntu Pedagogy through 
Cultural Expressions, Symbolism and Performance” (2010) Skills@work, Theory and Practice Vol 3 at 
81-87. 
58
 Brand Socio-economic rights in South Africa op cit note 41 at 235-236.  
59
 The Taylor Committee Report op cit note 8 at 15-47.  
60
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 603. According to Olivier et al (at 62), 
the connection between human dignity and equality is in accordance with the objectives of social 
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5.2.2 Enforcement of the right to social security  
 
The state’s duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the right to have access to 
social security can be interpreted to mean that the courts can enforce social security 
rights and order state organs and private institutions to act positively with regard to 
this right.61 The courts, tribunals, and forums62 are also enjoined by the Constitution 
to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any 
legislation and when developing the common law.63 As the supreme law of the 
country, the Constitution specifically grants the power to the courts to adjudicate on 
and review laws or conduct for constitutional consistency.64 The courts have the 
power with regard to the Bill of Rights to grant appropriate relief to rectify violations 
of the Bill of Rights.65 In this regard, the courts have not hesitated to enforce the 
supremacy of the Constitution in the area of social security, in circumstances where 
its principles have not been adhered to.66 The courts also play a supervisory role. 
This role involves the courts giving orders; directing the legislative and executive 
branches of government to bring about reforms, defined in terms of their objectives; 
and retain supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation of these reforms.67  
                                                                                                                                       
 
security rights, in that social security places more emphasis on the eradication of poverty and 
inequalities and on the protection of those who are most vulnerable. 
61
 See the case of Grootboom supra note 19 at par 24. 
62
 This would include the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator established in terms of Chapter VA 
of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
63
 Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that when interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal, or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport, and objectives of the Bill of Rights. According to the court in Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC); 
2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC); 2009 (7) BCLR 637 (CC) at par 30, section 39(2) issues an injunction to all 
the courts to interpret legislation in manner that will promote the spirit, purport, and objectives of the 
Bill of Rights. 
64
 Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution states that when deciding a constitutional matter within its 
power, a court must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency, while section 165(1) gives the courts independency – except for the 
provisions of the Constitution.  
65
 Section 38 of the Constitution. 
66
 See Certification case, supra note 6 at par 78; and the case of TAC (2) supra note 19 at paras 98-
101, 104, 106 and 113. 
67
 See the cases of Grootboom supra note 19 at par 97; TAC (2) supra note 19 at par 129. However, 
the court has shown reluctance to interfere with executive decisions as it was held in the case of 
Soobramoney supra note 33 at par 29. In this case, the applicant, Mr Soobramoney, an unemployed 
diabetic who was in the final stages of chronic renal failure, launched an application with the 
Constitutional Court for an order to force the hospital to give him ongoing treatment. His life could only 
be prolonged by means of regular renal dialysis, but the hospital could not help him due to limited 
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In terms of section 38 of the Constitution, anyone listed under the section68 has the 
right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has 
been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief – including a 
declaration of rights.  
 
Appropriate relief was described in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security69 to mean: 
 
“… relief that is required to protect and enforce the Constitution. The relief may take the form 
of declaration of rights, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure that 
constitutional rights are protected and enforced, but this will depend on the circumstances of 
each particular case. The courts may even have to create new remedies in ensuring that 
rights are protected and enforced.”  
 
The courts of law are empowered by section 38 of the Constitution to intervene and 
assist social security beneficiaries where statutory entitlements to social security 
rights have not been recognised, or where administrative law principles of 
constitutional prerequisites have not been adhered to. For example, the courts have 
already ruled against the Provincial Departments of Social Development in instances 
where the grants were unilaterally suspended or stopped,70 and where there have 
been unwarranted delays in considering applications for social grants.71 
 
The Constitution also gives everyone the right to just administrative action72 and the 
right of access to courts.73 Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone 
has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
facilities for kidney dialysis. His application was dismissed and the court held that indeed the 
obligations imposed upon the state by sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution with regard to access to 
adequate housing, health care, social security, etc. are dependent upon the availability of resources 
(at par 11). The court held with regard to whether it could interefere with executive decisions that “a 
court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and 
medical authorities whose responsibility is to deal with such matters” (at par 29). 
68
 In terms of section 38(a)-(e) of the Constitution, these include anyone acting in their own interest; 
anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; anyone acting as a 
member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; anyone acting in the public interest; and 
an association acting in the interests of its members.  
69
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at par 19. 
70
 See generally, Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) 1998 1 AII SA 525 
(E); Ngxuza supra note 37; and Bushula & Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape Provincial Government & Another 2000 7 BCLR 728 (E) (hereafter, Bushula).   
71
 See the cases of Mbanga; and Mahambehlala, respectively supra note 37. 
72
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
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The function of this right was held in President of the Republic of South Africa v 
South African Rugby Football Union74 as being to regulate the conduct of the public 
administration and, in particular, to ensure that where action taken by the 
administration affects or threatens individuals, the procedures followed comply with 
the constitutional standards of administrative justice. Decisions made by the 
executive and other functionaries in relation to social security rights and benefits 
must be rational and should not be arbitrary.75 
 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 200076 (PAJA) was enacted to give 
effect to the provisions of section 33 of the Constitution. This Act gives expression to 
the requirement of section 33(3) that national legislation be enacted to set out details 
of the broad framework of administrative law rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
The Act lays down guidelines and benchmarks for administrative action and 
decisions, and requires a fair procedure to be followed in the event of administrative 
action materially and adversely affecting the rights or legitimate expectations of any 
person.77 The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 200078 also plays an 
important role in assisting people in enforcing their constitutional rights.  
People who approach different forums with complaints regarding government’s 
interference with their right to have access to social security can also invoke section 
32 of the Constitution; which gives everyone the right of access to any information 
held by the state or by another person which is required for the exercise or protection 
of any rights.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                       
 
73
 Section 34. 
74
 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 10 BCLR 
1059 (CC) at 1117E-F. 
75
 See in this regard, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte 
Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 89. 
76
 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). 
77
 Section 3(1) of PAJA. 
78
 The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2 of 2000 (PAIA). 
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5.2.3 International obligations 
 
The birth of democracy and the introduction of the final Constitution79 in South Africa 
have not only resurrected this country’s ties with the international community, but 
have also confirmed South Africa’s commitment to comply with international 
standards. The Constitution provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal, or forum must consider international law and may consider foreign law.80 It 
also provides that when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.81 The 
Constitution further provides that customary international law is law in the Republic 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.82  
 
South Africa has already indicated its intention to be party to and to be legally bound 
by the obligations imposed by international agreements by ratifying some of the 
international conventions pertaining to social security.83  
 
                                            
 
79
 South Africa had an interim Constitution in 1993 and the final (new) Constitution was introduced in 
1996. The interim Constitution was formally adopted as an Act for the pre-democratic, tri-cameral 
parliament, ensuring the continuity of the South African state. After the 1994 elections, the new 
Parliament and Government of National Unity were established and began to function in accordance 
with the interim Constitution, which came into force on 27 April 1994. The new and final Constitution 
was drafted and adopted by an elected Constitutional Assembly (parliament elected in 1994) and was 
adopted on 8 May 1996, but was only signed into law by President Nelson Mandela on 4 February 
1997 – see De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook op cit note 34 at 5.  
80
 Section 39(1) of the Constitution. The following decisions are examples of cases where the South 
African Constitutional Court considered the binding effect of international law: Grootboom case supra 
note 19; Coetzee v Government of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC); S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 
(CC); Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC); and Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC). 
81
 Section 233 of the Constitution. 
82
 Section 232 of the Constitution. 
83
 The international treaties applicable to social security rights that have been ratified by South Africa 
include the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered 
into force on 21 October 1986 – South Africa acceded on 9 July 1996; the United Nations Convention 
of the Rights of the Child, adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990, 
South Africa signed the document on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on December 15, 1995; and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, entered into force on 18 
December 1979 and South Africa signed the document on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 16 
December 1995. South Africa signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) on 3 October 1994. 
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The following factors are among the most important in the relationship between 
social security law in South Africa and international law:84 
 
 International instruments contain social security provisions; and 
 Most international social security provisions are structured as standards 
against which national legislation and policies are measured. 
 
In this regard, international instruments, especially the International Labour 
Organisation’s Conventions and Recommendations on social security, together with 
the systems in other countries, provide a measure against which South Africa’s 
social and retirement security systems may be compared. The benchmark may 
include, among others, the following:85 
 
 State responsibility;  
 Types of benefits and protection offered; 
 Level of protection; and 
 Equality between men and women.  
 
Even in those instances where South Africa has not yet signed or ratified certain 
treaties, the courts of law and other bodies entrusted with the duty of interpreting the 
fundamental rights will be compelled by section 39(1) of the Constitution to consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. The courts may also consider 
foreign law.86 International supervisory bodies also play an important role in assisting 
countries such as South Africa to implement international socio-economic rights; 
including the rights relating to retirement security.87 
 
                                            
 
84
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 528-533.  
85
 Ibid at 623. 
86
 In the Makwanyane supra note 57 at par 35, the Constitutional Court stated that public international 
law includes binding as well as non-binding law. South African courts are therefore not only confined 
to international instruments that are binding. 
87
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 649. 
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5.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
 
South Africa’s retirement security system does not have a public or national 
retirement fund. The absence of a public fund has unfortunately created a gap in the 
system as those workers whose employers have not established retirement funds for 
them, the self-employed, and those employed in the informal sector of the economy 
are excluded by the system, which accommodates mainly those in the formal sector 
of the economy. The situation is that not every worker in this country is covered by 
the system, which means that access to social security as guaranteed by section 27 
of the Constitution is not afforded to everyone. This is a point of concern considering 
the fact that the majority of people who are not covered will rely on the state for 
support. The Mouton Committee88 rejected a contributory national scheme for 
reasons that included the following:  
 
 It would have mainly catered only for people in formal employment;  
 It would not have been easy to make sure that contributions are paid; 
 There would be a chance for evade paying contributions; and 
 The benefits would have been very low – forcing people to rely on the state 
old-age pension.89  
 
However, the National Treasury of South Africa has proposed the introduction of a 
National Savings Fund (NSF) in its First and Second Discussion Papers for Social 
Security and Retirement Fund Reform.90 The National Savings Fund is aimed at 
extending coverage to those who are not presently covered. This will see the 
introduction of mandatory participation in the national social security system, up to 
agreed earnings, and providing basic retirement, unemployment, and death and 
disability benefits.91  
                                            
 
88
 The Mouton Committee Report op cit note 8 at 568-569.  
89
 Idem. 
90
 South African Social Security and Retirement Reform: First Discussion Paper (op cit note 8) and 
South African Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Papers (op cit note 8)). 
91
 First Discussion Paper (ibid) at 2 and Second Discussion Paper (ibid) at 3. 
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The system is made up of the non-contributory state old-age pension, under pillar 1; 
contributory-occupational retirement schemes, under pillar 2 and privately arranged 
savings, under pillar 3; and in certain instances other forms of informal support. The 
system separates poverty relief from retirement savings made in occupational 
retirement funds by those who are employed, and private savings made by people 
using available savings vehicles offered by different financial institutions.92 These 
components are discussed below. 
 
5.4 NON-CONTRIBUTORY STATE PENSIONS 
 
5.4.1 Description 
 
Non-contributory social assistance is provided for under the Social Assistance Act of 
2004,93 which repealed the old Social Assistance Act of 1992.94 It is regulated by the 
Regulations promulgated under the Act.95 The Social Assistance Act of 2004 gives 
effect to the provisions of section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, which extends social 
assistance to those who are unable to support themselves and their dependants. 
Social assistance measures are a form of social protection in terms of which 
vulnerable individuals or groups receive need-based assistance from public funds.96  
 
In South Africa, state-provided old-age pension serves as the primary source of 
income for the majority of the aged population. It was estimated in 2002 that about 
                                            
 
92
 South African Social Security and Retirement Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 8 at 12. 
93
 Act 13 of 2004. 
94
 Act 24 of 1992 rationalised the previously fragmented social assistance system in South Africa. It 
created a single social assistance delivery system that does not discriminate against people on the 
basis of colour or race and a system that protects and promotes human dignity. 
95
 Section 10 of the Constitution states that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected. It was held in the case of Grootboom supra note 19 at par 44 that 
society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society 
based on human dignity, freedom, and equality. This follows from section 1(a) of the Constitution, 
which provides that the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on 
human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedom. 
96
 Brand Socio-economic Rights in South Africa op cit note 41 at 211. 
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68% of old people relied on the state old-age pension.97 In the First Discussion 
Paper, the number was estimated to be over 70% of people in old-age.98  
 
The number of people eligible for the state old-age pension has seen an increase 
after the announcement by the Minister of Finance during his 2008-2009 Budget 
Speech that there would be a gradual decrease of men’s qualifying age from 65 to 
60 to be the same as that of women. Indeed, since April 2012 both men and women 
qualify for the state old-age pension at the age of 60 years.99  
 
A further dramatic increase was brought by the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 
the Christian Roberts100 case, where the constitutionality of the provisions of section 
10 of the Social Assistance Act of 2004 and Regulation 2(2) was challenged. The 
case was about the constitutionality of the position where men received the pension 
at the age of 65 and women at the age of 60. The court found the provisions of the 
Act together with the said Regulation to be inconsistent with section 9 and 27 of the 
Constitution respectively, and therefore unconstitutional and invalid. However, the 
applicants in this case could not receive the relief they wanted because according to 
the court by the time any order of invalidity would be confirmed the applicants would 
be 65 years old and would therefore be eligible to receive the state pension. The 
court could not grant the applicants a retrospective relief as such a relief or order 
would have given rise to budgetary concerns, the matter which would have required 
both the applicants and respondents to argue before the court.  
Thus the court had to order a prospective implementation of an order of 
constitutional invalidity. The order included the rewriting of definitions in the Act and 
Regulation to replace the 65-year age limit of men with a 60-year limit.101  
 
                                            
 
97
 United Nations (UN) National Report on the Status of Older People: Report on the Second World 
Assembly on Aging (1994-2002), Madrid, Spain (April 2002) at 20 (hereafter, National Report on the 
Status of Older People). 
98
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 8 at par 2.1. 
99
 National Report on the Status of Older People op cit note 97 at 20. 
100
 Christian Roberts v The Minister of Social Development (Case No: 32838/05) (TPD), 17 March 
2010 (unreported). 
101
 Supra at paras 85-92. 
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To qualify men for the state old-age pension at the age of 65 and women at the age 
of 60 was unconstitutional as it was against the provisions of the “equality clause” in 
section 9 of the Constitution.102  
 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution states that everyone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; while section 9(3) provides that 
the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, colour, and age. The Constitution 
promotes equality before the law and equal treatment,103 and this could not be 
achieved with men having to wait five years longer than women before they could 
receive the pension. It was also important to correct the anormaly as the majority of 
men below the age of 65 were denied what could be their only form of income.104 
Presently, the social assistance component provides for the partially universal state 
old-age pension which is means tested. Thus not all older persons above the age of 
60 are eligible to receive the social pension.105  
 
A person is eligible for the state old-age pension if, in addition to satisfying the age 
requirement, he or she meets the following requirements:106 
 
 Is a South African citizen or is permanently resident in the Republic;107 
 Lives in South Africa; 
                                            
 
102
 Supra at par 85. The Constitutional Court ruled in this case that the differentiation between men 
and women for purposes of qualifying for the social assistance pension was unconstitutional as it 
could not be justified. 
103
 Section 9(1) of the Constitution.  
104
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 235. 
105
 Section 5(2)(b) of the Social Assistance Act of 2004. See generally on the means-test applied in 
South Africa’s social security grants, Van der Berg S “The Means Test for Social Assistance Grants 
and its Recent Evolution” Social Work (2001) 37(2) 125 (hereafter, Van der Berg “The Means Test for 
Social Grants”). In this article, Van der Berg explains how the means-test works and describes the 
problems/challenges with the application of the means-test during the apartheid era, and since 1996 
when the apartheid means-test was replaced by the new system. Having considered all the problems 
characterising the means-test in general, he still maintains that it should not be abolished as 
extending cover on a universal basis would be distributionally regressive as it would also bring about 
a reduction of the progressivity of the old-age pension (at 138).    
106
 Regulation 2 of the Regulations in terms of the Social Security Act, 13 of 2004. 
107
 It was decided in the Khosa case supra note 39 at par 98 that people with permanent resident 
status should be treated the same way as citizens of the country for purposes of qualifying for social 
security benefits as their exclusion is inconsistent with the Constitution. 
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 Has a valid identity document; 
 Is not a beneficiary of another social grant;  
 Passes the means-test; and 
 Is not maintained in any one of the following state institutions or institutions 
funded by the state (e.g. a prison, state psychiatric hospital, state home for 
older persons, care treatment centre, or a treatment centre for drug 
dependants). 
 
A means-test is used to target those who deserve to receive the pension. The future 
of the means test is still being debated as part of the overall retirement and social 
security reform, with a strong possibility of the it being removed, allowing all South 
African residents who qualify to receive the pension to receive it when they reach the 
set age. The means-test could be removed, for among other reasons, to simplify the 
administration of the pension and to prevent the exclusion of vulnerable people.108 It 
is submitted that the means-test should not be removed as there is no guarantee 
that its removal will encourage people who are saving for retirement to continue to 
do so. In fact, the opposite is likely to happen as removing the means-test might just 
encourage more dependency on the state. This will increase government’s spending 
on social pensions, which will also bring about an increase on the income tax paid by 
those who are employed and paying taxes. On the other hand, removing the means-
test can go a long way in ensuring that more people who are vulnerable to the risk of 
poverty receive protection in the form of a social pension. This will be a bold step by 
government as it will move the state old-age pension towards universal coverage.  
This might also bring about an increase in the overall coverage within both the formal 
and informal sectors of the economy.109 The means-test should not be done away 
with as it is there to ensure that only the people who are needy receive support. It 
                                            
 
108
 National Treasury, Republic of South Africa Budget Review 2013, 27 February 2013 (Chapter 6: 
Social Security and Social Wage) at 85, accessed from http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/ 
national%20budget/2013/review/FullReview.pdf, last visited 21 May 2015. 
109
 Moodley-Isaac N “More People to get Grants after Means-test is Adjusted” May 31, 2008 Personal 
Finance. The Minister of Finance has announced in his 2013 Budget Speech that the means-test will 
be done away with as from 2016, accessed from http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20 
budget/2013/speech/speech.pdf, last visited on 21 May 2015. See also in this regard Van der Berg 
“The Means-Test for Social Grants” op cit note 105, on the problems relating to the means-test and its 
application. Van der Berg is not in support of total abolition of the means-test (at 138).  
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should rather be compulsory by law for all the people who are in a position to 
participate in retirement schemes to do so. 
 
Through its reforms that are currently underway the National Treasury intends to, 
among other things, turn the state old-age pension into a universal grant, and to link 
social grants increases to a specified index.110 The state old-age pension is the 
largest social assistance grant in South Africa, and the pension plays a pivotal role in 
poverty alleviation for the majority of people who receive it. The pension brings 
substantial volumes of cash into poor households and communities.111 The state old-
age pension is used to support the elderly, the unemployed, children and 
grandchildren whose parents are unemployed or have died, and other members of 
the household.112  
 
The pension has proven to play a very important role in improving people’s lives as it 
has become a form of income for many families who would have otherwise been 
without any income. It should be noted, however, that the main objective of the 
pension is poverty relief, and not the provision of income after retirement. Therefore 
it is essentially redistributive in nature.113 It is paid to qualifying persons as of legal 
right,114 and it is not related to the beneficiary’s past earnings. Whether the person 
                                            
 
110
 Outline of a Social Security and Retirement Savings Framework: Discussion Document for the 
Inter-Departmental Task Team on Social Security and Retirement Reform at 2 [Updated 29 
November 2007, incorporating discussions from Basic Benefit Design Workshops on 8 November and 
20 November 2007] available on 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/ssrr/Session%20Three%20Papers/ 
Outline%20Soc%20Sec%20&%20Retirement%20Savings%20Framework%20%2029%20Nov%2020
07.pdf, last visited 21 May 2015 (hereafter, Inter-Departmental Task Team “Outline of a Social 
Security and Retirement Savings Framework”).  
111
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 244-245. 
112
 Samson M “The Challenge of Ageing for Social Security in South Africa” at 9 (the paper was 
presented at African Conference on Ageing, Johannesburg, 2004), accessed from 
www.eldis.org/go/country-profiles&id=18020&type=Document, last visited on 21 May 2015; Devereux 
S “Future Uncertain: Social Pensions in Southern Africa” 31 May, 2002 available on 
http://www.eldis.org/id21ext/insights42art7.html, last visited on 21 May 2015; and Barrientos A 
(University of Manchester, UK), Lloyd-Sherlock P (School of Development Studies, University of East 
Anglia, U.K.) “Non-Contributory Pensions and Social Protection” September 2002 at 9, accessed from 
http://eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/doc22073.pdf, last visited on 21 May 2015. 
113
 The Smith Committee Report op cit note 8 at 31. 
114
 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution gives the state the duty to provide social assistance to 
everyone who is unable to support himself or herself or his or her family. The categories of people 
who qualify for social assistance are stipulated in section 4 of the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004, 
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was employed or not is not important. In 2015 the amount paid for the pension was 
R1 410 per month.115 The payment of the grant may be reviewed by the South 
African Social Security Agency (SASSA) at any time, but with prior notification three 
months before the review takes place.  
 
There are a number of factors which can lead to the suspension of a pension, 
provided the correct procedure was followed;116 which include the following:117 
 
 If the beneficiary’s circumstances change; 
 The results of a review; 
 The beneficiary fails to cooperate when the pension is reviewed;118 
 The beneficiary has committed fraud or misrepresentation;  
 The grant is abused;119 and 
 There was a mistake when the grant was approved.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
and include children under the age of 18, foster children, care-dependent children, disabled people, 
war veterans, and old people. 
115
 The amount of R1 410 is payable from 1 April 2015. The Minister of Finance has announced in his 
2015 Budget Speech an increase from R1 350 to R1 410 per month as from 1 April 2015 (see 2015 
Budget Speech at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/ 
speech/speech.pdf, last visited 21 May 2015). 
116
 Section 39(1) of the Social Assistance Act of 2004 and Regulation 31 of the Regulations in terms 
of the Act. In the case of Maluleke supra note 37 at 413, it was held that the suspension of the 
payment of the applicant’s old-age grant was unlawful and invalid after the government of the 
Northern Province had decided to cancel the old-age grants of all the people whose records did not 
comply with the relevant statutory requirements. The court found that the only section (section 6 of the 
Social Pensions Act, 7 of 1976, (of Gazankulu)) which government could have relied on, made no 
provision for the suspension of payment of old-age pensions in circumstances such as those in this 
case. Also see generally a critical analysis of the Maluleke decision by Plasket C “Standing, Welfare 
Rights and Administrative Justice: Maluleke v MEC, Health and Welfare, Northern Province” SALJ Vol 
117 (4) 2000 at 647-661. In the case of Ngxuza supra note 37 at paras 7-8, it was stated that 
suspensions of payments of social grants were unlawful because fair procedures were not followed 
before the decisions to suspend the social grants. In the case of Bushula supra note 70 at 734, it was 
held that the decision to cancel a disability grant must be set aside because the department failed to 
give the first applicant proper notice of the intention to cancel the grant and the applicant was not 
given a hearing of any kind before the decision to cancel his disability grant was taken either.    
117
 See generally, Regulations 27 and 29 of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004. 
118
 In that case the beneficiary will have to apply for restoration of the grant. See Regulation 27(4) of 
Regulations to the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004. 
119
 In terms of section 19 of the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004, the Social Security Agency can 
suspend the payment of a social grant if, after an investigation, it is found that an abuse of a grant has 
taken place. 
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The pension will also stop if the beneficiary dies, is admitted to a state institution, 
does not claim the pension for three consecutive months, or if the beneficiary is 
absent from the Republic of South Africa.120 
 
Even though the state old-age pension plays a vital role in improving the lives of 
individuals, families, and communities, it is not without criticisms.  
 
The criticisms include the fact that targeting creates permanent dependency as 
people might strive to remain beneficiaries of the social assistance programmes 
instead of saving for retirement while still working.121 The system also offers 
qualifying elderly people a war veterans’ grant. To qualify for a war veterans grant, a 
person must have fought in the First World War, Second World War, the Zulu War, 
or the Korean War, and not be able to support himself or herself.122  
 
The applicant must be a South African citizen or permanent resident, live in South 
Africa, be 60 years old or older, must not receive any other social grant, must not be 
cared for in a state institution, and must satisfy the means-test.123 The pension can 
be suspended or stopped under the same circumstances as the state old-age 
pension.124 
 
                                            
 
120
 See section 16 of the Social Assistance Act of 2004 and Regulation 37(1) of the Regulations to the 
Act. 
121
 Pauw K and Mncube L “Expanding the Social Security Net in South Africa: Opportunities, 
Challenges and Constraints” (International Poverty Centre Country Study (Number 8): Cash Transfers 
Research Programme, Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), University of Cape Town), July 
2007 at 3-5, accessed from http://www.crin.org/docs/IPCCountryStudy8.pdf, last visited on 21 May 
2015.  
122
 The First World War, also known as the Great War, began on 28 July 1914 and ended on 11 
November 1918; the Second World War (WWII) started in 1939 and ended in 1945; the Zulu War, 
which is also known as the Anglo-Zulu War, started in January 1879 and ended in 1896; and the 
Korean War was fought from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953. 
123
 The War Veterans Grant is paid in terms of section 11 of the Social Assistance Act, 2004. The 
Minister of Finance announced in his 2015 Budget Speech an increase from R1 350 per month to 
R1 410. 
124
 See Regulation 27(1) of the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 2004, which provides that 
the Agency must, within 90 days of the date on which a social grant will be reviewed, inform the 
beneficiary in writing of the date of such review. 
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5.4.2 Administration and regulation 
 
Social grants are administered and paid by the South African Social Security 
Agency, which started functioning in April 2005.125 The Agency was set up by 
government to eradicate fraud and to improve the administration of social grants. It 
has taken over the administration of social grants from national and provincial 
government.126  
 
The Bill of Rights applies to the Agency as an organ of state127 in terms of section 
8(1) of the Constitution. The Agency has the duty to ensure that appropriate social 
assistance is afforded to all who qualify for it.128 On the other hand, the Agency is 
compelled by section 7(2) of the Constitution to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights; including everyone’s right to have access to social 
security.  
The Agency must not unlawfully or unreasonably interfere with everyone’s right of 
access to social security. For example, the Agency may not stop or suspend the 
payment of a social grant without valid reasons and without following proper 
procedures and it may also not unreasonably delay the payment of a social grant or 
the approval of an application for a social grant. Thus the state shall have failed in its 
constitutional duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the beneficiary’s right of 
access to social security if the Agency does not consider an application for the state 
old-age pension within a reasonable time, if it fails to pay a pension, and if it 
unlawfully terminates payment of a pension. 
 
                                            
 
125
 The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) was introduced by Chapter 2 of the Social 
Security Agency Act of 2004. 
126
 The functions of the South African Social Security Agency are listed under section 4 of the Social 
Security Agency Act, 13 of 2004. Previously, that is after the introduction of the final Constitution, the 
provision of social assistance in this country was the responsibility of both the national and provincial 
departments, and this brought about many functional and regulatory problems. The system was too 
fragmented as there were various departments involved in the provision and administration of the 
social security system. As a result, the system could not be coordinated well. 
127
 Section 239 of the Constitution. 
128
 Olivier MP, Okpalupa MC, Smit N, Thompson M, D Toit AM, Greyling E, Van Rensburg J, Liffmann 
R, Ogunronbi SO, and Porter I Social Security: General Principles 1999 at 499 (hereafter, Olivier et al 
Social Security: General Principles). 
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In Bushula and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape Provincial,129 Van Rensburg J stated the following about a disability grant (and 
in principle, any social grant):  
 
 “A disability grant, once granted, confers upon the beneficiary the right to receive that grant 
until it is lawfully terminated in terms of the Act and the regulations. In my judgement, such 
right cannot be validly terminated without the rules of natural justice and the right to fair 
administrative action, including the right to be heard, being observed.”
130
  
 
A person who is aggrieved by a decision of the Agency must lodge an appeal in 
writing to the Minister within 90 days of gaining knowledge of such a decision, setting 
out the grounds on which the appeal is based, and submit a copy thereof to the 
Agency. The Minister may appoint a person or persons to constitute a tribunal to 
consider that appeal. The tribunal must dispose of the appeal within 30 days, unless 
the Minister directs otherwise. The Minister must communicate the outcome of the 
appeal in writing and in the official language of preference of the beneficiary within 
ten days of the decision of the tribunal.131 The courts of law also have the power to 
enforce constitutional rights, as well as constitutional obligations imposed on the 
state or state organs, including the South African Social Security Agency.132  
The court system is, however, not the best dispute resolution mechanism for social 
security disputes, and in particular, for matters relating to social grants – taking into 
account the type or category of people who mostly rely on social assistance grants 
as their only form of income. Most of these people are poor, vulnerable, illiterate, and 
have a very limited or no knowledge of the law and court proceedings. The court 
processes can take time before the dispute is resolved and it costs a lot of money, 
which the applicants of social assistance grants do not have, which is one of the 
reasons why they are applying for social assistance. The court proceedings are also 
                                            
 
129
 See the case of Bushula supra note 70. 
130
 Supra at 854. 
131
 Section 18(1-7) of the Social Assistance Act, 13 of 2004.  
132
 Sections 27(2) (the right to have access to social security) and 26(2) (the right to have access to 
adequate housing) of the Constitution give the state certain duties in terms of the realisation of rights 
in these sections. In the Certification case supra note 6, the court held that socio-economic rights are 
to some extent justiciable (at paras 76-77). The Constitutional Court revisited the issue of socio-
economic rights in the case of Grootboom supra note 19 (at par 20), where the decision in the 
Certification case (supra note 6) was reaffirmed. In the case of TAC (2) supra note 19 at par 99, the 
court held that the court should not hesitate to say so if the state fails in its constitutional obligations. 
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adversarial in nature, which is not really advantageous to grant applicants who are 
distressed by the socio-economic circumstances they find themselves in. People 
who are in urgent need of social assistance cannot wait for long periods for their 
applications to be approved and therefore need a dispute resolution mechanism that 
is less complicated and which will provide a quicker solution to their problems. It is 
important therefore to have a specialised body which will handle all social security-
related complaints. This body must be easily accessible, with an informal and flexible 
approach to dispute resolution, and its services must be offered for free.133  
 
The duty of the Social Security Agency to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the 
right to have access to social security obliges the Agency to also facilitate, rather 
than obstruct, access to social security.134 The Agency should not arbitrarily stop, 
delay, or deny qualifying elderly people access to the state old-age pension. It may 
also not defend legitimate claims for payments of social grants brought against it in 
the courts of law in order to avoid paying the grants to qualifying beneficiaries.135  
A specialised dispute resolution forum will thus ensure that qualifying people receive 
help as soon and as efficiently as possible.  
 
5.5 CONTRIBUTORY OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SCHEMES   
 
5.5.1 Description 
 
The contributory occupational retirement schemes are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6 below.136 Therefore, only an overview of the system is given in this 
chapter. 
 
                                            
 
133
 See generally, Nyenti MAT “Dispute Resolution in the South African Social Security System: The 
Need for more Appropriate Approaches” Obiter 2012 at 27-46 (hereafter, Nyenti “Dispute Resolution 
in the South African Social Security System”). 
134
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 9 at 78. 
135
 See for example Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (4) SA 237 (CC); and 
Ntame v MEC Department of Social Development and Two Similar Cases [2005] 9 BPLR 762 (SE).  
136
 See Ch 6.  
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These schemes137 are generally established by employers for their employees. An 
occupational retirement fund simply refers to a fund which has been created 
specifically for employees or workers.138 They are regulated by the state using an 
institution called the Financial Services Board (FSB), through various pieces of 
legislation,139 with the main one being the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, which has 
in recent times gone through a series of amendments. Occupational retirement funds 
include those established by private employers, the sector or industry specific 
funds,140 and a fund for government employees.141  
 
These funds142 take the form of social insurance schemes. Both employers and 
employees contribute towards the fund in terms of the fund rules. Only those who 
contribute are eligible to receive the benefits offered by the funds. The means-test 
that applies with respect to the state old-age pension does not apply with regard to 
retirement fund benefits,143 as a person is entitled to benefits by contributing to the 
fund. The benefits are also available to the members’ dependants in certain 
circumstances.144  
 
Membership of the fund becomes one of the conditions of employment for all 
employees who are eligible to join – including the new employees once the employer 
establishes a fund.145 However, it is by law still not compulsory for employers to 
establish pension schemes for their employees except in instances where the 
Minister has issued a sectoral determination for a specific sector in that regard. 
                                            
 
137
 Occupational retirement funds (for example, their nature and benefits they provide) are discussed 
in more detail Ch 6. 
138
 Sephton B, Cooper DI, and Thompson C A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds Legal and 
Policy Considerations 1990 (Glossary of Terms Used) at 5 (hereafter, Sephton et al A Guide to 
Pension and Provident Funds).  
139
 See in this regard par 6.3 in Ch 6. 
140
 See par 6.2 in Ch 6. 
141
 See par 6.4.6.3 in Ch 6. 
142
 Occupational pensions are discussed in more detail in Ch 6.  
143
 Van der Berg S “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” Vol 14, No 4, Dec 
1997 Development Southern Africa at 480-491 (hereafter, Van der Berg “South African Social 
Security under Apartheid and Beyond”).  
144
 Strydom et al Essential Social Security Law op cit note 49 at 10. 
145
 Dewar N, De Kock A, Kruger N, Roper R The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement 
Planning (2005-2006) at 41 (hereafter, Dewar The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and 
Retirement Planning). 
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Examples of such determinations are: the Sectoral Determination 2: Civil 
Engineering Sector: 12 March of 2001 (as amended) where in item 20 the employer 
is duty-bound to establish a retirement fund for its employees and also for both the 
employer and employees to contribute equally into the fund; Sectoral Determination 
6: Private Security Sector: 30 March 2001 (as amended), which provides for the 
establishment of the Private Security Sector Provident Fund and for the compulsory 
participation of employers and employees in the fund. The benefits that accrue by 
reason of membership of a particular fund are determined by the rules of that 
fund.146 These funds are available to those who are employed in the formal sector of 
the economy to the exclusion of the majority of people who work in the informal 
sector.147  
 
During the period of employment, people make contributions into the fund; the 
benefits of which will serve as income when they are no longer working as a result of 
old-age.148 However, the fact that only those who are employed in the formal sector 
are covered means there are many other people who are without cover. This means 
fewer people are covered and that many people who are excluded will have to rely 
on state pension. It therefore remains a great challenge for South Africa to come up 
with ways in which cover can be extended to those who are presently excluded. 
Different types of retirement funds and benefits provided by these funds are 
discussed in Chapter 6 below.149  
 
  
                                            
 
146
 Idem. 
147
 Outline of a Social Security and Retirement Savings Framework: Discussion Document for the 
Inter-departmental Task Team on Social Security and Retirement Reform op cit note 110 at 2. In 
South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper (op cit note 8 at 5), the Finacial 
Services Board estimates coverage of employees in this sector to be 60%, which is comparatively 
high considering the fact that participation is not yet compulsory in this country. This reflects the 
extent to which membership of occupational funds is accepted as an obligatory condition of 
employment. 
148
 This view has been supported by the following Committees: The Smith Committee Report op cit 
note 8 at 32; The Mouton Committee Report op cit note 8 at 17-22; The Taylor Committee Report op 
cit note 8 at 94. 
149
 Discussed under par 6.4.  
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5.5.2 Administration and regulation 
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 establishes ground rules for the registration and 
proper administration150 of retirement funds. Every fund must have its own rules 
fashioned according to the nature of the fund and the needs of the members of that 
fund. The fund rules are very important for the operation of the fund,151 and the fund 
must be administered in terms of the rules,152 applicable legislation, and common 
law principles. Fund rules are regarded as the constitution of the fund.153  
In terms of Regulation 30 of Regulations to the Pension Funds Act of 1956, the rules 
must contain, among others, eligibility conditions, the payment and calculation of 
contributions, the nature and extent of benefits, rule amendments, dispute resolution, 
unclaimed benefits, and the appointment of trustees.154 The rules of the fund are 
binding on the fund and members, shareholders, officers, and on any person who 
claims under the rules or whose claim is derived from a person so claiming.155 The 
rules must be consistent with the provisions of the Pension Funds Act.156 The rules 
of the fund must be considered in the context of an employment relationship and it is 
the responsibility of the employer to ensure that the fund rules are not structured in a 
manner that would amount to unfair labour practice in terms of section 186(2) of the 
                                            
 
150
 These roles are covered in Chapters II and III of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.  
151
 Section 13 of the Pension Funds Act provides that fund rules are binding on fund members, 
beneficiaries, board members, and principal officers.   
152
 See generally Pension Funds Circular PF96.  
153
 In terms of section 13 of the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956, fund rules are binding on the fund and 
members, shareholders, officers, and on any person who claims under the rules or whose claim is 
derived from a person so claiming. It was confirmed in Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance 
Company (South Africa) Ltd [2001] 8 BPLR 2307 (PFA) at par 30, that the fund rules amount to the 
constitution of the fund. See also Abrahamse v Connock’s Pension Fund 1963 (2) SA 76 (W) at 78D-
E, where the court stated that the fund rules were the fund’s constitution as that was the document by 
which the fund was constituted. It was also stated in Tek Corporation Provident Fund & Others v 
Lorentz [2000] 3 BPLR 227 (SCA) at par 28 (hereafter, Tek Corporation) that the trustees may not do 
what they are not empowered to do by the fund rules. See also generally Mgabisa v Central 
Retirement Annuity Fund & Another [2005] 7 BPLR 636 (PFA) at par 10; Mahlathi v Metropolitan 
Preservation Provident Fund [2005] 6 BPLR 498 (PFA) at par 8; and Holmes v Morris Crane Aid 
Pension Fund [2005] 4 BPLR 309 (PFA) at par 11.     
154
 Regulation 30 of the Regulations to the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
155
 Section 13. 
156
 Regulation 30(2) of the Regulations to the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
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Labour Relations Act of 1995157 and in contravention of section 23(1) of the 
Constitution, respectively.158  
 
All fund rules must be approved by the Registrar of Pension Funds.159 The board of 
the fund takes binding decisions and enforces them in terms of fund rules using its 
board of trustees. Thus all the affairs of the retirement funds are regulated by the 
fund rules.  
 
In terms of section 1 of the Pension Funds Act, “rules” means the rules of a fund, 
and includes:160 
 
(a) The Act, charter, deed of settlement, memorandum of association, or other 
document by which the fund is constituted; 
(b) The articles of association or other rules for the conduct of the business of the 
fund; and 
(c) The provisions relating to the benefits which may be granted by and the 
contributions which may become payable to the fund.  
 
A registered fund’s legal capacity to conclude contracts or enter into legal 
relationships emanates from the fund rules. If an activity of the fund is neither 
expressly nor impliedly provided for in the fund rules, such activity shall be regarded 
as being outside the powers the funds have in terms of their rules and will therefore 
                                            
 
157
 An unfair labour practice in this regard may relate to unfair distribution of employee benefits. In 
terms of the definition of “unfair labour practice” in section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act of 
1995, unfair labour practice means any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and 
an employee involving unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation 
(excluding disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to probation), or training of an employee or 
relating to the provision of benefits to an employee. 
158
 In Low v BP Southern Africa Pension Fund and Another [2000] 2 BPLR 171 (PFA) at 194-195, a 
benefit enhancement provided only to members with more than 20 years’ service, aimed at improving 
the employer’s competitive position in the employment market, was considered to be perfectly 
legitimate and not in contravention of the other members’ right to fair labour practice. 
159
 Sections 11 and 12 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
160
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 defines “rules” as rules of a fund registered in terms of 
the Pension Funds Act. 
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be null and void and will also be ultra vires.161 Employers and employees appoint the 
board of trustees, which runs the affairs of the fund in line with the fund rules. 
However, the administration of the funds lies mainly with insurance companies.162 
The main objectives of a board of trustees are to direct, control, and oversee the 
operations of a fund in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the 
fund.163  
 
In performing its duties, the board of trustees must take reasonable steps to ensure 
that members’ interests are protected; act with due care, diligence, and good faith; 
avoid conflict of interest; and act with impartiality in respect of all members and 
beneficiaries.164  
 
The board or individual trustees can be held liable if they together or individually 
conduct themselves in a manner that contravenes its objectives and duties in terms 
of sections 7C and 7D of the Pension Funds Act, respectively. The Registrar 
monitors pension funds to ensure that their affairs are conducted in an honest and 
responsible manner. On the other hand, the functions of the Financial Services 
Board include ensuring compliance with laws regulating financial institutions.165 The 
Registrar has the powers to approach the High Court, having jurisdiction for an order 
to force any institution to comply with any law or to stop acting in contravention of 
any law.166  
 
If the Registrar believes that a person is contravening any law for which the Registrar 
has any powers, the Registrar can refer the offence to the Enforcement 
                                            
 
161
 See the case of Tek Corporation supra note 153 at par 28. 
162
 Spring M (Chief Editor of Personal Finance Newsletter) A Private Report: A comprehensive study 
of pension, provident, retirement annuity, and deferred compensation schemes; alternative funding 
vehicles such as unit trusts, shares, property and gold coins; strategic planning and detailed 
recommendations for a comfortable retirement 12 ed July 1991 at 4 (hereafter, Spring A 
Comprehensive Study of pension, provident, retirement annuity and deferred compensation 
schemes). 
163
 Section 7C(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
164
 Section 7C(2). The duties of the board of trsutees are discussed in more detail in Ch 6. 
165
 Section 3 of the Financial Services Board Act; and Spring A Comprehensive Study of pension, 
provident, retirement annuity and deferred compensation schemes op cit note 162 at 4. 
166
 Section 6(1)(b) of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001. 
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Committee,167 which is an administrative body with powers to determine whether 
there has been any contravention of the law, and impose administrative sanctions 
where it finds that there has been contravention; for example by ordering such a 
person to pay a sum of money to the Financial Services Board,168 or by issuing cost 
orders and compensatory orders on offenders.169 These administrative sanctions do 
not constitute a previous criminal conviction.170 However, if the Registrar is himself or 
herself by law empowered to impose a penalty, such a case may not be referred to 
the Enforcement Committee.  
 
5.6 VOLUNTARY PROVISIONS 
 
5.6.1 General 
 
People may voluntarily save for retirement by using private schemes or insurance 
arrangements. While occupational retirement funds are established by employers for 
their employees, voluntary provision171 relies much more on an individual deciding, 
sometimes in addition to an occupational retirement scheme he or she has with the 
employer, to make savings for retirement. This arrangement is made when a person 
is still working or self-employed as regular contributions must be made into the 
savings vehicle.172 Voluntary schemes include, among others, the retirement annuity 
fund, deferred compensation schemes, standard insurance policies, and unit trusts. 
These schemes are discussed next.  
 
  
                                            
 
167
 Section 6A(1). 
168
 Section 6D. 
169
 Section 6D(2)(a)-(b)(i). 
170
 Section 61(3). 
171
 Supported by the following Committees: The Smith Committee Report op cit note 8 at 32; The 
Mouton Committee Report op cit note 8 at 17-22; The Taylor Committee Report op cit note 8 at 94 – 
see Figure 16 – proposed strategic framework for retirement provision in South Africa. 
172
 The Smith Committee Report (ibid) at 31. 
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5.6.2 Retirement Annuity Fund 
 
A retirement annuity is a private pension plan for the individual. Most retirement 
annuity funds are funded by long-term policies. The funds are administered by an 
insurer and the member pays contributions to the fund. When the day of retirement 
arrives, the fund benefit becomes payable by the fund to the member. Retirement 
annuity funds are permanent funds established for the sole purpose of providing life 
annuities to their members, and annuities to the dependants or nominees of 
deceased members. These schemes are required to register as pension fund 
organisations under the Pension Funds Act of 1956.173 An employer-employee 
relationship is not required in the case of a retirement annuity, as it is a personal 
retirement investment vehicle.174  
 
It is mainly for self-employed persons, professional people, independent 
entrepreneurs, employees whose companies do not have a pension scheme, or 
whose scheme has inadequate benefits, and those who frequently move from one 
job to another during their career.175 Retirement annuities operate with individual 
endowment type contracts. Members may only access their money at the age of 55, 
unlike a pension and provident fund where members have access to their benefits 
when they resign from employment and terminate their membership.176  
 
The objective of a retirement annuity in this regard will be to fund a retirement 
benefit. The member decides where and how to invest the money and the 
performance of the policy will depend on performance of the market.  
A member of the fund will be negatively affected, for example if he or she stops 
contributing to the policy before reaching the age of 55 as the insurer will have to 
cover the costs incurred as a result of the termination of the policy. These costs 
                                            
 
173
 Section 4 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
174
 Dewar The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement Planning op cit 145 at 60. 
175
 Spring A Comprehensive Study of pension, provident, retirement annuity and deferred 
compensation schemes op cit note 162 at 4. 
176
 Marx GL, Hanekom K The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee 
Benefits 2009 Vol 1 at 13 (hereafter, Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds 
and Other Employee Benefits). 
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would have been covered by the insurer should the policy have run over the full 
contracted period.177 
 
Retirement annuity funds have the following advantages and disadvantages:178 
 
 Attracts tax benefits, 
 Benefits cannot be attached (e.g. by creditors), 
 Members determine their contributions depending on affordability from year to 
year, 
 Members choose financial institutions they like, 
 When the member receives the benefit, he or she can use the benefit to buy 
an annuity, 
 They only mature at the age of 55, which can be a long time if someone 
needs money urgently, and 
 Some of the old policies require full commission and are as a result 
expensive. 
 
A major difference between a retirement annuity fund and a retirement fund is that 
the former is not established for a group of employees and so membership is 
generally voluntary. As membership is voluntary, there is no limit on who may join a 
retirement annuity fund. However, they do not offer the advantage of employer 
contribution to the policy as there is no need for an employer-employee 
relationship.179 Most of the retirement annuity funds are underwritten funds and thus 
do not have assets other than policies used to fund their liabilities of paying life 
annuities to members.180 The value of the annuity is calculated when the policy 
matures. This value is made up of the member’s contributions over the years, plus 
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 Ibid at 90. 
178
 Spring A Private Report: A Comprehensive Study of pension, provident, retirement annuity and 
deferred compensation schemes op cit note 162 at 14-15. 
179
 Section 4 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
180
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 176 at 92.  
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the accumulated value of capital profits and income gained from investment, less the 
various expenses the insurer will charge.  
 
A member may choose to withdraw one-third of the capital sum in cash. The two-
thirds balance has to be used to buy what is called a “compulsory annuity”, which 
can be paid to the member on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis.181 Members of 
retirement annuity funds who are not happy with the benefits payable by the fund 
under the policy can lodge complaints with the Pension Funds Adjudicator or the 
Ombudsman for Financial Services Providers under section 27 of the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002.  
 
5.6.3 Deferred compensation scheme 
 
A deferred compensation scheme is one in which an employee agrees to defer part 
of his or her earnings from employment until retirement. For example, instead of 
receiving a salary increase, the employee may agree with the employer to invest that 
amount in a scheme on the employee’s behalf. When the employee retires, the 
employer gives the employee the invested money as a lump-sum.182 Benefits paid as 
a lump-sum do not always provide a long-term source of income in retirement as 
they can be consumed within a short space of time while the beneficiary still has 
many years to live. Again, it will not make any difference if the amount of the 
benefit/savings is small. This should, however, be encouraged as it is another 
method of saving employees can use. 
 
5.6.4 Standard insurance policies 
 
An insurance policy that complies with the definition of a standard insurance policy in 
Schedule 6 of the Income Tax Act of 1962 can also be used for purposes of saving 
for retirement. The person pays premiums for the policy every month, and upon 
                                            
 
181
 Spring A Comprehensive Study of pension, provident, retirement annuity and deferred 
compensation schemes op cit note 162 at 23. 
182
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds op cit note 138 at 38-39.   
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maturity receives a benefit made up of the premiums plus investment income. 
However, the premiums are not tax deductible and there is no protection of benefits 
against creditors as there is in the case of pension and provident fund benefits.  
 
The investment income is taxable in the hands of the insurer and will reduce the 
returns the policy owner will eventually receive.183 Even though standard insurance 
policies may not provide sufficient benefits for retirement purposes, they can play a 
supplementary role to other retirement insurance schemes. 
 
5.6.5 Unit trusts 
 
Unit trusts184 are created and managed by management companies, which are 
mainly private insurance companies. The Financial Services Board is the regulatory 
body of the unit trust industry in South Africa. A large number of people called 
investors pool their resources to invest in shares, bonds, money market instruments, 
and other investments. Investors can either put in a lump-sum as an investment or 
use a monthly debit order. These investors will then share in gains, losses, income, 
and expenses on a proportional basis. The advantages of unit trusts include the 
following: investment safety, performance reporting by management companies, 
transparency, affordability, convenience, diversification, competitive cost structures, 
and professional management. Unit trusts are also easy to buy and to sell.  
They are able to provide small investors with an opportunity to invest in stock and 
bond markets.185  
 
One can thus use unit trusts to save for retirement, as long as the person is not 
going to be tempted to access the money before the time of retirement. It should be 
accepted though, that by their nature, unit trusts cannot be used as the only vehicle 
                                            
 
183
 Ibid at 40.   
184
 See Oldert N Understanding Unit Trusts: Details of New Legislation 4ed January 2003 at 15. 
According to Oldert, the first South African unit trust was introduced by Sage in 1965. However, 
according to Merriman CO Unit Trusts 2ed 1959 at 1, the first unit trust was introduced in 1868 in the 
City of London, and was a Foreign and Colonial Trust which took the form of unincorporated trust. 
185
 Oldert (ibid) at 15-21. See also generally on the historical development of unit trusts, types of unit 
trusts, how a unit trust is created, etc., Merriman (ibid) at 1-10, 14-17 and 30-35.  
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of saving for retirement, but may be used to supplement other conventional methods 
for retirement savings. 
 
5.6.6 Administration and regulation   
 
Voluntary schemes are administered by insurance companies or management 
companies. However, the FSB as the regulator supervises the business of all 
financial institutions, except those of the banking sector. Any person who feels 
aggrieved by a decision of the executive officer may in terms of the Financial 
Services Board Act of 1990,186 or any other law, appeal against the decision to a 
board of appeal, established in terms of section 26 of the Act. Appeals must be 
noted within 20 business days and the FSB must furnish reasons for its decision 
within one month. If the appellant does not find the reasons acceptable, he or she 
should, within one month, give notice of appeal with full particulars. The appeal 
board will then determine a date, place, and time for the hearing.187  
 
Those who have complaints about bad or inappropriate advice received from a 
financial service provider may approach the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Ombudsman188 to consider and dispose of their complaints. However, note 
should be taken that the Ombudsman cannot consider complaints relating to pension 
funds.189  
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 Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990.  
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 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 176 at 73. 
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 Established by section 20 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002. 
189
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5.7 INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
5.7.1 Description 
 
The modern-day informal arrangements have developed as a result of the 
exclusionary nature of formal social security systems. Communities have also relied 
on the informal systems of support to protect themselves against social and 
economic hardships they have and still continue to experience. The informal systems 
rely on reciprocal support, social networks of support, and the element of solidarity 
(Ubuntu) between individuals, families, or communities to fight against poverty.190  
 
In African communities, mostly individuals and families used the kinship 
arrangements as forms of support. However, these systems were seriously affected 
by industrialisation and urbanisation, which opened the way for modern forms of 
mutual aid support, such as savings clubs, social clubs, burial societies, stokvels, 
kinship, networks, patrons, religious and other non-governmental organisations, and 
food cooperatives.191  
 
Thus, in addition to social assistance grants and social insurance arrangements, the 
informal arrangements play a complementary role to formal social security 
arrangements in this country. They contribute a lot in eradicating poverty192 within 
the South African poor communities, and many families survive on benefits coming 
out of these informal arrangements. The informal means of support should therefore 
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 Patel L Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa 2005 at 138-139. See also generally, 
Triegaardt JD “Accomplishments and Challenges for Partnerships in Development in the 
Transformation of Social Security in South Africa” (2005) at 3-4, available at 
http://led.co.za/document/accomplishments-and-challenges-partnerships-development-
transformation-social-security-sout, last visited on 21 May 2015 at 7. 
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 Triegaardt (idem at 7-8), and see also generally Molefe SP “An Overview of Characteristics of Self-
help Organisations Amongst Blacks in South Africa – A historical perspective” Social 
Work/Maatskaplike Werk 32 (2) 1996 at 177-178. 
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 Subbarao K, Bonnerjee A, Braithwaite J, Carvalho S, Ezemenari K, Graham C, Thompson A 
Safety Net Programs and Poverty Reduction. Lessons from Cross-Country Experience (1997) 
(Washington DC: The World Bank) at 5. 
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not be ignored in the process of rationalising and streamlining social security 
provision in South Africa.  
 
Informal schemes are generally open for people who share the same background, 
like relatives and friends, or people who share a common goal – and here people 
may establish social groups such as stokvels. These institutions generally 
supplement the support from families. Even though people may prefer stokvels to 
other formal forms of savings, it should be noted that stokvels, just like any other 
informal arrangement, are not without problems. For example, as opined by 
Dekker,193 the arrangements are subject to limitations for reasons that include the 
following: they can easily lose their effectiveness as members of the family, 
especially the younger generation, move to urban areas to look for jobs; benefits are 
sometimes very little and cannot meet the present-day demands; and there is no 
guaranteed protection against social and economic factors by the benefits offered by 
the system.194 Thus, individuals, families, communities, and members of different 
social groups might receive benefits that are inadequate as compared to the type or 
demands of the risk(s) the persons or community wanted to protect themselves 
against. Other risks might include where all the resources of the scheme are lost due 
to mismanagement or dishonesty by some of the members of the scheme. 
 
5.7.2 Regulation and administration  
 
Informal schemes generally have their own set of rules which are in the form of a 
constitution.195 However, problems start when members fail to abide by the rules of 
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 Dekker AH Informal Social Security: A Legal Analysis (Doctoral Thesis) April 2005 at 141 
(hereafter, Dekker Informal Social Security). 
194
 Idem. 
195
 The National Stokvels Association of South Africa (NASASA) provides a template of a constitution 
which can be used by stokvels when writing their own constitutions (available at www.nasasa.co.za, 
last visited 07 September 2015). It was discovered in the study completed by Moodley L “Three 
Stokvel Clubs in Urban Black Township of KwaNdangezi, Natal” (Department of Economics, 
University of Durban-Westville), 27 Feb 2008: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03768359508439821, last 
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the scheme. Where there are no proper systems in place – for example on, how to 
record and keep minutes of the meetings and enforce resolutions taken, how to 
handle and deal with members’ contributions, the control and distribution of benefits 
and the discipline of members – the scheme might not survive for a long time.  
 
The constitution of each and every scheme should provide for a number of 
regulatory issues; such as membership, contributions, benefits, investments, 
discipline, meetings, dispute resolution procedures, recording of minutes and 
resolutions, and, most importantly, the scheme’s banking account. There must be a 
way to enforce all these. 
 
The constitution would have provisions on how to deal with a member or members 
who do not abide by the rules of the scheme. Punishments for violating the 
constitution range from verbal and written warnings, suspension of the membership 
of an offender, fines for late arrival at meetings, and there are even provisions for 
expulsion from the scheme where the offence is of a serious nature. In most cases 
the executive committee or the chairman, in conjunction with the secretary or all the 
members of the scheme, deliberate and decide together on an appropriate sanction 
for different transgressions.  
 
The problem lies with the fact that there are no enforcement mechanisms in case a 
member fails to cooperate or to abide by the decision taken to punish him or her. 
Where a member is not happy with the sanction, there is normally no provision for an 
appeal or review process and as such there is room for abuse of powers or even for 
biasness from the side of those who have the responsibility to decide on the matter 
and appropriate sanction. Most of these schemes break up because of issues 
pertaining to members’ discipline and the nature of sanctions meted out where 
friends or relatives take sides.196 Most of the informal schemes depend on kinship 
                                                                                                                                       
 
contributions are collected. These clubs mainly survive on confidence and trust between members 
(who are mainly friends, family members, or colleagues). 
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relationships and are founded on the principle of reciprocity. It is therefore more of a 
fraternal regulatory relationship, which does not always work.197 
 
In cases where members of the scheme cannot resolve a dispute, they or an 
aggrieved party, as the case may be, may approach a civil court on a common law 
basis in the same way as he or she would do with formal schemes.198  
This is not always the best route to follow considering the adversarial nature of the 
court system and also how costly it might be. Informal schemes are mostly made up 
of close relatives, friends, neighbours, or colleagues, and relationships are likely to 
break down should the matter escalate to the level of the courts of law.   
 
5.8 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
 
The South African retirement income security system relies more on formal 
arrangements. The system consists of social assistance, occupational retirement 
funds, and private savings.199 There are also other arrangements; which mostly take 
informal forms of savings. In South Africa a significant percentage of workers in 
formal employment are members of retirement funds.200  
 
However, the problem facing this country is that too many people still reach 
retirement age with insufficient retirement benefits and many more are still excluded 
by the system and therefore would go into retirement with no benefits at all.201 South 
Africa does not have a public retirement scheme and this has unfortunately resulted 
in the majority of people, especially those in the informal sector of the economy, 
being left out. At the moment, the coverage that is provided by the South African 
retirement system is clearly not able to provide adequate protection to all the workers 
in this country. The only available form of income for people who are excluded by the 
                                            
 
197
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system comes through the state old-age pension. Because of gaps in South Africa’s 
retirement system, the social assistance old-age pension presently serves as income 
replacement instead of being a safety-net.  The South African social security system 
uses social insurance primarily to protect those in formal employment, while social 
assistance is meant to protect the poor. The social assistance old-age pension is 
means tested, which means that it is not universal.  
 
The onus is thus upon the individuals to prove that they are destitute and therefore 
qualify to receive the grant. The system also follows a categorical approach which 
only targets certain categories of people to the exclusion of the majority of other 
vulnerable groups. In addition, private provision is encouraged and common in the 
country.202 People who are employed in the formal sector of the economy belong to 
retirement funds which are mostly established by their employers. Therefore 
coverage in the formal sector is quite high, while those working in the informal sector 
have little cover or no cover at all. Another shortcoming is that employers are by law 
not obliged to establish retirement funds for their employees except in limited 
circumstances where the establishment of a fund and participation in the fund are 
established through a sectoral determination issued by the Minister for a particular 
sector. Examples of such sectoral determinations may be found in the civil 
engineering sector and the private security sector.  
 
This is a big challenge as it affects the effectiveness and adequacy of the system. It 
also opens gaps in the system as some of the employers can choose not to establish 
funds for their employees and that will leave these employees vulnerable to 
elements of poverty when they are no longer working and earning a salary due to 
old-age. The system also allows for private savings, which are voluntary and are 
made on an individual basis. As the name implies, the savings are made on a 
voluntary basis, which means it is not compulsory for people to save using private 
savings vehicles. These are mostly used by people who already belong to 
occupational retirement funds to supplement the benefits they will receive from those 
                                            
 
202
 Van der Berg “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” op cit note 143 at 488-
489.  
SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL AND RETIREMENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
 
205 
 
funds. The savings vehicles are normally not within the reach of those working in the 
informal sector and therefore cannot be considered as alternatives to a national fund.  
 
People have also relied on informal arrangements to protect themselves against 
social and economic risks. These arrangements evolved from kinship forms of 
support to the modern-day models of support, which are in the form of savings clubs, 
social clubs, burial societies, stokvels, and food cooperatives. Most of these 
arrangements are, however, not sustainable.  
 
The benefits are sometimes very little and cannot meet the members’ needs. They 
therefore do not provide guaranteed protection against social and economic factors.  
They are not formally regulated and generally depend on kinship regulatory 
relationships, which can easily be affected by other factors such as internal fights, 
strained relationships, and loss of trust. The informal arrangements are therefore 
susceptible to many risks. 
 
The system does not provide comprehensive coverage. A more comprehensive 
approach needs to be adopted in line with the Taylor Committee Report’s 
recommendations203 for comprehensive social protection instead of the narrow 
approach the system has taken so far.  
The concept of social protection is more appropriate for a developing country like 
South Africa than the concept of social security, which takes a more formal and 
structured approach. Social security is more suitable in conditions where large 
numbers of citizens depend on the formal economy for their livelihood. However, in 
the context of a widespread informal economy like South Africa, formal social 
security arrangements do not always work for the vast majority of the working 
population. Those lacking social protection belong to the economically weaker 
sections of the community and therefore require adequate and secure protection 
from poverty. A sound social and retirement income security system should bring all 
categories of people into the national system, covering the whole population 
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regardless of the type of employment sector they find themselves in. A primary 
reform objective for this country, according to South Africa’s National Treasury Task 
Team for Social and Retirement Reform, is to provide basic income protection for all 
South Africans through a combination of social assistance and contributory savings. 
The aim should be to create a system that will protect everyone – employed or 
unemployed.204 
 
The country’s policies and national legislation should be seen to promote the 
progressive realisation205 of universal protection and access for the whole society 
where immediate cover is not possible for everyone. Even though universal benefits 
may be seen as an option, they cost more and might even bring the unwanted result 
of discouraging people from saving for retirement. It should, however, also be 
accepted that universal benefits can contribute in promoting equality206 and human 
dignity,207 as they promote social protection which does not only provide for mere 
survival, but also ensures social inclusion.     
 
The next chapter examines South Africa’s occupational retirement funds. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 6 
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines retirement funds which are established by employers for their 
employees. These funds are called “occupational retirement funds” as there is an 
employment relationship between the employer who establishes the fund and the 
employees belonging to that fund. Occupational funds may also be an initiative of the 
trade unions, sector, industry, or may result from a sectoral determination issued by 
the Minister for a particular sector.  
 
South Africa’s occupational retirement schemes take the form of private schemes 
focused primarily on the formal sector of the economy,1 to the exclusion of the 
majority of the workers in the informal sector of the economy. Van der Berg has 
observed very low coverage in the following categories: agriculture, trade, catering, 
accommodation, small traders, shopkeepers, and domestic workers.2 Coverage in 
the formal sector was estimated to be between 66% and 84% by South Africa’s 
National Treasury in its December 2004 Discussion Paper3 which is high considering 
the fact that participation is by law not compulsory. This can be an indication that 
workers in this sector have accepted membership of occupational retirement funds 
as an obligatory condition of employment. It has been discovered that people in 
South Africa generally retire with insufficient benefits due to a number of reasons; 
some of which will be highlighted in the discussions that follow.4  
                                            
 
1
 See the National Treasury South Africa Retirement Fund Reform (A Discussion Paper) December 
2004 (The Three Pillars of Retirement Funding System) at 5 (hereafter, South Africa Retirement Fund 
Reform: First Discussion Paper). 
2
 See Van der Berg S “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond” Vol 14, No 4, 
December 1997 Development Southern Africa at 489. 
3
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Dewar et al reported in 2005 that only 6% of the South African population could retire 
with adequate retirement savings, with the other 94% either being forced to continue 
working beyond their retirement age – with the majority relying on the state old-age 
pension.5 Factors that contribute to inadequate benefits, according to Dewar et al, 
include shortened periods of employment, taking lump-sum benefits at retirement, 
early retirement, poor investment decisions, and the fact that people are living longer 
than expected. It is further reported that in the year 2001 about R62 billion was 
withdrawn by fund members from their funds before they reached the age of 
retirement.6  
 
These figures are alarming for a country that aims to see everyone adequately 
protected with adequate benefits when they retire. In evaluating South Africa’s 
occupational retirement system, it is important to consider the following three vital 
elements as highlighted by Colin Gillion:7 
 
 The type of protection provided; 
 The level of protection provided; and  
 The categories of people covered by the system.  
 
This evaluation should be done in relation to the obligations the state has in terms of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In terms of section 27 of the 
Constitution, everyone in this country is guaranteed the right of access to social 
security. Section 27(2), on the other hand, requires the state to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to social security.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper (Republic of South Africa (National Treasury)) 
February 2007 (hereafter, South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion 
Paper). These two Papers describe the nature of South Africa’s current retirement system with its 
positive elements and weaknesses. 
5
 See Dewar N, De Kock A, Kruger N, Roper P The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and 
Retirement Planning 2005-2006 at 18 where the authors call this unfortunate situation which South 
Africa is facing “a wake-up call”.  
6
 Ibid at 19-25. 
7
 Gillion C, Turner J, Bailey C, Latulippe D Social Security Pensions: Development (International 
Labour Office Geneva) 2000 at 193 (hereafter, Gillion et al Social Security Pensions). 
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What these provisions imply is that everyone should have access to social security, 
and that those who do not yet have access, must be given progressive realisation by 
the state using reasonable legislative and other measures. This obligation should, for 
purposes of this study, be understood to mean that the state has the duty to 
progressively extend coverage to those who are currently not covered and improve 
coverage for those who are not adequately covered. This will include changing the 
laws and policies on retirement provision and creating a framework for more 
inclusivity and adequate protection.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is limited to the following: the nature of the system, the 
types of retirement schemes, the regulatory framework, the scope of coverage, types 
of benefits and their preservation and protection, protection of member’s interests 
and rights, and legal remedies available to beneficiaries.  
 
6.2 THE NATURE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
 
The historical development of South Africa’s occupational retirement funds was 
discussed in Chapter 48 of this study and therefore only a brief description is 
provided here. It is important to mention for background purposes that the first formal 
regulation of retirement funds came in 1958, after the introduction of the Pension 
Funds of 1956.9 Prior to that, pension funds were in the form of trusts and were not 
regulated by any statute. The Pension Funds Act has come a long way and has over 
the years seen numerous amendments which brought the retirement system in this 
country to where it is today.10 Occupational retirement funds are used by workers to 
save money for their retirement.  
                                            
 
8
 Discussed under par 4.3.3 in Ch 4. 
9
 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (hereafter Pension Funds Act of 1956). 
10
 Downie JAB Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa 2005 at 5 (hereafter, 
Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa) at 4.  
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Retirement funds must conform to the definition of a pension as defined in section 1 
of the Pension Funds Act of 195611 in order to be recognised as such. A “pension 
fund organisation” is defined as follows:12 
 
(a)     any association of persons established with the object of providing annuities or 
lump sum payments for members or former members of such association upon 
their reaching retirement dates, or for the dependants of such members or former 
members upon the death of such members; or 
(b)     any business carried on under a scheme or arrangement established with the 
object of providing annuities or lump sum payments for persons who belong or 
belonged to the class of persons for whose benefit that scheme or arrangement 
has been established, when they reach their retirement dates or for dependants of 
such persons upon the death of those persons; or 
(c)     any association of persons or business carried on under a scheme or arrangement 
established with the object of receiving, administering, investing and paying 
benefits, referred to in section 37C on behalf of beneficiaries, payable on the death 
of more than one member of one or more pension funds, and includes any such 
association or business which in addition to carrying on business in connection 
with any of the objects specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) also carries on 
business in connection with any of the objects for which a friendly society may be 
established, as specified in section 2 of the Friendly Societies Act of 1956, or 
which is or may become liable for the payment of any benefits provided for in its 
rules, whether or not it continues to admit, or collect contributions from or on 
behalf of members. 
 
All the funds that provide benefits on retirement must register with the Registrar of 
Pension Funds, except where such a fund is exempted from registration.13  
                                            
 
11
 Pension Fund Act of 1956. 
12
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 defines the concepts “pension fund” and “pension 
organization”. In terms of the section, there are three types of “pension fund organisations”, namely 
an (a) association of persons, (b) any business carried under a scheme or arrangement, and (c) a 
beneficiary fund.  
13
 Section 4 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 requires every pension fund (except those which are 
exempted from registration in terms of the Act) to register with the Registrar of Pension Funds. 
Section 1 of the Act defines “Registrar” as the Registrar or Deputy Registrar of Pension Funds 
mentioned in section 3 of the Act. Section 3 provides that the executive officer and a deputy executive 
officer (mentioned in section 1 of the Financial Services Board Act, 97 of 1990), shall also be the 
Registrar and the Deputy Registrar of Pension Funds, respectively. Funds can be exempted by the 
Registrar from complying with any provision of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 in terms of section 
2(3)(a) of the Act. 
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This is to ensure that funds are properly regulated and administered to protect the 
interests of fund members and/or beneficiaries. If a fund, which has not been 
exempted, fails to register as required, that fund will not be recognised as a 
retirement fund by the Registrar and members thereof will not enjoy the necessary 
protection afforded by such recognition.14 These statutory measures are there to 
ensure that only the funds that satisfy the requirements of the Pension Funds Act of 
1956 run the business of pension funds. The legislature has even put in place 
punitive measures for those who fail to meet this statutory requirement. Failure to 
comply with the provisions of section 4 of the Act constitutes an offence and if a 
person is found guilty, he or she could be fined an amount not exceeding R10 million 
or sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or to both a fine 
and imprisonment.15 The Registrar of Pension Funds is also empowered by section 
37(2) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 (as substituted by section 14 of the Financial 
Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008) to impose an administrative 
penalty not exceeding R1 000 or such amount as prescribed by the Registrar for 
every day during which a person fails to submit to the Registrar any documents or 
information required by the Registrar; for example in relation to the registration of a 
fund.  
The intention of the legislature in imposing these sanctions is to deter people from 
establishing and operating pension funds illegally, as that can expose fund members 
and beneficiaries to serious risks.  
 
  
                                            
 
14
 Section 31(1)(b) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 prohibits any person from carrying on the 
business of a pension fund, unless that fund has been provisionally or finally registered under the Act. 
In terms of section 31(1)(d) of the Act, no person shall apply to his or her business a name which has 
the words “pension fund” or any other name which might give an impression that the person runs a 
business of a pension fund, unless such business is registered as a pension fund under the Act. See 
also generally on the registration of pension funds and the effect thereof, Marx GL, Hanekom K The 
Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits 2009 Vol 1 at 16 (hereafter, 
Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits).  
15
 Section 37(1)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.   
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It should be noted though that there are funds which, even though they are 
established for workers, are not required to be registered in terms of the Act. Those 
funds include those established by the state16 and to which the state contributes 
financially.  
 
Government employees in South Africa belong to the Government Employees 
Pension Fund (GEPF), which is regulated by the Government Employees Pension 
Fund Law of 1996. Until May 1996, there were five categories of state pension or 
provident funds designed by the government as an employer.17 The word “state” has 
been given a broader meaning by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Council v Eskom18 to include all institutions which are 
collectively concerned with the management of public affairs, unless a contrary 
intention appears.  
 
The court stated in casu that “state” may in certain circumstances have a wider 
meaning than government and that for the purposes of the Pension Funds Act of 
1956, “state” may also encompass “organs of state”, as defined by section 239 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution).19  
 
 
 
                                            
 
16
 See in this regard Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council v Eskom 2000 (1) SA 866 (SCA) at 
875-876 (hereafter, Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council).   
17
 Those funds are the following: The Associated Institutions Pension Fund, which was established by 
and regulated under the Associated Institutions Pension Fund Act, 41 of 1963; the Temporary 
Employees Pension Fund, which was established and regulated under the Temporary Employees 
Pension Fund Act, 75 of 1979; the Authorities’ Service Pension Fund, established and regulated 
under the Authorities’ Service Pension Fund Act, 6 of 1971; and the Authorities’ Service 
Superannuation Fund, established and regulated under the Authorities’ Service Superannuation Act, 
6 of 1971. 
18
 See generally the case of Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council supra note 16. 
19
 In terms of section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), 
“organ of state” means any department of state or administration in the national, provincial, or local 
sphere of government; or any other functionary or institution exercising a power or performing a 
function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial officer.  
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Reference to “state” may therefore include any institutions exercising public powers 
or performing public functions in terms of legislation, whether or not they are 
controlled by government and state-owned enterprises such as Eskom, the Financial 
Services Board, and universities.20  
 
The following sectorial funds are also not regulated by the Pension Funds Act of 
1956, but by legislation in terms of which they were established: The Transnet Fund, 
which is a fund for the employees of Transnet, was established by and is regulated 
by the Transnet Pension Fund Act of 1990,21 with effect from 29 June 1990; the 
Telkom Fund, a fund for the employees of Telkom South Africa that was established 
in terms of section 9(1) of the Post Office Act of 1958,22 with effect from 1 October 
1991 and is regulated by that Act – the Telkom Retirement Fund is also supervised 
under the Post Office Act; and the Post Office Fund was established by Section 10 of 
the Post Office Act, with effect from 1 October 1991.23  
 
Funds for political office-bearers24 are also not governed under the Pension Funds 
Act. These funds are excluded from registration under the Pension Funds Act of 
1956 until such time that they, with the consent of the Minister, have to register in 
terms of the Act.25  
 
                                            
 
20
 The wording of section 4A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 was interpreted by the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator (then, Prof. John Murphy) in Retired University of Natal Staff Association v Associated 
Institutions Pension Fund & Another [2000] 3 BPLR 302 (PFA) at 308, to mean that “the Minister has the 
discretion to decide whether to establish a management board for a pension fund to which the state contributes financially or 
not, and also whether to agree to the registration of such fund in terms of section 4 of the Pension Funds Act or not”. In casu 
(at 310-311), the Adjudicator held that universities in South Africa (in this case the University of Natal) 
are “organs of state” by virtue of the functions they perform, universities exercise powers and perform 
functions associated with government and therefore that the Associated Institutions Pension Fund 
was a pension fund to which the state contributes financially.  
21
 Transnet Pension Fund Act, 62 of 1990. 
22
 Post Office Act, 44 of 1958. 
23
 Van den Heever A “Pension Reform and Old Age Grants in South Africa”, 12 June 2007, at 5, 
accessed from http://www.researchgate.net/researcher/2010761091_Alex_M_van_den_Heever, last 
visited on 22 July 2015 (hereafter, Van den Heever “Pension Reform and Old Age Grants in South 
Africa”). 
24
 The example in this case would be, the Members of Parliament and Political Officers Pension Fund 
regulated under the Members of Parliament and Political Office Bearers Pension Scheme Act of 1984.  
25
 The pension funds to which the state contributes financially are exempted from registration by 
section 4A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. On the other hand, the Government Employees 
Pension Fund is regulated by the Government Employees Pension Law of 1996.   
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Funds for state employees are discussed briefly in paragraph 6.4.6, as more focus is 
on what can be regarded as private retirement funds. 
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 also previously did not apply to pension or provident 
funds established or continued in terms of a collective agreement in accordance with 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (before 1 February 1999). This was mainly to 
encourage collective bargaining.26 During that dispensation, the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator held in Maputuka v Gauteng Building Industry Pension Scheme27 that he 
did not have jurisdiction over any bargaining council fund, irrespective of when it was 
established. The reason given by the Adjudicator was that, as a bargaining council 
fund, the respondent was not governed by the provisions of the Pension Funds Act 
of 1956. A complaint involving a bargaining council was supposed to be determined 
or dealt with in terms of the dispute resolution of the collective bargaining agreement 
of the relevant bargaining council.28 The position was clarified by section 2(1) of the 
Act as amended and now the Pension Funds Act of 1956 also applies to those 
funds.29  
 
Section 2(2)(a) of the Act gave all the funds previously created as such until 1 
January 2008 to register in terms of the Act. If they were unable to do so, they could 
apply to the Registrar for an extension until 30 April 2008.30It is submitted that all 
retirement funds should be regulated by one piece of legislation to ensure that there 
is uniformity and consistency in the regulation of all retirement funds in the country. 
This will ensure that members of pension funds enjoy the same treatment and 
protection.  
                                            
 
26
 See in this regard Arendse v Metal Industries Provident Fund & Another [2001] 7 BPLR 2182 (PFA) 
at par 18, where the Pension Funds Adjudicator stated that the purpose of section 2(1) of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956 (both before and after the amendment) is to allow industrial self-regulation of 
pension funds by a process of collective bargaining in duly formed bargaining forums. 
27
 See Maputuka v Gauteng Building Industry Pension Scheme [2004] 11 BPLR 6233 (PFA) at paras 
9-11. 
28
 Supra. 
29
 Section 2(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 provides that the provisions of the Act apply to any 
pension fund, including those established in terms of a collective agreement and registered in terms 
of section 4. However, the section further states that this is subject to section 4A and any other law in 
terms of which a fund is established.  
30
 This is in terms of Financial Services Board Pension Funds (PF) Directive No 1. 
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The Pension Funds Act of 1956, which is a specialised piece of legislation, is (with 
necessary amendments) fit for the purpose of regulating the whole pension industry 
in South Africa.  
 
Registration of a pension fund organisation makes that fund a body corporate.31 On 
the other hand, the registration of a fund defined by section 1(b) of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956 will mean that its assets, obligations, and liabilities are of the fund 
to the exclusion of any other legal entity or person.32 Legal personality in simple 
terms means that the fund will be able to sue or be sued. Such a fund will further be 
able to acquire rights and duties separate from its members, former members, and 
beneficiaries.33 This is similar to the Netherlands where pension funds are regarded 
as independent legal entities.34  
 
In Belgium, pension funds can either take the form of a special purpose entity with 
legal personality; for example a foundation, trust or corporate entity; or a legally 
separated fund managed by a pension management company or other financial 
institution.35 This differs from the United Kingdom, where pension funds are 
established under trust law. In terms of section 592(1) of the Income and Corporation 
Taxes Act of 1988, a pension scheme needs to be registered under irrevocable trust 
to benefit from tax reliefs.36  
                                            
 
31
 See in this regard section 5(1)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. See also Venter v Protektor 
Pension Fund [2000] 3 BPLR 340 (PFA) at 345 (hereafter, Venter) and Webb and Co. Ltd v Northern 
Rifles; Hobson & Sons v Northern Rifles 1908 TS 462 at 464 (hereafter, Webb and Co).  
32
 Section 5(1)(b) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.   
33
 See the case of Venter supra note 21 at 345. In Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company 
(South Africa) Ltd [2001] 8 BPLR 2307 (SCA) at paras 44-52 (hereafter, Mostert) the court said that 
“the fact that section 5(1)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 specifically states that the fund will become a body corporate 
capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name while on the other hand section 5(1)(b) does not say that, may at first 
blush seem to lend support to the argument that such a fund does not have a separate legal personality”. The court then 
held that section 5(1)(b) of the Act must be seen in the context of the whole of section 5(1), which on 
proper interpretation must be taken to do so. In another decision of Tek Corporation Provident Fund 
and Others v Lorentz [2000] 3 BPLR 227 (SCA) at par 15 (hereafter, Tek Corporation Provident 
Fund), Marais JA stated that both sections 5(1)(a) and (b) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 mean 
that a pension fund is a legal persona and that it owns its assets in the fullest sense of the word 
“owns”. It should be noted that even though in South Africa a pension fund organisation acquires the 
status of a legal person upon registration, that is not the case in English law (England), where a 
pension fund takes the form of a trust and is regulated under trust law.  
34
 Discussed under par 3.4.2.2 in Ch 3. 
35
 Discussed under par 3.3.2.2 in Ch 3. 
36
 Discussed under par 3.5.2.2.2 in Ch 3. 
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It should be noted that in English law, a trust is not regarded as a legal person and, 
as such, trustees have control over trust property for the benefit of beneficiaries and 
they can sue or be sued.37 
 
In the case of Venter v Protektor Pension Fund,38 the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
held that a pension fund is a universitas personarum, which implies that the fund is a 
voluntary association with corporate personality.  
 
In another old case, Webb and Co. Ltd v Northern Rifles; Hobson & Sons v Northern 
Rifles,39 the court defined a universitas as follows:  
 
“A universitas personarum in Roman-Dutch law is a legal fiction, an aggregation of individuals 
forming a persona or entity, having the capacity of acquiring rights and incurring obligations to 
a great extent as a human being. An universitas is distinguished from a mere association of 
individuals by the fact that it is an entity distinct from the individuals forming it, that its capacity 
to acquire rights or incur obligations from that of its members.”
40
 
 
Legal personality means a fund is a legal entity separate from its members. The fund 
enjoys limited liability; for example, if members of the board of management of the 
fund acted negligently or recklessly, the fund will be exonerated of any liability and 
the board or individual members may be jointly or individually held responsible for 
the wrong doing.41 This is to ensure that the board takes its job seriously and that it 
always acts with due care and diligence and in good faith. 
 
                                            
 
37
 See in this regard Hayton D “The Extent of Pension Trustees’ Obligations in South Africa” (Paper 
presented at the Pension Lawyers Association 2004 Conference in Cape Town) 2004 February at 1 
and 2, accessed from http://www.pensionlawyers.co.za/resources/downloads/2004-2/, last visited 23 
August 2015. 
38
 See the case of Venter supra note 31. 
39
 See the case of Webb and Co supra note 31. 
40
 Supra. 
41
 See Mes v Art Medical Equipment Pension Fund (now liquidated) and Others [2006] 2 BPLR 140 
(PFA) (hereafter, Mes); Trustees African Explosives Pension Fund v New Properties Ltd; Trustees 
African Explosives Pension Fund v Nestel 1961 (3) SA 245 (W); and the case of Mostert supra note 
33. 
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Retirement funds are mostly managed by insurance companies, financial institutions, 
industrial councils, and government.42  
 
They have an element of insurance and saving, and can therefore be considered to 
be an integral part of the social insurance component of social security.43 South 
Africa’s retirement system can be considered to be quasi-mandatory as in most 
cases a person will become a member of a retirement fund established by the 
employer when he or she starts working for that employer. When a person enters 
into a contract of employment with the employer or is employed within a sector44 
which already has a retirement fund, that person automatically becomes a member 
of the fund by virtue of being an employee.  
 
A retirement fund is administered in terms of the fund rules, which are regarded as 
the constitution of the fund. The activities of the fund, including its management, 
must be authorised by fund rules and the relevant legislation.  
 
The fact that fund rules constitute the constitution of a pension fund was confirmed in 
the case of Mostert v Old Mutual Life Assurance45 and Tek Corporation Provident 
Fund,46 respectively. It was further stated in Tek Corporation Provident Fund supra 
that the pension fund, the powers and duties of its trustees, and the rights and 
obligations of its members and the employer are governed by the rules of the fund, 
relevant legislation, and the common law. Any action that is outside what is 
authorised by the fund rules will be ultra vires.47 Thus everything that is done in 
                                            
 
42
 Van der Merwe T “The Occupational Pillar of the South African Pension System” Development 
Southern Africa Vol 21, No 2, June 2004 at 311 (hereafter, Van der Merwe “The Occupational Pillar of 
the South African Pension System”).  
43
 Ibid at 304.    
44
 It should also be noted that in terms of section 55(4) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 75 
of 1997 (BCEA), the Minister of Labour may, when making sectoral determinations for employees in 
specific sectors, also make pronouncements with regard to retirement fund membership. For 
example, the Minister may make membership of a fund compulsory for all employees in a particular 
sector.  
45
 See in this regard the case of Mostert supra note 33 at par 30. 
46
 See the case of Tek Corporation Provident Fund supra note 33 at par 15. See also an old decision 
of Abrahamse v Connock’s Pension Fund [1963] 1 AII SA 159 (W) at 159-164 where the fund rules 
were referred to as the constitution.    
47
 See the case of Tek Corporation Provident Fund supra note 33. 
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relation to the fund must be permitted by the fund rules or applicable legislation, 
otherwise the board’s actions could amount to abuse of power or maladministration.  
 
Fund rules should, among other things, contain information on contributions 
employees and the employer must pay to the fund, their level, and the benefits 
payable by the fund.48 The level of contributions is normally stated as a percentage 
of an employee’s weekly wage or monthly salary.49  
 
In its 2012 Benchmark Survey, Sanlam averaged contributions by employers at just 
above 10%, and contributions by employees for some funds as being just below 6%, 
while for others as above 6%. If put together, employees’ and employer’s 
contributions come to a total of about 16%.50  
 
This contribution level is not far from what is advocated by the World Bank – which 
considers contribution rates of between 10% and 13% of the total annual salary as a 
suitable level for occupational pension funds.51 It should be noted, however, that 
contributions paid to the fund and the benefits offered by the fund can also be an 
outcome of collective agreements.52  
 
                                            
 
48
 Section 13A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 deals with payment of contributions to retirement 
funds. Section 13A(8) of the Act (as added by section 17 of the Financial Services General 
Amendment Act, 45 of 2013) provides a list of persons who may be held personally liable for non-
compliance with section 13A.  
49
 Sephton B, Cooper DI, and Thompson C A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds Legal and Policy 
Considerations 1990 (Glossary of Terms Used) at 5 (hereafter, Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and 
Provident Funds). 
50
 See in this regard Sanlam’s 2012 Benchmark Survey at 14 accessed from 
http://www.sanlambenchmark.co.za/webadmin/include/content/Benchmark%20Survey%202012.pdf, 
last visited on 07 September 2015 (hereafter, Sanlam’s 2012 Benchmark Survey); and Sanlam’s 2011 
Benchmark Survey at 6, respectively, accessed from http://www.sanlambenchmark.co.za/webadmin/ 
include/content/2011%20Stand-Alone.v2.pdf, last visited on 07 September 2015 (hereafter, Sanlam’s 
2011 Benchmark Survey). 
51
 South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 13. 
52
 In terms of section 23(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, every trade union, 
employers’ organisation, and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. In terms of 
section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, a collective agreement means a written 
agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest 
concluded by one or more registered trade unions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, one or 
more employers, one or more registered employers’ organisations, or one or more employers and one 
or more registered employers’ organisations. 
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Section 13A(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 gives the employer of any member 
of a registered fund the duty to pay any contribution which, in terms of the rules of 
the fund, is to be deducted from the member’s remuneration and any contribution for 
which the employer is liable in terms of the fund rules. Failure by the employer to 
adhere to the requirements of this section may result in a fine or imprisonment.53  
 
In the case where the employer has been deducting contributions from the 
employee’s salary but failed to pay them to the fund, the Pension Fund Adjudicator 
has held in a number of determinations that an appropriate relief is one which has 
the effect of placing the complainant in the position he or she would have been had 
the employer timeously paid the contributions.54  
In such a case, the employer will be required to compute the employee’s withdrawal 
benefit plus late payment interest owed by the employer in terms of section 13A(7) of 
the Act. This is how serious the legislature is in ensuring that retirement benefits 
receive adequate protection in order for fund members and/or beneficiaries to 
receive benefits that are adequate when the members retire. Retirement funds also 
pay “risk benefits” either through the fund itself or the employer can make separate 
arrangements with an insurance company for that purpose. For example, death 
benefits55 are payable to the deceased member’s dependants should the member 
die before his or her retirement date.  
                                            
 
53
 Section 37(1) (as inserted by section 49 of the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, 
45 of 2013) provides that a person is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding R10 million or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both such a fine 
and imprisonment if the person contravenes or fails to comply with section 13A. Regulation 33(5) (of 
Regulations to the Pension Funds Act of 1956) provides that such failure must be reported to a ttions. 
It should be noted that if the Registrar of Pension Funds is of the view that the employer has 
contravened the provisions of section 13A, he or she may refer the matter to the Financial Services 
Board Enforcement Committee (see the discussion of the powers of the Enforcement Committee 
under par 5.5.2 in Ch 5). Where the employer’s failure is a contravention of fund rules, such a 
complaint can be lodged with the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator. See further regarding the 
employer’s duty to pay contributions, Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern 
Africa op cit note 10 at 5. 
54
 See in this regard the following determinations made by the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator: Zondi v Private Security Sector Provident Fund and Others [2013] 3 BPLR 457 (PFA); 
Smit v Road Freight Provident Fund and Other [2013] 3 BPLR 421 (PFA); Orion Money Purchase 
Pension Fund (SA) v Pension Funds Adjudicator and Others [2002] 9 BPLR 3830 (C); and Mabale v 
Feedmix Provident Fund and Others [2008] 1 BPLR 29 (PFA). 
55
 A “death benefit” can be described as an amount, either in the form of a percentage of an annuity or 
a lump-sum payment which a beneficiary (for example a dependant of the deceased) receives when 
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It can be deduced from the definition of a “pension fund organisation” that the 
primary objective of a retirement fund is to provide its members with benefits when 
they retire or to members’ dependants should the member die before retirement. The 
benefits received should be at a level that will allow the member to keep the same 
standard of living or a standard that will be reasonably comparable to the standard of 
living he or she had prior to retirement. Retirement funds’ rules can also determine 
the extent to which a fund can be used for other purposes.56 What is critical though is 
the fact that the fund should be used primarily to provide retirement benefits to 
members.57 Using retirement benefits for any other purpose will not serve the 
purpose they are created for, which is to serve in the place of income when a person 
has retired.58  
 
The idea is that if more people save money for retirement, then a smaller percentage 
of people will go into retirement without any form of income.  
 
This will reduce the number of people who rely on state social assistance 
arrangements when they retire as the majority of people will have adequate income 
in their retirement. At the moment South Africa has a high number of people working 
in the formal sector of the economy who are members of retirement funds.59 South 
Africa is, however, faced with two challenges. Firstly, the country needs to come up 
with a plan on how to extend coverage to categories of people who are currently not 
                                                                                                                                       
 
the member of a retirement fund passes away before the date of retirement. See the discussion about 
distribution of “death benefits” under par 6.6.4.2.  
56
 See in this regard Kransdorff v Sentrachem Pension Fund & Another (1999) 9 BPLR 55 (PFA) at 
66. 
57
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 10 at 5. 
58
 This view has been supported by the following Committees: The Smith Committee: The Committee 
on Strategy and Policy Review of Retirement Provision in South Africa, 1995 at 32 (hereafter, The 
Smith Committee Report); The Mouton Committee: the Committee of Investigation into a Retirement 
Provision System for South Africa, was appointed in 1988 at 17-22 (hereafter, The Mouton Committee 
Report); and The Taylor Commission (Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, March 2002 at 
94 (hereafter, The Taylor Committee Report).  
59
 In South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 5, the Financial 
Services Board estimates coverage of employees in this sector to be 60%, which is comparatively 
high considering the fact that participation is not yet compulsory in this country. This reflects the 
extent to which membership of occupational funds is accepted as an obligatory condition of 
employment.  
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covered by the system, and secondly, the country must improve the quality or level 
of coverage for those who are inadequately covered.  
 
The majority of those who are either completely not covered or inadequately covered 
by the system come from those who are employed in the informal sector of the 
economy including the self-employed.  
 
The discussion will now move to the legislative framework of South Africa’s 
retirement system to see how the legislature has resolved to regulate the pension 
funds industry in an effort to protect the interests of fund members and to safeguard 
that the funds achieve their objectives. 
 
6.3 THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
6.3.1 General 
 
Even though retirement funds in South Africa are mostly managed by financial 
institutions and insurance companies, these funds are regulated by the state through 
legislation.60 The two main statutes that regulate retirement funds in South Africa are 
the Pension Funds Act of 1956 and the Income Tax Act of 196261.  
 
Other statutes which apply to retirement funds include the Long-term Insurance Act 
of 1998,62 the Financial Services Board Act of 1990,63 Financial Institutions Act 
(Protection of Funds) of 2001,64 the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act of 1998,65 
and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002 (FAIS Act).66  
 
                                            
 
60
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds Legal and Policy Considerations op cit note 
49 at 5 (Glossary of Terms Used). 
61
 Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
62
 Long-Term Insurance Act, 52 of 1998. 
63
 Financial Services Board Act, 97 of 1990. 
64
 Financial Institutions Act (Protection of Funds), 28 of 2001. 
65
 Inspection of Financial Institutions Act, 80 of 1998. 
66
 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002. 
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6.3.2 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
 
There were no statutes specifically regulating pension funds in South Africa before 
the introduction of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. Retirement funds were either 
regulated as trusts or were regulated under specific statutes that established them or 
by provincial ordinances.67 All retirement funds in South Africa, except those 
specifically excluded from the operation of the Act, are regulated by the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956,68 which plays a protective role to fund members.  
 
The Act regulates the registration and proper administration69 of retirement funds. 
The Act ensures that funds are administered in such a way that they will achieve 
their objectives. Most of its provisions are peremptory. For example, funds are 
required to register with the Financial Services Board in order to gain recognition 
from the regulator,70 and they are also required to be approved by the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) to receive tax benefits meant for retirement funds.71 The 
industry is regulated by the Registrar of Pension Funds.72  
 
                                            
 
67
 For example, the South African Public Library (Pensions and Provident Fund) Act, 9 of 1924, and 
under ordinances such as the Cape Provincial Ordinance, 15 of 1943. 
68
 Section 2(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 provides that subject to section 4A and any other 
law in terms of which a fund is established, the provisions of this Act apply to any pension fund, 
including a pension fund established or continued in terms of a collective agreement concluded in a 
council in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995, and registered in terms of section 4. Note should 
be taken that section 4A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 contains more provisions regarding the 
registration of pension funds to which the state contributes financially. 
69
 These roles are covered in Chapters II (Registration and Incorporation) and III (Manner of 
Administration and Powers of Registered Funds) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.  
70
 Section 4 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 regulates the registration of pension funds. 
71
 See in this regard relevant provisions under sections 10 and 11 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962.  
72
 Section 3(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 provides that the person appointed as executive 
officer in terms of section 1 of the Financial Services Board Act of 1990 is the Registrar of Pension 
Funds and has the powers and duties provided for by the Pension Funds Act or any other law. In 
Pepkor Retirement Fund & Another v Financial Services Board & Another [2003] 8 BPLR 4977 (SCA) 
at par 11, Cloete JA, stated as the following: “The Act  (Pension Funds Act of 1956) was passed, as appears from 
the preamble thereto, to provide, inter alia, for the regulation of pension funds. It is the Registrar who performs this function. As 
the learned Judge in the court below pointed out … virtually every section of the Act contains some or other provision reflecting 
the Registrar’s supervision over the affairs of pension funds.”   
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
223 
 
The Financial Services Board Act of 1990 established the Financial Services Board 
(FSB),73 and in terms of section 3 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, the chief 
executive officer of the FSB assumes the functions of the Registrar. The Registrar 
has certain powers and duties given to him or her by the Act,74 which are protective 
in nature.  
 
The duties include making decisions on the following:  
 
 The registration of pension funds;75   
 Authorisation of a fund to have a board consisting of less than four members 
or exempt a fund from the requirement that the members of the fund elect 
members of the board;76  
 Approval of any appointment of an auditor or withdrawal of any prior approval 
of such an appointment;77  
 Approval and registration of an amendment of pension fund rules;78 and 
 Approval of an amalgamation of pension funds or the transfer of business 
from one fund to another.79  
 
The Registrar monitors pension funds to ensure that their affairs are conducted in an 
honest and responsible manner. On the other hand, the functions of the FSB include, 
                                            
 
73
 The Financial Services Board (FSB) was established in terms of section 2 of the Financial Services 
Board Act of 1990.  
74
 See Financial Services Board and Another v De Wet NO and Others 2002 (3) SA 525 (C) at par 
169 (588F-G) and the case of Pepkor Retirement Fund supra note 72 par 48. 
75
 For example; in terms of section 4(3) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, the Registrar may 
provisionally register a fund if it has complied with his or her requirements and if he or she believes 
that registration is in the public interest. What this provision means is that the Registrar may decide 
not to grant a fund provisional or final registration where the fund has failed to comply with his or her 
requirements and where it will not be in the public interest to do so. Cloete JA stated the following in 
the case of Pepkor supra note 72 at par 14: “The general public interest requires that pension funds 
be operated fairly, properly and successfully and that the pension fund industry be regulated to 
achieve these objectives. That is the whole purpose which underlies the Act.” The Judge further 
stated (at par 14) the fact that the function of the Registrar is generally performed in the public 
interest.  
76
 Section 7B of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
77
 Sections 9(3) and 4.   
78
 Section 12. 
79
 Section 14. 
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ensuring compliance with laws regulating financial institutions.80 It is important to 
note regarding the regulation of pension funds that South Africa is planning to move 
towards what is known as the “Twin-Peaks System” of regulating the financial sector. 
The system has its roots in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill of 2013. This Bill will 
eventually repeal the Financial Services Board Act of 1990, which established the 
Financial Services Board (with the exception of section 28, but with consequential 
amendments). The “Twin-Peaks” will consist of a “Prudential Authority”, which will 
focus on the safety and soundness of financial institutions (prudential supervision) 
and a “Market Conduct Authority”, which will look at the manner in which financial 
institutions conduct their business, as well as the fair treatment of financial 
customers (market conduct supervision). Prudential supervision will fall under the 
South African Reserve Bank and the Market Conduct Authority will be a stand-alone 
entity. The Prudential Authority and Market Conduct Authority are established by 
section 11 of the Bill.  
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 in Chapter III provides for an important aspect of the 
fund administration or management, which is mainly placed in the hands of the board 
of management81 – generally known as the “board of trustees”. The board of 
management is an important component of fund management as it is responsible for 
the success or failure of the fund. The board takes important decisions that can 
affect the fund, fund members, and their dependants.  
 
Its decisions need to be well thought out as they might eventually either directly or 
indirectly affect the primary objective of the fund, which is to ensure that members 
                                            
 
80
 The supervision and enforcement of compliance with the laws regulating financial institutions is in 
terms of section 3 of the Financial Services Board Act of 1990. Those laws include the following: 
Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 45 of 2002; Credit Rating Services Act, 24 of 2012; 
Financial Advisory and Intermediaries Services Act, 37 of 2002; Financial Institutions Act, 28 of 2001; 
Financial Markets Act, 19 of 2012; Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act, 37 2004; Financial 
Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act, 8 of 1993; Friendly Societies Act, 25 of 1956; Inspection 
of Financial Institutions Act, 80 of 1998; Long-term Insurance Act, 52 of 1998; Pension Funds Act, 24 
of 1956; and the Short-term Insurance Act, 53 of 1998. It was stated in the case of Pepkor supra note 
72 at paras 19 and 20 respectively, that “The FSB is empowered by section 3(a) of the Financial 
Services Board Act, read with the definition of the term “financial institution” in section 1 of the Act, to 
supervise the exercise of control, in terms of any law, over the activities of the fund...”  
81
 Section 7A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
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receive adequate benefits when they retire. It is important, therefore, for the board of 
trustees to run the affairs of the fund in a manner that the assets of the fund are 
adequately protected and to ensure that the interests of fund members and of their 
dependants are well protected and promoted. The Pension Funds Act of 1956 gives 
the board of trustees certain duties to ensure that they run the affairs of the funds in 
the manner that will enable them to achieve their objectives. These duties are 
discussed in relation to fund members’ rights under paragraph 6.8.2 below. 
 
6.3.3 The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962  
 
The Income Tax Act of 1962 plays a significant social security role in relation to 
retirement income provision in South Africa as it contains measures intended to 
encourage people to make savings for their retirement through tax savings. 
Employer and employee contributions paid to funds that conform to certain 
standards are tax deductible, while the pay outs from approved funds also receive 
preferential tax treatment.82 Tax deductions should encourage more people to save 
for retirement and by doing so reduce the burden that could have been on the state 
to support them. If more people save money for their retirement, then more people 
will be protected against falling into poverty and the government will also be in a 
position to channel its funds to other things such as infrastructure development, 
building of schools, etc. The provisions of the Income Tax Act relating to funds are 
generally not obligatory.83 
 
  
                                            
 
82
 In terms of section 10(1)(d)(i) of the Income Tax of 1962, receipts and accruals from pension funds, 
pension preservation funds, provident preservation funds, retirement annuity funds, or beneficiary 
funds shall be exempted from normal tax. On the other hand, section 11(1) of the same Act provides 
that “for the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade, there shall be 
allowed as deductions from income of such person so derived, (k)(i) any sum contributed during the year of assessment to any 
pension fund by way of current contribution by a person who holds any office or employment …; (ii) any sum paid during the 
year of assessment to any pension fund by any person who, as a member of such fund, has in terms of the rules governing 
such fund undertaken to pay such sum in respect of any past period which is to be reckoned as pensionable service of that 
member …; (l) any sum contributed by an employer during the year of assessment for the benefit of his employee to any 
pension fund, provident fund or benefit fund ….” 
83
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds op cit note 49 at 1-2.   
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6.3.4 Other statutes 
 
6.3.4.1  Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
 
Most importantly, this Act established the Financial Services Board (FSB), which is 
the body regulating the financial institutions that include retirement funds in South 
Africa.84 The responsibilities of the FSB include supervising the compliance with laws 
regulating financial institutions and the provision of financial services.85 
Retirement funds need proper regulation as that will ensure compliance with relevant 
laws, openness, and fairness in all the funds’ dealings, including with their members 
and in handling the assets of the funds.86 Any person who feels aggrieved by the 
decision of the executive officer in terms of the Financial Services Board Act or any 
other law may appeal against the decision to a board of appeal, established in terms 
of section 26 of the Act.  
 
6.3.4.2  Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 
 
In terms of section 2 of the Act, all persons dealing with funds and these include 
pension funds, must observe the utmost good faith and exercise proper care and 
diligence and not use the funds in a manner calculated to gain directly or indirectly 
any improper advantage for himself or herself or for any other person to the 
prejudice of the fund.  
 
                                            
 
84
 Section 2 and 3 of the 22 of 1990. The possibility that this Act might be repealed in the near future 
is discussed under par 6.3.2. 
85
 The Supreme Court of Appeal held in the case of Pepkor supra note 72 at par 20 that the FSB is 
empowered by section 3(a) of the Financial Services Board Act of 1990, read with the definition of the 
term “financial institution” in section 1 of the Act, to supervise the exercise of control, in terms of any 
law over the activities of the fund. 
86
See the objects of the board of trustees in section 7C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. There are 
different types of trustees namely member-elected trustees, employer-appointed trustees, 
independent trustees (trustees that are not employed or controlled by the employer or its employees 
or any organsation which acts on behalf of members of the fund, the Financial Services Board keeps 
a register of independent trustees), and professional trustees (trustees that give expert advice on 
matters where board members may lack sufficient expertise). 
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Similar duties are prescribed by section 7C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 for the 
board of trustees of a retirement fund.87 Duties of the board of trustees are discussed 
under paragraph 6.8 below. 
 
6.3.4.3  The Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 80 of 1998  
 
Section 2 of this Act gives the Registrar the powers to appoint inspectors. On the 
other hand, section 3(1) and (2) empowers the Registrar to inspect the affairs of any 
financial institution to check if there are no irregular dealings. In terms of section 12, 
any person who fails to cooperate with inspectors commits an offence and may be 
imprisoned for a period of up to two years or be liable to pay a fine or to both a fine 
and imprisonment. This is to ensure that funds are administered in accordance with 
the prescribed laws, and that the affairs of the funds are managed to the best 
interests of the fund, its members, and/or beneficiaries. 
 
6.3.4.4  Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act 37 of 2002 
 
This Act regulates all financial services providers who give advice or provide 
intermediary services to their clients.88 An example in this regard would be advice 
with regard to a retirement annuity. The objectives of this Act include ensuring that 
the financial providers act honestly and fairly and that they comply with all applicable 
statutory or common law requirements applicable to the conduct of business.89  
 
A client who is aggrieved by the conduct of a representative refers the matter to the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Ombudsman,90 who deals with 
complaints if the internal complaints procedure of the Financial Services Providers 
was unsuccessful and the complainant wants to pursue the matter further.  
                                            
 
87
 Section 7C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
88
 Section 1 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002 defines “financial service 
provider” as “any person, other than a representative, who as a regular feature of the business of 
such person furnishes advice; or furnishes advice and renders any intermediary service; or renders 
an intermediary service. 
89
 Section 16(1)(a) of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002. 
90
 Section 20(3). 
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The Ombudsman acts as an adjudicator in disputes between clients and Financial 
Services Providers.91  
 
Below follows a discussion on different types of retirement funds in South Africa. 
 
6.4 THE TYPES OF RETIREMENT FUNDS 
 
6.4.1 General 
 
There are primarily two types of retirement funds in South Africa, namely a “pension 
fund” and a “provident fund”. The other one, which is mainly used by the self-
employed, professionals, and any other person who can afford to make contributions 
to the fund and those who would like to top up the benefits they will receive from 
pension and provident funds, is a “retirement annuity fund”92, and one other 
important fund is a “preservation fund” – which is solely used to preserve retirement 
benefits.  
 
6.4.1.1  Retirement annuity fund 
 
A retirement annuity fund is not employment-related and there is therefore no need 
for a person to be employed in order to join this fund. Participants in the fund also do 
not enjoy employer contributions. A retirement annuity fund can serve a 
supplementary role to occupational retirement funds. It takes the form of a private 
pension plan for individuals, hence it is a personal investment vehicle.93 Retirement 
annuity funds must register under the Pension Funds Act of 1956.94  
 
                                            
 
91
 Section 28(5)(a). 
92
 Retirement annuity funds also discussed under par 5.6.2 in Ch 5. 
93
 Dewar et al The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement Planning op cit note 5 at 60. 
94
 Section 4 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
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The fund is funded through a long-term policy which is administered by an insurer. 
The benefit can only be accessed when a person reaches the age of 55.95  
 
At retirement a member has the same options as a member of a pension fund. It 
should be noted, however, that a retirement annuity fund does not provide an income 
at retirement as it merely serves as a savings vehicle. A person can choose to either 
use the full benefit or a compulsory two-thirds to buy an annuity. The fund also pays 
a benefit to dependants and/or beneficiaries in case of a member’s death before 
reaching the age of 55 or before accessing the benefit. A person who cancels 
membership or contributions to the fund will also have to wait until he or she reaches 
the age of 55 to access the fund. Such a person also has the option to transfer the 
benefit from the former fund to another retirement annuity fund if he or joins a new 
fund. Contributions may take the form of regular contributions, lump-sum 
contributions or a transfer from another fund. Retirement annuity funds can also be 
considered to serve as preservation funds as they only allow withdrawals when a 
member reaches the age of 55.96 Membership is open for everyone who can afford 
to pay contributions on voluntary basis.97  
 
6.4.1.2  Preservation fund 
 
A preservation fund is specifically used to invest or preserve a benefit received from 
either a pension fund or provident fund when a member is dismissed, has resigned, 
or has been retrenched. A member of a retirement fund who exits the fund under 
such circumstances can transfer part or the whole of their benefit to this fund. Such a 
person will be entitled to a further once-off withdrawal from a preservation fund after 
joining the fund. Similar to a retirement annuity fund, a member of a preservation 
fund may retire from the fund any time after reaching the age of 55 if the rules of the 
                                            
 
95
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op cit 
note 14 at 13. 
96
 Brown M “Retirement Annuity Funds in South Africa” June 2013 at 1-3, accessed from: 
http://www.etfsara.co.za/news/latest/retirement_annuity_funds_in_sa.pdf, last visited 07 September 
2015. 
97
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op cit 
note 14 at 92.  
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fund provide for that. A member can also retire from employment but not exit a 
preservation fund and vice versa. It is also not required that there should be an 
employer and employee relationship with regard to the membership of a preservation 
fund. A person can transfer his or her benefit to a preservation fund of his or her 
choice. The transfer of a withdrawal benefit from an occupational retirement fund to a 
preservation fund does not attract tax.98 This is the government’s way of encouraging 
people to preserve their retirement benefits until they reach retirement. Once the 
benefit is placed in a preservation fund, a member will no longer make any 
contributions to the fund.99 It is at the moment not compulsory for people who make 
withdrawals from their funds to preserve those benefits. A move which would have 
seen the introduction of compulsory preservation of retirement benefits was rejected 
by trade unions in the early 1980s after the enactment of the Preservation of 
Pensions Bill. This Bill was aimed at legislating the compulsory transfer of retirement 
benefits when employees changed jobs. In terms of this Bill, the employee would 
move the benefit from the fund the old employer participated in to the fund the new 
employer is participating in.100  
 
Preservation funds are very important from a social security perspective as many 
people in this country retire with insufficient funds because of the leakages that exist 
within the system. People are allowed to withdraw money when they change jobs 
and this reduces the benefits they will receive when they retire. It is therefore high 
time that the government should make it compulsory for people who resign or 
change jobs to preserve the money they withdraw from the funds their former 
employer/s participated in and access it only at the time of retirement.  
 
The discussion of retirement annuity funds and preservation funds is limited to this 
brief description as they are not necessarily employment related.  
                                            
 
98
 Retirement Fund Note RF1/2012, 1 November 2012; Naidoo P (Legal Specialist: Research 
Momentum Employee Benefits – FundsAtWork) Legal Update No.1 of 2013, 10 January 2013, 
https://eb.momentum.co.za/downloads/pdf/LegalUpdate_1_2013_PreservationFunds_10_January_20
13.pdf, last visited on 26 July 2015.  
99
 Dewar et al The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement Planning op cit note 5 at 70. 
100
 Field W “Employees’ Pension and Provident Fund Rights: A Renewed Interest Develops” (1991) 
12 ILJ at 965 (hereafter, Field “Employees’ Pension and Provident Fund Rights”).  
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The need for compulsory preservation of retirement benefits in South Africa, 
however, has become high priority and therefore can no longer be ignored. The 
preservation of retirement benefits is discussed further under paragraph 6.6.3 below.    
 
Pension funds and provident funds are discussed in paragraph 6.4.2 below as they 
are the two main types of retirement funds. It should be noted that even though the 
term “pension fund” is generally used to refer to all retirement funds, it is important to 
be able to distinguish between a “pension fund and a provident fund” in order to 
understand what they are about. Pension and provident funds can take the form of 
either a “defined-benefit” or “defined-contribution” fund. The difference between the 
two is in the way the retirement benefit is calculated.101 It is believed the first 
retirement funds in South Africa were in the form of defined-contribution schemes 
which were funded by endowment policies.102  
 
These funds were replaced by defined-benefit funds in the 1960s. A shift back to 
defined-contribution funds occurred in the 1980s as a result of pressure from black 
trade unions, which were against the introduction of the draft Pension Preservation 
Bill of 1980103 as it would have limited withdrawals that employees could make from 
their retirement funds.104 This Bill sought to regulate the compulsory transfer of 
pension and provident fund benefits when the employees changed jobs. Unions 
were in favour of defined-contribution provident funds as they are simple and for the 
                                            
 
101
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern op cit note 10 at 10-13; Sephton 
et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds  (Glossary of terms used) op cit note 49 at ix-x; The 
Smith Committee Report op cit note 58 at 25 
102
 Standard insurance policies are discussed under par 5.6.4 in Ch 5. 
103
 The Draft Pension Preservation Bill of 1980 was intended to introduce compulsory preservation 
and to stop leakages on resignation before retirement, which had been recognised as a major reason 
for inadequate retirement benefits from occupational schemes. See Andrews J “Conversion from 
Defined Benefits to Defined Contribution – The South African Experience” at 3-4 accessed from 
http://www.actuaries.org/EVENTS/Seminars/Brighton/presentations/andrews.pdf, last visited 22 July 
2015.  
104
 See Andrews “Conversion from Defined Benefits to Defined Contribution – The South African 
Experience” (idem). See also generally on the unions’ dissatisfaction about the introduction of the 
Preservation of Pension Bill, Field “Employees’ Pension and Provident Fund Rights” op cit note 100 at 
965-967; South Africa’s Retirement Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 10.  
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
232 
 
fact that members could receive lump-sum benefits when they retired or when they 
lost their jobs.105  
 
6.4.2 The distinction between a pension fund and a provident fund 
 
A pension fund is a retirement fund in which a member can take only up to one-third 
of the retirement benefit as a lump-sum payment, and the balance is paid out in the 
form of a monthly pension over the rest of the member’s life.106 What is good about a 
pension fund, and also for social security purposes, is the fact that a pension benefit 
is paid in the form of regular income during retirement and the chances of 
squandering all the money saved for retirement are minimised. A member of a 
pension fund also receives tax deductions for contributions made into the fund. The 
monthly annuity payable is taxed as normal income.107 
 
A provident fund, on the other hand, is a retirement fund in which a member receives 
up to 100% of the retirement benefit as a lump-sum cash payment.108 The whole 
pension benefit is available to the member at retirement and the money will be 
subject to tax. It should be highlighted here that the main objective of a retirement 
fund is to provide the member with adequate income during retirement, in the case of 
disability, or an adequate benefit to dependants of the member should the member 
die before retirement. This is the reason why regular income payment should be 
preferred instead of lump-sum payments. This should also be understood as being 
the objective underlying the right of access to social security in section 27 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; the aim being to protect people 
from falling into poverty.  
 
                                            
 
105
 See Munnell G, Orszag M The Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income (Anthony 
Asher: Pensions in Africa) 2006 at 825-826. See also generally, Field “Employees’ Pension and 
Provident Fund Rights” op cit note 100 at 965-967; Hanekom et al The Manual on South African 
Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op cit note 14 at 12. 
106
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident op cit note 49 at (x). 
107
 Snyman I “Work, Retirement and Financial Crises: The Views of a Number of Key Persons from 
Employer’s and Employees’ Bodies” 1988 at 22 (hereafter, Snyman “Work, Retirement and Financial 
Crises”). 
108
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds op cit note 49 at (x). 
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The problem with a provident fund, and from a social security perspective, is that the 
person receives all the money at once and the chances of squandering the money 
during the first few months or years are very high, depending on individual persons 
and circumstances they find themselves in.  
 
The risks that face members who opt to take lump-sum cash payments include a 
longevity risk, that is where a member outlives his or her retirement savings; and 
investment risks, that is where investments made fail to perform as projected or 
underperform or the member experiences both. The best way to guard against these 
risks, especially the longevity risk, is to go for annuitisation of the benefit, which will 
ensure that the person receives income as long as he or she lives.109 People who 
participate in provident funds often choose lump-sum cash payments when they 
retire or when they exit the funds as they want immediate access to the cash, 
sometimes due to difficult economic conditions but also due to other factors such as 
lack of proper advice at the time of withdrawal and a lack of understanding the dire 
consequences of choosing to take a cash lump-sum.   
 
There are many risks with lump-sum cash payments which make it not the best 
option for social security purposes; considering the fact that an employee who 
receives the whole benefit as lump-sum cash will be without income for the rest of 
his or her life in retirement should he or she not be able to make a good investment 
or use the money wisely. It should be accepted though that these challenges do not 
necessarily mean that provident funds are an absolute bad option as it will always 
depend on how the receiver of the benefit handles or uses the money.110  
 
  
                                            
 
109
 The National Treasury: Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds (Technical 
Discussion Paper C for Public Comment) 21 September 2012 at 21, accessed from 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/Preservation%20portability%20and%20governa
nce%20%2021%20Sept%202012%20.pdf, last visited on 07 September 2015 (hereafter, The 
National Treasury Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds). 
110
 Snyman “Work, Retirement and Financial Crises” op cit note 107 at 21. 
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South Africa’s National Treasury has proposed in its Discussion Paper on 
Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds111 for regulations to 
be introduced to allow for the payment of a portion of the benefit from a provident 
fund as a lump-sum, with the remaining portion of the benefit used to buy an annuity 
which the member will receive as regular income. This, according to the National 
Treasury, should be the case except where the value of the benefit is below a certain 
level. This proposal is welcomed as it will place a restriction on the freedom retirees 
always had to take all the money and use it for other things except for their actual 
purpose, being income replacement during retirement. The National Treasury has 
made further proposals with regard to how provident fund benefits should be dealt 
with. Those proposals include aligning the retirement benefits of provident funds to 
those of pension and retirement annuity funds. According to the National Treasury, 
this will help those who retire from provident funds to better manage longevity and 
investment risks. It will further prevent retirees from spending their retirement benefit 
too quickly and becoming reliant on the state or their families for support. The 
proposal will also see members of provident funds enjoy the same tax deduction on 
their own contributions as those who contribute to pension funds.  
 
The National Treasury is looking at a number of options in its effort to address the 
problem of leakages currently found in the system. The first option is to continue with 
things the way they are, that is to allow members of funds to access their benefit in 
full and in cash, but to close the door for the establishment of any new provident 
funds. The second option is to preserve vested rights and allow the value of the fund 
credit accrued on the day of the implementation of the legislation to be paid out as a 
lump-sum on retirement. The growth on this amount and new contributions will be 
subject to the same rules governing retirement benefits. The third option is to adopt a 
vesting scale system that will allow employees aged 50 and above, at the date of 
implementation of the legislation, to take a larger portion of their retirement savings 
as a lump-sum at retirement. Provident fund members aged below 50 at the date of 
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 The National Treasury: Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds op cit note 
109 at 22-24. 
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implementation of legislative changes will be subject to provisions applicable to 
pension fund members.112  
 
It is submitted that applying the same rules for both pension and provident funds will 
mean the system is in fact providing for one form of a fund which is a pension fund. 
This raises the question whether there will still be a need for provident funds. The 
transitional arrangements suggested by the National Treasury provide some 
solutions to a certain extent, while others open the door for more problems. For 
example; the first option will bring about the discontinuation of provident funds, while 
on the other hand, it will allow members who are already in the fund time to exit the 
fund as they reach retirement age. The challenge with this option is the issue of 
administration costs because more people will exit the fund, while on the other hand, 
there will be no new members joining the fund. The higher the number of people who 
exit the fund, the lesser the number of participating members; which then means that 
the smaller number of people who remain in the fund will have to carry the costs of 
running the fund.  
 
The second option allows for the member of the fund to receive the value of the 
credit which had accrued on the day of implementation of the new legislation as a 
lump-sum. This option will favour those who are closer to retirement as they are 
likely to receive the whole benefit as a lump-sum as it will not make sense to 
annuitise the benefit for contributions of, for example, five years and less. The last 
option will see members who are 50 years and above taking home a larger portion 
as a lump-sum, while those below 50 will have to settle for regular pensions. The 
question here is whether such law will stand the constitutional test, as those who 
have to take regular pensions might feel hard done and discriminated against.113 It is 
submitted that the best option will be to give members an opportunity to decide what 
they want, of course with professional advice guided by factors such as age, years of 
                                            
 
112
 Idem.  
113
 Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states that everyone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. On the other hand, section 
9(3) is against any unfair discrimination directly or indirectly on one or more grounds that include 
among others gender, sex, and age. 
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contribution, and the amount of benefit. Members can choose whether they would 
still want to receive the benefit as lump-sum cash payment or as regular income 
when they retire. In this regard, retirement benefits of those who choose 
annuitisation will attract the application of the law that applies to pension funds. 
Provident funds may then be abolished or only be used by those who can prove that 
they already belong to either a pension fund or a retirement annuity fund.  
 
6.4.3 Defined-benefit pension and provident funds 
 
A defined-benefit fund is also known as a “fixed-benefit” or “promised-benefit” fund. 
The benefit the employee is entitled to at retirement is calculated using the period he 
or she has been a member of the fund and his or her annual salary before 
retirement.114  
 
The employee’s contribution is usually fixed, as a percentage of earnings; while on 
the other hand, the employer’s contribution is calculated looking at how much is 
needed to provide the employee with an adequate benefit. In other words, the 
employer has to meet the balance of the cost to achieve the targeted benefit. Thus 
the employees’ contributions and benefits are fixed, while the employer contribution 
varies.  
 
The benefit in a defined-benefit provident fund is a 100% lump-sum cash payment – 
the amount of which depends on the length of the period the employee has been a 
member of the fund.115 The disadvantage with this is that the employee who takes 
another job closer to a retirement date will lose a portion of his or her pension 
benefit. It is therefore important for employee members of the funds not to change 
jobs during the vesting period. A defined-benefit fund is a better option from a social 
security perspective if a person does not change his or her job closer to the vesting 
period as they will be guaranteed a certain amount when they retire. On the other 
hand, a defined-contribution fund member’s benefit will depend on the contributions 
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 The Mouton Committee Report op cit note 58 at 553. 
115
 Sephton et al A Guide to pension and Provident Funds op cit note 49 at 6-9. 
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made and also on how the market behaved. Thus a defined-benefit fund is less 
risky,116 (provided the employee does not change jobs closer to retirement), as 
compared to a defined-contribution fund. 
 
Benefits payable from defined-benefit funds are determined by the member’s needs. 
For example, while a member with a spouse will be entitled to a spouse’s pension 
and a member with dependants will be entitled to dependants’ benefits, a member 
without a spouse or dependants will not be entitled to these benefits. The question 
with this position is whether this is constitutional, in that members of the same fund 
are treated differently based on their marital or dependency status.117 It is submitted 
that this should indeed be approached on the basis of need in that, for example, a 
fund cannot pay a benefit for a spouse who does not exist or pay a disability benefit 
to an able-bodied person. This will not make sense based on the fact that benefits 
are mainly risk-based. Therefore, there should be no need to compensate a person 
for a risk which has not occurred and this surely cannot be considered to be 
constitutionally unfair.  
  
6.4.4 Defined-contribution pension and provident funds 
 
A defined-contribution fund is also known as a “fixed-contribution” or “money-
purchase” fund. This form of a fund may be seen as a savings scheme. The 
contribution amount is determined by the rules of the fund. The retirement benefit 
received at retirement depends on the contributions made and interests 
accumulated. Most provident funds take the form of defined-contribution funds. The 
contributions work in exactly the same way as in a defined-contribution pension fund.  
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 See generally, Baker A, Logue DE and Rader JS Managing Pension and Retirement Plans: A 
guide for Employers, Administrators, and Other Fiduciaries (Published to Oxford Scholarship Online, 
July 2005) at 1-8 (hereafter, Baker et al Managing Pension and Retirement Plans). 
117
 See Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits 
op cit note 14 at 115. Section 9(1) of the Constitution guarantees everyone equality before the law 
and equal protection and benefit of the law. Section 9(4), on the other hand, states that no person 
may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of 
subsection (3). The grounds in subsection (3) include marital status. 
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Retirement benefits are calculated in the same way too, but the whole benefit in a 
defined-contribution provident fund may be taken as a lump-sum.118 Defined-
contribution funds need members who are familiar with issues of investment as the 
level of benefit depends more on the contributions made and the investment returns.  
The member’s benefit is not necessarily based on the number of years a person has 
worked for one particular employer; neither is it dependent on the employee’s age. 
However, this can be a disadvantage to employers as the plan does not discourage 
valuable employees from leaving their employers in search of greener pastures. The 
plan is attractive to employees as they will not lose much by changing jobs. The cost 
of administering a defined-contribution fund is lower than that of a defined-benefit 
fund. Employers providing defined-contribution funds may have to make higher 
contributions to offset the risk premium demanded by employees due to the added 
risk.119 
 
6.4.5 Other types of funds 
 
There are other types of retirement funds which are created to serve a specific 
purpose. These funds are discussed below. These funds include preservation funds, 
which have already been described in paragraph 6.4.1 above.  
 
6.4.5.1  Umbrella funds 
 
An umbrella pension or provident fund is a single fund created and usually managed 
by an insurance company. It is a fund that is already in existence, registered, and 
has a board of management and fund rules which govern all those who join the fund. 
Employers or groups of employers who cannot establish their own funds join 
umbrella funds. Joining umbrella funds saves employers a lot of money in 
administration costs,120 and therefore reduces the costs that would have been 
incurred by the members of the funds, which means more money will go to members 
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 Hanekom et al (ibid) at 9-10. 
119
 Baker et al Managing Pension and Retirement Plans op cit note 116 at 1-8. 
120
 Dewar et al The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement Planning op cit note 5 at 35-
36. 
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and not towards administration costs. Umbrella funds take the form of a defined-
contribution fund.121 At the time of exit, a member can either take the benefit in cash 
or transfer it to another fund.  
 
These funds offer participating employers various risk benefits either as part of the 
fund or as a separate scheme. Some of these funds are sector-specific and do not 
take employers outside that specific sector. This country has seen an increase of 
umbrella funds in the past few years. Concerns raised regarding umbrella funds 
relate to their governance; whereby employees are generally not represented on the 
boards of trustees as required by the Pension Funds Act of 1956. The boards of 
umbrella funds are usually made up of employees of insurance companies and the 
administrator of the fund. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that umbrella 
funds may apply for exemption from being required to have the required number of 
member elected trustees if it will not be practical for it to do so.122  
 
Umbrella funds are a way to go if the intention is to improve on the management of 
funds and also to save on costs. Employers which would not have been able to 
establish funds for their employees are able to join these funds and this will therefore 
also increase the number of people who are covered by the system.  
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 Van den Heever “Pension Reform and Old Age Grants in South Africa” op cit note 23 at 3. 
122
 Hendrie S, Smith A, Hobden T, Genesis OM: Risk benefit provision through provident and pension 
funds (Research undertaken for South African Treasury), 17/10/2007: Version 1.1 at 18 (hereafter, 
Hendrie et al Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension Funds). See also generally on the 
nature of umbrella funds and their growth in this country, Hacking H “Research: Appeal of Umbrella 
Funds Continues to Grow” The Prospector (Old Mutual Corporate), 19 September 2010 at 5.  
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6.4.5.2  Industrial funds 
 
Most of these funds were established by means of collective agreements in terms of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. These funds were not previously regulated 
under the Pension Funds Act of 1996. All bargaining council funds which had not 
been registered in terms of this Act had to be registered by 1 January 2008, and 
those which could not do so by the given date could only be given extension until 30 
April 2008.123 
 
This was long overdue as the Pension Funds Act of 1956 is specialised for that 
purpose, while on the other hand, the Labour Relations Act is meant to regulate the 
employment relationship between the employer and employees.  
 
6.4.5.3  State-controlled funds 
 
In South Africa, all those who are employed by different government departments 
belong to a common fund known as the Government Employees Pension Fund 
(GEPF).124 This fund is regulated by the Government Employees Pension Law of 
1996.125 Homelands previously also had their own separate and independent 
funds.126 All those funds have been discontinued127 and now all government 
employees belong to one fund.128  
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 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 14 at 96. 
124
 The Government Employees Pension Fund was established in terms of the Government 
Employees Pension (GEP) Law, Proclamation 21 of 1996, to manage and administer pension matters 
related to government employees. The normal retirement age is 60 years but members can retire 
early under certain circumstances. The fund also pays ill-health and disability benefits, resignation 
benefits, funeral benefits, orphan’s annuity, and spouse’s annuity (both also paid where a member 
dies while still in service and had a full potential service period of at least ten years) and death 
benefits. Retirement annuities are guaranteed for five years after a member goes on retirement. 
Should a member die within this period, his or her beneficiaries will receive the balance of the five 
year annuity payments in the form of a once-off cash payment. See in this regard 
http://www.gepf.gov.za/index.php/our_benefits, last accessed 07 September 2015.  
125
 Proclamation 21 in GG 17135 of 19 April 1996 [date of commencement: 1 May 1996]. 
126
 The Government Services Pension Fund (eligible employees of the following government 
departments belong to this fund: public servants appointed in terms of the Public Service Act; 
educators; personnel of the Services Departments – those were the South African Police Service, the 
Department of Correctional Services, the South African National Defence Force, and National 
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Note should be taken that even though government employees belong to the 
Government Employees Pension Fund, there are those who work for state organs, 
for example in the security forces, who have their own separate funds.  
 
6.5 THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE  
 
Coverage in the formal sector of the South African economy is provided through 
private retirement schemes which are regulated by the government through 
legislation. South Africa does not have a public retirement fund.129 As a result, the 
majority of people, especially from the black communities are either not covered or 
inadequately covered because most of them are employed in the informal sector of 
the economy as farm workers, day labourers, and domestic workers, and are earning 
very little.130  
  
                                                                                                                                       
 
Intelligence Agency); The Associated Institutions Pension Fund (Act 41 of 1963) (eligible employees 
of the following institutions belonged to this fund: research councils; cultural institutions; universities; 
technickons; and institutions which have been declared Associated Institutions. While most of these 
institutions opted to manage their own pension funds, some employees chose to remain members of 
the AIPF); the Temporary Employees Pension Fund (eligible employees in the temporary employment 
of the employers participating in the above two funds belonged to this fund); and the Authorities’ 
Service Pension Fund (eligible employees of an Authority or Territorial Board established under the 
Bantu Authorities Act, 68 of 1951, belonged to this fund. Local Authorities of the following authorities 
qualified: Lebowa; Gazankulu; Kwandebele; Kangwane; KwaZulu; and QwaQwa. Eligible employees 
in the temporary employment of the aforementioned authorities belonged to this fund). The following 
previous funds were also discontinued: the Government Employees Pension Fund of the Transkei, 
the Transkeian Government Service Pension Fund, the Ciskeian Civil Servants Pension Fund, the 
Government Pension Fund of Bophuthatswana, the Government Pension Fund of Venda, the 
Government Superannuation Fund of Venda, and the Authorities’ Service Superannuation Fund.  
127
 Section 14 of the Government Employees Pension Law, 1996. 
128
 See generally, Government Employees Pension Fund: Member’s Guide at 9, accessed from 
http://www.gepf.co.za/uploads/annualReportsUploads/Member_Guide_Page_Final_1-23.pdf, last 
visited 26 July 2015.  All the assets of the old funds were transferred to the Government Employees 
Pension Fund in terms of section 14 of the Government Employees Pension Funds Law, 1996. 
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 The Mouton Committee Report op cit note 58 at 10. Note should be taken that Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have public pension funds. See in this regard the discussions in 
Ch 3. 
130
 Olivier MP, Smit N and Kalula ER (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 1ed (2003) at 137-138 
(hereafter, Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis).  
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Thus, even though coverage is relatively high in this country, the focus is mainly on 
those who are employed in the formal sector of the economy. This can be attributed 
to, among other factors, that workers in the formal sector are better organised than 
those in the informal sector.131 The system is also rigid as it does not allow workers 
the opportunity to select an occupational pension fund of their own choice. 
Employees are obliged to belong to the funds established by their employer or within 
the sectors they are working in. Workers are also not able to switch between funds of 
their own accord and usually have to change jobs to be able to change their pension 
funds. This in a way limits workers’ freedom to participate in funds of their own 
choice and further denies them the opportunity to invest their money with funds they 
think will offer them better service and adequate benefits.  
 
Freedom to choose one’s preferred fund and to shift accumulated funds to a new 
retirement fund with a better investment performance could promote competition and 
encourage fund managers to keep costs low and make sound investment decisions. 
This might also open the door for more workers to participate in saving for their 
retirement. Such flexibility may, however, also mean more system costs, which might 
have to be carried by participants. 
 
In terms of the Income Tax Act of 1962, an employer-employee relationship must 
exist in order for the employer to establish a retirement scheme.132 This means that 
other categories of workers who do not qualify as employees are excluded and have 
to make individual arrangements. All present and future employees who qualify to be 
members of the fund must participate in the fund, otherwise the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) will not approve the fund.133 Membership of more than 
one fund is permissible, provided that the employee qualifies in terms of the 
                                            
 
131
 Gillion et al Social Security Pensions op cit note 7 at 197–198. 
132
 This can be deduced from the definitions of “pension fund” and “provident fund”, respectively in 
section 1 of the income Tax Act of 1962. 
133
 Dewar et al The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement Planning op cit note 5 at 40-
41. A pension or provident fund must be approved by the Commissioner of SARS. The requirements 
that must be met before such approval will be given are contained in the definitions of the terms 
“pension fund” and “provident fund” in section 1 read with section 3(5) of the Income Tax Act of 1962. 
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requirements of the funds involved.134 Eligibility for membership is generally 
stipulated in the fund rules and mainly depends on the person being employed. 
 
South Africa’s National Treasury in its First Discussion Paper on Retirement Reform 
published in 2004135 estimates coverage of employees in the formal sector to be 
between 66% and 84%, which is considerably high, taking into account the fact that 
participation in this country is by law generally still not compulsory.136 This in fact 
confirms the fact that membership of occupational retirement funds is accepted as 
an obligatory condition of employment in the South African workplace. 
 
A research study undertaken for the South African National Treasury in 2007 found 
that most or all people in higher-income categories, earning R120 000 annually and 
employed in the formal sector, were members of either a pension or provident fund. 
The gaps in coverage were discovered in the below R60 000 income group for both 
formal and informal workers. About four million or little over 60% from a population of 
six million formal employees earning R60 000 annually were members of retirement 
funds. Thus, roughly three million or 42% of the formally employed in this income 
category did not have retirement coverage through a formal fund arrangement. 
There were still another 360 000 formal employees without retirement coverage in 
the R60 000 to R120 000 annual income category and the total number of formally 
employed without retirement fund membership was estimated at a little over three 
million individuals. This represented almost 40% of the formally employed below the 
R120 000 annual income threshold.137  
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 South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 13. 
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 Dewar et al The Practical Guide to Retirement Funds and Retirement Planning op cit note 5 at 3.  
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This is an indication that people in the lower-salary level in both the formal sector 
and the informal sector of the economy are not adequately covered as the number of 
those who are covered is less than the number that is not covered. This is a worrying 
factor, considering the fact that these are categories of people who are likely to 
experience poverty in their retirement. This is also a demonstration that the thinking 
that employees in the formal sector are reasonably well covered needs to be 
qualified by further stating that it is in fact those earning higher salaries that are 
adequately covered. Of even greater concern is that Sanlam138 discovered from the 
majority of fund members and mostly from black communities who find it difficult to 
save for retirement, that this is due to factors that include the following: most of them 
are sole breadwinners with everyone in their families depending on their salary; they 
are financially responsible for other people like siblings, parents, and other 
immediate or extended family members; and most of them do not earn enough 
money to use some to save for the future as they have immediate needs such as 
taking care of children and providing shelter and health needs for the entire 
household.  
 
What is interesting and encouraging, however, is the fact that most of the 
respondents demonstrated an understanding that saving for retirement is something 
that should start early in one’s career and also that people should save money 
regardless of how small their salary may be.139 Other contributing factors include a 
high level of debt, the fact that people receive retirement advice very late in their 
careers, and that generally people fail to prioritise health and medical care when 
saving for retirement and as a result some of the money from a retirement benefit is 
spent on medical costs.140  
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 Sanlam Limited is a South African financial services group. 
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 Sanlam’s 2012 Benchmark Survey op cit note 50 at 4-5. 
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 Ibid at 5. 
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The informal sector is certainly the most affected as there is currently no suitable 
savings vehicle for them, also considering the fact that most of them do not even 
earn anything near R60 000 a year. Most people in the low-income group work for 
small businesses and therefore do not earn much. Businesses in this category have 
low profit margins and would worry more about their survival rather than about 
providing for their employees’ retirement. The small enterprises also often lack the 
capacity to establish and run their own funds. Employees who earn little are 
generally also reluctant to have their salaries deducted even if it is to save for the 
future.141  
 
Statistics South Africa142 (Stats SA) describes people who are in “informal 
employment”143 as “persons who are in precarious employment situations 
irrespective of whether or not the entity for which they work is in the formal or 
informal sector”. These are people who are not entitled to basic benefits such as 
pension or medical aid contributions from their employers. Most of them feel that 
they do not have job security as they do not even have a written contract of 
employment.144  
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 Hendrie et al “Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension Funds” op cit note 122 at 37.  
142
 Statistics South Africa is a government agency given the mandate under the Statistics Act 6 of 
1999 to collect information (including economic and social statistics, statistics relating to employment, 
poverty, health, and the population). In terms of section 3(1) of the Statistics Act of 1999, statistics 
collected help government, businesses, and other organisations or the public in planning, decision 
making, and monitoring or assessment of policies. The Act is administered by the Statistician-General 
(Head of Statistics South Africa), who is appointed by the President in terms of section 6 of the Act.     
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 Statistics South Africa (the national statistical service of South Africa), Statistical Release: P0211 
(Quartely Labour Force Survey (Quarter 2, 2013), at 1, accessed from 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2013.pdf, last visited on 26 July 2015 
(hereafter, Statistics South Africa). See Statistics South Africa’s definition of “informal employment” 
and “informal sector”. See also generally, Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 
130 at 253, where the informal sector is said to include informal traders, small-scale manufacturers, 
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Stats SA distinguishes two components of the informal sector as follows: 
 
 Employees working in establishments that employ less than five employees, 
who do not deduct income tax from their salaries/wages; and 
 Employers, own-account workers, and persons helping in their household 
business without pay and who are not registered for either income tax or 
value-added tax.145 
 
Many people working in the informal sector are excluded by the system because 
most schemes have been established to suit the circumstances of people in regular 
and more formalised employment. People employed in the informal sector are mainly 
from the agricultural sector and would normally depend largely on the land produce 
and in some cases family support, and would not worry much about saving for 
retirement.  
 
The informal sector is characterised by low salaries, job insecurity, and lack of 
access to social security benefits. People in this sector use the money they receive 
for survival and would therefore have nothing left to save for retirement. The fact that 
their work circumstances are often uncertain is also a problem. A person must also 
be employed for a long period in order to be able to save enough for retirement and 
this is not always possible as people in the informal sector are likely to change jobs 
more often in search of better conditions and wages. They often give priority to more 
immediate needs such as food, clothes, and healthcare.146  
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 Idem. 
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 Gillion et al Social Security Pensions op cit note 7 at 197–198. It is said that informal sector 
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As the majority of people are employed in the informal sector, this means that the 
number of people not covered is much higher than the number that is covered, which 
is certainly not a good thing for a system that is considered to be doing well by world 
standards.147 South Africa’s National Treasury has estimated in its First Discussion 
Paper for Retirement Reform that about 50% of the economically active population 
provide for their retirement through occupational and voluntary saving arrangements. 
Failure to extend coverage to the majority of the workers in the formal sector was 
attributed to the fact that the formal sector has a high number of part-time 
employees, contractors, or seasonal workers. It would also seem that generally 
employees on their own choose not to join a fund or they are just not eligible to 
join.148  
 
It was further discovered that a certain proportion of those who are covered by the 
system will still rely on the state old-age grant in their retirement due to insufficient 
benefits.149 This is a big challenge for the government as it has to carry the burden of 
supporting those who are not able to support themselves during retirement. The 
state has to use revenue that could otherwise have been directed to other things to 
fund social assistance and state old-age pensions to cater for these people.  
 
It is submitted that notwithstanding all the challenges that exist with regard to 
extending coverage to all workers in this country, the buck still stops with the state, 
especially where the exclusions are caused by the absence of laws, policies, and 
measures that could open doors of access for many who are presently excluded. 
The Constitution in section 27 guarantees everyone the right of access to social 
security. Everyone in this context should be interpreted to include all those who are 
working and can afford to make contributions to retirement funds, but they cannot do 
                                            
 
147
 See in this regard the Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report at 16, accessed from 
http://globalpensionindex.com/2014/melbourne-mercer-global-pension-index-2014-report.pdf, last 
visited on 22 July 2015 (hereafter, Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report). In this report, South 
Africa was given a “C” rating, which means South Africa has a system with some good features.  
148
 South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 19. 
149
 Ibid at 12.  
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that either because the system does not provide savings vehicles that suit the nature 
of their employment, or that the system is not accommodative of their salary levels.  
In this regard, the state is obliged by section 27(2) to take initiatives that would 
ensure that these people’s right of access to social security is realised. Those 
initiatives include reasonable legislative and other measures, within the state’s 
available resources, to achieve progressive realisation of this right. The provisions of 
section 27(2) are more aligned to what is provided for by article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, except that the 
article, unlike section 27(2) of the Constitution, does not mention that legislation and 
appropriate means must be reasonable. In other words, section 27(2) has gone 
beyond just requiring the state to enact legislation and coming up with measures to 
achieve progressive realisation, but it requires those measures to be reasonable. 
Thus, in terms of this section, legislation and measures taken can only be 
considered appropriate if they are reasonable.  
 
Therefore the question to be asked will be whether what the state has done to 
realise the right to access to adequate retirement provision is reasonable or not. 
Action taken by the state could include introducing laws and policies that would allow 
people to establish or participate in retirement schemes. This might require the 
amendment of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 to open doors for more forms of 
retirement schemes to cater especially for those employed in the informal sector, the 
self-employed, and those earning low salaries. In Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom, the Constitutional Court when dealing with the issue of 
access to adequate housing had to interpret the word “reasonableness” in relation to 
legislation and other measures.150 The Court said, among other things, that the 
measures taken must establish a coherent programme directed towards the 
progressive realisation of the right of access [to adequate housing] within the state’s 
available means and that the programme must be capable of facilitating the 
realisation of the right.151 The Court stated that legislative measures that are to be 
                                            
 
150
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 at par 42 (hereafter, 
Grootboom).  
151
 At par 41. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
249 
 
taken by the state have to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and 
programmes implemented by the executive. The policies must be reasonable both in 
their conception and implementation.152  
 
Thus, what the state does in its effort to extend protection to categories of people 
who are excluded by the system will be measured according to its reasonableness 
and its effectiveness in facilitating the realisation of the right. What the Constitutional 
Court said about this duty in the Grootboom supra has, according to the Taylor 
Report,153 increased pressure on the state to put in place a coherent and 
comprehensive programme for progressively realising the constitutional obligations 
and opens a way for constitutional challenges against the state to comply with the 
provisions of section 27(2) of the Constitution.  
In the Committee’s view, this will require the state to devise, formulate, fund, 
implement, and to constantly review relevant measures.154  
 
The Taylor Report set out the following as the criteria that should be used to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the measure:155 
 
 Socio-economic and historical context of the deficiencies to be addressed; 
 Whether there is institutional capacity to implement the programme; 
 Whether the programme is open for review and whether it addresses short-, 
medium-, and long-term needs; 
 Whether the programme is inclusive and does not exclude the majority of the 
people; 
 Whether the measure will meet basic human needs and takes into account 
the extent to which the right they aim to protect is being denied; and  
 Whether the programme and measures ensure that more people will be 
progressively included. 
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 At par 42. 
153
 The Taylor Committee Report op cit note 58 at 32. 
154
 Idem. 
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 At 51. 
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South Africa is moving towards finalising the reform of its retirement system and it is 
important for the government to ensure that whatever will come out of those reforms 
is in both content and form reasonable, and that its implementation is reasonable to 
achieve the required results – also taking into account important elements put 
forward by the Taylor Committee. 
 
Below follows a discussion of benefits provided by the South Africa’s occupational 
retirement system. 
 
6.6 THE TYPES OF BENEFITS   
 
6.6.1 General 
 
The primary objective of retirement funds is to provide retirement benefits to 
members when they retire. It is only in special circumstances such as where the 
member loses his or her job, is disabled, or dies before going into retirement, that 
other benefits are paid to the member or his or her dependants. Benefits payable 
must be at a level that will enable the member or dependants to maintain a 
reasonable standard of living after the member has stopped working.  
 
The standard of living during retirement may not be the same as that which the 
person enjoyed prior to retirement or the death of the breadwinner, but must at least 
be at a level that will be adequate to protect the beneficiary from falling into the 
poverty trap. A social security system should be considered to be adequate only if it 
offers benefits that are adequate for the beneficiaries to live above mere survival. 
Thus, a system that provides insufficient benefits will fail the social security test as it 
shall also not be able to provide adequate protection to the people it is targeting. The 
fund rules regulate, among other things, the types of benefits payable by the funds, 
entitlements to benefits, and payment of benefits. Section 1 of the Pension Funds 
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Act of 1956 defines “benefit” in relation to a fund as any amount payable to a 
member or beneficiary in terms of the rules of the fund.156 
 
As indicated above the benefits that are offered by retirement funds are not only 
limited to a benefit that a member receives at the time of retirement,157 but may also 
include what are generally known as “risk benefits” or “ancillary benefits”. These 
include, among others, death benefits, withdrawal benefits, disability benefits, and 
benefits payable to a non-member spouse upon divorce.158  
Withdrawal benefits are payable in circumstances where the member resigns or is 
retrenched from his or her job. These benefits are discussed below. 
 
6.6.2 Retirement benefits and payment of minimum benefits 
 
The main objective of a retirement fund is to pay a retirement benefit at the time a 
member retires.159 This comes either in the form of a monthly pension; that is, if a 
member belonged to a pension fund; or a cash lump-sum payment in the case of a 
provident fund. The benefit is meant to serve as income replacement when the 
person stops working and enters into retirement. 
 
The requirements for a member who has been participating in a fund to be eligible to 
receive a retirement benefit usually relate to minimum age and years of contribution. 
The retiree becomes entitled to an unreduced benefit at a particular age if all the 
other conditions are satisfied.160  
  
                                            
 
156
 See the definition of “benefit” as inserted by section 1 of the Pension Funds Amendment Act 11 of 
2007. 
157
 Strydom EML, Le Roux PAK, Landman AA, Christianson MA, Dupper OC, Myburgh P, Barker FS,  
Garbers CJ, Basson AC, Dekker A and Esselaar V Essential Social Security Law 2006 2ed at 28.  
158
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 130 at 283.  
159
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds (glossary of terms used) op cit note 49 at 
(x). 
160
 Gillion et al Social Security Pensions op cit note 7 at 41. 
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Thus the age of a fund member is the main determining factor with regard to 
accessing the benefit, while the determining factors for the level of the benefit would 
include years and level of contributions and returns on investments made by the 
fund. It may also be required that a worker must have had a minimum number of 
years of contribution to qualify for a benefit at a certain level.  
 
Defined-benefit schemes usually require a minimum number of years of coverage as 
a contributing member to qualify for a pension benefit, with those working more 
years than the minimum receiving greater benefits. Workers who do not satisfy the 
minimum number of years of coverage often become entitled to a lump-sum cash 
payment.161  
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 does not define “retirement age”, but defines a 
“retirement date” as the date on which a member becomes entitled to a benefit in 
terms of the rules of the fund, to the grant of an annuity, or the receipt of a lump-sum 
payment on account of age, ill health, or retrenchment of staff.162  
                                            
 
161
 Ibid at 43-44. 
162
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 defines “retirement date”. Section 187(2)(b) of the 
Labour Relations Act of 1995 provides that a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has 
reached the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity. In Harris v 
Bakker and Steyger (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 ILJ 15553 (IC), the case which was decided prior to the 
introduction of the Labour Relations Act of 1995, it was held that the employer may tell the employee 
to go on retirement when that employee reaches a retirement age. In such a case, the employer may 
not consult the employee and the employer does not commit an unfair labour practice if it terminates 
the employment contract of an employee who has reached a retirement age. However, in Botha v Du 
Toit Very & Partners CC [2006] 1 BLLR 1 (LC), the Labour Court held that the employee whose 
contract of employment is terminated after the date of retirement had passed (post-retirement) was 
entitled to be consulted before such termination. Note should also be taken that when an employee 
reaches the normal retirement age or the agreed retirement age, the contract will automatically come 
to an end and therefore such termination will not amount to an unfair dismissal or to a dismissal as 
defined by section 186 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. See in this regard Rubenstein v Price’s 
Daelite (Pty) Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 528 (LC) and Schwitzer v Waco Distributors [1998] 10 BLLR 1050 
(LC). Such termination will also not amount to an automatically unfair dismissal. See Venn v Moser 
Industries Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 1402 (LAC); Van Niekerk v Karee Mine (Western Holdings) (2001) 22 ILJ 
1202 (LC)). However, the Labour Court in SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Rubin Sportswear 
(2003) 24 ILJ 429 (LC) held that it was automatically unfair to force employees to retire without proper 
consultation. The court ordered that those employees should receive compensation. In determining 
whether an employer has reached normal retirement age, there are a number of things to look at; 
namely the contract of employment concluded between the employer and employee, relevant 
workplace policies, and retirement fund rules. A distinction has to be drawn between fund rules which 
merely state the age from which a member may claim retirement benefits, and retirement age as per 
employment contract. Also see generally in this regard the following cases: Kirsten v Southern Cross 
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On the other hand, the Income Tax Act of 1962 (with effect from 22 July 2008) 
defines “retirement date” as: 
 
the date on which a member of a pension fund, pension preservation fund, provident fund, 
provident preservation fund or retirement annuity fund, in terms of the rules of that fund, 
becomes entitled to an annuity or a lump-sum benefit contemplated in paragraph 2(a) of the 
Second Schedule on or subsequent to death or attaining normal retirement age.   
 
This is the date on which a member of a fund becomes entitled to an annuity or a 
lump-sum benefit.163 Pension funds rules often stipulate a retirement age and may 
also make provision for early retirement, which is normally from the age of 55. 
Generally, if a person retires before the age of 55, that is regarded as a withdrawal 
from the fund and not as retirement.  
 
All funds registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 are now required to 
provide for prescribed “minimum benefits” in terms of section 14A of the Act.164 This 
has changed the position where previously funds paid members different benefits 
determined by circumstances in which a member exited the fund before retirement 
due to incidents such as resignation, retrenchment, dismissal from employment, or 
fund liquidation.165 The Pension Funds Second Amendment Act of 2001 defines the 
“minimum benefit” as the member’s minimum individual reserve.  
 
A minimum individual reserve is, in terms of section 15B(2) of the Pension Funds Act 
of 1956, in the case of defined-benefit funds, the fair value equivalent to the present 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Manufacturing Co Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 2471 (CCMA); Evans v Japanese School of Johannesburg (2006) 
27 ILJ 2607 (LC); and SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Assurance (SA) Ltd [2005] 4 BLLR 378 (LC). 
163
 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act of 1962 defines “normal retirement age”. Interestingly this term is 
not used in the Pension Funds Act of 1956. The Act instead uses the term “normal retirement date”.  
Pensionable age for OECD countries is defined as the age at which an individual with a full career 
can first receive full pension benefits in the main pension scheme. See in this regard Chomik R, 
Whitehouse ER Trends in Pension Eligibility Ages and Life Expectancy, 1950-2050 (OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 105) (2010) OECD Publishing: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km68fzhs2q4-en, last visited 07 September 2015. 
164
 Section 14A inserted by section 3 of the Pension Funds Amendment Act of 2001. 
165
 Hunter R, Esterhuizen J, Jithoo T, Khumalo S The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act, 
regulations, selected notices, directives and circulars (2010) (hereafter, Hunter et al The Pension 
Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act). 
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value of the member’s accrued deferred pension; and in the case of defined-
contribution funds, the board must determine the value of the member’s individual 
account as determined in terms of subsection (1) plus a share of the investment 
reserve account, the member surplus account, and such contingency reserve 
accounts as the board may determine should be included in terms of section 15G in 
the proportion that the member’s individual account value as at the effective date of 
the calculation bears to the total of all members’ individual account values as at that 
date or such other method of apportionment as the board deems reasonable.166 
Furthermore, section 14B(3) requires the board of pension funds to establish and 
implement a policy for minimum pension increases. The policy must aim to award a 
percentage of the consumer price index, or some other measure of price inflation 
which is deemed suitable by the board. The increases are to be considered every 
year, with comparison to the minimum pension increase at least once every three 
years.  
 
This is to ensure, among other things, that members receive benefits that are in line 
with inflation rates when they exit the fund.  
 
6.6.3 Withdrawal benefits and preservation of benefits 
 
Withdrawal benefits are paid to members in cases such as where a member has 
resigned or where a member has been retrenched from work. Fund rules generally 
provide for such withdrawals.167 Retrenchment often comes as a result of the 
employee’s position becoming redundant. The Pension Funds Act of 1956 defines 
retrenchment in relation to a member of the fund as “dismissal from employment 
based on the operational requirements of the employer”. Termination of employment 
in this regard does not arise from any fault of the employee. In other words, the 
                                            
 
166
 Section 15B(2) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
167
 Gillion et al Social Security Pensions op cit note 7 at 43-44. In Telkom SA Limited & Two Others v 
P N Blom & Others [2004] 6 BPLR 5781 (SCA) at par 17, where membership of the fund were 
terminated when employees’ contracts of employment were assigned by the employer (Telkom) to 
Molapo Technologies (when the Telkom business in which they were employed was sold to Molapo 
as a going concern in terms of section 197 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995), the court held that 
those employees were entitled to benefits payable on transfer of their contracts.  
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employee is not dismissed because he or she has done anything wrong, but mainly 
due to the employer’s needs, which include financial challenges.168 
 
This is the reason why the law is so protective of the employee and requires the 
employer to go through a consultative process prior to effecting any dismissals for 
operational reasons.169  
 
The employer is required to consult with all the employees affected by retrenchment 
and their trade unions at the time the employer is still contemplating dismissing those 
employees for operational reasons.170 The aim of consultation and the timing thereof 
is, among other things, to avoid retrenchment where possible and to agree about the 
severance pay that is to be paid to retrenched employees. When coming to 
employee benefits, employees who are retrenched are not treated the same way as 
those employees who resign from employment and those who are dismissed due to 
misconduct. When an employee resigns or is retrenched, he or she receives a lump-
sum benefit usually related to the contributions he or she has paid into the fund from 
the time he or she joined the fund.  
 
An employee who is retrenched will be entitled to severance pay made up of a 
minimum of one week’s remuneration for every completed and continuous year of 
                                            
 
168
 Item 1 of the Code on Dismissal Based on Operation Requirements defines “dismissal based on 
the operational requirements of the employer” as dismissal based on the economic, technological, 
structural, or similar needs of the employer. Economic reasons relate to the financial standing of the 
business; technological reasons refer to the introduction of new technology, for example, new 
machines which make existing jobs redundant or a need to adapt to new technology which leads to 
restructuring of the workplace; structural reasons refer to restructuring of the business/workplace 
which leads to the redundancy of jobs. See generally the following cases which dealt with dismissal 
based on the employer’s operational requirements: Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal 
Workers of SA [2003] 24 ILJ 133 (LAC); SACTWU and Others v Discreto-a Division of Trump & 
Springbok Holdings (1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC); National Union of Metal Workers of SA v Genlux 
Lighting (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 654 (LC); and Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v NUM and Others [2005] 3 
BLLR 219 (LAC). 
169
 Section 189 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (applies to small-scale retrenchments where an 
employer employs fewer than 50 employees) read with section 189A (applies to large-scale 
retrenchments where an employer employs more than 50 employees and contemplates dismissing a 
number of employees who fall within the categories mentioned in the section) of the Act. 
170
See generally, NEHAWU and Others v University of Pretoria (2006) 5 BLLR 437 (LAC); General 
Food Industries Limited v FAWU [2004] 7 BLLR 667 (LAC); and Enterprise Foods (Pty) Ltd v Allen & 
Others [2004] 7 BLLR 659 (LAC). 
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service with that employer171 and a lump-sum withdrawal benefit, or the benefit may 
be transferred to another fund, or may even be deferred for the member to receive it 
on reaching the retirement age.  
 
However, it is mostly preferred by funds to pay cash withdrawal benefits as it is not 
always easy to track deferred pensioners or their dependants in case the pensioner 
dies.172 Retrenchment benefits are generally paid from employer and employee 
contributions plus full interest.173 On the other hand, an employee who resigns from 
work will not be entitled to severance pay. Such an employee will only be entitled to 
a withdrawal benefit; that is, if he or she was a member of a retirement fund. The 
benefit may come in the form of a lump-sum cash payment, or it may be transferred 
to a new fund, or can even be deferred for the member to receive it on reaching the 
retirement age. It should be noted that, in terms of section 41 of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act 75 of 1997, severance pay is only paid when an employee is 
dismissed for reasons based on the employer’s operational requirements. This 
implies that no severance pay will be payable where the employee has resigned or 
where he or she has been dismissed for misconduct.174  
 
If upon acceptance of a benefit the member transfers the benefit directly into a 
retirement annuity fund or another pension fund, no tax is payable on the benefit. 
This will be the case if, for example, the original fund issues a cheque payable 
directly to the new fund. The member must not receive the benefit but it must be paid 
directly into another fund in order for the benefit not to attract tax. Tax is payable on 
resignation or withdrawal benefits only when some or all of the benefits are received 
by the member as cash or a cheque is issued in the member’s name.175  
 
                                            
 
171
 Section 41 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 provides for severance pay. On the 
other hand, section 35 of the Act prescribes the formula to be followed in calculating severance pay. 
172
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 130 at 284.  
173
 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds op cit note 49 at 5 and 12-13.  
174
 Van Niekerk A, Christianson MA, McGregor M, Smit N and Van Eck BPS Law@work 2ed (2012) at 
319. 
175
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 10 at 124.  
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The withdrawal of benefits before the retirement date is a problem as it reduces the 
pension benefit a person will receive when he or she retires. It should also be 
accepted that a person who makes a withdrawal prior to the actual retirement date 
loses a lot as most pension and provident fund rules only offer a refund of the 
person’s own contributions and a stipulated interest, which is generally low.  
 
Thus employees lose the right to an adequate retirement benefit as the benefit the 
person receives is reduced. Employer contributions are also not paid over to 
employees making early withdrawals, and, if paid, it is only a small percentage. In a 
defined-benefit plan, the employer is in a favourable position if the long-serving 
employees exit before their retirement age as they leave behind the employer’s 
contribution or the equivalent thereof and the investment returns.176 
  
Sephton et al’s view about this is that the employee should also receive the 
employer’s contribution as it was offered to the employee as part of a package; that 
the employer is able to deduct the benefit immediately for income purposes, while 
the employee cannot; and that there is no benefit to the employer in withholding 
employer contributions in a defined-contribution fund. Sephton et al further argue 
that this practice discriminates between fund members, penalising those who do not 
reach retirement age irrespective of the length of service given to the employer.177 
Sephton et al’s view holds water in that should the employee have stayed until the 
retirement date, he or she would have received the full employer contributions plus 
interests.  
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 Field “Employees’ Pension and Provident Fund Rights: A Renewed Interest Develops” op cit note 
100 at 969-971. The “early withdrawal rule” sounds very unfair and contrary to public policy. In terms 
of this rule, the employee who makes an early withdrawal from the fund will only be entitled to his or 
her own contributions and to interest on the contributions made. Such an employee will not receive 
payment of the employer’s contributions. The balance of what the employee could have received may 
be used to better the benefits of the employees remaining in the fund. Therefore, the employee who is 
withdrawing will lose. It is for these reasons that Hunter R (in Hunter RT Inequities and Illegalities in 
Occupational Retirement Funding in South Africa (LLM Dissertation) November 1993, at 18-19, 
(hereafter, Hunter Inequities and Illegalities in Occupational Retirement Funding in South Africa) was 
of the view that this rule is illegal on the basis that it is contrary to public policy (at 18-19). This rule 
deprives the employee of the benefits of the employer’s contributions to a retirement fund and the 
earnings of that fund on all the contributions made by both the employee and employer to the fund. 
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 Sephton et al A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds op cit note 49 at 57. 
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The contributions are part of the employee’s income during the period he or she 
works for the employer.178 These contributions are meant for the employee and it is 
only fair that they go to the employee as he or she earned them through the service 
offered to the employer. The employee makes his or her services available to the 
employer in return for a salary (or earnings) and retirement benefits (contributions) 
paid by the employer, who benefits from the skills and knowledge of the employee. 
In this regard, employees may be differentiated in terms of how they have left the 
job. For example, while the employee who voluntarily resigns from his job may be 
denied the employer’s contributions, the opposite should apply with regard to the 
employee who is retrenched. The employee who is retrenched is not at fault and 
may therefore not be punished by denying him or her the employer’s contributions, 
while, on the other hand, the employer may be justified in withholding its 
contributions for the employee who is dismissed, for example due to misconduct or 
one who just decides to resign.  
 
Allowing withdrawals from retirement funds has a negative effect on the benefit a 
fund member and/or beneficiary will receive when the time to retire arrives. There is 
a general concern that South Africans do not have the culture of saving, and 
withdrawal benefits that are consumed prior to retirement add to this problem. This is 
a serious challenge because it results in more and more people going into retirement 
with insufficient benefits or no benefits at all.  
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 In Smoker v London Fire Authority [1991] 2 CA 502 (HL), Auld J stated that “a pension is a reward 
for past service whether or not is contributory, and if contributory (by employee), regardless of the 
relative contributions of employer and employee”. Hunter Inequities and Illegalities in Occupational 
Retirement Funding in South Africa op cit note 176 at 11-12, when contributions are made to a 
retirement fund in terms of a contract of employment, these contributions form part of the employee’s 
remunerations for past service. In Hunter’s view, the fact that the employee only receives the benefit 
of the payment of such contributions when receiving investment returns in the form of a pension does 
not make pay deferred. Accordingly, pension benefits are not deferred pay but they are the fruit of the 
investment of contributions made by both the employer and the employee to the retirement fund, and 
the employer’s contribution is simply another form of pay. Thus, once the employer has paid its 
contributions to the fund, it has no right to the fruit of the investment of those contributions. It was 
confirmed in Oberholzer v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1970 (1) SA 227 (N) that a pension was a return 
for the plaintiff’s past services regardless of whether it was deductible or discretionary. Note should 
also be taken that retirement funds are now required by section 14A and 14B of the Pension Funds 
Act of 1956 to pay their members a minimum benefit. See the discussion regarding payment of 
minimum benefits under par 6.6.2.  
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Leakages that occur prior to retirement date can be attributed to the lack of 
preservation of funds when people change jobs.  
 
Preservation, according to the National Treasury in its Discussion Paper on 
Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds,179 occurs when 
money saved for retirement through pension, provident, and preservation funds 
remain in those funds until the person retires, or is rolled over into another similar 
retirement savings vehicle without incurring taxes or penalties when a person 
changes jobs. At the moment, a member of a retirement fund who exits the fund prior 
to a retirement date is not obliged to preserve the benefit he or she receives. An 
attempt to introduce compulsory preservation of retirement benefits in South Africa 
was abandoned when it met resistance from trade unions in the early 1980s. The 
government at that time wanted to introduce the Preservation of Pensions Bill, which 
would have seen retirement benefits being transferred when people changed jobs, 
but this move failed because the unions were not happy about the change that would 
deny employees access to immediate money that could be used to take them out of 
poverty.180  
 
One of the proposals that has been made by the National Treasury is that it should 
be compulsory for members of pension funds to preserve their accrued pension 
benefits when they change jobs. The Treasury wants every fund to create a 
preservation section within the fund as a default option, and transfer funds to that 
preservation fund when a member leaves employment – unless the member has 
indicated that he or she would like to receive the benefit in cash.181 It is submitted 
that, in order for preservation of benefits to work, the government should make it 
compulsory for everyone to preserve the benefit when changing jobs and that 
exceptions must only be made in limited circumstances. For example, a person may 
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 The National Treasury: Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds op cit note 
109 at 15. 
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 Field “Employees’ Pension and Provident Fund Rights” op cit note 100 at 965.  
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 National Treasury: Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds op cit note 109 
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be allowed to withdraw the whole benefit where the amount of the benefit is below a 
certain level.  
 
It should also be in exceptional circumstances such as where a person has reached 
a certain age, for example 55 and the chances of employment are limited, that a 
withdrawal should be permitted. A person should only be allowed to withdraw a 
certain portion of the benefit if he or she goes for a certain number of months without 
finding a job and has exhausted his or her unemployment benefits. Alternatively, a 
person can be given regular pensions until he or she finds another job, or a person 
who goes for a certain number of months without finding employment can be allowed 
a certain number of withdrawals from a preservation fund and up to a certain amount 
– provided the benefit is more than the amount to be determined by the relevant 
minister.  
 
In this way, it will be difficult for people to access retirement benefits before they 
reach their retirement age, and this will go a long way in protecting benefits from 
being depleted way before the time and purpose they are meant for arrive.  
 
According to Sanlam, the trend of withdrawing all the benefits when a member 
changes jobs has continued at a very high rate. In its 2011 survey, Sanlam reported 
that about 70% of people have withdrawn from a retirement fund upon resigning or 
being retrenched. The factors that contribute to this include the level of debt people 
find themselves in and unplanned living expenses.182 
 
 
                                            
 
182
 Sanlam 2015 Benchmark Survey at 6, accessed from: http://www.sanlambenchmark.co.za/ 
webadmin/include/content/Benchmark2015_1.Summary.21052015.pdf, last visited on 07 September 
2015. In an article written by Louw P “Broke Teachers Break System” The Times 1 September 2015 
at 2, the writer presents a worrying picture of financial distress the majority of teachers are 
experiencing. According to Louw, the National Teachers’ Union has asked the Department of Basic 
Education to allow teachers to cash in part of their pensions (between 30% and 40%) earlier than 
their retirement date as that will prevent experienced teachers from leaving the profession because of 
the financial challenges they are facing. It is reported in this article that teachers use their pension 
money to pay for their children’s education (as they do not qualify to receive financial assistance from 
the National Student financial Aid Scheme) and for housing (as they do not qualify for RDP housing). 
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It is estimated that the average South African changes jobs every seven to eight 
years.183 This number is quite high and if the person withdraws and consumes the 
benefit every time he or she changes a job, such person will either end up with no 
retirement benefit or with insufficient benefits when he or she retires.  
 
Such person will then have to rely on the state old-age pension for survival. It was 
reported in South Africa’s National Treasury Second Discussion Paper for 
Retirement Reform that, according to the survey undertaken by Alexander Forbes,184 
preservation of accumulated funds by those who are under the age of 40 was less 
than 10% and could be as low as 1% in the category of low-income earners. It was 
also estimated that the majority of retirement fund members received retirement 
income that was less than 28% of their pre-retirement income. 
 
South Africa’s National Treasury has made certain proposals with regard to the 
preservation of retirement benefits. The proposals will apply to new contributions by 
existing employees and to growth on existing assets. They will also apply to new 
employees joining funds. The first option is a full withdrawal of the benefit when 
leaving employment with tax deductions on withdrawal above current levels. This is 
intended to discourage people from withdrawing the benefits. The second option is to 
monitor the response of people to the first option over a period of three to five years, 
and if there are no improvements in preservation rates, to revisit the issue. The third 
option is to allow partial access to a cash lump-sum before reaching retirement, but 
require preservation of the balance. The fourth option is to allow a withdrawal of a 
certain amount each month for individuals who are not able to find new employment. 
The fifth and last option is to require full preservation and allow no withdrawals of 
growth on existing assets or new contributions by new or existing employees.185  
  
                                            
 
183
 See in this regard Reddy C What do Individuals Think about Compulsory Preservation Funding? 
(Master of Business Administration (MBA: Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of 
Pretoria) Research Project) 26 September 2012 at 9. 
184
 South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper op cit note 4 at 5 
(in reference to Member Watch (Issues 1), Alexander Forbes 2006).  
185
 The National Treasury: Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds op cit note 
109 at 17-18. 
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The Discussion Paper also encourages the portability186 of benefits between pension 
funds.187 The fourth option sounds workable as it will allow those who cannot find 
jobs and have exhausted their unemployment benefits to receive some income while 
still searching for a job. There should, however, be conditions for one to access the 
benefit. For example, a person may be required to register with the Department of 
Labour as a jobseeker and to regularly prove that he or she is actively looking for 
employment. This will ensure that the benefit is not withdrawn as a lump-sum and 
used for other purposes, and the conditions set will ensure that the benefit sustains 
the person while still looking for a job so that that person and his or her family may 
not fall into poverty.    
 
6.6.4 Risk benefits  
 
6.6.4.1 General 
 
Most retirement funds offer their members risk benefits188 such as life cover, 
disability, dread disease, and funeral benefit. The role played by these benefits is 
very significant in providing income security to the employee and those who exit 
employment due to the risk occurring before their retirement. According to South 
Africa’s National Treasury in its Second Discussion Paper for Retirement Reform, 
“ancillary benefits” play an important role in the absence of comprehensive social 
security in this country.  
                                            
 
186
 Portability refers to an employee’s ability to transfer accumulated retirement savings to a 
prospective employer’s pension fund, transfer to a preservation fund with a financial institution, or 
leave retirement savings with their former employers when changing jobs (See the National Treasury: 
Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds op cit note 109 at 5).  
187
 Ibid at 19. 
188
 Risk benefits are normally provided for through insurance policies separate from retirement 
benefits. They include life cover, disability, retrenchment, dread-disease, death, etc. Risk benefits 
provided as part of a registered and approved fund are called approved benefits while those provided 
as part of a separate insurance benefit are called unapproved benefits. 
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This is the reason why the National Treasury considers it desirable that the design of 
occupational pension funds continue to include a supplementary package of benefits 
but that these benefits should be appropriate to the member profile of each fund.189 
 
Fund rules stipulate what type of cover is offered to members, including for when 
members are forced to leave the fund before retirement due to unforeseen 
circumstances such as death, disability, or ill health. Where a fund does not offer its 
members risk benefits, the employer may do so through a separate group scheme. 
However, unlike with retirement funds, contributions paid by the employer to these 
schemes will be considered for tax purposes. An employer can approach an 
administrator, insurer, or employee benefits consultant for assistance to put together 
a suitable package of benefits.190 Death, ill-health, and disability benefits are 
discussed below. 
 
6.6.4.2 Payment of death benefits and protection of dependants 
 
Retirement funds pay death benefits. This benefit is paid to make sure that the 
dependants of the deceased member are not left destitute due to the member’s 
death.191 A benefit can be in the form of a lump-sum, instalment, or pension 
depending on whether the scheme is a pension or provident fund. In its 2011 survey, 
Sanlam observed that almost all the funds surveyed in that year provided lump-sum 
death benefits to dependants.192 Some of the funds offered spouse pension in 
addition to a lump-sum benefit. The lump-sum benefits are often reinsured with an 
insurance company, but trustees may decide to pay the benefit in the form of 
instalments if it is in the best interest of the dependants of the deceased member.193 
                                            
 
189
 South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper op cit note 4 at 
22.  
190
 Hendrie et al “Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension Funds” op cit note 122 at 26-
27.  
191
 Idem at 26.  
192
 Sanlam’s 2011 Benchmark Survey op cit note 50 at 9. 
193
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 10 at 23-25. 
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The benefit levels are normally set in the fund rules, and should a member require 
more cover, he or she will have to request it privately as an individual.194   
 
Section 37C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 regulates how death benefits195 
payable after a member’s death should be distributed to a deceased member’s 
dependants. In terms of this provision, death benefits do not form part of a member’s 
estate and should be dealt with in the manner stipulated in the section.196 The 
section gives the trustees discretionary powers to distribute death benefits in the 
manner they deem equitable. A member’s freedom of testation is clearly limited in 
this regard, although it could be argued that this is done for a good cause. It is 
important to mention at this stage that there is a proposal made by the National 
Treasury in its First Discussion Paper for Retirement Reform that trustees should try 
to comply with the expressed wishes of the deceased member, and only depart from 
those wishes where in their opinion there are compelling reasons why they should 
not.197 It is submitted that a closer reading of section 37C will show that what is being 
proposed by the National Treasury is exactly what the section anticipates that the 
trustees should in fact do, even though this is not necessarily done in practice. 
Naturally, the board should start by looking at the nomination form before it can start 
searching for other dependants whose names may not be on the form. It is only after 
discovering that there are other dependants who could also possibly be eligible to 
receive the benefit that the board should move to determine if those people are 
worthy of a share in the benefit, either because they were or would have in future 
been legally or factually dependent on the deceased member. 
  
                                            
 
194
 Hendrie et al “Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension Funds” op cit note 122 at 28.  
195
 Benefits that can be distributed in terms of section 37C are payable by a pension fund upon the 
death of a member in terms of the rules of that fund and not benefits payable; for example, by an 
insurer directly to a member’s nominated beneficiaries. 
196
 See generally Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund and Another 2003 
(1) SA 629 (W) at 632H-633A (hereafter, Mashazi); Kaplan and Another NO v Professional and 
Executive Retirement Fund and Others 1999 (3) SA 798 (SCA) at 803A-B (hereafter, Kaplan); and 
Malanga and Group Five Multi-Benefit Retirement Fund [2001] 10 BPLR 2607 (PFA) at par 12. 
197
 South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 47. 
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The trustees have discretion whether to pay the benefit as income or a lump-sum.198 
The National Treasury encourages the payment of regular income instead of lump-
sum payments. Lump-sum payments should especially be done in cases where 
benefits are so small that it will not be cost-efficient to pay them as regular income. 
Where a dependant is, according to the trustees (or in case of a minor dependant), 
not in a position to manage the benefit, the board could establish a beneficiary fund 
(before the 2007199 amendments to the Pension Funds Act of 1956, the board could 
establish a trust) into which the benefit will be paid and managed on behalf of the 
dependant. 200   
 
Section 37C serves a social security purpose201 and therefore complements the 
provisions of section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The 
section is there to promote the objectives of social security; one of which is to protect 
dependants from being destitute. This section enforces the right of access to social 
security entrenched in section 27 of the Bill of Rights.  
 
It can also be said that the trustees also perform a social service role when they 
investigate whether the deceased had other dependants or not and by distributing a 
death benefit to deserving beneficiaries.202 The aim of social security is to guarantee 
an adequate living standard and minimum income protection, and to safeguard the 
acquired standard of living. On the other hand, the purpose of a retirement fund is to 
provide a form of benefit to its members when they retire or to their dependants 
when the members die.  
                                            
 
198
 See generally, Sher H “Pension Funds” (1997) Juta’s Business Law Vol 5 No 2 at 59-61; Le Roux 
PAK “Decisions in terms of s 37C” (1999) CLL Vol 8 (10) at 99-100; Moledi I “Taking the Mystery out 
of Section 37C” 2003 Sowetan August 19 at 20; and Manamela T “Chasing Away the Ghost in Death 
Benefits” (2005) SA Merc LJ 2005 Vol 17 at 279-284. 
199
 Section 37C was amended by the Pension Funds Amendment Act of 2007. 
200
 South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 47. 
201
 See the case of Mashazi supra note 196 at 632. 
202
 See in this regards Sanlam 2005 Mini-Survey at 2, accessed from 
http://www.sanlambenchmark.co. za/webadmin/include/content/2005%20Survey-
Executive%20Summary_2.pdf, last visited on 07 September 2015 (Sanlam’s 2005 Mini-Survey). 
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In making sure that the dependants of a member who dies before retirement receive 
some form of income, the legislature has introduced section 37C, which protects the 
dependants of the member after the member’s death.  
 
All the dependants of the deceased member should receive a share of the benefit as 
will be determined by the trustees if there is evidence that they depended on the 
member or would have depended on the member if he or she was still alive. The 
section opens a door to accommodate the deceased member’s dependants who 
have not been named on the nomination form by allowing trustees to consider all 
potential dependants.  
 
The rationale behind this section is that the dependants of the deceased member 
should not be left without any form of support because of the member’s death. The 
section promotes social protection and has to be well interpreted and applied by 
boards of trustees203 in order to serve the intended purpose. Trustees may, however, 
not pay a benefit to a dependant who has unlawfully caused the death of the 
member. In common law there is a saying that “the one who has caused the unlawful 
death of another is precluded from benefiting financially from such death”.204   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
203
 See generally these cases: Kaplan supra note 196, and the case of Mashazi supra note 196 at 
632H-J. 
204
 See Makhanya v Minister of Finance and Others 2001 (2) SA 1251 (D) at 1254 where the court 
held that the principle should also be used with regards to benefits paid in terms of legislation. 
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The word “dependant” is defined by the Pension Funds Act of 1956 to give trustees 
an idea of who should qualify to receive a benefit when the distribution of a death 
benefit is being made. Section 1 of the Act defines a “dependant” as follows:205 
 
Dependant in relation to a member of a retirement fund, means: 
 
a) a person in respect of whom the member is legally liable for maintenance; 
b) a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable for maintenance, if such person 
– 
i. was, in the opinion of the board, upon the death of the member in fact dependent on 
the member for maintenance; 
ii. is the spouse of the member; 
iii. is a child of the member, including a posthumous child, an adopted child, and a child 
born out of wedlock; 
c) a person in respect of whom the member would have become legally liable for maintenance 
had the member not died.  
 
Clearly the definition of dependant in this regard is too wide and therefore opens a 
door for different categories of dependants and at different levels. Thus, broadly 
speaking, a dependant is a person whom a member is legally or factually liable to 
maintain or whom the member would in future have become legally liable to 
maintain.206  
 
 
 
                                            
 
205
 Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 defines “dependant”. 
206
 It was held in Wellens v Unsgaard Pension Fund (2002) 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA) at par 16 (hereafter, 
Wellens), that the mother of the deceased, who was not a dependant of the deceased at the time of 
his death, was entitled to receive death benefits because she would have become dependent on him 
at a future date. See also generally Wasserman v Central Retirement Annuity Fund (1) [2001] 6 BPLR 
2160 (PFA); and Van Zyl v Delta Motor Corporation Salaried Provident Fund and Another 
PFA/EC/698/04/Z/CN (unreported). See generally on legal dependency the following determinations: 
Dyas v CTS Provident Fund & Another [2003] 3 BPLR 4448 (PFA); Dijane v Tiger Oats Provident 
Fund [2003] 6 BPLR 4773 (PFA); Mkaba v SA Breweries Staff Provident Fund [2002] 3 BPLR 3209 
(PFA); Mokele v SAMWU National Provident Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 4175 (PFA); Bruce v Lifestyle 
Retirement Annuity Fund [2001] 7 BPLR 2193 (PFA); and Cala Dairies cc v Orion Money Purchase 
Provident Fund & Another (2) [2001] 11 BPLR 2683.  
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This definition includes both those persons a member was legally bound to maintain; 
for example, spouses and children and those whom the member was not legally 
bound to maintain, known as factual dependants.207 An example here will be children 
born out of wedlock.208  
 
The following people will all qualify as dependants: spouses, children, and parents209 
of the deceased member. Spouses will qualify in terms of section 1(b)(ii),210 
biological children in terms of section 1(a), stepchildren in terms of section 1(b)(i), 
and parents will qualify in terms of both section 1(a) and (b)(i).211  
                                            
 
207
 See the following determinations on the test for factual dependency: Govender v Alpha Group 
Employees Provident Fund and Another (2) [2001] 8 BPLR 2358 (PFA); Khambule v Telkom 
Retirement Fund [2003] 10 BPLR 5214 (PFA); Stacey (Koevort) v Old Mutual Protektor Pension Fund 
and Another [2005] 1 BPLR 3 (PFA); Hlathi v University of Fort Hare Retirement Fund and Others 
[2009] 1 BPLR 37 (PFA); and Gerber v Aberdare Cables (Pty) Ltd Provident Fund and Another [2010] 
3 BPLR 275 (PFA). See also generally Mhango M “What Should the Board of Management of a 
Pension Fund Consider when Dealing with Death Claims Involving Surviving Cohabitants?” (2010) 
PER/PELJ Vol (13) 2 at 183-204; and Lehmann K “Death and Dependency: The Meaning of 
‘dependant’ under section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956” Vol 126 (4) SALJ 650-666 
(2009).  
208
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 130 at 179-180. 
209
 Van Heerden B, Cockrell A, and Keightley R Boberg’s Law of Persons and Family 2ed (1999) at 
233-248. With regard to spouses’ reciprocal duty to support each other, see generally Miller v Miller 
1940 CPD 466 at 469; Woodhead v Woodhead 1955 (3) SA 138 (SR) at 139-140; and Witham v 
Minister of Home Affairs 1989 (1) SA 116 (Z) at 131. An order to pay medical expenses for the 
medical treatments of a divorced partner also qualifies as maintenance. See in this regard Lombard v 
Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2003] 3 BPLR 4460 (PFA) at par 22. On the parents’ duty of 
support towards their children, see generally Bannatyne v Bannatyne & the Commissioner for Gender 
Equality 2003 (2) SA 362 (hereafter, Bannatyne); Heystek v Heystek 2002 (2) SA 754; Bursey v 
Bursey and Another 1999 (3) SA 33 (SCA); Sparks v Sparks 1996 (3) SA 33 (SCA); S v Macdonald 
1963 (2) SA 431 (C) at 433; Lloyd v Menzies NO 1956 (2) SA 97 (D) at 103; and In Re Estate Visser 
1948 (3) SA 1129 (C) at 1133. Children may also be obliged to support their parents in appropriate 
circumstances. See generally B v B and Another 1997 (4) SA 1018 (SE); Pike v Minister of Defence 
1996 (3) SA 127 (CKS); Van Vuuren v Sam 1977 (1) SA 100 (W) at 101; Jacobs v Cape Town 
Municipality 1935 CPD 474 at 479; and Wright v Wright 1907 TS 204. 
210
 See Mabetlela & Another v Progress Provident Fund [2003] 7 BPLR 4915 (PFA) at par 11 
(hereafter, Mabetlela); and Moshidi v Kimberly-Clark Provident Fund and Another [2003] 7 BPLR 
4947 (PFA) at par 24.  
211
 See generally Nsele and Human Rights Commission Staff Provident Fund [2000] 7 BPLR 756 
(PFA) at par 11; and Khutswane and Malbak Group Pension Fund and Another [2000] 12 BPLR 1354 
(PFA) at par 14 (hereafter, Khutswane). In Kekana v Nedcor Defined Contribution Provident Fund 
[2010] 3 BPLR 295 (PFA), where the complainant was aggrieved by the respondent’s decision to 
grant death benefits to a child whose paternity was questionable, the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
indicated that a biological relationship was not the sole factor considered in the distribution of a death 
benefit. The Adjudicator highlighted the fact that what was the issue was dependency and not a 
biological relationship, as an important factor in determining whether or not anyone must receive a 
death benefit (at par 5.5). In Cele v Alexander Forbes Retirement Fund [2010] 1 BPLR 35 (PFA) at 
39, the Adjudicator held that even though the two minor children were not the deceased’s biological 
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Section 1(b)(i) covers a live-in girlfriend or boyfriend; and people living in a same-sex 
relationship if they can proof that they depended on the member prior to his or her 
death.212 Same-sex relationships should enjoy the same protection as other unions 
since section 9 of the Constitution protects everyone against unfair discrimination, 
including on the grounds of sexual orientation.213  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
children, they were financially dependent on the deceased and that qualified them as factual 
dependants. 
212
 See Tladi and Pfizer Provident Fund, Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd PFA/GA717/02/CN (unreported) 
at 7-8. In Smith v SAA Flight-Deck Crew Provident Fund and Another [2010] 3 BPLR 330 (PFA), the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator was satisfied that the board of trustees was correct in allocating 50% of 
the deceased’s death benefit to the second respondent who cohabited with the deceased when he 
was alive. It was found in this matter that the second respondent shared a house with the deceased 
and was financially dependent on the deceased prior to his death. It was also apparent that the 
deceased wanted both the complainant and the second respondent to benefit from the estate.  
213
 See in this regard Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (1998) [1998] 8 BLLR 
880 (T) at 883 (hereafter, Langemaat), where in the court’s view partners in a same-sex union 
deserved respect and protection as married couples because, according to the court, the stability and 
permanence of their relationship are the same. See also generally on same-sex relationships 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2004] 1 BPLR 5333 (CC) 
(hereafter, Satchwell), in this case sections of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions Act, 88 of 
1989 were declared unconstitutional to the extent that they afforded benefits to the spouses of judges 
but not to same-sex partners; in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (hereafter, National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality), the court 
interpreted the term “spouse” in the then Aliens Control Act, 96 of 1991, to include “same-sex life 
partner”, in order to give effect to the constitutional prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. In another case of Farr v Mutual and Federal Insurance Company Ltd 2000 (3) SA 
684 (C), the court held that two gay men living together in a domestic relationship constituted a family. 
The applicant’s same-sex partner was held to be a member of the applicant’s family within the 
meaning of the exclusion. The court took into account the degree of permanency and the manner in 
which the partners lived together and concluded that it resembled a marriage between husband and 
wife; Jivan U “From Individual Protection to Recognition of Relationships: Same-sex Couples and the 
South African Experience of Sexual Orientation Reform” 2007 Law Democracy and Development 19 
at 19-46 provides an analysis (through an analysis of case law, especially after 1994) of the protection 
(or lack of protection) of same-sex partners before 1994 and after; Carpenter G “ The Right not to be 
Discriminated Against on the Ground of Sexual Orientation, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice” THRHR 2002 (65) 50; Chetty C “Sexual Orientation as a Constitutional 
Right: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1) SA 39 
(CC)” 2001 (64) THRHR 657; Havenga P “Same-sex Unions, the Bill of Rights and Medical Aid 
Schemes; Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (61) SA 312 (T)” 1998 THRHR (61) at 
722-726; and Louw R “Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security and Others: A Gay and Lesbian 
Victory but a Constitutional Travesty” (1999) Vol 15 SAJHR at 393-405. Louw R “Gay and Lesbian 
Partner Immigration and the Redefining of Family National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs” (2000) 16 SAJHR 313; Motara S “Making the Bill of Rights a Reality for Gay 
and Lesbian Couples, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs” 
(2000) 16 SAJHR 344; Silver B “Till Deportation Do Us Part: The Extension of Spousal Recognition to 
Same-sex Relationships” (1996) 12 SAJHR 575; and Smith BS and Grobler NJ “Gay Rights (and 
obligations!): Consequences and Implications of Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs” TSAR 2005 (4) 
745.  
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Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on among other grounds 
gender, sex, marital status, and sexual orientation. It should also be noted that the 
achievement of equality is one of the values the democratic Republic of South Africa 
is founded on.214 It was held in Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security and 
Others215 that the parties in a homosexual relationship who had been living together 
for a number of years have a duty to support each other.216 In this case, a lesbian 
police captain wanted her partner to be included in her medical aid scheme. The 
court found in her favour, as, according to the court, a dependant is someone who 
relies upon another for maintenance. According to Roux J, same-sex couples who 
lived together for years owe a duty of support to each other. In his opinion, the 
stability and permanence of their relationships do not differ from that of married 
couples and therefore both types of unions deserve respect and protection.217 
According to the Pension Funds Adjudicator in Rory Martin v Beka Provident 
Fund,218 where the matter was about people living in a same-sex relationship, 
trustees should determine whether the person qualifies as a factual dependant by 
using a “mutual dependency test”, and the existence of shared common household 
and financial dependency. This is to establish if the two parties were dependent 
upon each other. Should it be found that there was mutual dependency between the 
two, then a benefit is payable.  
 
 
                                            
 
214
 Section 1(a) of the Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is one sovereign 
democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. In Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group 
[1990] ECR I-1889, the European Court of Justice found the different retirement ages for men and 
women to be in contravention of article 141 of the EC Treaty. Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 (Equal 
Treatment Directive) was issued in 2000 to establish a general framework to combat discrimination on 
different grounds including age. This Directive is binding on the United Kingdom [law] and will as such 
outlaw age discrimination in all the areas including in pension provisioning. 
215
 See the case of Langemaat supra note 213. 
216
 Supra at 883.  
217
 Supra. 
218
 Rory Martin v Beka Provident Fund [2000] 2 BPLR 196 (PFA) at 214. See also Van der Merwe and 
Others v Southern Life Association Ltd 2000 BPLR 321 (PFA) at 331, where the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator accepted that the definition of dependant is wide enough to include same-sex partners. 
The same principle was applied in TWC and Others v Rentokil Pension Fund and Another [2000] 2 
BPLR 216 (PFA) (hereafter, Rentokil). 
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The fact that the definition of a dependant has been couched in such wide terms 
does not make the work of the board of trustees any easier. The board of trustees 
has taken the role of investigators as they have the duty to make sure that all 
possible dependants are considered in their distribution of the death benefit. This 
has even prompted Sanlam to propose that persons who qualify as dependants be 
limited to the deceased spouse and children. According to Sanlam, in order for 
section 37C to operate effectively, the line should be drawn much narrower.219 What 
Sanlam is proposing will certainly make the trustees’ work much easier and will limit 
the distribution to legal dependants to the exclusion of factual dependants. It is 
submitted though that this may work against communities whose support systems 
still have some elements of the kinship220 system; that is, where the support goes 
beyond one’s immediate family made up of the deceased member’s spouse and own 
children and is extended to other family members such as parents.   
 
The benefit may be paid directly to a beneficiary, into a trust, or into a beneficiary 
fund.221 Before the 2007222 amendments to the Pension Funds Act of 1956, section 
37C stated that benefits could be paid into a trust. This has since been changed and 
now the board has the option to pay death benefits into a beneficiary fund, which is 
regulated in terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.  
 
The section also allows for the benefit to be paid to the guardian or caregiver on 
behalf of the minor. A guardian is liable to the dependent child should he or she 
mismanages the money put in his or her trust. The child can enforce a claim against 
the guardian when he or she reaches the age of majority.223  
                                            
 
219
 Sanlam 2005 Mini Survey op cit note 202 at 3. 
220
 The kinship system is discussed in Ch 4. 
221
 See section 37C(2) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. See generally about the responsibilities of a 
guardian/caregiver in sections 18 and 32 of the Children’s Act, 38 of 2005. See also Kowa v 
Corporate Selection Retirement Fund and Another PFA/GA/14151/2007/SM (unreported) at par 22 
(hereafter, Kowa), where the Pension Funds Adjudicator ruled that any person who administers and 
safeguards a minor child’s property and property interests should be regarded as the guardian of that 
minor child. 
222
 Section 37C was amended by the Pension Funds Amendment Act of 2007. 
223
 In terms of section 28 of the Constitution, a child is anyone below the age of 18 years. See also 
generally De Villiers N and Giese S “A Review of Children’s Access to Employment-based 
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The guardian will have to be someone who is not only able to administer the money, 
but must also be someone who is qualified to do so and must use the benefit to 
provide for the minor’s needs until he or she reaches the age of majority.224 The 
objective here is to further strengthen the protection of death benefits and to ensure 
that these benefits are used to support the deceased member’s dependants, and not 
for anything else. The manner of payment should always take the best interests of 
the minor child into account.225 Thus, the board is required to apply its mind in 
deciding the manner the payment should be made in relation to the prevailing 
circumstances at that time.226 A beneficiary who receives the benefit in instalments 
will also receive interest from the invested amount from time to time.227  
 
The relevant provisions of section 37C now provide as follows: 
37C. Disposition of pension benefits upon death of member 
 
(1)     ………  
(2) 
(a)  For the purposes of this section, a payment by a registered fund for the benefit of 
a dependant or nominee contemplated in this section shall be deemed to be a 
payment to such dependant or nominee, if payment is made to: 
(i)      a trustee contemplated in the Trust Property Control Act, 1988, nominated 
by 
(aa)    the member; 
 
(bb)   a major dependant or nominee, subject to subparagraph (cc); or 
 
(cc)    a person recognised in law or appointed by a Court as the person 
responsible for managing the affairs or meeting the daily care needs 
of a minor dependant or nominee, or a major dependant or nominee 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Contributory Social Insurance Benefits” (Commissioned by UNICEF in partnership with the 
Department of Social Development), May 2008 at 7. 
224
 See the case of Kowa supra note 221 at 23-24. 
225
 Section 28 of the Constitution. 
226
 See in this regard the following cases/determinations: Ex Parte Oppel and Another 2002 (5) SA 
125 (C); Mafe v Barloworld SA Retirement Fund (PFA/FS/13033/07/CN) (unreported); and Moralo 
Holcim South Africa Provident Fund (PFA/GA/5400/2005/ZC) (unreported).  
227
 Section 37C(3) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
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not able to manage his or her affairs or meet his or her daily care 
needs; 
(ii)     a person recognised in law or appointed by a Court as the person 
responsible for managing the affairs or meeting the daily care needs of a 
dependant or nominee; or 
(iii)    a beneficiary fund. 
(b)     No payments may be made in terms of this section on or after 1 January 2009 to a 
beneficiary fund which is not registered under this Act. 
 
In making a decision, the trustees must, among other things, consider the age of the 
dependants, the extent of dependency, and the financial position of the dependants, 
including their future earning capacity228. The board needs to consider all the factors 
in relation to how each applies to a particular dependant to make sure that each of 
the dependants receive fair consideration.  
Failure by the board to properly apply its mind to all the dependants and their 
individual circumstances will prejudice other dependants and can even be set aside 
by the Pension Funds Adjudicator229 or the courts of law.  
 
A number of problems have been experienced with the interpretation and application 
of section 37C of the Pension Funds Act. In terms of the section, trustees must 
determine whether the deceased member had any dependants who are entitled to a 
share of the benefit when the benefit is distributed.230 The process of locating 
dependants may be difficult, particularly as illegitimate children, common law or 
customary law spouses,231 and anyone who was fully or partly dependent on the 
deceased member must be identified in order for the distribution to take place.232 
                                            
 
228
 See the duties of the board of trustees with regard to distribution of death benefits in Sithole v ICS 
Provident Fund and Another [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA) paras 24-25; and Carvalho v Lifestyle 
Retirement Annuity Fund & Others (PFA/WE/7998/06/CN) (unreported). 
229
 Mashego v SATU National Provident Fund [2007] 2 BPLR 229 (PFA) at 235. 
230
 Section 1(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 defines a “dependant”. In terms of this section, both 
legal and factual dependants qualify.  
231
 These are people whose marriages to the deceased member were conducted according to African 
customs and traditions and are acknowledged as a marriage for purposes of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act, 120 of 1998. Section 4(9) of the Act provides for registration of such 
marriages, but makes it clear that failure to register the marriage does not make the marriage invalid.  
232
 These examples show how difficult it can be for trustees to determine who should and who should 
not receive death benefits: the case of Mabetlela supra note 210, and in the case of Moshidi supra 
note 210 at 6-7, it was decided that a wife who was periodically visited by her customary law husband 
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Where the dependants and/or beneficiaries’ existence has already been established, 
the next step would be for trustees to find them and this is not always an easy 
task.233 In searching and ultimately paying out the benefits to the deceased 
member’s dependants, trustees must consider the issue of the 12-month period 
stipulated in section 37C of the Act. In terms of section 37C(1)(a), if the fund 
becomes aware of the existence of a dependant or dependants within 12 months of 
the death of the member, the benefit must be paid to such dependant or dependants 
as the board of the fund may deem equitable.  
However, if the board does not become aware or cannot trace any dependant within 
12 months of the death of the member, and the member has designated in writing to 
the fund a nominee to receive the benefit, the benefit must be paid to such nominee 
– provided the requirements of section 37C(1)(b) have been satisfied. The 
requirement that payment must be made within 12 months is to ensure that the 
board of trustees has enough time to investigate whether the deceased had other 
dependants other than those he or she has placed on the nomination form. This is 
also to ensure that no deserving dependant is left out. The 12-month period might 
sound too long; however, the period should be accepted as reasonable as a shorter 
period will put the board under a lot of pressure as identifying or locating all the 
dependants can be a difficult task in certain instances. The question, however, will 
be what should happen to the deceased’s dependants, especially minor children, 
during the period of waiting; that is prior to the finalisation of the investigation made 
by the trustees to determine who will be eligible to receive a share of the death 
benefit. This is something the legislature should look into for purposes of protecting 
the welfare of minor children while the distribution is being finalised. It is proposed 
                                                                                                                                       
 
was not a dependant of her deceased husband because he spent more time with his new customary 
wife (alternatively, the woman with whom he had a long-standing relationship of co-habitation). It was 
held by the Pension Funds Adjudicator in the case of Wellens supra note 206 at par 16, that the 
decision of the board that the mother of the deceased who was not a dependant of the deceased at 
the time of his death, was entitled to receive death benefits because she would have become 
dependent on him at a future date, was reasonable and that the conclusion was justifiable based on 
the facts that were before the board. 
233
 See Moledi I “Trustees are Battling to Trace all Beneficiaries” Sowetan September 14, 2004 at 19. 
In the case of Khutswane supra note 211 at par 9, co-employees were summoned to go and search 
for the girlfriend and the illegitimate child of the deceased. 
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that a certain percentage of the death benefit should be deposited into the 
beneficiary fund to be used for the immediate and/or urgent need of minor children.  
 
The trustees will naturally have to take into account the short- and medium-term 
needs of the minor children, for example school fees and medical expenses, to 
determine how much should be put in the beneficiary fund. This amount will have to 
be taken into account later when the distribution is finalised. 
 
Where a member has a dependant and has also nominated a beneficiary in writing, 
the fund is required to pay the benefit within 12 months of a member’s death in such 
proportions as the board may deem equitable; subject to section 37(1)(bA).234  
 
In a case where the fund is not aware or cannot trace any dependants within 12 
months, and the deceased member has not designated any nominee, the benefit or 
the remaining portion of the benefit after payment to the designated nominee shall 
be paid into the estate of the member.  
 
The benefit can also be paid in the Guardian’s Fund if no inventory in respect of the 
member has been received by the Master of the High Court in terms of section 9 of 
the Estates Act 66 of 1965.235 Should the trustees fail to act timeously and without 
good reason, that might put the fund in mora and the fund might even have to pay 
the dependants some interest.236 
 
6.6.4.3 Payment of benefits due to disability or ill health 
 
Disability benefits are offered in order to protect the member from the risk that he or 
she will no longer be able to earn a salary as a result of being disabled or ill and will 
                                            
 
234
 That is, provided it applies to the nomination made on or after 30 June 1989: provided further that, 
in respect of a designation made on or after the said date, the fund shall not be prohibited from paying 
the benefit, either to the dependant or nominee contemplated in paragraph (bA) or, if there is more 
than one such dependant or nominee, in proportions to any or all of those dependants and nominees.   
235
 This is in terms of section 37C(1)(c) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
236
 See generally Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund [1999] 9 BPLR 29 (PFA). 
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have to leave his or her job and exit the fund.237 Thus, the benefits cover early 
retirement due to disability and ill health. Disability benefits take the form of lump-
sum payments or a regular income. Where a lump-sum disability benefit is paid, the 
likelihood is that the member’s employment with the employer will also be terminated 
as these benefits are generally paid where a member is suffering from a physical or 
mental infirmity which prevents him or her from performing his or her duties or similar 
work for which he or she was employed. Ill-health benefits are paid to members who 
become unable to work due to infirmity or sickness.238  
 
The person must be below the age of 55 and must qualify in terms of the definition of 
disability as contained in the fund rules to receive a disability benefit. Thus, the 
member must be functionally impaired.239  
 
The amount payable is calculated in relation to a member’s salary at the time he or 
she became disabled.240 The benefit is usually limited to 75% of the member’s 
salary. The member must go through medical procedures to determine if he or she is 
indeed disabled before a benefit can be released as insurers would like to satisfy 
themselves that the person is disabled, as well as the extent of the disability before 
they pay. In some instances the assessment of disability is done on a periodic basis 
to determine if the person’s disability status has not changed or improved. It is 
important for the employer and fund to align their definitions of disability, otherwise 
there might be situations where a member may no longer be able to work for their 
                                            
 
237
 Hendrie et al “Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension Funds” op cit note 122 at 26.  
238
 Idem. 
239
 In Reynolds v Metal & Engineering Industries Retirement Fund (1) [2001] 1 BPLR 1507 (PFA) at 
1511, the fund rejected a disability claim on the basis that the complainant could still do some of his 
usual tasks and was therefore not completely disabled. The Pension Fund Adjudicator ordered that 
the complainant should be reassessed to allow the Adjudicator the opportunity to make a 
determination as to whether the fund’s decision to refuse the complainant’s application was 
reasonable in the circumstances (at 1512). In Belgium, disability benefits are paid to a maximum age 
of 65 in line with the normal retirement age in the country. See in this regard Jousten A, Lefebvre M, 
Perelman S “Disability in Belgium: There is More than Meets the Eye” (Working Paper 17114, 
National Bureau of Economic Research) 2011, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17114, last 
visited on 07 September 2015. 
240
 A disabled person is, within the context of a disability grant, defined by section 1 of the Social 
Assistance Act of 2004 as “any person who has attained the prescribed age and is, owing to his or 
her physical or mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, employment or profession the 
means needed to enable him or her to provide for his or her maintenance”. 
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employer, and so has to leave the retirement fund and the insurer refuses to admit 
their claim. This can lead to a situation where a member is unemployed because he 
or she is disabled, and without income because the insurer refuses to pay as it does 
not consider the member disabled in terms of its policy.241   
 
6.6.4.4 Challenges with risk benefits 
 
HIV/Aids has a great impact on retirement funds as it increases incapacity and 
mortality. Incapacity will increase the number of disability claims, while mortality will 
increase the number of survivors’ claims against pension funds. HIV/Aids also has a 
great effect on productivity and output. As soon as a member becomes incapacitated 
by the illness, he or she leaves employment and withdraws from the fund to use the 
money for their medical expenses, and when there is no more money, they and their 
children rely on their elderly parents for support.  
 
When the members (parents) die, their children continue relying on their 
grandparents for support and the whole family depends on the state old-age 
pension. Older people also lose financial support of their children because of the 
pandemic. It is thought that risk benefits will continue to play an important role in 
South Africa’s social security landscape as a result of HIV/Aids as it is expected that 
the number of deaths in the category of the working age will exceed the number of 
new participants in the near future.242 
 
Risk benefits depend mainly on employment. Thus the person’s employment plays a 
significant role in determining whether he or she should be a member of a risk 
protection scheme and receive benefits from the scheme, and also for that person’s 
dependants to benefit from the scheme should the risk the member is covered 
against occur. After exiting the fund, the risk benefits which were offered by the fund 
                                            
 
241
 Hendrie et al “Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension Funds” op cit note 122 at 31-
32. 
242
 Van Zyl E “Old-age Pensions in South Africa” International Social Security Review Vol 56, No 3-4 
July–December 2003 at 111; and Hendrie et al “Risk Benefit Provision through Provident and Pension 
Funds” (ibid) (Executive Summary) at (v). 
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are no longer available, unless a member decides to continue with the risk cover 
policy with an insurance company on an individual basis. It then becomes a problem 
should a member who is already in retirement suffer a risk, such as disability or ill 
health.243 What this would mean is that such a person would have to use a 
retirement benefit to pay for all his or her medical costs from the retirement benefits. 
These costs can be very high and might deplete a retirement benefit within a very 
short space of time, and such a person would then be left with no income for support 
during retirement. The situation can become worse should the person live longer 
under such a condition. In this case, a member outlives his or her retirement savings 
and lives with a condition which in most cases was never planned for. This 
demonstrates a serious need for retirement funds to consider including a post-
retirement medical benefit as one of the benefits offered by the funds.  
 
Death benefits are paid at the discretion of the board of trustees, which means 
mistakes can happen resulting from many factors, such as insufficient information 
received by trustees during their investigations and biasness towards some of the 
dependants. Another worrying factor is that dependants are generally not 
represented when decisions are made, and communication with them is also often 
non-existent or very poor.244 This often results in board of trustees relying on 
second-hand information to decide on distributions. 
 
Where members changed jobs during their career and die before retirement, the 
dependants might not know about the benefits held by the previous employers or 
funds and as such they might not be able to access them. Dependants who later 
discover that there was some benefit they could have received, would often find it 
difficult to prove their claim as that normally happens after a long period of time has 
elapsed. 
 
 
 
                                            
 
243
 Ibid at 26. 
244
 Ibid at 11. 
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6.7 PROTECTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS  
 
6.7.1 General 
 
Pension benefits receive special protection to ensure that they are not wasted or 
depleted before a member’s retirement date as they are meant to sustain the 
member during retirement and, if possible, until death. These benefits can also serve 
as a source of income for the member’s dependants should the member die before 
retirement.245  
 
According to South Africa’s National Treasury in the Second Discussion Paper for 
Retirement Reform, the protection of retirement benefits is also about member 
protection and includes a combination of adequate funding, the protection of rights to 
benefits, good governance, adequate disclosure, and trustee and member 
education.246 Retirement benefits qualify for protection under section 25 of the 
Constitution; also known as the “property clause”.  
 
Section 25 provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law 
of general application, and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
In Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of RSA,247 the Court said 
                                            
 
245
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 7 at 165.  
246
 South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper op cit note 4 at 
29. 
247
 See Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of RSA (1995) 9 BCLR 1235 (TK) at 
1246 (hereafter, Transkei Public Servants Association), where the court had to decide whether 
employee benefits such as a housing subsidy are property rights. The court stated that the concept of 
property in section 28 of the Constitution (interim) may be broader to include employment benefits 
and subsidies. See also Devenish A A Commentary on the South African Constitution (Butterworths 
1998) at 71; Johan de Waal, Iain Currie, Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 6
th
 impression 
2004 at 415-516 where it is stated as follows: “It seems unjustifiable to say that if your house is taken from you by 
the state you are entitled to compensation, but that if the state freezes or reduces your pension you are not, simply because in 
the former case you are dispossessed of a real right and in the latter of a personal right …. In addition, a particularly important 
source of wealth in the modern state is ‘interests in government largesse’: claim rights against the state to certain resources or 
performances such as state pensions, medical aid schemes, state jobs and state contracts.” According to De Waal et al, 
most of these public law rights have the character of property and should therefore receive property 
clause protection. Lewis C “The Right to Private Property in a New Political Dispensation in South 
Africa” South African Journal on Human Rights 1992 at 392-393 (writing about the inclusion of the 
right to property in the interim Constitution) mentioned the fact that there are many other important 
sources of wealth other than land and that all the other types of property must be taken into account 
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“property” within the meaning of the constitutional clause (in the interim Constitution), 
possibly extends to social benefits, pension and medical benefits, and employment 
rights.  
 
According to the Court, “property” would encompass a broader field of incorporeal 
objects and would extend to social and economic interests and benefits.248 However, 
for a right to become property, it must be a vested right, which means a right should 
be more than just an expectation and must have accrued to the claimant according 
to the relevant rules of common law or statute. Thus no arbitrary deprivation of 
retirement benefits shall be allowed. With regards to pension benefits, a right in a 
member’s interest in a pension fund has been correctly held by the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator in Atkinson and Others v Southern Field Staff Pension Fund249 to qualify 
as property. The Adjudicator in this case accepted the fact that the concept of 
property in the constitutional sense is not restricted to movable or immovable 
corporeals, but that it also includes incorporeals. The Adjudicator, however, moved 
to clarify the position with regard the enjoyment of the rights to ownership of such 
property. He alluded to the fact that as a member’s interest in a pension is of 
incorporeal nature consisting of a complexity of contingent contractual rights, 
expectations, and interests; entitlement to the benefits will be determined by the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
when justifications for private property, its distribution, and protection in a Bill or Rights are 
considered. The author alluded to the fact that while property means immovable property to many, to 
lawyers it means both movable and immovable property. See also importantly the ground-breaking 
article on the new face of property by Reich CA “The New Property” The Yale Law Journal Vol 73(5) 
at 770, where it is stated that the valuables that are distributed by government are gradually taking the 
place of conventional forms of wealth. According to the author, the wealth of people comes from the 
government as many people live on government largess (for example, social benefits provided by 
government). This, coupled with a distinctive system of law, according to the author, brings profound 
consequences as it, among other things, has an impact on the power of private interests, and their 
relationship to each other and the government. See the following US cases which confirm a global 
recognition of welfare benefits to be property: Goldberg v Kelly 397 US (1970) at 262; and Logan v 
Zimmerman Brush Co 455 US 422 (1982) at 430.  
248
 See the case of Transkei Public Servants Association supra. 
249
 See Atkinson and Others v Southern Field Staff Pension Fund [2000] 4 BPLR 367 (PFA) at par 38, 
where it was stated that the concept of property in the constitutional sense is not restricted to movable 
or immovable corporeals, but includes incorporeals, where one may have a right which is the 
objective of another right such as ownership. However, at par 46 the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
qualified the latter statement as follows: “A finding that a member’s interest in a pension fund is of a proprietal nature 
deserving of constitutional protection does not necessarily mean that the member enjoys rights of ownership of the 
contributions made to the fund on his or her behalf. The property is of an incorporeal nature consisting of a complexity of 
contingent contractual rights, expectations and interests. The extent of entitlement or access to the benefits of the resources of 
the fund is contingent and will be determined by the circumstances and the application of legitimate and rational rules 
regulating that access”.  
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application of rules regulating entitlement or access to those benefits. The 
Adjudicator was correct, considering the fact that contributions made by fund 
members to the fund do not necessarily give fund members ownership of the assets 
of the fund, but only gives them a legal expectation to receive a benefit at a later 
date. Thus, a fund member only receives legal entitlement to the fund when the 
benefit accrues in terms of the fund rules.   
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 also accords retirement benefits special protection 
under section 37A(1) of the Act.  
This section prohibits any attachment or reduction of the member’s pension benefit 
subject to the following exceptions:250  
 
 Payment of income tax in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; 
 Payment of maintenance in terms of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998;251 
 A maximum amount of R3 000 per annum which can be taken into account in 
a determination in terms of a judgment debtor’s financial position of section 65 
of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944; and  
 Deductions permitted under section 37D. 
 
A fund may only make deductions from the member’s retirement benefit in very 
limited circumstances, as per the provisions of section 37A(1) of the Pension Funds 
Act of 1956. The effect of this section is to establish a general rule protecting 
pension benefits from creditors. Its main objective is to protect pensioners against 
being deprived of their source of income in their retirement.  
 
                                            
 
250
 Section 37A(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. This provision is similar to section 91(1) of the 
Pensions Act of 1995 (United Kingdom), which provides that no pension entitlement from an 
occupational scheme can be assigned, commuted, surrendered, or charged, or set off. This provision 
is, however, subject to certain exceptions such as where money is due to a scheme or where the 
employer is entitled to deduct money for an obligation due to it as a result of the beneficiary’s criminal, 
negligent, fraudulent act, or omission.     
251
 See generally the cases of Bannatyne supra note 209; Mngadi v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates 
Provident Fund & Others [2003] 2 All SA 279 (D) (hereafter, Mngadi); and Magewu v Zozo & Others 
(2004) (4) SA 578 (C) (hereafter, Magewu). 
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The next discussion looks at circumstances under which deductions are allowed by 
the Act and why the legislature possibly decided to allow them.  
 
6.7.2 Section 37D exceptions 
 
Section 37D of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 sets out limited instances under 
which deductions may be made from a member’s pension benefit as follows: 
 
(1) A registered fund may: 
(a) deduct any amount due on the benefit in question by the member in accordance 
with the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962), and any amount due to the 
fund in respect of: 
(i)       a loan granted to a member in terms of section 19(5); or 
(ii)      any amount for which the fund becomes liable under a guarantee furnished 
in respect of a member for a loan granted by some other person to the 
member in terms of section 19(5), from: 
(aa) …;  
(bb) …; 
(cc) …; 
(b) deduct any amount due by a member to his employer on the date of his 
retirement or on which he ceases to be a member of the fund, in respect of: 
(i)       
(aa)    a loan granted by the employer to the member for any purpose 
referred to in section 19(5)(a); or 
(bb)    any amount for which the employer is liable under a guarantee 
furnished in respect of a loan by some other person to the member 
for any purpose referred to in section 19(5)(a), 
to an amount not exceeding the amount which in terms of the Income Tax 
Act, 1962, may be taken by a member or beneficiary as a lump sum benefit 
as defined in the Second Schedule to that Act; or 
(ii)     compensation (including any legal costs recoverable from the member in a 
matter contemplated in subparagraph (bb)) in respect of any damage 
caused to the employer by reason of any theft, dishonesty, fraud, or 
misconduct by the member, and in respect of which: 
(aa)  the member has in writing admitted liability to the employer; or 
(bb)    judgment has been obtained against the member in any court, 
including a magistrate’s court, 
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from any benefit payable in respect of the member or a beneficiary in terms 
of the rules of the fund, and pay such amount to the employer concerned; 
(c) deduct any amount which the fund has paid or will pay by arrangement with, and 
on behalf of, a member or beneficiary in respect of: 
(i)      such member’s or beneficiary’s subscription to a medical scheme, 
registered otherwise than provisionally in terms of the Medical Schemes 
Act, 1998 (Act No. 131 of 1998); 
(ii)      any insurance premium payable by such member or beneficiary to a long-
term insurer registered in terms of the Long-term Insurance Act, 1998 (Act 
No. 52 of 1998); 
(iii)    any purpose approved by the registrar, on the conditions determined by 
him, upon a request in writing from the fund, 
from the benefit to which the member or beneficiary is entitled in terms of the rules 
of the fund, and pay such amount, if due, to such medical scheme, insurer or 
person concerned, as the case may be. 
(d) deduct from a member’s benefit or minimum individual reserve; as the case may 
be: 
(i)     any amount payable in terms of a maintenance order as defined in section 1 
of the Maintenance Act, 1998 (Act No. 99 of 1998); or 
(ii)      any amount assigned from his or her pension interest to a non-member 
spouse in terms of a decree granted under section (8)(a) of the Divorce Act, 
1979 (Act No. 70 of 1979)... 
 
The following deductions are analysed in the paragraphs below to determine why the 
legislature saw it fit to allow them: amounts outstanding in respect of housing loans 
which were granted to members directly by the fund or employer; any amount for 
which the fund or employer is liable in terms of a guarantee given by the fund or the 
employer in respect of a housing loan; amounts where the employer stood surety for 
a housing loan granted to the member by a company which is a separate legal entity 
from the employer where the employer would be liable under it for the full amount of 
the loan; damages caused to the employer by the member as a result of theft, fraud, 
dishonesty or misconduct provided certain conditions are met; any amount in terms 
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of a maintenance order; and a portion of a member’s pension interest in terms of a 
divorce order.252  
 
Section 37D, which is an exception to section 37A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, 
provides for at least eight instances where a fund will have the power to make 
deductions from a pension benefit. While section 37A(1) establishes a general rule 
protecting pension benefits from creditors, section 37D, on the other hand, opens a 
door for deductions in very limited and special circumstances. The main objective of 
section 37D is to make the benefit available to fund members for situations that are 
crucial for the well-being of the member and member’s dependants. It is only in one 
or two instances that deductions are allowed, as will be seen below.  
 
Retirement benefits are a very important asset of a fund member as it is an important 
component of member’s income during retirement. It is therefore important for the 
board of trustees to make sure that they interpret and apply the provisions of section 
37D within the spirit which the section was drafted for. The significance of this 
section lies in the fact that it is only in special circumstances that retirement benefits 
are allowed to be tampered with. It should be accepted that if retirement benefits 
were readily accessible, and if random deductions could be made on them, that 
would leave a member with no benefit to take home when the member retires, or a 
member will be left with insufficient benefit.  
 
Below is the discussion of important deductions permissible under section 37D of the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
252
 Section 37D of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 as amended. The onus is on the person seeking a 
deduction to prove that the deduction falls within section 37D of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. See 
in this regard Rowan v Standard Bank Retirement Fund and Another [2001] 2 BPLR 1643 (PFA); and 
Odayan v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund and Another [2005] 6 BPLR 523 (PFA). 
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6.7.2.1 Housing loans 
 
Fund rules may provide for other kinds of benefits. For example, retirement funds 
can give members housing loans (pension secured/supported loans). The funds do 
this by way of investments.253  
 
The rules of the fund may also make provision to provide guarantees for housing 
loans. Such loans are granted under the following circumstances:254 
 
 To repay an existing loan previously taken in respect of property belonging to 
a member or spouse or both (on which a residence will be erected to be 
occupied by the member or a dependant); 
 To acquire property on which a residence has been or will be erected, or to 
erect a residence on immovable property to be occupied by member or a 
dependant; and 
 To make additions or alterations or maintain or repair a residence which a 
member or spouse or both have ownership of or a right to ownership through 
a right to occupation, which will be or is occupied by a member or dependant.  
 
The loans covered under section 37D(1)(a)(i), (b)(i)(aa), and (bb) of the Act for 
purposes of section 19(5) of the Act, are those amounts outstanding in respect of 
housing loans, which were granted to members directly by the fund or employer, and 
any amount for which the fund or employer is liable in terms of a guarantee given by 
the fund or the employer in respect of a housing loan.255 With these exceptions, 
funds do not only look to make investment returns, but they also play a social 
security role in that members who would have otherwise been unable to afford to 
build houses or who would not have qualified for housing loans from financial 
institutions such as banks, are given these loans by their funds at low interest rates.  
 
                                            
 
253
 Section 19(5) read with item 9(b) of the Schedule to Regulation 28. 
254
 Section 37D(1)(i) and (ii) read with section 19(5)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
255
 Khumalo v Coca Cola Canners Provident Fund and Others [2004] 1 BPLR 5409 (PFA). 
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In order not to burden the member with a debt which the member will not be able to 
pay back, section 19(5)(c) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 restricts the maximum 
loan a fund may grant to a member to the fair value of the property and/or the value 
of the member’s withdrawal benefit. The loan or guarantee may not be more than 
90% of the market value of the property in respect of which a first mortgage bond will 
be registered.  
 
Members must be able to repay the loan in order not to negatively affect the benefit 
they will receive at the time they retire. Thus housing loans should not be meant to 
give members early access to their retirement benefit.256 The loan must be for 
housing and nothing else as this is mainly to help members to meet their immediate 
housing needs. In Nikani v Sala Pension Fund257 where a certain amount of money 
was deducted from a member’s withdrawal benefit for a housing loan which was still 
owed, but which he claimed not to know anything of, the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
held that because there was evidence to prove that the member had a home loan 
which was in arrears, the deductions made were in line with the provisions of the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956. However, if it could be discovered that the amount that a 
member received as a housing loan was used for something else, that will be against 
the provisions of sections 37D(1)(i)-(ii) and 19(5) of the Act. For example, in Zuze v 
Nampak Contributory Provident Fund,258 the Adjudicator found that there were no 
housing loans given to a member as alleged by the fund, but that there were 12 
loans taken by a member over a period of ten years. The loans could not have been 
for purposes provided for under section 19(5) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, and 
therefore could not be deducted from the benefit due to the spouse. The amount 
which was deducted from the spouse’s benefit at the time of divorce for the alleged 
outstanding housing loan was refunded to the complainant. These cases confirm that 
                                            
 
256
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 7 at 153-155. 
257
 See in this regard, Nikani v Sala Pension Fund (PFA/GA/10026/2006/MD) (unreported). 
258
 See Zuze v Nampak Contributory Provident Fund (hereafter, Zuze); and NBC Fund Administrators 
(Pty) Ltd and Another (PFA/GA/31676/2009/MR) (unreported). 
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the purpose of the loan must be for a housing-related purpose and not for anything 
else.259  
 
However, in another case of Farrell v Cape Municipal Pension Fund and Another,260 
the complainant was dissatisfied with the calculation of her share of pension interest 
as she was of the view that she should only be liable for 50% of the outstanding 
housing loan and that the member’s spouse was still paying instalments on the 
housing loan even after the outstanding amount was deducted from the pension 
interest. The Pension Funds Adjudicator correctly held in this regard that the fund 
was correct in deducting the outstanding housing loan in view of the provisions of 
section 37D(3)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.  
 
6.7.2.2  Damages caused to the employer by the employee 
 
Section 37D(1)(b)(ii) also allows deductions from retirement funds for damages 
caused to the employer by a member as a result of theft, fraud, dishonesty, or 
misconduct261 – provided certain conditions are met. These conditions are where the 
member has admitted liability in writing and judgment by a court of law has been 
obtained. It should be clear from the written statement that the member admits 
liability. The member should specifically allow for the deduction to take place in 
respect of a wrongdoing or delict committed against the employer. If judgment is 
given by a court of law against the member, it must relate to a civil judgment 
sounding in money or a compensatory order made by a criminal court in terms of 
section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, specifically stating that 
compensation must be made to the employer for the damage or loss suffered. It 
should be understood that acknowledgement of liability by an employee in this 
                                            
 
259
 See generally on housing loans offered by retirement funds, Sing L “Pension-Secured Loans: 
Facilitating Access to Housing in South Africa?” (Prepared for FinMark Trust), accessed from 
http://www.housingfinanceafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Pension_secured_loans.pdf, last 
visited 22 July 2015.    
260
 See Farrell v Cape Municipal Pension Fund and Another [2011] 2 BPLR 189 (PFA) at 192-193. 
261
 It was held in Moodley v Scottburgh, Umzinto North Local Transitional Council & Another 2000 (4) 
SA 524 at 532C-E (D), with regard to the word “misconduct” that its general meaning must be inferred 
from that of specific words like theft, dishonesty, fraud, or misconduct. Therefore “misconduct” in 
section 37D(b)(ii) must be taken to include dishonest conduct, or at least an element of dishonesty. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
288 
 
regard is only for the employee’s misconduct and not for any other thing, including 
unrelated debts. However, there are times were employers are caught trying to 
deduct money for other unrelated contractual arrangements from their employees.  
 
Some of the things that employers may want to deduct pension money for include 
money owed to the employers for debts such as car loans, computer loans, and 
advance salaries paid to employees at some stage during their employment 
relationship with the employer concerned. The boards of retirement funds need to be 
reminded in this regard that deductions made outside what is allowed by section 37D 
are unlawful.  
 
In Sibanyoni v Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another,262 the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator had to determine whether the document signed by the complainant 
constituted an unequivocal acknowledgement of liability, on the basis of which the 
fund could effect a deduction from the complainant’s benefit in terms of section 
37D(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. Upon termination of the complainant’s employment, he 
became entitled to a withdrawal benefit to the amount of R126 919, 61. However, 
when the complainant applied for his benefit, he was informed that his withdrawal 
benefit had been paid to the employer as compensation for the loss that he had 
caused to the company through an alleged theft. The employer initially instructed the 
fund to withhold the complainant’s benefit as there was a pending criminal case 
against the complainant for theft committed whilst in employment. The case was 
later withdrawn due to a lack of evidence. The employer thereafter instructed the 
fund to make a deduction from the complainant’s withdrawal benefit, since the 
complainant had allegedly acknowledged liability in writing that he caused damage to 
the employer in the amount of R157 158, 93. The fund did so and paid R85 677, 13 
to the employer on the strength of the admission of liability. The complainant alleged 
that the affidavit which he signed did not constitute a full and complete 
acknowledgement of liability, with the result that the deduction by the fund was 
unlawful. The Adjudicator found that the affidavit did not constitute an unequivocal 
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 Sibanyoni v Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another [2005] 4 BPLR 352 (PFA) (hereafter, 
Sibanyoni). 
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acknowledgement of liability because even though the employee admitted liability to 
stealing a cheque, the admission was not about a specific cheque and for a specific 
amount.  
 
Two important factors came out in Govender v L’Oreal SA Provident Fund263 with 
regard to the requirement that the court of law must have passed judgment in favour 
of the employer. In this case the employer had not yet obtained any judgement 
against the members of a fund, but had a good case against them. In such a case, 
the Pension Funds Act of 1956 allows for the fund to withhold the members’ pension 
benefits pending the establishment of the entitlement to the deduction in terms of 
section 37D. The Pension Funds Adjudicator in this case agreed that the fund could 
be allowed to withhold the benefit as he felt that a strong prima facie case had been 
made to show that should a court order be obtained, the employer will qualify for 
protection under section 37D of the Act. However, the Adjudicator could not rule in 
that manner as it was discovered that the employer did not comply with rule 13 of the 
fund rules, which required the employer to give written notice to the fund of its 
request to withhold a benefit.264  
 
Deduction in section 37D has been interpreted by the Pension Funds Adjudicator in 
Appana v Kelvinator Group Services of SA Provident Fund265 to by implication also 
include the power to withhold payment of the benefit, for a reasonable period, 
pending the determination or acknowledgement of liability by the employee. 
However, the fund or employer cannot withhold the benefit indefinitely. The employer 
is not allowed to withhold the benefit indefinitely. In Buthelezi v Municipal Gratuity 
Fund and Another (1),266 a delay of just less than two years was considered 
unreasonably long and in excess of the Municipal Council’s power to withhold. It is 
important for boards of trustees of retirement funds to always remember that they 
are expected to act in a fair and reasonable manner in exercising their duties, 
including their decisions to make deductions or withhold benefits for purposes of 
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 Govender v L’Oreal SA Provident Fund [2005] 6 BPLR 482 (PFA). 
264
 Supra at paras 12-13 and 16-17. 
265
 Appana v Kelvinator Group Services of SA Provident Fund [2000] 2 BPLR 126 (PFA)), 
266
 Buthelezi v Municipal Gratuity Fund and Another (1) [2001] 5 BPLR 1996 (PFA). 
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section 37D deductions. In this regard the board should know that it is acting as an 
administrative functionary and that it is as a result bound by the provisions of section 
33 of the Constitution. For example, the board cannot just act arbitrarily when 
making such decisions.  
 
The board should always aim to protect the interests of the fund members and 
beneficiaries. Where the board does not exercise its powers reasonably, its 
decisions may be taken to a court of law on review basis.267 It would appear that 
section 37D gives the employers preference over other creditors in this regard, 
mainly because the employer participates in and contributes to the fund. It should be 
accepted that by allowing deductions for the loss caused by the employee to the 
employer, the legislature is indirectly giving fund members the responsibility to deal 
with the employer with honesty at all times. The employer is protected against 
dishonest employees and it is only fair that the employer is allowed to deduct any 
loss suffered as a result of an employee’s dishonest dealings from the employee’s 
pension benefit. The protection of the employee’s pension benefit in this regard is 
limited as it stops immediately when the employee chooses to act dishonestly in his 
or her dealings with the employer – provided the two requirements set out section 
37D(1)(b)(ii) have been complied with. 
 
6.7.2.3 Maintenance 
 
Section 37D(1)(d)(i) allows for deductions for maintenance obligations. Retirement 
funds can deduct or withhold a portion of a retirement benefit for purposes of 
maintenance payment268 under the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998. This Act provides 
that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, any pension, 
annuity, gratuity, or compassionate allowance or other similar benefit will be liable to 
                                            
 
267
 See in this regard Johannesburg Municipal Pension Fund and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others 2005 (6) SA 273 (W); Newclicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang and Another 
NNO Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and Others v Tshabalala-Msimang and Another NNO 
2005 (2) SA 530 (C); and Mafongosi and Others v United Democratic Movement and Others 2002 (5) 
SA 567 (TKH). 
268
 See in this regard the following cases: Mngadi supra note 251; Magewu supra note 251; Soller v 
Maintenance Magistrate, Wynberg and Others 2006 (2) SA 66 (C). 
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be attached or subjected to execution under any warrant of execution or any order 
issued or made under Chapter V of the Act in order to satisfy a maintenance 
order.269  
 
The orders under this Chapter include an order to secure a pension benefit due by a 
defaulting member to pay maintenance which is in arrears to a child.270 It is clear 
from these provisions that pension funds can enforce maintenance orders against 
defaulting fund members. This is to ensure that children, and in certain instances 
spouses, are maintained by their parents or partners or former partners where the 
parties have divorced.  
 
6.7.2.4 Pension sharing on divorce 
 
A portion of a member’s interest can be deducted at the time of divorce as per court 
order. This is called a “clean break” principle. The concept of pension sharing upon 
divorce where one of the spouses is a member of a retirement fund, was introduced 
in the South African law by the Divorce Amendment Act of 1989.271 Before this 
Amendment Act, the member spouse’s pension interest was not regarded as an 
asset in his or her estate at the date of divorce.272 Even though the member 
spouse’s pension interest formed part of his or her estate, at the time of divorce the 
non-member’s spouse could not obtain a share of the member spouse’s pension 
benefit because section 7(8) of the Divorce Act of 1979 delayed payment of that 
share until the benefit had accrued to the member spouse.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
269
 Section 26(4) of the Maintenance Act of 1998.    
270
 Section 40.   
271
 Divorce Amendment Act 7 of 1989. 
272
 Boqwana N (of Thipa Incorporated Attorneys) “Dealing with the Pension Benefit of Divorce” (Law 
Society of South Africa – Legal Education and Development) 2009 at 3; Nevondwe L “The Law 
Regarding the Division of the Retirement Savings of a Retirement Fund Member on his or her Divorce 
with Specific Reference to Cockcroft v Mine Employees’ Pension Fund [2007] 3 BPLR 296 (PFA) 
Law, Democracy & Development 2009 (13) at 1-12; and Marumoagae C “Breaking Up is Hard to Do, 
or is it? The Clean Break Principles Explained” De Rebus (September 2013) at 38-40.  
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In terms of section 7(8), a court may give an order to award a non-member 
spouse273 a portion of a member’s interest in a retirement fund when the member 
exits the fund or when a retirement benefit accrues to such a member. After the 
amendment, a non-member spouse could receive a portion of the pension interest, 
but only at the time the member exited the fund and not at the time of divorce. 
  
This undermined a “clean break” following divorce274 and was unfair to a non-
member spouse who had to wait until the member spouse exited the fund, which 
could take years and at times the non-member spouse might not even see that day 
due to other factors such as death before the member spouse’s exit or before the 
benefit could accrue to the member spouse. In other words, the non-member spouse 
could only receive the share when, for example, the member retired, resigned, or 
died.  
                                            
 
273
 “Spouse” means a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil union partner of a 
member in accordance with the Marriage Act (68 of 1961), the Recognition of Customary marriages 
Act (120 of 1998), or the Civil Union Act (17 of 2006), or the tenets of a religion (inserted by section 1 
of Act 11 of 2007). According to Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit 
note 165 at 86, the ruling in Volks NO v Robinson [2005] 2 BPLR 101 (CC), which held that the 
consequences of marriage may not be imposed on persons, or the estate of persons, who were not 
prevented by law from marrying but who simply chose not to marry and that it is both reasonable and 
justifiable for legislation to differentiate between married and unmarried persons when determining 
who should be granted the benefits that may arise from marriage, only applies to benefits granted in 
terms of legislation such as maintenance and the right to be considered as a beneficiary of lump-sum 
benefits payable by retirement funds on the deaths of deceased in-service members. This ruling, 
according to the authors, did not preclude funds from granting cohabitees the same benefits, such as 
pensions, that are granted to married spouses if this was authorised by their rules. That reference to 
‘permanent life partner’ in the definition of “spouse” appears to have been intended to reverse the 
impact of the case of Volks supra decision on the distribution of death benefits in terms of the Pension 
Funds Act. 
274
 Section 7 of the Divorce Act of 1979 provides that the pension interest of a member of the pension 
fund shall be taken into account when dividing the joint estate of parties married in community of 
property upon divorce. What this section means is that the portion to be shared will only be 
determined after the court has declared that the pension interest forms part of the member’s estate. In 
Maharaj v Maharaj and Others 2002 (2) SA 648 (D) at 3032, it was held that the applicant was not 
entitled to receive a share of the member’s pension interest until such time as the estate is divided 
following a divorce. In another case of Sempapalele v Sempapalele and Another [2002] 2 BPLR 3035 
(O) at 3039, the court held that the applicant’s claim that she was entitled to half of the respondent’s 
pension interest had to fail as she had failed to get a court order granting her a share in the pension 
interest in terms of section 7 of the Divorce Act of 1979 at the hearing of the divorce matter. See also 
generally Heaton’s criticism of the previous position where the non-member spouse had to wait for the 
member spouse to exit the fund before he or she could receive his or her share of the benefit, in 
Heaton J “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” (2005) 21 SAJHR 
at 571 (hereafter, Heaton “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law”).  
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The problem with this position was that during the period the non-member spouse 
will be waiting for the member to exit the fund, the non-member’s share remained the 
same until the date of payment, while, on the other hand, the member’s benefit 
would increase with contributions and investment returns throughout the period of 
membership. This meant that the amount the non-member spouse was entitled to 
was determined according to the total amount of the member spouse’s contributions 
up to the date of divorce only, and could not increase despite the amount of time that 
may have lapsed before the benefit was paid out.275 This was clearly unfair to a non-
member spouse who wanted immediate access to benefits and a clean break from 
the marriage with the member.  
 
The legislature realised that there was a problem with the previous position and has 
since addressed it by introducing amendments through the Pension Funds 
Amendment Act of 2007, the Revenue Law Amendment Act 60 of 2008, and the 
Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008. In terms of the 
amendments, the date of accrual of the retirement benefit is accelerated and will be 
the date of the court order. This is to enable a non-member spouse to receive a 
share of the member spouse’s pension interest on divorce if that is what is directed 
by the court order.276 In terms of section 37D(1)(d)(i) of the Pension Funds Act of 
1956 (as amended), a non-member spouse is now allowed to claim a portion of the 
member’s pension interest at the time of divorce. What this implies is that the non-
member spouse no longer has to wait for a member spouse to exit the fund before 
he or she can access a share from the member’s pension benefit. In other words, the 
change accelerated the date of accrual of the benefits to the non-member spouse to 
the date of divorce.  
 
                                            
 
275
 See generally Masie D “Funding a Clean Break” (BusinessDay) accessed from http://www. 
netassets.co.za/retirement/retirement.asp?websiteContentItemID=70781, last visited April 2009. See 
also Heaton’s criticism of the previous position, in Heaton J “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality 
in Family Law: Selected Issues” (idem). 
276
 Section 28 of Pension Funds Amendment Act of 2007. 
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The Pension Funds Adjudicator277 had the opportunity to apply this amendment for 
the first time in the ground-breaking determination of Cockcroft and Mine Employees’ 
Pension Fund.278 The Adjudicator held in this matter that the amendment notionally 
accelerated the date of accrual of the benefit to the member spouse to the date of 
divorce. According to the Adjudicator, section 37D(1)(e), as it was after the first 
amendment by the Pension Funds Amendment Act of 2007 but before it was deleted 
by the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act of 2008, deemed the date 
of accrual of the benefit to be the date of divorce. She also had to determine whether 
the new provision applied to divorce orders granted prior to the effective date of the 
new amendments, which was 13 September 2007. She was of the view that the 
amendment was not to apply retrospectively, but prospectively and also that the 
member spouse was not required to pay interest to the non-member spouse 
retrospectively with effect from the date of divorce.279  
 
The non-member spouse has 120 days after receipt of a court order to elect whether 
he or she wants the share to be paid directly to him or her or have it transferred to 
another approved pension fund.280 The court order must identify the fund from which 
the share must be deducted, otherwise the fund can refuse to honour the order.281  
 
A social security challenge with this shared benefit is that most of the non-members’ 
spouses are likely not to save or preserve the benefit in approved retirement 
schemes. Most of them might be tempted to take the benefit as cash and use it for 
other things, such as buying a new car or going on a long holiday.  
 
                                            
 
277
 The Pension Funds Adjudicator was Ms M Mohlala at that time. 
278
 See the ground-breaking determination by the then Adjudicator (Ms Mohlala), Cockcroft and Mine 
Employees Pension Fund [2007] 3 BPLR 296 (PFA). 
279
 See the case of Cockcroft supra at paras 22-23. See also an analysis of the Cockroft’s 
determination and its possible implications by Barrow O and Gubula N “The Right to Claim a Share of 
Spouse’s Retirement Benefits on Divorce” Without Prejudice November 2007 at 13-14; and 
Marumoagae MC “A Non-Member Spouse’s Entitlement to the Member’s Pension Interest” PER/PELJ 
2014 Vol 17 (6) at 2488-2524.  
280
 Section 37D(4)((b)(ii) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
281
 Section 37D(4)(a)(i)(aa). 
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It is important for a non-member spouse, especially those working and earning a 
salary, to preserve the benefit in another fund and use the money to supplement the 
pension benefit they will receive when they retire. There is also a growing trend of 
people divorcing specifically to access the retirement money.282 This is very 
unfortunate as the money is then not used for the purpose it was meant for. This 
again regrettably contributes to the high level of poverty in this country. Such are the 
types of gaps which currently exist in South Africa’s retirement system. With these 
gaps, money that could have been used to take care of the non-member spouse in 
retirement or money that could have been used to supplement the non-member’s 
spouse’s retirement benefit, that is, if he or she was working, is used for other things 
and in that way the benefit does not serve its intended purpose.  
 
It is therefore important to enforce the preservation of the benefit even in this regard. 
For example, the receiving spouse, if working and earning above a specified salary 
threshold; can be required to preserve a certain percentage of the benefit and he or 
she can use the rest as he or she likes.  
 
The whole benefit can be paid, for example where the person is not employed or 
where the amount of the share is below a certain amount; otherwise the system 
should avail other options on how the money can be preserved to earn interest and 
to be released when that person reaches the age of 55. 
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 See generally Cameron B “Splitting a pension on divorce”, 23 January 2012 Personal Finance, 
accessed from http://www.iol.co.za/business/personal-finance/retirement/splitting-a-pension-on-
divorce-1.1218453, last visited 26 July 2015. 
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6.8 MANAGEMENT OF RETIREMENT FUNDS AND THE PROTECTION OF 
MEMBERS’ INTERESTS AND RIGHTS  
 
6.8.1 The powers of the board of trustees 
 
The Pension Funds Amendment Act of 1996283 introduced far-reaching changes to 
the management of retirement funds. In terms of the said changes, now all new 
funds registered on or after 19 April 1997 and all existing funds with effect from 15 
December 1998 must have a board of management consisting of at least four 
members of which at least 50% must be elected by the members.284 Employers and 
employees appoint the board of management,285 which runs the affairs of the fund as 
directed by the fund rules. The idea with this balanced representivity is for both 
employers and workers to be jointly responsible for the management of the fund. The 
board of trustees must exercise its powers and perform its duties as empowered by 
the fund rules, and not as directed by those who elected them. Thus, members of the 
board are expected to use their discretion without being influenced by those who 
elected them to the board. They may also not under any circumstances undertake to 
perform their duties or exercise their discretion in a particular way.286  
 
 
                                            
 
283
 The Pension Funds Second Amendment Act, 22 of 1996. Section 7A of the Pension Funds Act of 
1956 (dealing with the constitution of the board of management of a fund) was inserted into the Act by 
section 2 of the Pension Funds Second Amendment Act of 1996. 
284
 Section 7A(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
285
 Every registered fund, unless exempted by section 7B, is required by section 7A of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956 to have a board of management (board of trustees) made up of at least four board 
members, 50% of which must be elected by members of the fund and 50% elected by the employer or 
employers participating in the fund.  
286
 See in this regard PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood 
And Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) 2008 (2) SA 351 (W) at par 24 (hereafter, PPWAWU 
National Provident Fund); Tobin v Motor Industries Pension Fund (2001) BPLR 2769 (PFA); and 
Hoosen NO & Others v Deedat & Others 1999 JOL 5179 (A) at par 21. See also an English decision 
of British Coal Corporation v British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme Trustees Ltd [1995] 1 AII ER 
912, where it was stated that a person may not be expected to exercise a discretion regarding a fund 
within a group he belongs to as such a person cannot be able to weigh his own interests against 
those of others. See also another British case of Manning v Drexel Burnham Lambert [1995] 1 WLR 
32. 
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The board of trustees has the duty to take all reasonable steps to protect the 
interests of the members in terms of fund rules and the provisions of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956. The board also has common-law fiduciary duties287 to act with 
due care, diligence, and in good faith;288 to avoid conflict of interests;289 and to act 
with impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries290 of the fund. These 
common law duties have since been codified in sections 7C and 7D of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956.291 These duties are discussed below.  
 
6.8.2 Trustees’ fiduciary duties and members’ rights 
 
6.8.2.1 General 
 
The board of trustees manages the fund and looks after the interests of the fund 
members. The board also has a relationship with other stakeholders, such as the 
participating employer, service providers, fund administrators, and investment 
managers. It is, however, the relationship that the board has with the fund and fund 
members and/or beneficiaries which is of great relevance to this discussion.  
 
  
                                            
 
287
 These common-law duties are codified in section 7C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. The word 
“fiduciary” emanates from the Latin word “fiducia” which means “trust”. The board of trustees therefore 
holds the assets of the fund in trust on behalf of the members of the fund (see in this regard Hudson 
A, The Law on Investment Entities (2000) at 85-86. See also generally on the topic of fiduciary duties, 
Havenga M Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities 
(LLD Thesis, University of South Africa) (1995). According to Havenga M “Breach of Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties: Liability on What Basis” (1996) 8 SA Merc LJ at 366, the fact that analogies are 
usually made between the fiduciary offices of directors and other fiduciaries, such as trustees and 
agents confirm that a fiduciary duty exists. 
288
Section 7C(2)(b). 
289
Section 7C(2)(c). 
290
Section 7C(2)(d). See also PF Circular 98 dealing with the objects and duties of the boards of the 
funds. 
291
It was held in PPWAWU National Provident Fund supra note 286 at par 21, that section 7C of the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956 created statutory duties that overlap with the pre-existing common law 
fiduciary duties of the board. See also Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) at 813A-B 
(hereafter, Doyle) and Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustees 1915 AD 491 at 499. 
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The relationship between the board of trustees, the fund, and fund members is called 
a “fiduciary relation”. It is this relationship that gives rise to what are generally known 
as “fiduciary duties”. It was held in Doyle v Board of Executors292 that a trustee 
occupies a fiduciary office which imposes upon him or her the duty of utmost good 
faith towards beneficiaries, whether actual or potential. A fiduciary duty is a high duty 
of care and involves the elements of good faith, trust, and honesty. Trustees are 
fiduciaries as they occupy a position of trust to the fund. Fiduciary duties mean that 
the board of trustees must act in good faith and in accordance with the powers 
conferred on them, and must be loyal to the fund293 to the exclusion of others. It is 
assumed this also refers to fund members and beneficiaries. The board must not 
make any secret profit in the exercise of their powers and must also not allow 
themselves to be placed in a position in which their interests or the interests of third 
parties are inconsistent with or in conflict with their duties to the fund.294  
 
The board of a retirement fund cannot choose not to be obliged to perform their 
fiduciary duties. In other words, the board cannot opt-out of its fiduciary duties in any 
way. These duties are imposed on the board of trustees by common law and are 
also now codified in sections 7C and 7D of the Pension Funds of 1956. In terms of 
section 7C(1) of the Act the object of a board shall be to direct, control and oversee 
the operations of a fund in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the 
fund. On the other hand, subsection (2) states that the board shall, in pursuing its 
objects take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of the members in 
terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 
are protected at all times.  
                                            
 
292
 See the case of Doyle supra. 
293
 The fund in this regard is the principal of the (agent) trustee or fiduciary. In Mothew (t/a Stapley & 
Co) v Bristol and West Building Society [1996] EWCA Civ 533 [1996] 4 AII ER 698 at 711-712, Millet 
LJ said the following about a person who occupies a position of trust, or a fiduciary: “A fiduciary is 
someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is 
entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary …. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his 
trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the 
benefit of the third person without the informed consent of his principal.” 
294
 Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit note 165 at 172-173. 
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According to Hunter et al,295 trustees’ duties include ensuring that the fund is and will 
for the foreseeable future remain financially sound and be able to pay benefits to 
members and beneficiaries when those benefits accrue. These duties, and in 
particular the latter, are very important for a number of reasons; including that it is 
upon the board of trustees to ensure that fund members and/or beneficiaries receive 
adequate benefits when the time to retire arrives. The Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds) Act of 2001296 provides that a director, member, partner, 
official, employee, or agent of a financial institution who invests, keeps safe custody, 
controls, administers, or alienates any trust property must with regard to the trust 
property and the terms of the instrument or agreement by which the trust in question 
has been created, observe the utmost good faith and exercise the care and diligence 
required of a trustee in the exercise or discharge of his or her powers and duties.297 
Thus, trustees in a wider sense are regarded as such (trustees) because they stand 
in a fiduciary relationship to the trust.  
 
There has been an ongoing debate as to whether the board of trustees owes a 
fiduciary duty to both the fund and fund members, or only to the fund. In the case of 
Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz,298 the court had held that the 
board of trustees indeed owes a fiduciary duty to the fund and its members and 
beneficiaries. This view was supported by the court in Doyle v Board of Executors,299 
where it was held that the board of trustees holds a fiduciary position with respect to 
both the fund and its members as it administers or manages the fund and its assets 
on behalf of the members. However, there have been conflicting views about the 
issue.  
  
                                            
 
295
 Ibid at 162. 
296
 Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act of 2001. 
297
 Section 2(b). The wording of this section is almost similar to the wording of section 2 of the 
Financial Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act 39, of 1984. 
298
 See the case of Tek Corporation Provident Fund supra note 33 at par 28. 
299
 See the case of Doyle supra note 291 at 813A-B. 
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For example, Marumoagae300 thinks that the board of trustees does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to the members of the fund301 as the board cannot be expected to go 
out of its way to satisfy members’ wishes, but that the board’s responsibility is to 
ensure that in the process of carrying out its duties on behalf of the fund, members 
are not prejudiced unjustly.302 It is submitted that it is not the wishes of the fund 
members which the board must protect, but their interests. According to 
Marumoagae, the board only owes the members of the fund and stakeholders the 
duty of good faith.303 He submits that the board owes a fiduciary duty to the fund as it 
holds the assets of the fund in a fiduciary capacity.304 Hunter et al share 
Marumoagae’s view. Hunter et al are of the view that the board of trustees owes a 
fiduciary duty to the fund and not to its members; the same way in which members of 
the board of a company owes fiduciary duties to the company and not its individual 
members or shareholders.305 In their view the members of a retirement fund do not 
have any rights to the assets of the fund, but will in any event benefit from proper 
management and administration of the fund.306 However, according to Liberty, a 
person who is a trustee will have consequential fiduciary duties to fund members.  
                                            
 
300
 Marumoagae MC “Do Boards of Trustees of South African Retirement Funds Owe Fiduciary Duties 
to Both the Funds and Fund Members? The Debate Continues” [2012] PER/PELJ Vol 15(2) at 554-
569. 
301
 According to Marumoagae (ibid at 560), fiduciary duties should be understood as the obligation 
and responsibility the board of trustees has to be loyal to the fund, and thereby to carry out its duties 
towards the fund with dignity and honesty in order to advance the objectives of the fund. His view is 
that the boards of trustees owe fiduciary duties only to the funds they serve and not to the members 
of the funds. This view is supported by Hunter R “The Governance of Pension Funds” (Paper 
prepared for the Annual Convention of Financial Planning Institute, Durban) April 2002, at 2 par 2.1, 
accessed from http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/Governance-Of-Pension-
Funds.pdf, last visited on 23 August 2015. On the other hand, Scogland WL “Fiduciary Duty: What 
Does it Mean?” Tort & Insurance Law Journal Vol 24 No 4 (Summer 1989) at 803, states that in 
general terms a person is a fiduciary to the extent that he possesses or exercises any discretionary 
authority or responsibility in plan administration; exercises any authority or control respecting a plan’s 
assets; or renders investment advice with respect to a plan’s assets for a fee. 
302
 Marumoagae (ibid) at 556. 
303
 In Marumoagae’s view (ibid) at 558, the duty of good faith emanates from the provisions of section 
2(a) of the Financial Institutions (Protection Funds) Act of 2001. 
304
 Marumoagae (ibid) at 559. 
305
 See in this regard Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit note 165 
at 165, where in footnote 124 reference is made to Meskin et al Henochsburg on the Companies Act 
at par 208, where the authors state that directors owe no fiduciary duties to the members individually 
and not even to a member who is a majority shareholder. 
306
 Hunter et al (ibid) at 164-166. 
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This point makes sense in that indeed the board of trustees administers or manages 
the fund and its assets on behalf of the members.307 The fund and its members are 
mutually connected and inclusive of each other, as without the members there will be 
no fund and consequently no retirement benefits. The board is entrusted with the 
duty to protect the interests of the fund members and therefore it cannot be seen 
working against those interests by, for example, making secret profit at the members’ 
expense or placing itself in a position of conflict with the interests and aspirations of 
the members of the fund. It is for these reasons that the board can be considered to 
in one way or another also owe fiduciary duties to fund members. Trustees must act 
in the sole interests of the fund and its members, and this includes acting in good 
faith at all times. For example, decisions relating to the investment of the funds must 
be in the best interest of the fund and its members. Liberty defines trust as “an 
arrangement through which the ownership of, or control of, property of one person is, 
by virtue of a trust instrument, made over to, bequeathed to, or controlled by another 
person, the trustee, for the benefit of another or others”.308  
 
According to Liberty, retirement funds and their assets fall under the definition of a 
trust and sometimes have their own specific trust instrument called “a deed of trust”, 
but that even where there is no specific deed of trust for the fund, the fund rules 
constitute a trust instrument.  
                                            
 
307
 See in this regard the case of Doyle supra note 291 at 813A-B. This view is also support by Mdluli 
SM “The Role of the Board of a South African Defined Contribution Fund that Offers Investment 
Choice” SA Merc LJ (2011) 23, at 251 (hereafter Mdluli “The Role of the Board”).  
308
 Liberty Corporate: The Fiduciary Duties of Retirement Fund Trustees (Brochure on the Fiduciary 
Duties of Retirement Fund Trustees) at 8, accessed from http://www.libertycorporate.co.za/our-
brochures/Documents/our-brochures/fiduciary-duties-of-retirement-fund-trustees.pdf, last visited on 
22 July 2015 (hereafter, Liberty Brochure on Fiduciary Duties of Retirement Trustees). In the English 
case of Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270, it was stated that “the starting point is the duty of trustees to 
exercise their powers in the best interests of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding 
the scales impartially between different classes of beneficiaries”. The court further stated that this duty 
is of great importance and that in abiding by the law trustees must put the interests of the 
beneficiaries first. However in Edge v Pensions Ombudsman and Another [1999] AII ER 546 (CA), it 
was held that the trustees are not required to treat the members of the pension scheme equally. In 
casu, a surplus was used to improve the benefits of the active members of the fund and not those of 
the retired members. The Pensions Ombudsman held that the trustees acted impartially but when the 
matter was taken on appeal, the court held that the trustees were entitled to choose and prefer some 
beneficiaries over others and that it was not upon the Ombudsman to second-guess their discretion. 
What is expected from the trustees is to consider all the beneficiaries fairly. 
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This is, however, correctly disputed by Hunter et al who are of the view that trust law 
principles cannot just easily apply to the relationship between the board of trustees 
of retirement funds and fund members; because trusts and retirement funds differ. 
Hunter et al attribute the confusion regarding the application of trust law to retirement 
funds to the fact that, before 1956, retirement funds in South Africa were established 
as trusts.309  
 
Liberty states that where a person, such as a trustee, is charged with the control of 
another’s property, such person will be bound by fiduciary duties, whether a written 
document (in this regard a deed of trust) to that effect exists or not. Where a fund 
has, in addition to its rules, a separate deed of trust, this is regarded as forming part 
of the fund rules and must be registered along with the rules.310 Liberty maintains 
that the assets of retirement funds constitute trust property and any person holding 
or administering that property is a trustee and therefore stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to the fund, and owes fiduciary duties to that fund and the members 
thereof.311  
 
It is submitted that even though the principles that apply to trusts may look relevant 
to retirement funds, it should be accepted that retirement funds in South Africa have 
moved away from taking the form of trusts and are therefore not trusts and cannot be 
regulated by the same law that regulates trusts. Retirement funds are legal persons, 
while trusts are not.312 Thus, even though trustees are regarded as such because 
they stand in a fiduciary relationship to the trust (retirement fund), this should not be 
interpreted to imply that retirement funds are trusts, as opined by Liberty.  
 
                                            
 
309
 Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit note 165 at 163. 
310
 Idem. 
311
 Liberty Brochure: Fiduciary Duties of Retirement Trustees op cit note 308 at 13. See also Thomas 
G and Hudson A The Law of Trusts 2004 at 20, where they state that trustees’ obligations in relation 
to a trust instrument are twofold: firstly, they have the duty of good conscience which requires them to 
avoid conflict of interest, to deal fairly with all beneficiaries and not to make unauthorised profits from 
the trust; secondly, they have obligations to manage the trust properly, which requires them to act in 
the beneficiaries’ best interests, to act in a prudent manner when making investments, and to give 
beneficiaries different kinds of information. 
312
 See Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker & Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at par 10 
where the Supreme Court of Appeal said a trust is not a legal person. 
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It should also be noted that the boards of retirement funds are bound by the 
Constitution and they must in exercising their duties bear in mind their constitutional 
responsibilities. The Constitution is the supreme law of the country,313 and the Bill of 
Rights is especially entrenched314 in the Constitution and it binds the executive, the 
judiciary, and all organs of state, as well as natural or juristic persons – provided 
certain conditions have been met.315 Decisions of boards of trustees are also 
subjected to administrative law review.316 Note should, however, be taken that even 
though members of retirement funds enjoy certain rights, these rights are not 
absolute and they can be limited as long as the limitation satisfies the requirements 
of section 36 of the Constitution, which is also generally known as the “limitation 
clause”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
313
 Section 2 of the Constitution states that this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. See also 
Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 130 at 52. 
314
 The Bill of Rights is not easily amended. In terms of section 74(2) of the Constitution, Chapter 2 
(Bill of Rights) may be amended by a Bill passed by the National Assembly with a supporting vote of 
at least two-thirds of its members and the National Council of Provinces with a supporting vote of at 
least six provinces. 
315
 Section 8(2) of the Constitution states that a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic 
person if and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
316
 See the discussion under par 6.8.1.  
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For example; in limiting the rights in terms of the law of general application317 to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,318 consideration should be 
given to the nature of that right,319 the importance of the purpose of the limitation,320 
the nature and extent of the limitation,321 the relationship between the limitation and 
its purpose,322 and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.323 The law of 
general application with regard to retirement funds, boards of trustees, and fund 
members will be the Pension Funds Act of 1956 and retirement funds’ rules.  
 
                                            
 
317
 See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) at par 41, where it was stated 
that the limitation must be derived from the law of general application and not an executive act or 
policy. 
318
 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at par 104 (hereafter, Makwanyane); and the case 
of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality supra note 213 at par 34. In Law Society of South 
Africa and Others v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) at par 37, the court 
held that limitation of rights is wide-ranging and therefore the courts must take into account all 
relevant factors that go to the justification of the limitation. 
319
 This provision has been drawn from article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966, which provides that state parties to the present Covenant recognise that in 
the enjoyment of those rights provided by the state in conformity with the present Covenant, the state 
may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law, only in so far as this may 
be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society. It, however, looks like the Constitutional Court looks more into the 
importance and the purpose of the right and not necessarily its nature. See in this regard South 
African Transport and Allied Workers Union and Another v Garvas and Others (City of Cape Town as 
Intervening Party and Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2012 (8) BCLR 840 (CC) at 
paras 61-63 and 81. 
320
 The purpose aimed to be achieved by the limitation of the right must be of sufficient importance to 
justify the limitation of the right. What is being looked at in this regard are the values of an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom as set out in section of the 
Constitution. The next step will be to determine whether in terms of the value system the purpose is 
sufficiently important to justify the limitation of the right. In the case of Makwanyane supra note 318 at 
par 185, the court in determining the justifiability of capital punishment held that the deterrence of 
violent crime was an acceptable purpose but that retribution was not. 
321
 The more severe the infringement, the more compelling the purpose must be. Thus the harm done 
must be proportionate to the benefits/purpose achieved by the limitation. In S v Meaker 1998 (8) 
BCLR 1038 (W) at 1054, the accused was challenging the “reverse onus” provision that an owner of a 
vehicle is deemed to be the driver in any contravention of the traffic laws. The fact that the 
consequence of the limitation on the right to remain silent would result only in a fine was not an 
appropriate consideration in determining the nature and extent of the limitation on the right. 
322
 In the case of Makwanyane supra note 318 at par 184, it was found that there was no sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that capital punishment achieved prevention, deterrence, and redistribution. 
323
 Section 36(1)(a)-(e) of the Constitution. In the case of Makwanyane supra note 318 at par 128, the 
Constitutional Court held that long imprisonment can also serve the same purpose as the death 
sentence. In Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others 2002 (3) 
BCLR 231 (CC) at paras 129-130, the majority decision found that there was no objective way in 
which a narrower limitation could be framed in order to safeguard the applicant’s right to freedom of 
religion.  
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Specific fiduciary duties of the board of trustees are discussed below. The discussion 
also covers the rights which fund members and/or beneficiaries have in relation to 
some of these duties. 
 
6.8.2.2 The duty to take all reasonable steps to protect the interests of 
members in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of the 
Act 
 
The duty to take all reasonable steps to protect the interests of members underpins 
the main objective of a retirement fund, which is to ensure that members and/or 
beneficiaries receive adequate benefits when a member retires or to a member’s 
dependants should a member die before he or she could retire. The board must act 
in the best interests of the fund and its members at all times in its management of 
the fund. This is where, according to Hunter et al, pension funds differ from 
companies, which are established and operated to achieve the best possible return 
on the capital invested by shareholders; while, on the other hand, pension funds are 
not profit orientated.324 With regard to pension funds, the benefits come from 
contributions made by both employee members and employers as determined by the 
fund rules. In administering the fund, the board of trustees must make sure that all 
the decisions made are to the benefit of the fund and in turn to the benefit of the 
members and/or beneficiaries. The board must do this guided and authorised by the 
fund rules and the provisions of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. According to Hunter 
et al, the board is required to make sure that the fund is financially sound and that it 
is able to pay benefits when they accrue. It also means that members of the board of 
trustees cannot procure an amendment to the rules of the fund to provide that they 
are indemnified by the fund against all claims for compensation for losses resulting 
from their negligent or culpable acts or omissions, and cannot rely on disclaimers on 
liability in regard to incorrect information given to members and beneficiaries.325  
                                            
 
324
 Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit note 165 at 166-167. 
325
 Hunter et al (ibid) at 162-163. See also the following cases referred to by Hunter et al (idem): 
Warner v Old Mutual Staff Retirement Fund [2000] 7 BPLR 804 (PFA); Connery v Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Co (SA) Ltd & Another [2002] 6 BPLR 3544 (PFA) (hereafter, Connery); and Central 
Retirement Annuity Fund v Adjudicator of Pension Funds & Others [2005] 8 BPLR 655 (C). 
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6.8.2.3 The duty to act with due care and diligence 
 
This duty arises with regard to dealings with assets, property, and information 
belonging to the fund. The standard of care required in this regard is greater than 
that of a reasonable person.326 The board of trustees will have to act with the 
prudence and caution of a person who is required to manage another person’s 
affairs. This was confirmed in the case of Administrators Estate Richards v Nichol 
and Another.327 The said standard is of the bonus et diligens paterfamilias of Roman 
law. Such a person is obliged, in dealing with and investing the money of the 
beneficiary, to observe due care and diligence, and not to expose it in any way to 
any business risks.328  
 
The duty to act with care has four main elements in relation to retirement fund 
trustees:329 
 
 To handle the property entrusted to them with greater care than they would in 
dealing with their own property; 
 To be fully acquainted with all relevant legal aspects of their role as trustees; 
 To make sure that all relevant matters are properly covered in meetings; and  
 To keep members fully informed of all changes that relate to them and their 
benefits in terms of the fund. 
  
                                            
 
326
 It was held in an old decision of Sackville-West v Nourse & Another 1925 AD 516 that the standard 
of care required of a trustee in relation to trust property was higher than that which an ordinary person 
might generally observe in the management of his or her own affairs. 
327
 See Administrators Estate Richards v Nichol and Another [1998] 4 All SA 555 (A). 
328
 Supra at 561. 
329
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 10 at 113. See 
also generally the Mouton Committee Report op cit note 58 at 437. 
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Due diligence, on the other hand, requires the person who occupies the position of 
trust to engage properly with the affairs of the fund. For example, board members 
will be required to always apply their mind to the issues that come before the board. 
The board will be in breach of the duty to act with due care and diligence if they fail 
to act as expected of persons in their position. Such a breach may even amount to 
delict and the member or board may be liable should the fund suffer any loss as a 
result of such a breach.330 
 
6.8.2.4 The duty to act in good faith 
 
The board of trustees owes a fiduciary duty to the fund and a duty of good faith to 
the members and other stakeholders. However, there are no degrees of good 
faith.331 Thus, any judgment of the trustees’ action will be based on an unqualified 
standard of good faith.  
 
Any breach of good faith, regardless of its effect or nature, means that the trustees’ 
action is mala fide or in bad faith.332 Hunter et al describe the duty of good faith by 
the board of trustees to mean that the board:333 
 
 Must exercise such power and discretion as authorised by the fund rules; 
 Exercise the power or discretion granted to it only for its proper purpose; 
 Take into account all those facts and considerations which are relevant to its 
decision; 
 Disregard those facts and circumstances that are irrelevant to the issue at 
hand; 
                                            
 
330
 Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit note 172 at 177-178. 
331
 This was confirmed by the National Treasury in its First Discussion Paper (2004) (South Africa 
Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 1 at 56), where it is said that “the right of 
members to elect trustees has had the effect of improving ‘democracy’ in retirement funding but many trustees fail to appreciate 
that they owe their primary (fiduciary) duty to the fund as a whole and not to the ‘constituency’ (employer, in-service members, 
union or pensioners) who appointed or elected them”. See also generally Marais v Momentum Life Pension 
Fund [2003] 10 BPLR 5222 (PFA). 
332
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 14 at 103. 
333
 Hunter et al The Pension Funds Act: A Commentary on the Act op cit note 165 at 181-182. 
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 free itself from bias and refrain from fettering its discretion; 
 take a decision that is reasonable based on reasons given for it; and 
 if asked for them, provide reasons for its decisions. 
 
In Ganes and another v Telecom Namibia Ltd,334 it was held that the duty of good 
faith entailed that an employee was obliged not to work against the employer’s 
interests, not to place himself in a position where his interests conflicted with that of 
the employer, not to make a secret profit at the expense of the employer, and not to 
receive from a third party a bribe, secret profit or commission in the course of or by 
means of his position as an employee of the employer.335 The board of trustees is 
also expected not to work against the interests of the fund and its members and/or 
beneficiaries. The board must always act to advance the interest of the fund and 
may not act in such a way that the interests of the fund suffer and personal interests 
are furthered instead of the interests of the fund. In Tatiya v Liquor and Catering, the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator said:336 
 
“In other areas of administrative and employment law, the courts have consistently held that 
the duty to act in good faith incorporates the duty to disclose adequate relevant information. 
This is particularly so when individuals face an impending decision which may have adverse 
implications for them.” 
 
The duty of good faith requires trustees to ensure that members are placed in a 
position to make properly informed choices regarding the options available to them, 
as failure to provide such information constitutes a breach of their common-law duty 
of good faith and an improper exercise of their powers.337 This duty requires trustees 
to disclose to members, former members (pensioners), and beneficiaries information 
relating to the fund for the protection and enforcement of their rights. Failure to 
disclose such information without good reasons will amount to an improper exercise 
of the fund’s powers and/or maladministration by the board of management.338  
                                            
 
334
 Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA). 
335
 Supra at par 25.  
336
 Tatiya v Liquor and Catering [1999] 11 BPLR 315 (PFA). 
337
 Caffin and Dooling v African Oxygen [1999] 10 BPLR 113 (PFA) (hereafter, Caffin); Euijen v 
Nedcor [2000] 5 BPLR 465 (PFA). 
338
 Noordien v Metal Industries Provident Fund [2002] 3 BPLR 3236 (PFA). 
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
309 
 
In Caffin v African Oxygen,339 the complainants wanted access to the minutes of the 
trustee meetings and all other documentation concerning the activities, deliberations, 
and decisions of those to whom they had delegated their duties or functions. Having 
considered the relevant statutes, the Pension Funds Adjudicator said that the duty of 
the trustees to act in good faith carries with it the concomitant right of members to 
have access to sufficient and relevant information to protect and advance their rights, 
interests, and expectations arising under the fund. In certain cases, such information 
might well include relevant minutes of trustees’ meetings. In Lediga v Bosal Afrika 
Group Provident Fund and Another,340 the complainant was dissatisfied with the 
amount of his retrenchment benefit. He had also requested information regarding his 
transfer value in a predecessor fund and any surplus in the predecessor funds. The 
fund argued that it had provided him with a breakdown of his equitable share in the 
present fund, and that it no longer had records or information concerning his benefits 
and transfer values in previous funds. The fund was willing to supply the information 
provided the complainant bore the cost of obtaining same from an actuary. The 
Pension Funds Adjudicator correctly held that this was unreasonable and that the 
fund had not discharged its statutory duties in terms of section 7D of the Pension 
Funds Act of 1956 to supply adequate and appropriate information to the 
complainant. The Adjudicator stated that the fund could be seen as a natural 
successor of the previous pension funds since it received transfer values of 
members employed by the same employer. The Adjudicator ordered the fund to 
provide the complainant with the information required and to bear any related costs.  
 
Section 32 of the Constitution gives everyone the right of access to any information 
held by the state and any information that is held by another person, including in this 
case a retirement fund, and that is required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights.  
                                            
 
339
 See the case of Caffin supra note 337. 
340
 Lediga v Bosal Afrika Group Provident Fund and Another [2001] 7 BPLR 2211 (PFA) (hereafter, 
Lediga). 
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The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000341 was promulgated on 2 
February 2000 to give effect to the constitutional right of access to information.The 
Promotion of Access to Information Act applies to the records342 of public and private 
bodies343 and it prescribes the procedure which must be followed in order to gain 
access to a record.344 A person who requests a private body, for example, the board 
of a pension fund, for access to its records must be given access if the records are 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights.345  
 
 
 
                                            
 
341
 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
342
 Section 1 of Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 defines “record” as any recorded 
information, regardless of form or medium, in the possession or under the control of a private body, 
and whether or not it was created by that private body. The record/s or information must be in the 
possession of that body as the law does not require the body to find information from third parties or 
other sources (See in this regard Mdluli “The Role of the Board” op cit note 307 at 253. According to 
Mdluli (idem), neither the Pension Funds Act of 1956 nor the Pension Funds Adjudicator defines the 
nature of the duty to provide members with adequate and appropriate information with respect to 
members with investment choices as it happened in Crous v Imatu Staff Pension fund & Others 
[2001] 4 BPLR 1817 (PFA) where the complainant complained that she was not properly informed of 
the options available to her and the fact that she bore investment risks. Mdluli’s view is that even 
though the Pension Funds Adjudicator had found a lengthy documentation provided to the 
complainant to be clearly informing her of the options available to her and the fact that she bore 
investment risks, the Adjudicator, however, failed to stipulate any minimum requirements that the 
information supplied to the complainant had to meet in order to qualify as sufficient to enable her to 
make an informed choice (at par 18).  
343
 Section 3 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. 
344
 Part 2-4 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. 
345
 See section 50 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. See also the case of Zuze 
supra note 258, where the Pension Funds Adjudicator was faced with the question whether or not the 
complainant was entitled to information relevant to the calculation of her claim; it was held that the 
fund must provide her with the information as requested. The Pension Funds Adjudicator held that the 
complainant had the right of access to information relevant to the amount due to her, including how 
the amount was calculated and the terms and conditions governing the payment of benefits. In 
coming to the conclusion, the Pension Funds Adjudicator relied on the ruling in the case of Smith 
supra note 212. In Noordien supra note 338 at paras 19-20, where the complainant (non-member 
spouse) requested information regarding the amount paid to her former husband as well as the bank 
account into which it was paid. The fund refused to provide such information arguing that it would 
amount to breach of the duty of confidentiality owed to the member. The Pension Funds Adjudicator 
held that the complainant’s right to receive information was stronger than that of her former husband 
and that the fund did not have any sound reasons to refuse to give her the information she requested. 
The Pension Funds Adjudicator was of the view that the complainant would suffer undue financial 
hardships if she was not furnished with the information. The Adjudicator accepted that the duty was 
owed to both parties but that the interest of the non-member spouse needed more protection in this 
instance than that of the former husband.    
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It should be noted, however, that the right of access to information in the hands of 
the state is unqualified, while the right of access to information in others’ hands is 
qualified on a need-to-know basis; that is, the information must be required in order 
to exercise or protect the right.346 The fund or board thereof will thus also have a 
duty to provide specific information on request by a member.  
 
Section 7C(2)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 provides that one of the objects 
of the board is to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of members 
are protected; including in the event of termination or reduction of contributions to a 
fund by an employer, to increase of contributions of members, and withdrawal of the 
participating employer. One of the duties of the board is in terms of section 7D(c) to 
ensure that adequate and appropriate information is communicated to the members 
of the fund informing them of their rights, benefits, and duties in terms of the rules of 
the fund. The section obliges the board to furnish members with adequate and 
appropriate information to enable them to exercise their rights in terms of the rules. 
Failure by the board to provide such relevant information will amount to a breach of 
duty of good faith and will constitute maladministration of the fund.347  
 
 
                                            
 
346
 Section 9(a)(i-ii) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. 
347
 In Ngoepe v Metal Industries Provident Fund and Another [2003] 11 BPLR 5316 (PFA), the 
complainant lodged a complaint with the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator after he had 
requested information from the fund regarding its rules, as well as a detailed breakdown of the 
computation of his withdrawal benefit. The fund failed to provide him with the requested information. 
The Pension Funds Adjudicator held that the fund had the duty to ensure that adequate and 
appropriate information is communicated to the complainant and other members of the fund (at par 
13). Again in Lediga supra note 340 at 2216, the Adjudicator held that failure by the fund, in the 
absence of appropriate justification, to provide relevant information requested by the member to 
exercise his rights constituted a breach of the duty to act in good faith and therefore amounted to an 
improper exercise of powers and maladministration of the fund. In Kriedemann v Lubritene Provident 
Fund [2002] 2 BPLR 3082 (PFA) at par 15, the Pension Funds Adjudicator held that the board of the 
fund has a duty in terms of section 7D to, among other things, ensure that material information is 
communicated to members of the fund informing them of their rights, benefits, and duties in terms of 
the rules of the fund. The Adjudicator further held that failure by the board to provide material 
information to fund members amounts to maladministration. In McEwan v First National Bank Pension 
Fund [2000] 8 BPLR 913 (PFA) at 918-919, the Adjudicator held that the fund members have a right 
to adequate and appropriate information in terms of section 7D(c) and the constitutional right to 
information.  
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Members of retirement funds may also upon payment of the fees prescribed by 
regulation inspect at the office of the Registrar the rules of the fund, last revenue 
account, last balance sheet and may without paying any fee inspect at the 
Registrar’s office the last report by a valuator prepared in terms of section 16 of the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956, last statement and report thereon prepared in terms of 
section 17, and any scheme which is being carried out by the fund in accordance 
with the provisions of section 18 of the Act.348 The fund may also not furnish the 
member who requested certain information with incorrect information.349  
 
In terms of the PF Circular 130, even though not binding,350 the fund must have and 
make available to beneficiaries a code of conduct, an investment policy statement, a 
communication policy, and a performance assessment tool for trustees, which 
should inform their education and training policy. Fund members have the right to 
access the fund rules, actuarial valuations, and audited financial statements. 
Communication to members must be appropriate, timely, accurate, complete, 
consistent, useful, comprehensible, and accessible. It must also be transparent, fair, 
and display accountability.  
                                            
 
348
 Section 22 read with section 35 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
349
 In the case of Connery supra note 325 at paras 24 and 26, the Pension Funds Adjudicator stated 
that the duty of care and diligence requires the fund and the administrators not to act carelessly and 
without diligence. The Adjudicator held that the issuing of a disclaimer of a liability does not show the 
level of prudence expected on the part of the administrators, but constitutes an abdication of 
responsibility on their part which could amount to maladministration. The information provided by 
pension funds to members must be accurate. The Pension Funds Adjudicator has dealt with this issue 
in a number of determinations including the following: Bona v South African Local Authority Fund & 
Another (1) [2001] 10 BPLR 2563 (PFA); Neicker v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund [2002] 3 
BPLR 3218 (PFA); Strydom v Cape Technikon [2001] 3 BPLR 1797 (PFA); Metcalfe v ABSA 
Consultants & Actuaries (Pty) Ltd & Another [2002] 12 BPLR 4167 (PFA); Krog v Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund (PFA/GA/5769/2005/ZC) (unreported); and De Bruyn v Telkom Retirement Fund [2000] 
11 BPLR 1220 (PFA). Mhango M “Can Inaccurate Benefit Statements Lead to Pension Fund Liability 
under the South African Pension Funds Act” (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ at 462 states that pension funds 
must give their members periodic and accurate benefit statements because these statements are 
probably the only financial instruments pension funds members can rely on to plan for their 
retirement. It is therefore important for pension funds and administrators to pay special care in the 
preparation of benefit statements, since failure to do so may lead to liability. 
350
 See in this regard Chairman of the Board of Sanlam Pensionfonds (Kantoorpersoneel) v Registrar 
of Pension Funds 2007 (3) SA 41 (T); [2007] 1 BPLR 57 (T) at par 9 (hereafter, Chairman of the 
Board of Sanlam). In terms of section 33A of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, the Registrar “may” 
issue a directive to a pension fund, an administrator or any other person, which sets out what is 
required and what is prohibited. Thus the Registrar’s powers to issue directives are not legislative but 
administrative in nature.  
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Members and beneficiaries must receive communication on the performance of the 
fund’s investment, which are relevant to members and which will assist them to 
determine the credibility and trustworthiness of the fund administrators and delivery 
of benefits. The Circular requires the fund to respond promptly to all communication 
by members, beneficiaries, and stakeholders. Complaints made by fund members 
must be treated seriously and be noted by the board. Members should also be 
reminded periodically of the need to review the investment choices made by them. 
The fund may in certain cases even provide basic training to fund members to make 
sure that they understand the operations of the fund and the fund’s investments.351  
 
The board must communicate to fund members the investment performance of the 
fund, the average costs per member, and the fees and disbursements paid to 
independent board members. The members must be informed about determinations 
of the Pension Funds Adjudicator given against the fund, regulatory issues raised by 
the Registrar, and deviations from rules and policies.352 Trustees must also, among 
other things, and importantly so, ensure that fund members understand their position 
in terms of meeting their retirement goals. If members are well informed about this, 
they will be in a position to start thinking about their life in retirement and will also be 
able work out retirement budgets using that information. This will avoid high 
expectations that members normally have of receiving enormous amounts of money 
when they retire and it will further help fund members to determine if they are saving 
enough and also if they will need another form of saving to supplement what they will 
receive at the time of retirement.   
 
In Hilton Hotel Employees v Trustees of the Liquor and Catering Trade 
(Pietermaritzburg) Provident Fund and Another,353 where the complainants sought 
an order requiring the respondents to furnish them with information they needed to 
                                            
 
351
 Items 57-63 of PF Circular 130. 
352
 Items 57-63 of PF Circular 130. In its 2011 Benchmark Survey op cit note 50 at 13, Sanlam found 
that annual benefit statements, a rule booklet, and information on the intranet/Internet were the most 
popular tools of communication used by the funds. The most popular topic was found to be the benefit 
structure and investment performance. 
353
 Hilton Hotel Employees v Trustees of the Liqour and Catering Trade (Pietermaritzburg) Provident 
Fund and Another [2000] 5 BPLR 511 (PFA) at 518. 
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properly assess the fund’s liability to dormant members such as themselves, the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator held that the right to obtain information was a 
prerequisite for establishing that the trustees had acted improperly. The 
complainants had proved that they reasonably required the information to 
understand the basis of the allocation and application of the unclaimed benefits in 
the fund.354  
 
Again in Ndlovu v Vegmoflora Fund and Another,355 the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
upheld, in part, the complainant’s ancillary complaint that the fund had failed to 
provide certain information he had requested for the purposes of informed decision 
making.356 In Caffin v African Oxygen,357 the Pension Funds Adjudicator correctly 
held that the complainants may, in appropriate circumstances, be entitled to the 
minutes of trustee meetings, as long as the relevancy of the minutes of that 
particular meeting for purposes of the complaint was established. However, it was 
not the case in this instance as the request was of a general nature. In other 
determinations, the Pension Funds Adjudicator ruled that a duty to provide 
information existed where members are required or entitled to exercise options in 
terms of the rules of a fund.358  
  
                                            
 
354
 Supra at 519. 
355
 Ndlovu v Vegmoflora Fund and Another [2002] 3 BPLR 3224 (PFA) at par 27.  
356
 Supra at par 28. 
357
 See the cases of Caffin supra note 337 and Ndlovu supra note 355. 
358
 See Letlonkane v Southern Staff Pension Fund [1999] 11 BPLR 266 (PFA) at 274; and Roux v 
Messina Group Pension Fund [2000] 10 BPLR 1166 (PFA) at 1174. 
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In promoting the fund’s duty to disclose information, the Financial Services Board 
published two Circulars dealing with minimum disclosure requirements, namely 
Pension Funds Circular 86 and 90. Requirements set out in the Circulars are not 
statutory requirements but are merely a code of best practice agreed to by the 
stakeholders.359 Circular 86 requires retirement funds to provide new entrants with 
an explanatory pamphlet within three months of joining the fund, and existing 
members with an annual benefit statement360 within which specific disclosure is 
required. Funds are further required to provide all members with prescribed 
information on fund restructuring, withdrawal, retirement, and death. Information 
given to members must cover details of benefits; for example what benefits are 
payable and when, rate of contributions, members’ right to inspect the rules and the 
financial returns and valuation reports, the internal dispute resolution procedure, and 
the importance of nominating a beneficiary. Pension Funds Circular 90 deals with 
disclosure to pensioners, deferred pensioners, and dependants or nominated 
beneficiaries of deceased members where the benefit is a pension or lump-sum paid 
in instalments.361 It should be noted, however, that even though the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act of 2000 gives effect to the right of access to information, 
that access is subject to justifiable limitations; including but not limited to limitations 
aimed at the reasonable protection of privacy, efficient and good governance, in a 
manner which balances that right to any other rights, including the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  
                                            
 
359
 PF Circulars are mere guidelines and have no binding effect. See in this regard: Chairman of the 
Board of the Sanlam supra note 350 at par 9 where the Registrar stated that the circular is just a 
guideline for the board and that the board has discretion to comply or not to comply with the circular. 
360
 In Wentworth v GG Umbrella Provident Fund & Others [2009] 1 BPLR 87 (PFA) at paras 23-29, 
the Pension Funds Adjudicator held that it is reasonable that members of pension funds should 
receive benefit statements at least once a year. This is now provided for in PF Circulars 86 and 90. In 
Hoffmann v IF Umbrella Provident Fund and AON South Africa (Pty) Ltd PFA/WE/31623/2009/SM 
(unreported) at par 5.2, the Pension Funds Adjudicator stated that the provision of benefit statements 
to members on a regular basis serves an important function because it gives members relevant 
information regarding their benefits.  
361
 Pension Funds Circulars 86 and 90 on “Minimum Disclosure” requirements are available on 
www.fsb.co.za, last visited 22 July 2015. 
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For example, disclosure of information should be refused if such a disclosure would 
involve unreasonable disclosure of personal information concerning a third party 
such as a deceased person.362 
 
6.8.2.5 The duty to avoid conflict of interests 
 
The trustees are required to maintain an independent and dispassionate interest in 
the affairs of the fund and at the same time promote the interests of its various 
beneficiaries. Interests include interests in terms of the rules of the fund and the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956. The board and its members collectively or individually 
may not do anything that would place them in a position of conflict of interest with the 
fund. The duty includes the obligation to disclose any conflict of interest. This means 
that a trustee may not make any profit from any activities relating to the fund during 
his term of office except as may be regarded as remuneration under the rules. They 
may also not benefit themselves as members at the expense of other beneficiaries 
and members. The common law requires them to account for and to pay to the fund 
any profit they may have derived. They must hold assets of the fund for the benefit of 
the fund and its members, and may not have any personal interest in trust property. 
Trustees must be satisfied that only members and their beneficiaries benefit from the 
fund’s assets. Trustees must therefore ensure that any person regarded by them as 
a beneficiary is indeed a beneficiary and that he or she is correctly entitled to 
benefits. In this case, trustees would, for example, be expected to receive adequate 
confirmation that anyone claiming to be a beneficiary is indeed entitled to receive the 
benefit.363 
 
 
 
                                            
 
362
 See sections 34(1) (about public bodies) and 63(1) (about private bodies) of Promotion of Access 
to Information Act. See also Olivier at al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 130 at 115.  
363
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 14 at 113; see also a preamble to PF Circular 130 and the Mouton Committee Report op cit 
note 58 at 428-439.  
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6.8.2.6 The duty to act impartially in respect of all members and beneficiaries 
 
The duty to act impartially in respect of all members and beneficiaries requires the 
board of trustees to ensure that all members are treated equally and that no member 
is favoured either at the expense of other members or in such a way that all the 
members cannot enjoy equal treatment. Trustees will be expected to be transparent 
in their dealings with the fund and its members and this may be achieved by making 
public their decisions and actions.364 The trustees have a common law duty and they 
are also obliged by section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, to treat all members of the fund equally and impartially. Section 9 of the 
Constitution guarantees everyone equality before the law and further provides that 
everyone has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. In terms of section 
9(4) of the Constitution, no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  
 
Section 9(3) provides that the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds; including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. Retirement funds are 
frequently faced with matters where they are called to decide whether same-sex 
partners qualify as spouses or dependants of fund members. Section 9 of the 
Constitution is given effect to by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act of 2000365. Section 6 of this Act prohibits unfair discrimination 
against any person by the state or any other person. On the other hand, Chapter 2 of 
the Act places a duty on all persons to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of 
race, gender, and disability. Retirements funds are also bound by these provisions to 
treat everyone equally. Discrimination by the fund may relate to the administration of 
the fund or the application of the fund rules by the board. 
 
                                            
 
364
 Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 10 at 115. 
365
 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000. 
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In TWC and Others v Rentokil Pension Fund and Another,366 the matter dealt with 
the question whether a same-sex partner qualified as a dependant or spouse of the 
deceased member of the fund in terms of section 37C of the Pension Funds Act of 
1956. The Pension Funds Adjudicator held that when interpreting section 37C, read 
with section 1 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, he was obliged to give effect to the 
value contained in section 9 of the Bill of Rights that same-sex relationships (unions) 
in appropriate circumstances should enjoy the same status, rights, benefits, and 
responsibilities as a heterosexual union.367  
 
The High Court held in Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security and Others368 
that the stability and permanence of same-sex relationships are no different from 
married couples and that both types of unions are deserving of respect and 
protection. In casu, the applicant, a lesbian police officer, had applied to have her 
live-in partner registered as a dependant member of the medical aid scheme known 
as Polmed. 369 The rules of this scheme defined a dependant as, among others, “the 
legal spouse or widow or widower or a dependent member”. According to the Court, 
the rules excluded a large number of persons who were de facto dependants of the 
medical scheme members and as such constituted discrimination.370  
                                            
 
366
 See generally the case of Rentokil supra note 218.  
367
 Supra at 224. 
368
 See the case of Langemaat supra note 213. 
369
 See generally the case of Langemaat supra note 213 at 448-449, where in the court’s view 
medical aid regulations which do not recognise same-sex relationships are invalid and therefore 
unconstitutional; in Muir v Mutual and Federal Pension Fund [2002] 9 BPLR 3864 (PFA) at par 9 the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator held that the complainant who was involved in a long-term lesbian 
relationship with the deceased was a factual dependant of the deceased in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie and Others; in Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others [2005] 10 BPLR 807 (CC) at par 114 (hereafter, Fourie) the court held that failure of the 
common law and Marriage Act to protect same-sex couples constituted an unjustifiable violation of 
their right to equal protection of the law under section 9(1) and not to be discriminated unfairly in 
terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality op cit note 
213 at par 98, the court ordered that the words “or partner, in a permanent same-sex life partnership” 
be read in after the word “spouse”. See also Havenga P “Same-sex Unions, the Bill of Rights and 
Medical Aid Schemes” 1998 (61) THRHR at 724-725, where after considering the court’s reasons for 
the decision, he concluded that couples in a same-sex union will have to prove not only that there is a 
duty of support based on the time that their relationship existed, but also that the one party needs 
financial assistance and that the other party is able to provide it. This means that the legal and factual 
requirements to find a duty of support must be present. According to Havenga, this approach is only 
valid if it applies also to the married couples.     
370
 See the case of Langemaat supra note 213 at 449. 
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The same was reiterated by the Constitutional Court in Satchwell v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another371 and in Minister of Home Affairs and Another 
v Fourie and Others,372 where the court held that failure of the common law and the 
Marriage Act to protect same-sex couples in such a way that they can enjoy the 
same status, entitlements and responsibilities given to heterosexual couples 
constituted an unjustifiable violation of their right to equal protection by the law. What 
the equality clause says in respect of retirement funds, boards, and members of 
funds is that retirement funds may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against their members on one or more grounds stipulated in section 9(3) of the 
Constitution. In terms of section 9(5) of the Constitution, discrimination on one or 
more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair. In this regard, a member who alleges unfair discrimination on 
one or more of the prohibited grounds by the fund or board of the fund must prove 
that discrimination has occurred and the fund must then show that no unfair 
discrimination took place.373  
                                            
 
371
 See the case of Satchwell supra note 213. See also generally on the analysis of the Satchwell 
decision, Goldblatt B “Notes and Comments: Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2002 (6) SA 1 (CC)” (2003) 19 SAJHR at 118 and 122-123 who states that the judgment in the 
Satchwell case restated the view of the Constitutional Court that there are many different forms of 
family in society deserving of legal recognition and protection, and that it recognised the growing 
legislative trend of providing benefits to non-spousal partners. However, Goldblatt indicates that it is 
difficult to understand why the court added the requirement of proof of a duty of support in cases 
where spousal benefits are claimed as it is likely that proof of permanent life partnership would almost 
always entail demonstrating the existence of a reciprocal duty of support. The author is of the view 
that the court has failed to indicate what the parties need to demonstrate in order to prove the 
existence of reciprocal undertakings of support. According to Reddy V “Decriminalisation of 
Homosexuality in Post-Apartheid South Africa” Agenda 67 (2006) at 149 (accessed from 
http//dx.doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2006.9674708, last accessed on 22 July 2015), although the 
Satchwell judgment specifically grants “spousal” benefits to claimant, the political benefits of the 
judgment are profound in so far as the court, through extension of benefits, establishes the legal 
meaning of “spouse” to same-sex relationships in a way that affirms strange identities. See also 
generally, Albertyn C “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR at 
253-276; and Brown T “South Africa’s Gay Revolution: The Development of Gay and Lesbian Rights 
in South Africa’s Constitution and the Lingering Societal Stigma Towards the Country’s Homosexuals” 
Elon Law Review Vol 6 (2014) at 455-477; as well as the following determinations by the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator: Van der Merwe & Others v The Southern Life Association Ltd & Another [2000] 3 
BPLR 321 (PFA); the case of Rentokil supra note 218; Swanepoel v Abrahams & Gross Provident 
Fund & Another [1999] 10 BPLR 216 (PFA); and Ngewu and Another v Post Office Retirement Fund 
and Others [2013] 1 BPLR 1 (CC). 
372
 See the case of Fourie supra note 369 at par 114. 
373
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 14 at 110. 
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In Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council and Others v Leornard Dingler 
(Pty) Ltd and Others,374 the applicants wrote to the company requiring that they be 
permitted to join the Staff Benefit Fund, alleging direct and indirect race 
discrimination on the part of the fund. The applicants in another statement alleged 
that the Staff Benefit Fund was for white employees and the other funds for black 
employees. After the matter was referred to the CCMA but remained unresolved, it 
was then referred to the Labour Court, which held that the employer unfairly 
discriminated against its black employees by treating them differently regarding the 
membership of funds the employer participated in.  
 
The court further held that there was discrimination in the fund membership and 
contributions which were not the same with the one for black employees being lower 
than the one paid for white employees. With regard to the onus of proof, the court 
held that once the applicants (employees) established that there was discrimination, 
the evidentiary burden shifted to the respondent (employer) to show that there was 
unfair discrimination.375  
 
                                            
 
374
 See Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council and Others v Leornard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 
and Others [1997] 11 BPLR 1438 (LC). See also Cohen T “Justifiable Discrimination: Time to Set the 
Parameters” SA Merc LJ 255 (2000) at 267, where it is stated that where differentiation is based on 
one of the specific grounds as outlined by section 9(3) and 4 of the Constitution, it is deemed to 
constitute unfair discrimination, whether the differentiation is direct or indirect and that this is 
underscored by the presumption in section 9(5) which states that discrimination on one or more of the 
listed grounds is unfair unless the contrary is proven. This will be the case until the discrimination 
passes the requirements as stated in the “limitation clause” in section 36 of the Constitution. 
According to McGregor M “Elements of an Employment Discrimination” JBL Vol 10, Part 2 at 105, 
what happened in the case of Leonard Dingler is an example of indirect discrimination. In her view, in 
a case of unfair discrimination the applicant (employee) must show not only the existence of a 
differentiation, but must also show that it was on a listed ground. In her other article, McGregor M “An 
Overview of Employment Discrimination Law” SA Merc LJ (2002) 14 at 162-163, states that if one 
reads the provisions of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 against the background of Leonard 
Dingler, it is clear that third parties who can apply employment policies or practices such as medical 
aid funds, retirement funds, recruitment agencies, and labour brokers are also prohibited from 
discriminating. Therefore it is not only the employers who are prohibited by section 6 of the 
Employment Equity Act from discriminating against their employees. Employment policy and practice 
include remuneration, employment benefits such as pensions, and terms and conditions of 
employment. 
375
 See the case of Leonard Dingler supra at 1452. 
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The board of trustees must act with impartiality at all times and it may not unfairly 
discriminate between its members,376 member’s dependants, or beneficiaries. For 
example, the board cannot decide that the member must receive a higher benefit 
because he or she is of a particular gender. Note should be taken, however, that 
there will be cases where differentiation between members of one fund would not 
necessarily amount to unfair discrimination. For example; in Maltman v Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation) and Another,377 the complaint was about 
the differentiation between older members and younger members of the fund in 
calculating transfer values which resulted in older members being subsidised by 
younger members. The Pension Funds Adjudicator held that it was reasonable to 
treat these two categories of members differently. The Adjudicator also held that 
there was a rational connection between the differentiation and the objective of the 
fund, which is to provide benefits to members upon retirement.  
 
6.8.3 Trustee liability 
 
The Pension Funds Act of 1956 does not provide a specific penalty for trustees’ 
failure to comply with their common law fiduciary duties and statutory duties outlined 
in sections 7C and 7D of the Act. Penalties imposed by common law include having 
to return profits made as a result of improper conduct, and being liable in their 
personal capacity for any loss or damage caused by such conduct.378 It should be 
noted that the trustees’ failure to take appropriate action could lead to personal 
liability. A failure to take appropriate action could be considered by the courts to 
constitute negligence on the part of trustees.  
                                            
 
376
 In Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund [2003] 3 BPLR 4427 (SCA) at par 22 (hereafter, Meyer) the court 
stated that the trustees’ fiduciary duty towards members of the fund includes a duty of impartiality, 
which means they have an obligation not to treat members differently or to discriminate between them 
unfairly. 
377
 Maltman v Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation) and Another [2005] 4 BPLR 314 
(PFA). 
378
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 14 at at 107. 
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Trustees may on conviction in terms of the Financial Institutions Act of 2001 be fined 
or be imprisoned for a period of 15 years in addition to being ordered to repay all 
losses suffered by the fund, without being protected and indemnified by the fund.379  
 
In Jowell v Bramwell-Jones380 it was held that the trustee who departed from the 
standard of care to be expected of a diligens paterfamilias will be obliged to make 
good the loss sustained by the estate. He or she may be removed from office where 
his or her acts and omissions endanger the trust property. The measure of damages 
in an action against the trustee is the amount required to restore the trust to what it 
would have been had the trustee not been guilty of misappropriation or the 
unauthorised disposal or investment of trust assets as the case may be. Such a 
claim must be satisfied out of the trustee’s private assets.381 Trustees are thus 
obliged at all times to conduct the affairs of the trust in the best interest of the 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
 
Remedies available where trustees act in breach of their duties include the 
following:382 
 
 If the breach of duty has caused actual loss, the trustees can be sued 
personally for damages; 
 If the breach of duty is likely to cause loss, the trustees can be prevented from 
continuing to behave in the manner which may cause the loss; and 
 If the breach is very serious, the trustees can be removed from office. 
 
In Mes v Art Medical Equipment Pension Fund and Others,383 the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator held the trustee personally liable for compensation plus interest where 
the trustee of the fund was found to be in breach of duty of good faith in allowing the 
policy to lapse.  
                                            
 
379
 Section 10 of the Protection of Funds Act 28 of 2001. Hanekom (ibid) at 115. 
380
 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836. 
381
 Supra at 894H-J and 895C. 
382
 Dewar et al Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in Southern Africa op cit note 5 at 115. 
383
 See in regard the case of Mes supra note 27.  
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The Pension Funds Adjudicator further held that the legal position regarding the 
duties of the pension funds trustees are well established. He said that in the present 
case, the trustees had a duty in terms of the agreement with the insurer, to pay 
premiums to the insurer timeously and that the trustees also bore the duty to 
members to ensure that the policies did not lapse. The Adjudicator held that section 
7C of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 requires trustees to direct, control, and oversee 
fund operations in accordance with applicable laws and the rules of the fund and, in 
so doing, to take all reasonable steps to ensure that members’ interests are 
protected at all times; that section 7D(d) imposes a duty on trustees to ensure that 
contributions are paid timeously; and that both criminal sanctions and penalty 
interest face a trustee who breaches such duty. He further held that the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act also requires a trustee to observe the utmost 
good faith and exercise proper care and diligence. The Adjudicator stated that the 
Act imposes a criminal sanction on trustees who fail to comply with their duties as 
well as liability to beneficiaries who suffer loss as a result of such failure, and that the 
trustee’s argument that he was liable to the fund and not the complainant was 
without merit. The Adjudicator held the trustee personally liable to compensate the 
complainant for the financial loss she suffered by reason of his failure to exercise his 
duties with proper care and diligence. Even though pension fund trustees are not 
required to have any particular qualifications or experience, that does not take away 
the amount of responsibility they have with regard to managing the affairs of 
retirement funds. Trustees are expected to apply their minds every time they deal 
with matters of the fund and may not act dishonestly or negligently in their dealings 
with the fund or fund assets, otherwise they will be liable to make good whatever 
loss or damage their actions or activities shall have caused.384  
                                            
 
384
 The trustees will be liable for the loss emanating from breach of their fiduciary duties, just like 
directors of companies. In terms of section 77(2) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008, a director of a 
company may be held liable in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to breach of 
a fiduciary duty for any loss, damages, or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of any 
breach by the director of a duty contemplated in section 75 (to disclose a personal interest), 76(2) (to 
avoid a conflict of interest), or 76(3)(a) and (b) (to act in good faith and for a proper purpose or in the 
best interests of the company, or (c) (to act with the required degree of care, skill and diligence). 
Liability in this regard is joint and several. 
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Trustees may be liable in their personal capacity should negligence be proved. 
However, trustees that are innocent may not be liable for the actions of their co-
trustees. Where trustees are at fault, they can be jointly and severally liable even 
though they are not equally at fault. Trustees may exclude joint liability contractually 
and may also exclude personal liability where a trustee is not personally at fault. It 
should be accepted that where trustees fail to act with care, diligence, and in good 
faith, it is only fair that they be held liable for their irresponsible actions or activities 
and repay or compensate the fund for the loss so that members or beneficiaries can 
get the benefits they are entitled to. In terms of section 2(a) of the Protection of 
Funds Act of 2001, persons dealing with funds of and with trust property controlled 
by financial institutions must, with regard to those funds, observe the utmost good 
faith and exercise proper care and diligence; must regard trust property and the 
terms of the instrument or agreement by which the trust or agency in question has 
been created; observe the utmost good faith and exercise the care and diligence 
required of a trustee in the exercise or discharge of his or her powers and duties; 
and (b) may not alienate, invest, pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber or 
make use of the funds or trust property or furnish any guarantee in a manner 
calculated to gain directly or indirectly any improper advantage for himself or herself 
or for any other person to the prejudice of the financial institution or principal 
concerned. 
 
6.9 REMEDIES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
 
6.9.1 General 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution gives everyone, including fund members and/or 
beneficiaries, the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and 
procedurally fair. It further gives everyone whose rights have been adversely 
affected by administrative action, the right to be given written reasons.385  
                                            
 
385
 Section 33(2) of the Constitution. 
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The members’ right to just administrative action is in line with trustees’ common-law 
duty to act with care, diligence, and good faith. Section 33 protects members of 
retirement funds against adverse decisions of boards of funds. Section 33(3) 
requires that national legislation be enacted to give effect to these rights. This 
brought the enactment of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000386 
(PAJA), which came into operation on 30 November 2000.  
 
Administrative action is defined in section 1 of the Promotion of Access to Justice Act 
as any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by – 
 
(a) An organ of state, when: 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a  
provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation; or 
(b) A natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision… 
 
The Promotion of Access to Justice Act of 2000 imposes a duty on administrators to 
give effect to the rights in section 33 of the Constitution, to establish fair 
administrative procedures, to provide for the review of administrative actions, to 
enhance the accessibility of rules and standards, to promote efficient administration, 
and to establish an administrative review council and to provide for matters incidental 
thereto.387 Any person who is unhappy with an administrative decision can challenge 
the decision by judicial review in a court of law. If the court finds that the decision is 
unlawful, unreasonable, or procedurally unfair, it can make any of the following 
orders: declare the administrator’s decision invalid, order the administrator to 
reconsider the decision, or replace the decision with the court’s own decision.388  
 
                                            
 
386
 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
387
 Section 33(3)(a-c) of the Constitution. 
388
 In the case of Pepkor Retirement Fund supra note 72 par 47, the court stated as follows: “A material 
mistake of fact should be a basis upon which a court can review an administrative decision. That if a decision has been made in 
ignorance of facts material to the decision and which therefore should have been before the functionary, the decision should be 
reviewable …The decision maker in this case would not have made the decision had he known of the true facts.” 
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In Government Employees Pension Fund and Another v Buitendag and Others,389 
where the surviving adult children of a deceased employee and member of the 
Government Employees Fund died, a gratuity became payable. The Fund awarded 
the gratuity to the deceased’s husband and step-son and nothing was awarded to 
the children as the board of the fund was at that time not aware of the existence of 
the children. The question facing the court was whether the fact that the board did 
not know about the existence of the children entitled the court to set aside the 
board’s decision.390 The court found that the obligation to provide the board with the 
necessary information to allow it to make a proper decision was upon the Provincial 
Government,391 and as the Fund was not aware of all the material facts, the 
allocation made by the board had to be set aside. The court reaffirmed the principle 
that where legislation has empowered a functionary to take a decision in the public 
interest, the decision should be made on the material facts which should have been 
available to the functionary concerned; otherwise it would be a miscarriage of justice 
if the decision of the board was not set aside. Conradie JA filed a separate judgment 
concurring with the majority judgment where he emphasised the fact that the Fund is 
an organ of state that performs an administrative function. That if the children in this 
case wanted to be heard, they should have been given an opportunity to be heard. 
The judge stated that while the Fund may not be obliged to afford a hearing to every 
claimant, depending on the prevailing circumstances, it is obliged to do so when a 
hearing is requested.392   
 
In South Africa there are a number of forums that handle complaints relating to 
retirement funds; namely the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator; the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration; the Labour Court; the High 
Court; and the Constitutional Court.393  
                                            
 
389
 Government Employees Pension Fund and Another v Buitendag and Others [2007] 1 AII SA 445 
(SCA). 
390
 Supra at par 14. 
391
 At par 20. 
392
 At paras 24-30. 
393
 Hanekom et al The Manual on South African Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits op 
cit note 14 at 344. 
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However, only the powers of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the courts will be 
discussed for purposes of this study; the reason being that the Adjudicator’s office 
has been specifically created for this purpose, while the High Court, apart from the 
fact that it can hear pension-related matters, also has jurisdiction to hear reviews of 
the determinations made by the Pension Funds Adjudicator. Whether or not the court 
is an appropriate forum for pension or social security-related disputes is debatable – 
as will be seen in the discussion below.  
 
6.9.2 The Pension Funds Adjudicator 
 
The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator was established in 1996.394 This is similar 
to the Pensions Ombudsman who handles pension-related disputes in the United 
Kingdom. The Minister of Finance in consultation with the Policy Board appoints the 
Adjudicator.395  
 
The overall function of the Adjudicator is to investigate and determine complaints396 
lodged in terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, in a procedurally fair, economical, 
and expeditious manner.397 It is important to note that the Adjudicator will only hear 
disputes that qualify as “complaints” in terms of the Pension Funds Act.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
394
 The Office of the Pension Funds was established in terms of sections 30B (section 30B inserted by 
section 3 of the Pension Funds Amendment Act 22 of 1996) of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956.  
395
 Section 30C(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
396
 See Ngalwana V Pension Dispute Resolution Procedure – An Easy Guide (1999) at 40 – on a 
discussion of what a “complaint” is. 
397
 Section 30D of the Pension Funds Act of 1956.   
SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
328 
 
Section 1 of the Pension Funds Act defines a “complaint” as:  
 
a complaint of a complainant relating to the administration of a fund; the investment of its 
funds; or the interpretation and application of its rules and alleging: 
(a) that a decision of the fund or any person purportedly taken in terms of the rules was in 
excess of the powers of that fund or person, or an improper exercise of its powers; 
(b) that the complainant has sustained or may sustain prejudice in consequence of the 
maladministration of the fund or any person, whether by act or omission; 
(c) that a dispute of fact or law has arisen in relation to a fund between the fund or any 
person and the complainant; or 
(d) that an employer who participates in a fund has not fulfilled its duties in terms of the rules 
of the fund; 
but shall not include a complaint which does not relate to a specific complainant. 
 
A complaint must relate to a fund or pension fund organisation as defined by section 
1 of the Pension funds Act. What a person brings to the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
as a complaint must relate to and fall under the categories set out in the definition of 
a complaint in order to qualify as a complaint that can be heard by the Adjudicator. 
Importantly, the person who lodges a complaint must allege that a decision taken by 
the fund or any person398 in terms of the fund rules was not within the scope of 
powers of the fund or that person, or that the decision was not taken properly.399  
 
The definition has been coached in wide terms to allow members to approach the 
Adjudicator with problems they experience with regard to how the fund is run, how 
their monies are invested, and how the fund rules are interpreted or applied. This is 
purely to protect the fund members’ interests.   
 
 
                                            
 
398
 Any person in this regard will include, for example, the fund member or former member, employer, 
administrator, principal officer, actuary, valuator, or underwriter.  
399
 Any decision taken outside the powers given by the fund rules will be ultra vires and of no effect; 
see in this regard the case of Tek Corporation Provident Fund supra note 33 at par 28; Greenwood v 
Old Mutual Staff Retirement Fund(2) [2000] 11 BPLR 1229 (PFA); and San Giorgio v Cape Municipal 
Pension Fund [2007] 2 BPLR 255 (PFA).  
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The Pension Funds Adjudicator has jurisdiction over all pension funds registered in 
terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 and bargaining council funds, as these 
funds must as from 1 January 2008 be registered in terms of the Act.400 The Pension 
Funds Adjudicator does not have jurisdiction to hear social security disputes. For 
example, a person who is aggrieved by the failure of South Africa’s Social Security 
Agency to pay his or her state old-age pension cannot approach the Adjudicator with 
the complaint. Such a person will have to approach a court of law that has 
jurisdiction to hear the matter.  
 
The Adjudicator will also not be able to hear matters relating to insures in relation to 
a group life policy or annuities purchased by a fund in the complainant’s name, or 
short-term income replacement schemes, or the conduct of trust companies.401  
 
Section 30E(1) empowers the Pension Funds Adjudicator to investigate any complaint 
and make the order which any court of law may make, and in terms of section 32(2) of 
the Bill of Rights, when interpreting any legislation and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal, or forum must promote the spirit, purport, 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. In this regard, “forum” would include the Office of the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator.  
Orders that the Adjudicator may make in terms of section 30E include just and 
equitable orders under section 172 of the Constitution.402  
                                            
 
400
 Section 2 of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
401
 See generally the following cases: Olivier v Packard Group Pension Fund & Another [2004] 8 
BPLR 5945 (PFA) at paras 18-19, the Adjudicator stated that he (Prof. John Murphy at that time) did 
not have jurisdiction over a complaint that related to a group life policy as it did not provide retirement 
benefits, and that the appropriate forum to hear the matter of that nature was the office of the 
Ombudsman for Long-Term Assurance; in De Wet v Cargo Carriers Retirement Fund & Another 
[2004] 5 BPLR 5682 (PFA) at para 11-12, the Adjudicator held that he did not have jurisdiction on a 
complaint relating to a disability policy as the policy did not carry on the business of providing 
retirement benefits; and lastly in Moonsamy v Uniserve Income Security Scheme & Another [2004] 7 
BPLR 5907 (PFA), the Adjudicator stated that he did not have jurisdiction over income-continuation 
schemes as such schemes are benefits prior to retirement only, and that the benefits stop on 
retirement. 
402
 See in this regard, Fourie v Free State Municipal Pension Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 4131 (PFA) at par 
32, which stated that section 172 of the Constitution, which deals with powers of courts in 
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Section 172 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 (1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court: 
(a)  must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b)  may make any order that is just and equitable, including  
(i)  an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of 
invalidity; and 
(ii)  an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period 
and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct 
the defect. 
 
In terms of section 30E, the Adjudicator can make the same order as any court in a 
constitutional matter. This includes the power to declare a fund rule or the decision of 
a board of trustees invalid, and to grant a mandamus correcting the defect or to correct 
a rule by the process of reading it.403  
 
In Sebola v Johnson Tiles (Pty) Ltd and Others,404 the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
struck down as ultra vires and unconstitutional a rule of the fund that sought to deprive 
members of their right to receive a percentage of the employer’s contributions to the 
fund if they were to be found guilty of misconduct (in general) in the workplace. 
According the Adjudicator, allowing that to happen would subject the member to a 
double punishment of dismissal from work and the forfeiture of the employer’s portion 
of the withdrawal benefit. He found that the application of the rule was arbitrary and 
that its effect was disproportionate to the purpose it aimed to achieve.405  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
constitutional matters, read with section 30E(1)(a) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, vests in him the 
power to declare fund rules unconstitutional and to make any other order which is just and equitable. 
403
 See in this regard, Low v BP Southern Africa Pension Fund and Another [2000] 2 BPLR 171 (PFA) 
at 180, where the Pension Funds Adjudicator added that he could also correct a rule by extending a 
benefit enhancement to a group of members who were being unfairly discriminated against. 
404
 See in this regard, Sebola v Johnson Tiles (Pty) Ltd and Others [2002] 3 BPLR 3242 (PFA) 
(hereafter, Sebola). 
405
 See the case of Sebola supra at par 48. See also in this regard Mokoena & Others v Administrator, 
Transvaal 1988 (4) SA 912 (W) at 917, where Goldstone J held that the great loss of pension benefits 
as a result of dismissal was a ground for requiring the Administrator to give its employees a hearing 
before dismissal. See also Zenzile & Others v Administrator of the Transvaal & Others (1989) 10 ILJ 
34 at 39 where Coetzee J cited with approval Goldstone J’s judgment. 
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In the Adjudicator’s view, the drafter of the rules intended to deprive only members 
who had been dismissed on grounds of misconduct which had an element of wilful 
dishonesty of their entitlement to the employer’s portion of the withdrawal benefit.406 
The misconduct for which the complainant was dismissed was unauthorised absence 
from duty for a period of 21 days. If the rule were to be applied, the complainant would 
have forfeited an amount in excess of R50 000.  
 
However, the court in Mine Employees’ Pension Fund v Murphy NO and Others407 set 
aside the Adjudicator’s decision, where he found that he had the power to make a 
finding on the constitutionality of the fund’s rules and the conduct of its trustees. The 
court stated that the Adjudicator’s function is circumscribed to disposing of and 
investigating complaints lodged and constrained by issues as pleaded in the 
complaint. It also stated that the Adjudicator’s office does not give him or her any 
general power to investigate issues mero motu. The court held that if the Adjudicator 
does so, his or her actions would be ultra vires. In Grobler v Pension Funds 
Adjudicator and Others,408 the court correctly held that in the event that the Adjudicator 
sets aside a fund rule, he or she may order the board of trustees to amend the rule to 
make it consistent with the Constitution and to submit such a rule amendment to the 
Registrar for approval.  
 
 
                                            
 
406
 See the case of Sebola supra note 404 at par 20. 
407
 See Mine Employees Pension Fund v Murphy NO and Others [2004] 11 BPLR 6204 (W) at par 31, 
where the court said it is clear from the provisions of section 30O(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 
1956, and that the function of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is  to dispose of complaints lodged in 
terms of section 30A(3) of the Act. See also in this regard Metro Group Retirement Fund and Another 
v Murphy and Another [2002] 9 BPLR 3821 (C) at 3825; and Shell and BP South African Petroleum 
Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Murphy NO and Others 2000 9 BPLR 953 (D) at 958, 2001 (3) SA 683 (D) at 
693E-H (hereafter, Shell and BP South Africa); and Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at par 58. 
408
 See Grobler v Pension Funds Adjudicator and Others [2006] 1 BPLR 26 (T) at 34 where the court 
held that the Adjudicator had a right to make any order that a High Court could make including 
reviewing and setting aside the registration of the emended rule. 
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The Adjudicator has, in trying to put the issue of constitutional jurisdiction with regard 
to the constitutionality of the fund rules into perspective, said the following in Maritz v 
Absa Pensioenfonds409:   
 
“It would be inconceivable that the Adjudicator lacked the jurisdictional power to make 
a finding on the constitutionality or otherwise of a rule, should it be placed in issue. A 
fund rule is not a statute, and therefore pronouncements on its constitutional validity 
need not be limited to expressions by Courts of the standing of the High Court or 
higher. A finding that a rule is unconstitutional amounts to a determination that it has 
not acquired the binding effect and force of law conferred by s 13 of the Pension 
Funds Act 24 of 1956.”  
 
It can therefore be accepted that the Adjudicator has the power to decide on the 
constitutionality or otherwise of fund rules should such an issue come before him or 
her.  
 
The Adjudicator’s office is a creature of statute and as such does not have inherent 
jurisdiction, and his or her powers and functions are confined to those conferred 
upon him or her by the provisions of Chapter VA.410  
 
A person who is not satisfied with the determination of the Adjudicator may within six 
weeks after the date of the determination, submit an application for relief to the High 
Court having jurisdiction over the matter.411 In Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund,412 the 
court confirmed that it is clear from the wording of section 30P(2) that the 
contemplated appeal to the High Court is an appeal in the wide sense. The High Court 
is therefore not limited to a decision, whether the Adjudicator’s determination was right 
or wrong; nor is the court confined to the evidence or the grounds upon which the 
Adjudicator’s determination was based. The court can consider the matter afresh and 
make any order it deems fit.413  
                                            
 
409
 See Maritz v ABSA Groep Pensioenfonds [2005] 5 BPLR 421 (PFA) at par 2. 
410
 See in this regard Shell and BP South African Petroleum Refineries supra note 325 at 958; and the 
case of Meyer supra note 376 at paras 6-7.  
411
 Section 30P of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
412
 See the case of Meyer supra note 376 at par 9.  
413
 Supra. 
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The dispute submitted to the High Court for adjudication must therefore still be a 
“complaint” as defined in the Act. It must also be substantially the same complaint as 
the one determined by the Adjudicator. 
 
It is also possible to approach the High Court directly without first lodging the 
complaint with the Adjudicator.414 Determinations made by the Adjudicator may also 
be taken to the High Court on review.415 It is not necessary to join the Adjudicator as 
a party to any appeal against his or her determination.  
 
Joining the Adjudicator as a party to an appeal was held by the court in Old Mutual 
Life Assurance Company (SA) v Pension Funds Adjudicator and Others416 to be 
highly improper as it is not in the public interest that he or she should become 
embroiled in the dispute between the parties in the dispute after a determination in 
the same dispute had already been issued. 
 
Complainants may either lodge a complaint directly with the Adjudicator, or may first 
give the fund an opportunity to consider the matter and respond to the complaint. In 
terms of section 30A(1), a complainant may lodge a written complaint with a fund for 
consideration by the board of the fund notwithstanding the provisions of the rules of 
the fund. The fund or participating employer must consider the complaint and reply in 
writing to the complainant within 30 days after the receipt of the complaint.  
  
                                            
 
414
 This follows from the interpretation of section 30H(2) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 which 
precludes adjudication by the Pension Funds Adjudicator where proceedings have been instituted in a 
civil court.  
415
 The following cases are examples of where the Pension Funds Adjudicator’s determination was 
taken to the High Court on review: Armscor SA Ltd v Murphy NO 1999 4 SA 755 (C); and the case of 
Meyer supra note 376 at par 22. 
416
 See generally, Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) v Pension Funds Adjudicator and Others 
[2007] 1 BPLR 117 (C) at par 16. 
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However, according to the Pension Funds Adjudicator in Insurance and Banking 
Staff Association v Old Mutual Staff Retirement Fund and Another,417 this does not 
mean prior lodging of a written complaint with either the fund or the employer before 
it is lodged with the Adjudicator is a requirement for jurisdiction of the Adjudicator 
over such complaints. If the complainant is not satisfied with the reply of the fund or 
participating employer, or if no reply is received within 30 days after the receipt of the 
complaint, the complainant may lodge the complaint with the Office of the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator.  
 
In terms of section 30H, the Adjudicator shall not investigate any complaint if the 
proceedings have already been instituted in any civil court before the lodging of the 
complaint. The proceedings are, generally, informal, but the Adjudicator may also hold 
hearings, in which event the parties may appear in person to present their case. In 
terms of section 30K, no party is entitled to legal representation at proceedings before 
the Adjudicator, but this does not constitute an absolute prohibition on legal 
representation. In Henderson v Eskom and Another,418 the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
indicated that “legal representation” is usually understood to mean representation by 
attorneys or advocates practising as such. The Adjudicator held that the wording of 
section 30K imposes no prohibition and that as a result he at common law has 
discretion whether or not to allow representation. The position was clarified in Mellor v 
The Bidcorp Group Provident Fund and Another,419 where the Adjudicator said that 
section 30K simply prohibits entitlement to legal representation. He held that when 
legal representation is allowed by the Adjudicator without any objection from the other 
parties, or after determination of any such objection, then it should follow that in 
appropriate cases costs may be awarded in accordance with the principle that an 
award of costs will follow success in the suit. Section 30L provides for the keeping of a 
permanent record, in writing or by mechanical or electronic means, of the proceedings 
relating to the adjudication of a complaint and the evidence given.  
                                            
 
417
 See Insurance and Banking Staff Association v Old Mutual Staff Retirement Fund and Another 
[2005] 3 BPLR 272 (PFA) at par 10. 
418
 See Henderson v Eskom and Another [1999] 12 BPLR 353 (PFA) at 356. 
419
 See Mellor v The Bidcorp Group Provident Fund and Another [2003] 7 BPLR 4926 (PFA) at 4934, 
par 30. 
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After the Adjudicator has completed an investigation, he or she shall send a statement 
containing his or her determination and the reasons for it, signed by him or her, to all 
parties concerned, as well as to the Registrar of the court which would have had 
jurisdiction had the matter been heard by a court.420  
 
The Adjudicator has the powers to rescind or vary any order or judgment that he or 
she has made in which there was an ambiguity or an obvious error or omission, either 
mero motu (of his own accord), or upon the application of any party affected.  
 
This is in terms of Uniform Rule 42(1) and section 36(c) of the Magistrates Courts Act 
read with section 30E(1) of the Pension Funds Act.421 Any determination of the 
Adjudicator shall be deemed to be a civil judgment by any court of law had the matter 
in question been heard by such a court, and shall be so noted by the Registrar of the 
court, as the case may be. A warrant of execution may be issued by the Clerk or the 
Registrar of the court in question and executed by the Sheriff of such a court after 
expiration of a period of six weeks after the date of the determination, on condition that 
no application has been lodged to court by an aggrieved party.422  
 
Any person who acts in contempt of the Adjudicator, as set out in section 30V of the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956, is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or 
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.  
 
Section 30I of the Pension Funds Act provides that the Adjudicator shall not 
investigate a complaint if the act or omission to which it relates occurred more than 
three years before the date upon which the complaint is received by him or her in 
writing.  
 
                                            
 
420
 Section 30L of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
421
 See generally, Goddard v ASI Pension Fund and Others (3) [2001] 4 BPLR 1841 (PFA); and 
Somagaca v Mines 1970 Provident Fund and Another [2002] 9 BPLR 3895 (PFA).   
422
 Section 30O of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. 
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Section 30I(2) now categorically states that the provisions of the Prescription Act of 
1969423 apply in respect of the calculation of the three-year period referred to in 
section 30I(1).  
 
This brings the time limit with regard to lodging of complaints in respect of pension 
funds in line with other debts. In such a case, the beneficiaries might have to 
approach the court of law and apply for condonation of late application. This process 
could be very expensive and the matter might take even longer to resolve. This 
might further delay dependants’ access to the money needed urgently to cover 
school feels, medical costs, food, and other important day-to-day needs.  
 
Section 30I(2) previously provided that if the complainant was unaware of the 
occurrence of the act or omission which gave rise to the complaint, the period of 
three years would commence on the date on which the complainant became aware 
or ought reasonably to have become aware of such occurrence – whichever 
occurred first. Section 30I(3) gave the Adjudicator the power, on good cause shown 
or on his own motion either before or after the expiry of any period prescribed, to 
extend such period or condone non-compliance with any time limit prescribed. The 
Adjudicator’s discretion in this regard has been removed.424 
  
                                            
 
423
 Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See Swarts v Sanlam Umbrella Provident Fund: Participating 
Employer-Herholdt Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd PFA/FS5258/2011/SM 
(unreported) at par 5.6, where the Pension Funds Adjudicator refers to the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 at par 11, where the court said 
stated among the reasons for rules prescription, that inordinate delays in litigation damage the 
interests of justice and that they protract the disputes over the rights and obligations sought to be 
enforced, prolong the uncertainty of all concerned about their affairs, and by then witnesses may no 
longer be available to testify and documentary evidence may have disappeared. 
424
 Section 30I was substituted by section 21 of the Pension Funds Amendment Act of 2007. 
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Previous Adjudicators had given different interpretations to the old provisions of 
section 30I. In Sligo v Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund and Shell South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd,425 the Adjudicator (Prof. Murphy) held that section 30I created its own 
prescription regime which operated to the exclusion of the Prescription Act, and in 
Manzini v Metro Group Retirement Fund and Another (2),426 he said that the time-
barring provisions contained in section 30I of the Act must be read in conjunction with 
the Prescription Act.  
 
However, in Nyayeni v Illovo Sugar Pension Fund and Another and Sibanyoni v 
Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another427 respectively, the Adjudicator (Adv. 
Ngalwana) gave the section a totally different interpretation where he said that 
Chapter III of the Prescription Act applies to claims or legal proceedings instituted for 
the recovery of debt. He said further that where the claim or legal process is intended 
to achieve relief other than a recovery of a debt, Chapter III of the Prescription Act 
does not apply. Adjudicator Mohlala, Adv. Ngalwana’s predecessor, also had the 
opportunity of applying the amended section 30I in some of her determinations where 
she had also taken the view that the new provisions of section 30I did not apply 
retrospectively. In JS Madsen v Norwich Group Indoor Staff Pension Fund,428 the 
complaint was received by the office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator in 2005, while 
the cause of action arose in 1991; that is 11 years later.  
 
The Adjudicator held that although the Adjudicator’s discretion has been removed, the 
complainant is entitled to have his complaint adjudicated on the legal framework 
applicable at the time that he lodged his complaint.  
  
                                            
 
425
 See Sligo v Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund and Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd [1999] BPLR 299 
(PFA) at 308. 
426
 See generally, Manzini v Metro Group Retirement Fund and Another (2) [2003] 11 BPLR 5285 
(PFA) at 5294-5295. 
427
 See Nyayeni v Illovo Sugar Pension Fund and Another [2004] 11 BPLR 6249 at 6253; and the 
case of Sibanyoni supra note 262 at par 10. 
428
 See Madsen v Norwich Group Indoor Staff Pension Fund PFA/EC/5874/05/NS (unreported). 
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She held further that our courts will only hold that a statutory provision which 
interferes with vested rights or imposes a liability or a burden is retrospective in 
operation where the legislature either expressly indicates this or clearly intended the 
statute to have that effect. The Adjudicator expressed the same view in Sadie v 
South African Retirement Annuity Fund and Old Mutual Assurance Company.429  
 
It is submitted that prescription law must not be applied strictly to pension law 
matters, considering the purpose of pension funds and the role played by pension 
benefits. Pension benefits play a social security role as they are there to ensure that 
the recipients thereof, and their dependants should a member die, are guaranteed 
some form of income and that they maintain an adequate standard of living which 
they would not have enjoyed had it not been because of the benefit.  
 
If the member, or his or her dependants for that matter, are deprived the opportunity 
to lodge complaints relating to retirement benefits claims because the complaint has 
in terms of the law prescribed, be it out of their ignorance, lack of knowledge, or any 
other reason, that would defeat the purpose for which a retirement fund is 
established. The Adjudicator should be given the powers to use his or her discretion 
to condone late submission as it was the case before – provided valid reasons are 
given why the complaint or claim is submitted late. This is to ensure that those 
members or former members who could not lodge complaints in time due to reasons 
beyond their control are allowed to lodge those complaints regarding their retirement 
benefits from their many years of contributions and the same should apply to the 
dependants’ claims or complaints. In doing so, the state will also benefit in that it will 
not have to provide for the elderly who contributed to retirement funds when working 
but now cannot enjoy the benefit because of an unfavourable law which is in fact 
supposed to protect them. 
  
                                            
 
429
 See Sadie v South African Retirement Annuity Fund and Old Mutual Assurance Company 
PFA/WE/4702/2005/LM (unreported). 
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6.9.3 The courts of law 
 
Socio-economic rights, including social security rights, have already been declared 
to be justiciable.430 The courts in this country, particularly the High Courts and the 
Constitutional Court, play a very important role in the protection, enforcement, and 
adjudication of social security or retirement security rights. People who are aggrieved 
by decisions of boards of trustees of retirement funds can approach the High Court 
with their complaints.  
 
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court can also be approached with all 
complaints related to pension law that also impact on the constitutional rights of an 
aggrieved party.431 Where a constitutional right has been violated, the courts may 
make any order that is just and equitable.432  
 
The courts are also expected to give an appropriate relief in remedying an 
infringement of a constitutional right.433 The Supreme Court of Appeal may decide on 
appeals on any matter, except on constitutional matters,434 which must be handled 
by the Constitutional Court. 
 
  
                                            
 
430
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 at paras 76-77 (CC); Grootboom supra note 150 at par 20; 
and Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (2) 2002 (5) SA 721 at 
par 25 (CC). 
431
 Section 167(3) of the Constitution. 
432
 Section 172(b).  
433
 Section 38(1) of the Constitution. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (1997) (3) SA 
786 (CC) at par 19, where “appropriate relief” was described as relief that is required to protect and 
enforce the Constitution, which may include (depending on the circumstances of each particular case) 
a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure 
that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced.  
434
 Section 167(7) of the Constitution describes a constitutional matter as any issue involving the 
interpretation, protection, or enforcement of the Constitution. 
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Even though our courts can adjudicate on social security matters, the issue with that 
is that the courts provide adversarial adjudication, which is not necessarily suitable 
for resolving disputes pertaining to social security rights. The court system takes time 
to resolve disputes as the focus of the court is on matters of a different nature and 
from all areas of the law.  
 
The High Courts and the Constitutional Court handle different matters and are not 
meant only for social security disputes or pension-related disputes.  
 
The costs of the courts and of legal representatives are too high and most of the 
aggrieved parties cannot afford the costs, and would either have to drop the case or 
use the very same money they are fighting for in court to pay legal fees and for the 
costs of the case should they lose as there is no guarantee that when they take their 
cases to court they will win. Considering the purpose of social security benefits, it will 
not make sense if the aggrieved party loses the whole benefit to the payment of 
costs relating to the case or to wait for years to receive the benefit, which is meant to 
assist him or her at the time he or she is vulnerable, while the case still has to be 
heard and decided by the court.   
 
6.10 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
 
In South Africa, those who can afford to save for their retirement through 
occupational and private savings vehicles can do so. Occupational retirement funds 
are specifically meant for employees as they are established by employers, trade 
unions, or sectors for employees. Occupational retirement funds take the form of 
either a pension or a provident fund, while private or individual savings mainly take 
the form of retirement annuity schemes. The funds can be categorised into private 
funds and those established for civil servants, as well as for employees of state 
organs. Most of the employees who are employed in the formal sector of the 
economy belong to occupational funds. However, those who are employed in the 
informal sector are mostly excluded. This is a worrying factor as it is believed these 
people are in the majority as compared to those in formal employment.  
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This category of workers can also be considered as the most vulnerable, taking into 
account their employment conditions which include low salaries and employment 
insecurity. They are often not able to make any savings for their retirement and will 
therefore not be able to provide for themselves in retirement, and are most likely to 
rely on state support as soon as they reach the qualifying age.  
 
The reasons why these workers are currently excluded by the system include the 
following:435 
 
 Difficulties in the collection of contributions; 
 Unaffordability due to low wages; and 
 Other immediate needs such as food and healthcare. 
 
Retirement funds in South Africa are regulated primarily by the Pension Funds Act of 
1956. Regulation is at a higher level by world standards.436 These funds can, in 
addition to a retirement benefit, provide risk benefits. The system can be considered 
to satisfy widely accepted social security principles of risk pooling (that is, higher-risk 
participants are subsidised by lower-risk individuals), efficiency (whereby low-income 
participants are not penalised by being forced to let go of their disposable income for 
expensive service), and fairness (where benefits received by individuals are linked to 
the contributions they make to the fund). Retirement funds are, however, generally 
not offering risk benefits during retirement and it is left to individual members to 
decide whether to join private insurance or not.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
435
 Reynaud E “The Extension of Social Security Coverage: The Approach of the International Labour 
Office” ESS Paper No 3 (Social Security Policy and Development Branch: International Labour Office) 
at 16-17 available on http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=682162, last visited on 22 
July 2015.    
436
 The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index has given South Africa 76.3% for integrity (which is a 
B+ grade) which looks at regulation, governance, protection and costs. See in this regard, Melbourne 
Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 147 at 8.  
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Employers are free to decide whether to set up a fund or not, what type of fund, and 
which categories of employees will be eligible to participate in the fund.437 The 
system does not make it compulsory for employers to establish retirement funds for 
their employees, nor does it make it compulsory for employees to join existing funds 
– unless in cases where employers make it a condition of employment or where a 
sectoral determination has been issued in that regard. This is a huge problem as it 
creates gaps in the system, where only some employees enjoy coverage and 
nothing can be done to force employers not participating to do so. Fund rules 
stipulate the level of contributions to be made by employers and employees.  
 
The main concern with the system is that generally many South Africans reach 
retirement age with no benefits or with insufficient benefits.  
 
Factors that contribute to this problem include the following: 438 
 
 General lack of saving; 
 Withdrawals made before retirement date; 
 The majority of people work in the informal sector or experience irregular 
employment; and 
 Lack of compulsory preservation of benefits.  
  
The system does not provide comprehensive coverage as advocated by the Taylor 
Committee Report.439 The system does not always provide adequate benefits, hence 
those who are not adequately covered have to rely on state old-age pension for 
survival when they retire.  
 
 
                                            
 
437
 Ibid (Annexure 2) at 18. 
438
 Social Security and Retirement Reform (Questions and Answers) – National Treasury 21 February 
2007 at 2, available on http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2007/Q&A%20 
Social%20security%20and%20retirement%20reform.pdf, last visited 22 July 2015; see also generally 
Van der Merwe “The Occupational Pillar of the South African Pension System” op cit note 42 at 321. 
439
 The Taylor Committee Report op cit note 58 at 40. 
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The preference of provident funds to pension funds by many retirement funds 
members also has a negative effect on the objectives of a retirement fund. Provident 
funds pay cash lump-sums which are exposed to many risks. Lump-sum cash 
received is normally used for current consumption such as buying an expensive car 
or going on a long holiday.  
 
The personal nature of the provident scheme carries with it the feeling that it is 
accessible to meet other, more immediate, financial obligations, and members are 
ignorant or not aware of the fact that each withdrawal from a provident fund reduces 
the capacity of the fund to provide long-term protection. This leaves the person with 
no funds or insufficient funds to live on in retirement. Such a member will have to rely 
on the state old-age pension for support.440 A member may also lose the money 
through poor business ventures or investments.  
 
The system also has serious limitations as members cannot switch between funds or 
join funds of their own choice. They usually have to change jobs in order to change 
funds. Freedom to choose one’s preferred fund and to shift accumulated funds to a 
new retirement fund with a better investment performance could promote 
competition, and force fund managers to keep costs as low as possible.441 HIV/Aids 
also has a serious impact on retirement funds as those who are seriously ill will 
make early withdrawals due to incapacity. Early withdrawals mean low benefits. This 
will also affect the funds as more people will make withdrawals from the fund and a 
smaller number of participants will carry the costs of running the fund.  
 
Funds registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Pension Funds Adjudicator. However, there is still a multiplicity of other forums 
which adjudicate disputes concerning occupational retirement funds.  
                                            
 
440
 Van der Merwe “The Occupational Pillar of the South African Pension System” op cit note 42 at 
321. 
441
 Ibid at 320. 
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This unfortunately allows for forum-shopping and does not promote consistency and 
equality.442 Another factor is that even though the complaints procedure at the Office 
of the Pension Funds Adjudicator’s office is fairly simple, many pension funds 
members are not at the level that allows them to understand pension-law funds 
administration which can sometimes be very complex.  
 
This and other factors negatively affect the members’ chances of effectively using 
the Adjudicator’s services to enforce their rights and to have their complaints 
speedily resolved. People who have been aggrieved by decisions of boards of 
retirement funds can choose to approach the High Courts. The costs of taking the 
matter to a High Court can be very high and the person will need the services of a 
legal representative to do so. While funds and funds administrators can afford the 
high legal fees, the opposite is the case with members of the funds or complainants 
who are sometimes out of their jobs or are dependants without financial resources.  
 
Clearly the system has more weaknesses than strengths. These gaps that have 
been identified affect the adequacy of the system and will have to be addressed 
through the reform process the system is currently undergoing.  
 
Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees everyone 
the right of access to social security and if the system maintains its exclusionary 
nature, this right will remain just a dream to many. It is in this regard that the state is 
given a duty to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to progressively realise the right of access to social security, and in 
particular retirement security (provision).  
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 Idem at 55. 
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Going back to the elements that were noted at the beginning of this chapter for 
purposes of evaluating South Africa’s retirement system, it is submitted that because 
the system is exclusionary in nature (that is, not all categories of workers are 
covered), the system allows leakages before the date of withdrawal, and the fact that 
the system does not always provide adequate benefits, it can be concluded that 
even though the system has some positives, there is still a lot that needs to be done 
to achieve a higher level of protection and to include all the categories of people who 
are able to pay contributions and save money for their retirement.  
 
The next and last chapter provides a summary of the findings of this study, makes 
recommendations, and suggests a new model that will extend coverage to those 
who are presently excluded. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT 
SECURITY SYSTEM: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
Before colonisation, African people provided for themselves and their families 
through traditional arrangements of kinship. The family was the primary source of 
support for everyone within the family.1 However, the kinship system was later 
affected by colonisation and industrialisation, which brought with them Western 
methods of support.2 The Western system introduced social policies and laws that 
only favoured whites3 and to provide social assistance for whites who were 
unemployed.4 Extension of coverage to blacks only came in the 1960s and 1970s as 
many black people moved to cities in search of jobs in the mines and other emerging 
industries. This affected the traditional ways of survival in favour of Western 
methods.5  
 
South Africa’s approach to social security provision changed with the dawn of 
democracy, which introduced a right-based approach that has its roots in section 27 
of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. The section gives everyone the right to 
have access to social security and appropriate social assistance for those who are 
not able to support themselves and their dependants.  
                                            
 
1
 The kinship support system is discussed under paragraph (par) 4.2 in Chapter (Ch) 4 above. See 
also generally, on the kinship system, Eric O Ayisi An Introduction to the Study of African Culture 
1979 at 36-45; Dekker AH Informal Social Security: A Legal Analysis (Doctoral Thesis) April 2005 at 
139-140 (hereafter, Dekker Informal Social Security). 
2
The effect of industrialisation is discussed under par 4.2 in Ch 4 above. See also Patel L Social 
Welfare & Social Development in South Africa 2005 at 66 (hereafter, Patel Social Welfare & Social 
Development in South Africa). 
3
 Patel (ibid) at 66, 70 and 71.  
4
 The history of state old-age pension is discussed under par 4.3.2 in Ch 4. 
5
 The effect of industrialisation on traditional ways of support is discussed under pars 4.2.2 and 4.3.3 
in Ch 4. 
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Social security provision in South Africa takes the form of formal arrangements 
comprising social assistance and social insurance. Social assistance arrangements 
are primarily meant for poverty relief and are redistributive in nature.6 Social 
insurance is for those who are employed as it is contributory in nature. People 
contribute to insurance schemes such as retirement funds and receive benefits when 
they retire from work.7 These schemes have a social objective as members carry 
one another’s burden, and help those who are in a weaker position and those who 
are vulnerable to the risk of poverty. 
 
Occupational retirement funds are generally introduced by employers for their 
employees.8 Both employers and employees contribute to these funds to build up 
sufficient reserves over a period of time. The reserves are then paid out in the form 
of retirement benefits when members retire. The benefits received from these funds 
play a very important social security role in that they replace the person’s income 
when he or she is no longer able to continue working and to earn a salary because 
of being old. Those who do not have employer established retirement funds or those 
who are members of such funds but who would like to supplement the benefits they 
will receive from their funds, may also join private savings schemes offered by 
financial institutions and insurance companies. 
 
South Africa’s retirement security system follows a three pillar approach comprising: 
 
 Means-tested state provided pensions; 
 Occupational retirement funds; and 
 Privately arranged savings for retirement.  
 
                                            
 
6
 Discussed under par 5.4 in Ch 5. 
7
 Discussed under par 5.5 in Ch 5. 
8
 Discussed under par 4.3.3 in Ch 4. 
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There are also informal forms of support9 which play a complementary role to the 
three formal pillars.  
 
South Africa’s retirement security provision comprises separation of poverty relief, 
employment related retirement savings, and private savings in the form of retirement 
annuity funds – administered by private financial institutions and regulated by the 
government.10  
 
South Africa does not have a public retirement fund and mainly uses 
employerestablished funds managed by the private sector. These schemes are 
regulated by the government through various pieces of legislation,11 under the 
governance of the Financial Services Board.  
 
Benefits payable by occupational funds are restricted to the employee members and 
their dependants12 in certain circumstances.13 The benefits are not means tested, 
but are linked to contributions made during the period of employment. In addition to 
retirement benefits, retirement funds also offer withdrawal and risk benefits.  
 
These additional benefits also play a significant role as they ensure that the person 
who is out of work prior to his or her actual retirement date, due to disability, ill health 
or retrenchment, receives some form of income, or that his or her dependants 
receive death benefits in the case of his or her death.14 Dependants receive some 
form of compensation for the permanent loss of support resulting from the death of 
the breadwinner who contributed to the fund.15 
                                            
 
9
 Discussed under par 5.7 in Ch 5. 
10
National Treasury: South Africa Retirement Fund Reform (A Discussion Paper) December 2004 at 1 
(hereafter, South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper). 
11
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Pension Funds Act of 1956). 
12
 “Dependent” is defined in section 1 of the Pension Funds Act. See the discussion on what 
“dependant” in the context of death benefits means in par 6.6.4.2 in Ch 6. 
13
 See generally Kaplan and Another NO v Professional and Executive Retirement Fund and Others 
1999 (3) SA 798 (SCA). 
14
 Benefits are discussed under par 6.6 in Ch 6. 
15
Discussed under par 6.6.4.2 in Ch 6 above. See also generally, Olivier MP, Smit N and Kalula ER 
(eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 1
st
 ed (2003) at 307-308 (hereafter, Olivier et al Social 
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7.2 SUMMARY OF SOCIAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF OCCUPATIONAL 
RETIREMENT FUNDS 
 
Social security provision in South Africa remains an important political and social 
issue for a number of reasons which include, among others, the history and damage 
caused by apartheid and its discriminatory laws and policies which created serious 
social and economic inequalities in the country.  
 
In the White Paper for Social Welfare,16 social security within the South African 
context is described as follows:  
 
“Policies which ensure that all people have adequate economic and social protection during 
unemployment, ill heath, maternity, child rearing, widowhood, disability and old age, by 
means of contributory and non-contributory schemes for providing their basic needs …” 
 
South Africa’s approach to social security encompasses both public and private 
measures which are aimed at providing a safety-net for members of society against 
economic and social distress. Social security aims to provide protection against all 
possible social risks and provide a safety-net that ensures a minimum standard of 
living. Its objective is to give support to people, such as the elderly, who are 
vulnerable to being exposed to social and financial hardships.17 It tackles some of 
the economic risks communities and individuals are facing and it also promotes their 
economic efficiency. Social security guarantees the members of society minimum 
income protection and an adequate living standard, and safeguards their acquired 
standard of living.18  
  
                                                                                                                                       
 
Security: A Legal Analysis); Olivier MP, Okpalupa MC, Smit N, Thompson M, Du Toit AM, Greyling E, 
Van Rensburg J, Liffmann R, Ogunronbi SO, and Porter I Social Security: General Principles 1999 at 
157 (hereafter, Olivier et al Social Security: General Principles). 
16
 GN 1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997 (Chapter 7) (hereafter, The White Paper). 
17
 East R Social Security Law 1999 at 1 (hereafter, East Social Security Law).   
18
 Olivier et al Social Security: A Legal Analysis op cit note 15 at 39. 
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It serves as an income replacement measure that compensates for the financial 
consequences of a number of social contingencies, which include old-age or 
retirement.19 Retirement funds are created to enable people to make contributions 
into the funds while still working so that they can receive income in the form of a 
pension benefit when they are no longer working because of age.  
 
There is risk pooling in that members of different ages contribute to a single fund and 
those who retire at any particular time receive benefits from contributions made by 
those who are still working and participating in the fund.20  
 
Even though benefits paid by occupational retirement schemes are to an individual, 
they also contribute enormously to the betterment of society in general. If individuals 
participate in retirement funds, their families and the community will be directly or 
indirectly protected and the state will also be protected because revenue that would 
have been used to support people who failed to save money for retirement, will be 
used for other things such as education and infrastructure development. It is the duty 
of the state to protect both itself and society against the detrimental effects of social 
and economic factors. Thus the role of government can be seen as that of defending 
basic inalienable human rights, which include the right of access to social security.21 
The state has the duty to create a framework that will allow more people to save 
money for retirement. This duty comes from section 27 of the Constitution, which 
guarantees everyone the right of access to social security and appropriate social 
assistance where individuals cannot support themselves and their dependants. 
Where there is no access, the state is obliged by section 27(2) to progressively 
provide such access. Benefits offered must also be adequate to protect members of 
the funds against being destitute when they retire and to ensure that beneficiaries 
are able to maintain the same standard of living during retirement.  
 
                                            
 
19
 Ibid at 31. 
20
 East Social Security Law op cit note 17 at 15-16. 
21
 See generally the discussion under par 5.2 in Ch 5. 
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The primary objectives of retirement and social security may be summarised as 
being to: 
 
 Relieve want;  
 Prevent destitution; 
 Provide financial support to those considered to be poor or of being 
vulnerable to poverty; 
 Restore up to a reasonable level income which is lost by reason of inability to 
work; 
 Guarantee an adequate living standard; and 
 Protect society and the state (avoid individuals becoming a burden on the 
state and to society). 
 
Thus the purpose of retirement income security encompasses a number of social 
security objectives.  
 
7.3 SUMMARY OF THE SHORTCOMINGS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA’S 
RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
The following is a summary of what the study has found to be the areas of concern in 
South Africa’s retirement security system:  
 
▀ The system focuses more on formal employment and excludes people who 
are working in the informal sector of the economy, who are less skilled, and 
who are mostly black.22 Those who qualify in terms of the requirements 
receive the state old-age pension;23 those who work for employers or sectors 
which have established retirement funds participate in those funds;24 and 
                                            
 
22
 Discussed under par 4.2 in Ch 4. 
23
 Discussed under par 5.4 in Ch 5. 
24
 Discussed under par 6.2 in Ch 6. 
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those who are in a position to join private savings schemes do so.25 The 
benefits are for those who make contributions and are therefore not universal. 
The system has the effect of creating classes of uninsured and the partially 
insured.26 It generally extends social protection only to those who qualify as 
employees to the exclusion of other categories of workers.27 Consequently, all 
those who are excluded become dependent on the state old-age pension. The 
majority of people still do not have access to retirement schemes. A number 
of factors, including the level of unemployment,28 the informal sector taking 
the majority of workers, and scattered periods of employment, contribute to 
the problem.29 The system excludes those earning low salaries, which leaves 
them without any means of income when they retire. This category of workers 
is forced to depend on the state old-age pensions after retirement.30 Those 
who are employed in the informal sector of the economy are not covered for a 
variety of reasons, which include the fact that it would be extremely difficult to 
collect contributions from these workers and sometimes also from their 
employers,31 retirement schemes require regular contributions, if little 
contribution is made then little will be received, and high administrative costs.  
 
The employment conditions of those working in the informal sector also differ 
from those in the formal sector, whilst most social insurance schemes have 
been established to suit the circumstances of people in regular employment. 
 
                                            
 
25
 Discussed under par 5.6 in Ch 5. 
26
 See generally James E “Coverage under Old Age Security Programs and Protection for the 
Uninsured – What are the Issues?” 1999 at 2-3, accessed from 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10. 1596/1813-9450-2163, last visited 05 August 2015.   
27
 MP, Smit N, Kalula ER, Mhone GCZ Introduction to Social Security 2004 at 46 (hereafter, Olivier et 
al Introduction to Social Security). 
28
 Unemployment is one of the major contributing factors towards lack of savings in South Africa. 
According to Statistics South Africa, the rate of unemployment was at 27% in October 2013, accessed 
from statssa.gov.za, last visited on 05 August 2015. 
29
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6.  
30
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6. 
31
 The Smith Committee:  The Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of Retirement Provision in 
South Africa, 1995 (Annexure S4). 
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People who are not earning much are unlikely to contribute to retirement 
funds. In 2007, research undertaken for South African National Treasury 
discovered gaps in coverage for people earning below R60 000 annually from 
both the formal and informal sector. It was discovered that more than six 
million South Africans in some form of employment were not included in 
formal retirement savings structures – the majority of these being those in the 
informal sector of the economy.32 The growing popularity of contract work also 
limits coverage provided by occupational pensions, because it shifts the 
responsibility of retirement provision entirely to the individuals. The only real 
available option for them is to participate in voluntary savings plans or in 
informal arrangements which may not provide them with sufficient benefits to 
maintain their living standards when they retire.33  
 
▀ The system is fragmented as not all the workers are covered under one 
umbrella, sectors have funds specifically for employees working in those 
sectors regulated by various pieces of legislation, more than one statute apply 
to the retirement funds industry, and there is no uniformity in terms of fund 
administration and administrative costs.   
 
▀ Participation in occupational pension funds is at the moment not compulsory 
and employers are also not obliged to introduce funds for their employees 
except in the sectors where the Misniter has issued a sectoral determinaion in 
that regard. As a result, workers who never participated in the funds end up 
relying on the state old-age pension for survival. The state pension is 
presently not serving as a safety-net, but as the main source of income for the 
majority of those who have never saved for their retirement.34  
 
                                            
 
32
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6. 
33
See generally Van der Merwe T “The Occupational Pillar of the South African Pension System” 
Development Southern Africa Vol 21, No 2, June 2004 at 313 (hereafter, Van der Merwe “The 
Occupational Pillar of the South African Pension System”).   
34
 State old-age pension is discussed under par 5.4 in Ch 4.  
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▀ The system allows for leakages prior to the date of retirement. This reduces 
the size of the benefit a person will receive at retirement. As a result, many 
people reach retirement age with insufficient benefits. In this way, money 
which was meant for retirement is used for other things such as current 
consumption, debts, expensive cars, or holidays.35 In the cases of divorce, the 
non-member spouse who receives a portion of a member’s benefit is not 
compelled to save or preserve that money until the date of retirement, while, 
on the other hand, a member spouse does not have access to the money. In 
this way a non-member spouse can use the portion he or she received for 
anything and be left destitute once the money is depleted.   
 
▀ The levels of pensions are relatively low. Furthermore, the period of 
membership of a retirement fund is often too short to build up sufficient 
accumulated funds for retirement as people start very late to save money for 
retirement. Also, a very small number of people transfer their accumulated 
funds to other pension funds when they change jobs or are retrenched.36 The 
system does not make it compulsory for those who withdraw from the funds to 
preserve their benefits. A person can, upon resigning from work or changing 
jobs, take all the money in the fund and use it in any way he or she likes. This 
is problematic since those people more often than not end up with insufficient 
benefits when they retire.37  
 
  
                                            
 
35
 Discussed under par 6.6.3 in Ch 6. 
36
 Discussed under par 6.6.3 in Ch 6. See also Van der Merwe “The Occupational Pillar of the South 
African Pension System” op cit note 33 at 322-323. 
37
 Discussed under par 6.6.3 in Ch 6. 
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▀ South Africa does not have a public retirement fund. This has resulted in 
many people from the informal sector, low-income earners, and the self-
employed being excluded from participation in the system.38 The system 
therefore does not accommodate all categories of workers. A public fund 
forms part of current reform proposals.39 
 
▀ Many people who belong to provident funds take the benefit as a 100% cash 
lump-sum when they retire. In such a case, the chances of spending all the 
money during the first few months or years are very high. This makes 
provident funds (in their present form) not the best option for social security 
purposes, considering the fact that an employee who consumes the benefit 
shortly after reaceiving it will be without income for the remaining years of his 
or her life. However, this should not be taken to mean that there are those 
retirees who cannot use the money wisely; for example, invest the money, 
buy property, or start a successful business. That being the case, it remains a 
fact that there are more risks than advantages with provident funds from a 
social security perspective than there are with pension funds.40 
  
▀ Most employees in the formal sector do not have the opportunity to select an 
occupational pension fund of their own choice. People are also not able to 
switch between funds of their own accord and usually have to change jobs to 
change their pension funds. Individuals are not granted the opportunity to 
choose a fund that will serve their interests best and are obliged to stay with a 
pension fund, even if its overall performance is poor.  
                                            
 
38
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6. 
39
 Discussed under par 5.3 in Ch 5. See also South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion 
Paper op cit note 10 at 20 and National Treasury South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement 
Reform: The Second Discussion Paper (Republic of South Africa (National Treasury)) February 2007, 
at 3 (hereafter, South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper). 
40
 Discussed under par 6.4.2 in Ch 6. See also generally, Snyman I “Work, Retirement and Financial 
Crises: The Views of a Number of Key Persons from Employer’s and Employees’ Bodies” 1988 at 21. 
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Freedom to choose one’s preferred fund and to shift accumulated funds to a 
new retirement fund with a better investment performance could promote 
competition, and force fund managers to keep costs low.41    
 
▀ Retirement funds generally pay other benefits such as risk benefits in addition 
to retirement benefits. However, membership of social insurance schemes 
providing these benefits depends mainly upon a person being employed. 
Thus, risk benefits are provided for the period when a member of the fund is 
still employed. After exiting the fund, the risk protection is no longer available, 
unless a member decides to continue with a risk cover policy with an 
insurance company on an individual basis. It then becomes a problem should 
a person who is already in retirement suffer the risk. What this would mean is 
that such a person would have to use the retirement benefit to pay for all the 
costs of his or her disability or ill health, which could be very high.42 
 
▀ Death benefits are paid at the discretion of the board of trustees in terms of 
section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and the fund rules. It should 
be accepted that it is unlikely that the trustees will always get the distribution 
right, as has been evident from the number of complaints lodged with the 
Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator relating to how trustees have 
distributed the deceased’s death benefits. The other problem is that 
dependants are not represented on these boards and communication with 
them is generally non-existent or very poor.43  
 
  
                                            
 
41
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6 a. See also generally Van der Merwe “The Occupational Pillar of 
the South African Pension System” op cit note 33 at 320. 
42
 Discussed under par 6.6.4 in Ch 6. See also generally De Villiers N and Giese S “A Review of 
Children’s Access to Employment – Based Contributory Social Insurance Benefits”, (Commissioned 
by UNICEF in partnership with the Department of Social Development), May 2008 at 10 and 87. 
43
 Discussed under par 6.6.4 in Ch 6. 
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▀ In terms of section 30I of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator can only investigate a complaint if the act or omission to 
which it relates occurred less than three years before the date on which the 
complaint is lodged with the office. Even though this is legally correct, it can 
be unfair to members of the funds, considering the purpose for which pension 
benefits are paid. Pension benefits are there to make sure that the beneficiary 
is guaranteed some form of income. If the beneficiary is deprived of the 
opportunity to claim benefits because the law says the claim has prescribed, 
where, for example, the beneficiary has valid and sound reasons why the 
complaint was not lodged on time, that would defeat the purpose for which the 
pension fund is established.44  
 
▀ There is still a multiplicity of other forums which can adjudicate disputes 
concerning occupational retirement funds. This unfortunately allows for forum-
shopping and does not promote consistency and equal treatment.45 Another 
factor is that even though lodging a complaint with the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator is fairly simple, many pension funds members do not understand 
pension law and funds administration, which can sometimes be very complex. 
This and other factors negatively affect the members’ chances of using the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator’s services effectively and to enforce their rights. 
On the other hand, people who are not happy with the determinations of the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator can appeal to the High Court. This can be very 
costly since cases that go to the High Court require legal representation. 
While funds and administrators can afford the high legal fees of taking cases 
to the High Court, the opposite is the case with fund members or dependants 
who normally do not have financial resources to take on the funds in the 
courts of law.46  
 
                                            
 
44
 Discussed under par 6.6.4 in Ch 6. 
45
 See par 6.9 in Ch 6. 
46
 See par 6.9 in Ch 6. 
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM: 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
358 
 
The main factors that impact negatively on South Africa’s occupational pension 
provision can be summarised as follows: 
 
 The exclusionary nature of the system 
 General lack of savings; 
 Fragmented system;  
 No universal coverage; 
 Leakages; 
 No suitable retirement savings vehicles for workers outside the formal sector 
and low income earners; 
 No mandatory participation; 
 No mandatory preservation; 
 High administrative costs; 
 No public fund; 
 Preference for lump-sum cash payments; and 
 Low pension levels. 
 
It can be concluded therefore that the system has serious deficiencies which need to 
be addressed.  
 
Interestingly, South Africa was given a “C” rating as an overall grade in the 
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report,47 with all the weaknesses that 
have been highlighted. A “C” grade depicts a system which has some good features, 
but also has major risks or shortcomings which need attention. Thus, even though 
South Africa has a system that can be considered to be acceptable by world 
standards, the system still has serious shortcomings, which, if not addressed will 
continue to affect its efficacy and long-term sustainability.  
 
                                            
 
47
 In total five new countries were included in the 2014 Report; namely Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
and South Africa. Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index: http://globalpensionindex.com/2014/ 
melbourne-mercer-global-pension-index-2014-report.pdf, at 16, last visited 05 August 2015. 
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South Africa received 48.3% (which is a “D” grade) for adequacy, which looks at 
benefits, savings, tax support, benefit design, and growth assets; 44.6% (which is a 
“D” grade) for sustainability, which looks at coverage, total assets, contributions, 
demography, and government debt; and 76.3% (which is a “B+” grade) for the 
integrity of the system. South Africa scored high for integrity, which looks at 
regulation, governance, protection, communication, and costs.48 This is an indication 
that the country is doing well in terms of regulation and governance but not that well 
with coverage and level of benefits. 
 
7.4 IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION 
 
7.4.1 Primary objectives 
 
Retirement security should guarantee beneficiaries a basic standard of living, 
prevent destitution, and replace lost income. For those who are working and can 
afford to pay contributions, protection comes in the form of social insurance 
arrangements.49           
 
Social insurance schemes such as occupational retirement funds enable people to 
make contributions when they are still working so that they will benefit when they are 
no longer working.50 In general terms, a social protection system in respect of 
retirement security should at least have the following three main objectives:51 
 
 Basic universal coverage for the whole population; 
 Create a framework within which those who are in a position to contribute to 
social security schemes can do so; and 
 Allow supplementary retirement savings for those who can afford it. 
                                            
 
48
 Ibid at 6-8. 
49
 Discussed under par 5.3 and 5.4 in Ch 5. 
50
 Discussed under par 6.2 in Ch 6. 
51
 The International Labour Organization (ILO) - International Social Security Association (Pensions) 
ILO International Training Centre (Module 2: Public and Private Schemes) 2000 at 8. 
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In designing a system that will ensure adequate income provision and protection in 
old-age, the following principles as suggested by Monique Morrissey for the USA 
retirement reform are of great relevance:52  
 
7.4.1.1  Universal coverage  
 
All people who need social security or social assistance must be able to have access 
to it, as guaranteed by section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. All workers earning above a certain salary threshold should join either a 
public or private scheme.53 
 
South Africa presently does not provide universal retirement coverage as it does not 
have a public fund. Its retirement system uses tax incentives to encourage 
employers to establish retirement funds for their employees and to make 
contributions to those funds. Through this system individuals are also encouraged to 
save for retirement.  
 
The challenge, however, is that there might be some employers who choose not to 
establish funds for their employees as it is at the moment by law not compulsory for 
them to do so. Many workers are as a result excluded from coverage.54 It is for this 
reason that South Africa needs a system that will offer universal coverage to all 
workers regardless of the sector they are employed in. 
  
                                            
 
52
 Morrissey M “Toward a Universal, Secure, and Adequate Retirement System Retirement USA _ 
Working for a Universal, Secure and Adequate Retirement System” (Conference Report) October 21, 
2009 at 5-6 accessed from http://epi.3cdn.net/a6c47aa26cbfed9ee0_gqm6i6s5z.pdf last accessed on 
05 August 2015 (hereafter, Morrissey “Toward a Universal, Secure, and Adequate Retirement System 
Retirement USA”). 
53
 Ibid at 8. 
54
 Discussed under par 6.5 in Ch 6.  
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7.4.1.2  Secure and adequate retirement benefits 
 
Benefits received at retirement should be at a level that will ensure that beneficiaries 
continue to live at a standard similar to the one they enjoyed when still employed. 
The system must pay sufficient and adequate benefits when a person retires.55 The 
benefits received should be able to prevent a material decline in the living standards 
of beneficiaries.56   
 
In South Africa a large proportion of the formally employed currently contribute to 
retirement funds, but the contribution rates vary and coverage rates and benefits are 
low for lower-income earners, while, on the other hand, administrative costs are very 
high. This is where the proposed National Savings Fund should come in. This Fund 
will be open to all workers who meet a certain income threshold. The proposal 
entails compulsory contribution towards funding a basic retirement that is designed 
to ensure a minimum level of income protection in old-age over and above the state 
old-age pension.57  
 
The South African government’s goal is to see members being able to accumulate 
sufficient assets to provide an income after retirement at the age of 65, from a 
combination of the state old-age pension and a retirement fund, of 75% of their 
earnings in the year before retirement for a low-income earner, with the possibility of 
a lower percentage applying at higher income levels.58 
                                            
 
55
 Morrissey “Toward a Universal, Secure, and Adequate Retirement System Retirement USA” op cit 
note 52 at 11. 
56
 Ibid at 17. 
57
 Discussed under par 5.3 in Ch 5. See also the Outline of a Social Security and Retirement Savings 
Framework: Discussion Document for the Inter-Departmental Task Team on Social Security and 
Retirement Reform at 5 [Updated 29 November 2007, incorporating discussions from Basic Benefit 
Design Workshops on 8 November and 20 November 2007] available on 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/ssrr/Session%20Three%20Papers/Outline%20Soc%20
Sec%20&%20Retirement%20Savings%20Framework%20%2029%20Nov%202007.pdf, last visited 
21 May 2015. 
58
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper (Annexure 3) op cit note 10 at 30. 
See also the 2009 Sanlam Benchmark Survey at 8 (accessed from 
http://www.sanlambenchmark.co.za/ 
webadmin/include/content/Sanlam_EB_Research_Survey_2009.pdf, last visited 07 September 2015), 
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7.4.1.3  Shared responsibility 
 
Retirement should be the shared responsibility of employers, employees, and the 
government.59 In South Africa both employees and employers contribute towards 
retirement funds and the government mainly plays a regulatory role. The government 
encourages the culture of saving by offering tax benefits for members of pension 
funds as an incentive to save for retirement.  
 
7.4.1.4  Pooled assets 
 
Contributions to the system should be pooled and professionally managed to 
minimise costs and financial risks. Thus umbrella funds for different sectors should 
be encouraged to minimise administrative costs.60 South Africa has seen a 
considerable growth of multi-employer or umbrella funds in recent years. These 
funds offer ease of access, especially for employers. They usually have lower costs 
than stand-alone retirement funds, which is to the advantage of fund members, and 
frequently offer improved communication and better administration facilities.61  
 
7.4.1.5  Payouts only at retirement 
 
No withdrawals should be permitted before retirement, except for disability, ill health, 
and retrenchments as early withdrawals reduce the benefit a member will receive at 
the time of retirement.62 One main reason why people are retiring with inadequate 
retirement benefits is leakages that currently exist within the system when a person 
resigns or is retrenched from work.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
which discovered that that the majority of the people interviewed were aiming for a replacement ratio 
of between 80% and 100%. Government was reported to be considering a replacement ration of a 
minimum of 40%. 
59
 Morrissey “Toward a Universal, Secure, and Adequate Retirement System Retirement USA” op cit 
note 52 at 20. 
60
 Ibid at 14. 
61
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 10 at 10. 
62
 Morrissey “Toward a Universal, Secure, and Adequate Retirement System Retirement USA” op cit 
note 52 at 20 
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The introduction of compulsory minimum benefits in the Pension Funds Second 
Amendment Act of 2001 has partly succeeded in improving and guaranteeing 
retirement benefits at a certain level.63 The Amendment Act introduced a minimum-
benefit regime, which is designed to ensure that the fund pays an adequate benefit 
whenever a member leaves service. In terms of the Amendment Act, all retirement 
funds must pay a minimum benefit from 12 months after their first statutory actuarial 
valuations following 7 December 2001; implying that by 7 December 2005 all 
members of retirement funds subject to the Pension Funds Act of 1956 must benefit 
from the minimum-benefit regime.64  
 
South Africa needs to introduce strict rules for withdrawals and compulsory 
preservation of retirement benefits to ensure that a bigger portion of the benefit 
withdrawn prior to retirement is ring-fenced and only made available to the member 
at the time of retirement – except in special circumstances elaborated on below.  
 
7.4.1.6  Pension payments 
 
Benefits should be paid out over the lifetime of beneficiaries. Presently, employees 
have a choice of belonging to either a pension fund or a provident fund. A pension 
fund allows a member to take only up to one-third of the retirement benefit as a 
lump-sum payment, and the balance is paid out in the form of regular income for the 
rest of the member’s life; while with a provident fund, the member takes 100% of the 
retirement benefit as a lump-sum cash payment at retirement. The disadvantage with 
a member receiving a lump-sum cash payment is that the money might be spent on 
other things and that there are many other risks involved. A person who uses or 
loses all the money meant to serve as income during retirement will be left with no 
income for the rest of his or her life and will be forced to rely on the state old-age 
pension.65  
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 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 10 at 16. 
64
 Ibid (Annexure 3) at 38.  
65
 Discussed under par 6.4 in Ch 6.  
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7.4.1.7  Voluntary savings 
 
Individual voluntary savings should be encouraged.66 The government need to offer 
enticing tax benefits for those who use private savings as an incentive to save for 
their retirement. South Africa has retirement annuity funds and private savings 
schemes which are used by those who want to save money for retirement. These 
savings vehicles can also be used by workers in addition to the employer-
established funds. They are mainly used by the self-employed and those working in 
the informal employment sector who can afford to save some money for retirement.  
 
7.4.1.8  Efficient regulatory framework 
 
The system should be regulated by a body that is efficient and governed by boards 
of trustees that are representative of employers, employees, and pensioners.67 The 
regulatory body must promote retirement security.68 Funds registered in terms of the 
Pension Funds Act of 1956 are regulated by this Act. These funds are supervised by 
the Registrar of Pension Funds under the Financial Services Board. However, the 
Financial Services Board does not only regulate retirement funds but also other 
financial institutions. Funds registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956 are 
subject to regulation concerning funding requirements, the content of their rules, the 
audit and statutory valuation of the funds, information to be provided on application 
for registration of a fund, prudential investment limits, the licensing of fund benefit 
administrators and asset managers, the reporting of any non-payment of 
contributions, and the apportionment of actuarial surpluses.69  
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 Morrissey “Toward a Universal, Secure, and Adequate Retirement System Retirement USA” op cit 
note 52 at 22. 
67
 Ibid at 24. 
68
 At 25. 
69
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper (Annexure 4) op cit note 10 at 49. 
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Retirement funds registered and regulated under the Pension Funds Act are required 
to have boards which must have 50% representation from the members and 50% 
from the employer70 – unless they are exempted by the Registrar to meet this 
requirement. The boards of trustees owe fiduciary duties to the funds and must 
protect fund members’ interests and rights at all times to make sure that fund 
members or their dependants receive adequate benefits when the time to retire 
arrives. 
 
7.4.2 Recent Retirement Reforms in South Africa 
 
South Africa has for many years worked on improving its retirement security system. 
This process has seen many Committees71 being appointed, which proposed various 
recommendations on how the system could be improved. The findings and 
recommendations of the Taylor Committee, the proposals made in the First and 
Second Discussion Papers for Retirement Reform, and supplementary notes from 
the Treasury are briefly highlighted below. 
 
7.4.2.1 The Taylor Committee Report 
 
The Taylor Committee reported to Cabinet in March 2002.72 It was tasked to 
investigate the viability of different aspects of social security, and among them was 
“retirement and insurance”.73 The objective of the investigation was to ensure that 
social policies relating to the provision of retirement and insurance benefits provide 
people with adequate cover and provide protection against other risks that may befall 
them during their financial life cycle.74  
                                            
 
70
 In terms of section 7A(1) of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, every fund shall have a board 
consisting of at least four board members, at least 50% of whom the members of the fund shall have 
the right to elect. 
71
 Discussed under par 4.3.3 in Ch 4.  
72
 The Taylor Commission (Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, March 2002 at 
(iii) (hereafter, The Taylor Committee Report).   
73
 Taylor Committee Report (Chapter 1). 
74
 Idem at 93. 
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Shortcomings found include the exclusionary nature of the system; leakages, 
exacerbated by a lack of compulsory preservation; high administrative costs, which 
are unaffordable to low-income earners; low benefits received by retirement scheme 
members; and a lack of a national retirement scheme. Most of these weaknesses 
have already been highlighted above. According to the Taylor Committee Report, the 
system is in dire need of reform to address these weaknesses.75 The Taylor 
Committee considers the overarching aims of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa to be closely related to the following social security goals: healing the 
injustices of the past, ensuring social justice, improving the quality of life for all South 
African citizens, and freeing the potential of each citizen. The Report emphasises 
that the meaning of the constitutional fundamental rights must be determined and 
understood against the background of past human rights abuses.76 What this means 
is that people who did not have access to social security or those who could not 
have joined social insurance schemes to save for their retirement due to the 
apartheid laws, should now be given the opportunity to do so. The state must, in 
ensuring that people are well protected against the social risk of old-age, set up a 
framework within which people can either as a collective or as individuals come to 
realise their right of access to social security. The state is in this regard required by 
section 27(2) of the Constitution to use legislation and other measures to 
progressively ensure that everyone is covered.77 Some of the Committee’s 
recommendations have received attention from the government and now form part of 
recommendations made in the two Discussion Papers on Social and Retirement 
Funds Reform.78  
 
The recommendations of the two Discussion Papers are discussed next.  
 
  
                                            
 
75
 At 94-95. 
76
 At 49. 
77
 At 51. 
78
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper (op cit note 10) and South Africa’s 
Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Papers (op cit note 39). 
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7.4.2.2 National Treasury: The First Discussion Paper  
 
The Paper79 sets out the government’s objectives as follows:80 
 
 Encourage individuals to make enough savings for retirement; 
 Encourage employers to provide for retirement funding as part of the 
remuneration contract; 
 Make retirement funding arrangements affordable; 
 Protect pension benefits against the effects of inflation; 
 Improve fund governance and protect members’ interests; and 
 Remove the means-test from state old-age pension.  
 
The Paper highlights a number of problems that exist within the system, which 
include lack of a cost-efficient vehicle between the old-age grant and private savings 
appropriate to meet the retirement funding needs of lower and middle-income people 
and those whose lifetime earnings are largely informal or irregular; and high 
contribution rates. The Paper proposes the introduction of a National Savings Fund, 
which will allow irregular contributions, and ensure wide accessibility and affordable 
administration costs.81 It will provide employees from both the formal and informal 
sector with access to an adequate retirement funding vehicle. The Fund will be 
flexible enough to accommodate the many workers who experience periods of no 
income.82 The Fund will be a defined-contribution fund and the contributions will be 
tax deductible. It will link contributions to investment performance and benefits.  
 
Everyone who has contributed to the fund will receive a pension on retirement, as 
well as death and disability benefits.83  
                                            
 
79
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper (Objectives of Retirement Funding 
Policy) (ibid) at 4. 
80
 Idem.  
81
 At 20. 
82
 At 20-29.  
83
 See generally, Fisher-French M “How Social Security Reform Will Work” 05 March 2007 Mail & 
Guardian.  
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It is proposed in the Paper that death benefits paid by provident funds must take the 
form of income payments instead of lump-sum cash payments.84 The boards of 
retirement funds will also be required to distribute the member’s death benefit in 
accordance with the member’s wishes, as made by the member on the beneficiaries 
nomination form, and to only disregard the member’s wishes where there are 
compelling reasons to do so.85 The idea is to remove some of the unnecessary 
difficulties trustees are faced with when distributing death benefits as per the current 
provisions of section 37C of the Pension Funds Act.86 The payment of death benefits 
as regular income87 is aimed at protecting the benefits from being depleted within a 
short space of time. Should the benefit be received as a lump-sum and end up being 
misused, dependants will be disadvantaged and the benefit shall not have served its 
intended purpose. The introduction of a national fund will go a long way in 
addressing the problems that exist with the present system not being able to cater 
for all the workers in this country. It should be compulsory for all the people who 
meet a certain salary threshold to contribute to this fund. Only those who can prove 
membership of other funds providing similar or better benefits may be exempted 
from participating in the national fund.  
 
  
                                            
 
84
 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: The First Discussion Paper op cit note 10 at 36.  
85
 Ibid at 47. 
86
 Idem. 
87
 South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: The Second Discussion Paper op cit note 39 
at 3, 10, 21 and 24. 
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7.4.2.3 National Treasury: The Second Discussion Paper 
 
The Paper88 has the following as its basis for reform: 89  
 
 To ensure a basic standard of living and prevent destitution in old age; and 
 To encourage people to save in order to provide for income replacement in 
the event of death or incapacity, and after retirement from the workplace, 
through long-term insurance agreements.90  
 
The primary reform objective in terms of this Paper is to provide basic income 
protection for all South Africans through a combination of social assistance and 
contributory savings and insurance arrangements. The aim is to close the gap 
between, on the one hand, poverty relief measures and social grants programmes, 
and on the other hand, the tax incentivised long-term insurance and savings 
environment, which provides inadequately in certain respects for low-wage and 
irregular employees.91  
 
  
                                            
 
88
 At 4.  
89
 At 6. 
90
 Idem. 
91
 At 7. 
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The Paper proposes a multi-pillar social security system which will consist of the 
following:92 
 
 Social assistance grants, with the means-test either removed or significantly 
increased, providing a safety-net against poverty in old-age; 
 Mandatory participation in a national social security fund, up to an agreed 
earnings threshold providing basic retirement, unemployment, death, and 
disability benefits; 
 Additional mandatory participation in private occupational or individual 
retirement funds, for individuals with earnings above the threshold – ensuring 
coverage and income replacement in retirement; and 
 Supplementary voluntary savings permitting individuals to choose how they 
allocate income over their lifetime.93 
 
These will be supported by the following further reforms:94  
 
 Administrative reforms to enable the South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
to maintain individual contributor records and to ensure efficient and reliable 
benefits administration; 
 Complementary reforms of the governance and regulation of the retirement 
fund industry, which will continue to provide occupational and individual 
retirement funding arrangements to supplement the basic social security 
scheme; and 
 Reforms to the tax system which will seek to maintain sufficient incentives to 
provide adequately for retirement, while addressing inequities and complexity 
in the current system. 
 
                                            
 
92
 At 3-4. 
93
 Idem. 
94
 At 4. 
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The proposed multi-pillar approach and the introduction of the national fund are 
welcome as they will open doors for more people to save for their retirement. If 
participation is made to be compulsory, then all people who qualify in terms of a 
salary threshold will be forced to save a certain percentage of their income for their 
retirement and the higher the number of people who participate, the smaller the 
number of people who would want support from the government. In this way, almost 
everyone will be covered and the state pension will be reserved only for those who 
really need assistance due to reasons that include unemployment or short periods of 
employment.  
 
7.4.2.4 National Treasury: Strengthening retirement savings (an overview of 
proposals announced in the 2012 budget) 
 
In the 2012 Budget Review, the Minister of Finance provided more details 
(supplementary notes) on how retirement savings in this country may be 
strengthened. The Notes address issues such as reducing the costs of retirement 
products, reforming the annuities market, requiring preservation and portability, 
introducing a uniform approach to the tax treatment of retirement fund contributions, 
improving fund governance and the role of trustees, and to introduce tax incentives 
to promote retirement and other investment products.95 According to the Notes, high 
costs negatively affect retirement benefits and retirement returns. The high costs 
also affect voluntary participation in retirement savings.96 Members of defined-
contribution funds receive protection when they are still contributing but when they 
retire, that protection diminishes and they are left to the retail market when they retire 
where they are required to buy annuities with their remaining two-thirds of the 
retirement benefit.97  
  
                                            
 
95
 See National Treasury “Strengthening Retirement Savings (An overview of proposals announced in 
the 2012 Budget)” at 3, accessed from http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/ 
2012051401.pdf, last visited on 05 August 2015. 
96
 Ibid at 9. 
97
 Ibid at 12. 
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Due to low preservation rates, most people go into retirement with inadequate 
benefits. It is only 10% of South Africans who are able to retire with adequate 
benefits and it is because of this that the government is proposing to phase in a 
preservation requirement over a period of time. The introduction of compulsory 
preservation would mean that when a person changes jobs, the pension benefit can 
either be kept in the employer’s fund, be moved to a preservation fund, or to the 
person’s new employer’s fund. A person will no longer be able to withdraw the 
benefit as cash. The preservation requirement will, however, be relaxed in cases 
where a person is unemployed and has received all his or her unemployment 
insurance benefits. Such a person will be allowed to access up to one-third of the 
benefit.  
 
The same would apply for persons who can prove a medical need.98 The Notes 
further propose the same tax treatment for all retirement fund contributions.99 As part 
of improving governance, Pension Funds Circular 130 will be enforceable and 
trustees will be required to be fit and proper and must have no criminal records to 
qualify for the position.100 Trustees will be required to invest the assets of funds in 
the best interests of the funds’ members. The provisions of the Pension Fund Act of 
1956 will be extended to public-sector funds and members of these funds will receive 
similar protection as received by members of private-sector funds.101 The 
government is also intending to introduce tax-free savings instruments which will 
encourage people to save for short- and medium-term needs without being tempted 
to use their retirement savings.102  
 
These are still proposals and it will be very interesting to see how the government 
will put them into practice. 
 
                                            
 
98
 At 13. 
99
 Idem. 
100
 At 14-15. 
101
 At 15-16.  
102
 At 16. 
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7.4.2.5 National Treasury: Preservation, portability, and governance for 
retirement funds  
 
This Paper is one of a series of technical papers that followed the overview paper 
Strengthening Retirement Savings. It looks at the preservation requirement in South 
Africa’s retirement funds and puts forward a number of proposals. The Paper 
acknowledges the fact that in general South Africans do not save enough for their 
retirement and that it is only half of the workers in the country that participate in 
retirement savings.  
 
Proposals for pre-retirement preservation include the following:103 
 
Preservation and portability 
 
 Require retirement funds to create appropriate default preservation funds (to 
transfer funds into the fund when a person leaves employment, unless the 
person indicate otherwise); 
 Allow fund members access to funds when leaving employment, and put a tax 
levy on withdrawals above current levels with the aim of discouraging people 
from making withdrawals; 
 Allow withdrawals as indicated above and monitor the situation for a period of 
three to five years and if there are no improvements, revisit the issue; 
 Allow access to a cash lump-sum of up to one-third and require compulsory 
preservation of the remaining two-third; 
 Allow a withdrawal of a certain amount every month when a person cannot 
find a new job;  
                                            
 
103
 The National Treasury: Preservation, Portability and Governance for Retirement Funds (Technical 
discussion Paper C for Public Comment) 21 September 2012 at at 3-6, accessed from 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/Preservation%20portability%20and%20governa
nce%20%2021%20Sept%202012%20.pdf, last visited on 07 September 2015. 
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 Allow no withdrawals from growth on existing assets, or new contributions 
from new or existing employees; and 
 Encourage portability between pension funds. 
 
Provident fund and pension fund alignment 
 
 Align retirement benefits of provident funds to those of pension and retirement 
annuity funds to allow members of provident funds to enjoy same tax benefits 
as members of pension funds; 
 Allow those retiring from provident funds to receive cash lump-sum payments, 
but stop the creation of new provident funds (with the harmonisation of tax 
treatment of contributions to all retirement funds); 
 Preserve vested rights by allowing payment of the value of the fund credit 
accrued as a lump-sum on retirement on the day of the implementation of new 
legislation; however, growth on the fund and new contributions to be treated 
the same way as benefits for pension funds; and 
 Allow employees aged 50 and above to take a bigger portion of their 
retirement savings as a cash lump-sum but subject those who are below 50 at 
the date of the implementation of legislation to rules applicable to members of 
pension funds. 
 
The National Treasury’s proposals are generally welcome as it is clear that 
something needs to be done to correct the situation of insufficient benefits at 
retirement. There is undoubtedly an urgent need to put a restriction on the freedom 
retirees have of withdrawing the retirement benefits before retirement and using all 
the money for other things except for their actual purpose, namely income 
replacement during retirement. It is high time that the government realises that 
saving for retirement and preservation of funds is never going to bring the envisaged 
results until participation and preservation are made compulsory through legislation.  
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With regard to the alignment of provident funds to pension funds, it is submitted that 
applying the same rules to both pension and provident funds might just mean the 
system is in fact providing for one form of fund, which is a pension fund, and that 
brings an argument as to whether there will still be a need for provident funds. There 
are a number of options the National Treasury has put forward with regard to how to 
align provident funds to pension funds; some of which might bring some challenges. 
The option of stopping the creation of provident funds and to allow members who are 
already in the fund time to exit the fund as they reach retirement age, brings up the 
question of costs. This will mean as more people exit the fund, fewer people 
remaining in the fund will have to carry the costs of running the fund. The option that 
allows the member to receive the value of the credit which had accrued on the day of 
the implementation of the new legislation as a lump-sum will favour those who are 
about to retire, and might be unfair to those who still have a long way to go before 
retirement. It would be fair if all the members were to be given an opportunity to 
choose what they would prefer to do with their savings. The option to allow those 
who are 50 years and above to take home a larger portion as a lump-sum cash 
payment, while those below the age of 50 settle for regular pensions, might face 
serious constitutional challenges as those below 50 might feel hard done and unfairly 
discriminated.104 Further discussions and proposals on the preservation of funds and 
the treatment of provident funds will follow under paragraphs 7.5.5 and 7.5.6 below.  
 
7.4.3 Observations and lessons from Belgium, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the World Bank 
 
A determination whether South Africa’s occupational retirement security system 
meets international standards requires a look at what other countries of the world are 
doing. For this purpose, systems in Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the approach advocated by the World Bank, should provide a good measure. 
                                            
 
104
 Different types of funds are discussed 6.4 in Ch 6. 
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These systems are discussed in Chapter 3 of this study and only important findings 
are referred to below.   
 
7.4.3.1 Belgium 
 
The pension system in Belgium,105 similar to South Africa, follows a three-pillar 
approach. In Belgium it is compulsory for all people to have some form of insurance. 
Similar to Belgium, South Africa’s social security system offers social insurance to 
workers, and social assistance to those who are not working or those who even 
though were working, could not contribute to retirement schemes as they earned too 
little.  
 
The difference, however, is that in South Africa it is not compulsory for a worker to 
contribute to a social insurance scheme, except where the employer has already 
established an insurance scheme for its employees and has made it compulsory for 
the employees to participate in that scheme. Participation is also compulsory where 
the Minister has issued a sectoral determination to that effect. It is high time that 
South Africa should also make it compulsory for all workers (or at least from a 
particular salary threshold) to be insured and to participate in retirement saving. In 
South Africa not all workers participate in retirement funds as they are mainly for 
those who qualify as “employees” and who work in the formal sector of the economy 
– to the exclusion of other categories of workers, which include those employed in 
the informal sector of the economy and the self-employed.   
 
In Belgium, social insurance is afforded along industry or professional lines and 
separate pension schemes exist for public employees, private employees, and the 
self-employed. However, the pension system for the self-employed has been 
criticised in terms of its legitimacy, adequacy, and financial viability. For example, the 
system has been found to be based on flat-rate contributions and benefits which 
                                            
 
105
 See a discussion on Belgium’s retirement security system under paras 3.3 and 3.6 in Ch 3. 
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inevitably generate low minimum protection levels. This has led to a relatively large 
dependency on social assistance provision, while, on the other hand, the absence of 
income-related protection necessitated the development of individual retirement 
provisions in the third pillar (private savings) for those who can afford it. 
Occupational defined-benefit pension plans target retirement replacement rates of 
between 60% and 75%. However, the vast majority of sectoral pension schemes 
take the form of defined-contribution funds, funded exclusively by employer 
contributions. On the death of an insured person from occupational injury or disease, 
members of the family can obtain benefits at rates varying from 15% to 60% of the 
person’s basic wage – depending on their relationship with the deceased. 
 
Belgium’s retirement security system affords everyone legal protection against 
contingencies such as job loss and old-age. Social protection in this country plays a 
major role in preventing people from falling into poverty. It has been established that 
high-income earners’ pensions are generally insufficient to maintain their former 
standard of living. However, the fact that Belgium is not included in the group of 
countries which the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index graded, makes it 
difficult to determine how the country’s retirement system fares in the international 
community. As highlighted above, in South Africa it is presently not compulsory for 
everyone to join a retirement fund, nor is it compulsory for employers to establish 
retirement funds except in limited cases such as where that has been made 
compulsory by the Minister through a sectoral determination. It is high time that 
South Africa makes it compulsory for employers to establish funds or join umbrella 
funds in the case of employers who have too small a number of employees to 
establish a fund of their own. This is very important considering a high number of 
people who go into retirement with no form of income. One other notable aspect of 
the Belgian system is the fact that the country has a fund specifically meant for self-
employed people. South Africa does not have a fund specifically for this category of 
workers, but has retirement annuity funds and private savings vehicles which this 
category of workers can use. It is submitted that South Africa might not need a 
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special fund for this category of workers if the National Savings Fund is 
introduced.106  
 
Self-employed people who would like to use privately arranged retirement annuity 
funds can do so, provided they produce evidence that show that they are 
participating in another fund with similar or better benefits to those offered by the 
National Savings Fund. In Belgium, pension-related disputes are dealt with by the 
Office of the Pensions Ombudsman, which is a specialised body that deals with such 
matters. 
 
7.4.3.2 The Netherlands 
 
The pension system in the Netherlands107 also follows a three-pillar approach. All 
three pillars are taken into account when determining the amount of pension benefit 
a person must receive at the time of retirement.  
 
The state pension plays a significant support role to the occupational pensions 
system, which excludes the unemployed and those working in the informal sector. 
Although there is no statutory obligation for employers to offer a pension scheme to 
employees, industrial relations agreements have ensured that the majority of 
employees are covered. The number of people covered by the system is estimated 
to be more than 90%. This is an indication that high participation is possible if people 
are willing to save for their retirement without being forced to do so. South Africa, 
however, presents a different picture compared to the situation in the Netherlands. 
The situation in South Africa, unlike in the Netherlands, calls for compulsory 
participation – otherwise achieving a higher level of coverage will remain a dream. 
 
The Netherlands, just like South Africa, has a quasi-mandatory system. Employers 
who establish pension schemes for their employees make it compulsory for all their 
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 Idem. 
107
 See the discussion of the Netherlands’ retirement security system under par 3.4 in Ch 3. 
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employees or certain categories of their employees to participate in those funds. 
Saving for retirement is encouraged through tax relief. Most pensions take the form 
of defined-benefit schemes.108  
 
Even though occupational pension plans promise to replace at least 75% of the 
retiree’s final earnings, it is reported that most of the pension plans have been able 
to replace up to 100% of final earnings through defined-benefit plans. This is a sign 
of a good pension system. Lump-sum cash payments are not allowed, unless the 
benefit amount is very small. This is something very important which South Africa 
can take from the Dutch system. It is compulsory for members of a defined-
contribution plan to buy an annuity when they retire at the age of 65. Thus the 
retirement age is higher than in South Africa, where it is generally from the age of 60. 
Pension rights in the Netherlands are transferred in full when a person changes jobs. 
A person can also choose to leave the pension with the previous employer. This is 
another good element of the system that aims to provide adequate protection to 
participants which South Africa should take note of. Interestingly, the Netherlands, 
just like South Africa, has categories of employees who are excluded by the system, 
such as those in the informal sector.  
 
Unlike Belgium, the United Kingdom, and South Africa, the Netherlands system does 
not have a specialised tribunal or forum that specifically deals with pension or social 
security-related complaints or disputes. The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 
2014 Report gave the Netherlands a “B+” grade, which means the country has a 
sound system with good features, but it has some shortcomings differentiating it from 
an A-grade system109. The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index rated the 
                                            
 
108
 Idem.  
109
 An “A”-grade system is a first-class and robust retirement income system that delivers good 
benefits, is sustainable, and has a high level of integrity. See Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 
2014 Report op cit note 47 at 7. 
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adequacy sub-index110 for the Netherlands to be at 75%, the sustainability sub-index 
at 76%, and the integrity sub-index at 90%.111  
 
What South Africa needs to do in comparison to the Netherlands is to come up with 
a plan on how to extend coverage to people who are currently excluded by the 
system and to ensure that benefits receive adequate protection through the 
introduction of compulsory preservation or transfer of funds.  
 
7.4.3.3 The United Kingdom 
 
Even though the United Kingdom,112 just like Belgium, the Netherlands, and South 
Africa, follows a three-pillar approach, its system is quite complex as compared to 
the other three countries. The difference between South Africa’s system and that of 
the United Kingdom is that the latter provides a variety of schemes under the 
individual three pillars and this makes the system quite complicated.  
 
A unique feature of the United Kingdom pension system is the possibility to contract-
out or opt-out of the additional state pension. This requires coverage by an 
occupational or personal pension scheme providing equivalent or better benefits 
than the earnings-related component of the statutory scheme. Occupational 
pensions can be defined-benefit or defined-contribution schemes.113 The system 
provides protection to those not in paid work and those who earn below the lower-
earnings limit. It allows payment of lump-sum cash benefits upon a member’s 
request and in the case of death or survivors’ benefits, but at the discretion of 
                                            
 
110
 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report (ibid) at 72. The adequacy sub-index is 
determined by considering the base level of income provided, as well as the net replacement rate for 
a median-income earner; the sustainability sub-index is determined by considering several measures 
that affect the sustainability of current programs; the integrity sub-index is determined by considering 
the integrity of the overall pension system, but focuses more on the private sector system. It considers 
the role of regulation and governance, the protection provided to participants from a range of risks, 
and the level of communication provided to members (at 13-14).  
111
 Ibid at 72-74. 
112
 See the discussion of the United Kingdom’s retirement security system under par 3.5 in Ch 3. 
113
 Idem. 
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trustees. Pension plans operate as trusts and are regulated by trust law. Benefits are 
payable either on the death of a member, or on the member’s retirement – whichever 
comes first. Members who have completed more than two years of service and who 
leave the scheme can either preserve the benefit or transfer their accrued benefit to 
another pension plan. In other words, for this category of members it is not 
compulsory to transfer or preserve the benefit. This is understandable as 
contributions of two years and less will not make much of a difference.  
 
The problem will be where a person changes jobs every two years. This means such 
a person will never be able to accumulate enough savings to build a retirement 
benefit. Almost all the plans have an opt out option as long as a person can produce 
evidence that he or she has transferred to another suitable plan that offers similar or 
better benefits than the one he or she was participating in. The option to opt-out is 
what makes the United Kingdom pension system unique from systems of other 
countries of the world. What this means is that even though it is mandatory to join 
some of the pension schemes, workers still have a choice to join alternative pension 
schemes organised at company level or even individual funds.  
 
The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report gave the United Kingdom 
a “B”-grade rating. The United Kingdom is placed just above countries such as 
Ireland, the United States of America, Poland, Brazil, Germany, Singapore, and 
France. It has a system that has some good features, but also has major risks and 
shortcomings that need to be addressed.114  
 
Even though the system is a bit complex, it is rated by the Melbourne Mercer Global 
Pension Index as among the best in the world. Its adequacy sub-index has been 
scored at almost 70%, the sustainability sub-index at 52%, and the integrity sub-
index at 80%.115 The United Kingdom is one of the few European countries which 
are not facing a serious pension crisis because of the initiatives that the government 
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 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 47 at 7. 
115
 Ibid at 72-74. 
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has taken since the 1980s to prevent the crisis from developing. However, this does 
not mean the system is without shortcomings. One interesting element of the system 
is that it is compulsory for workers to be covered, but once covered; a worker is 
allowed to opt-out of the scheme if they can prove that they have adequate cover 
somewhere else. This is a unique feature which is there to make sure that every 
worker has some form of protection and also that workers cannot just exit the funds 
as and when they wish to do so.  
 
The system allows workers freedom of choice. It has, however, been discovered that 
while the system was able to provide reasonable pension income, it was 
nevertheless unable to deliver a retirement free from social exclusion for most of the 
citizens. The state provision failed to lift all individuals out of poverty because not all 
were protected by the first pillar against periods of out of paid work.  
 
The other thing is that where entitlement was secured, pensions were too low. The 
private occupational pension also had its shortcomings as its variability of coverage 
between employment sectors and employers of different sizes meant that some 
sectors such as the self-employed, small business employment, and informal work 
were rarely covered, creating systematic poverty risks for the whole group of 
workers. With regard to private savings, the findings indicated that they were 
unaffordable for some, while for others it was not clear that they represented a good 
investment,116 hence the system has undergone several reform processes.  
 
It is high time that South Africa must make participation for all workers who can 
afford to make contributions to retirement schemes compulsory. The government 
must also give the workers freedom of choice by making it possible for them to opt-
out of some of the funds they have joined (in this case, the National Savings Fund, if 
introduced) in instances where there are other funds which provide better benefits. 
The introduction of mandatory participation either in a public or private pension 
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scheme will increase the number of workers who participate in retirement savings 
schemes in South Africa, as not only employers will be obliged to establish 
retirement schemes for their employees but employees themselves will also be 
forced by law to join funds such as the proposed National Savings Fund.   
 
The United Kingdom has, in its effort to encourage the culture of saving among 
workers, published a White Paper on “Security in Retirement: Towards a New 
Pensions System” with which government intends to improve the country’s pension 
system to, among other things, make it strong, sustainable, workable, and 
affordable.117 The government has also, starting from 2012, introduced the Pension 
Act of 2008, which introduced automatic enrolments into pension schemes. The 
Pension Act established the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) and the 
new mandatory private pension for workers. This National Savings Trust will take in 
workers of any employer regardless of the size of the business or workforce. All 
companies are now required to automatically enrol their employees to this scheme. 
The scheme allows workers to opt-out should they decide to join other schemes that 
offer similar or better protection.118 This move will see millions of workers in the 
United Kingdom having some form of protection when they retire. This is another 
approach that South Africa should look into to enforce participation. 
 
The United Kingdom has the Office of the Pensions Ombudsman that handles 
pension-related disputes, which is a specialised office for such matters. This office 
works in the same way as the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator in South 
Africa.  
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7.4.3.4 The World Bank’s approach  
 
The World Bank wants people to be self-sufficient. It encourages a multi-pillar 
approach, comprising a mandatory publicly managed pillar that aims to be 
redistributive in nature; mandatory personal and occupational plans that are fully 
funded and privately managed but publicly regulated; and a voluntary pillar also 
aimed at savings (personal savings and occupational plans). This approach 
emphasises saving that comes through both public and private management.  
The World Bank’s view is that a mandatory pillar that is privately managed is ideally 
suited for handling people’s savings, but that a publicly managed tax-financed pillar 
is needed for redistribution, and that a voluntary third pillar is needed by people who 
want additional old-age security.119 The approach followed by South Africa is not far 
from what the World Bank is advocating, except that South Africa does not have a 
public fund. A public or national fund is being proposed and is likely to be introduced 
in the near future. 
 
7.4.4 Lessons and obligations from international instruments 
 
The right to social security is an internationally recognised human right. South Africa 
is a constitutional democratic country which is committed to international laws and 
standards.120 This is apparent from the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution, the inclusion of provisions that bind South Africa to approach 
international law in a certain way, and the fact that South Africa has already ratified a 
number of international instruments. In terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, 
South Africa is also bound by international instruments not yet ratified by Parliament. 
International standards help member states by guiding and shaping national 
legislation and reforms. Instruments that have been ratified provide guarantees up to 
a certain level.  
                                            
 
119
 Discussed under par 3.2.2.3 in Ch 3. 
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 International law and the role it plays in the development of the right to social and retirement 
security is discussed in Ch 2. 
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International law is important for South Africa because most of the social security 
instruments are couched as standards which provide the benchmark against which 
the country’s policies and legislation can be measured. The question here will be 
whether the South African retirement security system meets the standards set by 
international instruments on social security and retirement income provision.  
 
This determination has to be made considering the guarantee made in section 27 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa to give everyone access to social 
security, and the obligation the state has to take reasonable and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to 
access to social security for those who do not yet have access. Various instruments 
were discussed in Chapter 2 and here reference will only be made to the most 
relevant ones:  
 
▀ Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that 
everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to the realisation of this right through national effort and international 
cooperation, and in accordance with the resources of each state. This article 
has some elements that are found in section 27(2) of the Constitution; namely 
the duty to ensure realisation of the right through national effort, in this case 
reasonable legislative and other measures, and within available resources. 
The Declaration is, however, not binding on governments but it has moral and 
political authority. 
 
▀ The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 
recognises everyone’s right to social security and it requires member states to 
guarantee an adequate standard of living to all.121 According to the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the concept of “social security” 
implicitly covers all the risks involved in the loss of means of subsistence for 
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 Articles 9 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, 
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reasons beyond a person’s control.122 State parties are required to take 
appropriate measures to establish regimes of compulsory old-age 
insurance.123  
 The General Comment obliges member states to adopt legislative measures, 
national strategies, and plans of action to realise the right to social security.124 
This is contained in section 27(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, which requires the state to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to progressively realise the right of 
access to social security. Thus, the measures taken by the state will be 
acceptable if they are reasonable. This was interpreted by the Constitutional 
Court in the case of Grootboom125 to mean that the measures taken must be 
reasonable and effective both in their design and implementation. South 
Africa has ratified this Convention on 18 January 2015 and will now have to 
align its system towards what is required by the Convention. By ratifying this 
Covenant, South Africa is now legally bound to promote the realisation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights covered by the Convention.   
 
▀ The Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952, provides a list of 
contingencies which must be covered by every social security system, and it 
requires all member states to cover at least three of those risks.126 South 
Africa has social insurance arrangements which cover all those contingencies, 
including old-age. This means that the country has surpassed the standard 
set by the Convention in this regard. The Convention further lists the 
conditions a national social security scheme must meet in order to qualify as 
an acceptable system for the purpose of ratifying the Convention.127 The 
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 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 6 – The Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons (Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Thirteenth Session, 1995 at par 26.  
123
 At par 27. 
124
 At paras 67 and 68. 
125
 See the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 at par 
42. 
126
 Article 2 Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952. 
127
 Articles 71 & 72. 
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Convention wants, among other things, for the benefits paid to be periodical 
payments, the benefit to replace previous income to a certain extent or 
establish a guaranteed minimum, and for the state to carry the general 
responsibility for due provision of benefits and proper administration of social 
security institutions.  
 South Africa has pension funds that provide for periodical payments, and the 
system provides a framework within which people are able to buy annuities 
that will provide them with regular income in retirement. The system is also 
regulated at the level of international standards, as confirmed by the integrity 
rating of a “B+” given to South Africa in the Mercer Pension Index 2014 
Report when it comes to the administration and governance of its retirement 
funds.128 Article 26 of the Convention provides that the contingency covered 
must be survival beyond a prescribed age, which shall not be more than 65 
years or a higher age as will be determined by competent authority taking into 
account the working ability of elderly people in the country concerned. In 
South Africa, pension funds generally pay retirement benefits from the age of 
60, which is below the age of 65 set by the Convention. In terms of article 27 
of the Convention, coverage for old-age benefits must not be less than 50% of 
prescribed classes of employees or not less than 20% of all residents from 
prescribed classes of the economically active population of the member’s 
state. In this regard, the Convention sets the targets of coverage very low. 
South Africa has not done badly in this regard as coverage in the formal 
sector of the economy has been reported to be between 66% and 84%,129 
which is considerably high considering that participation is still not 
compulsory. This is the fact even though this study has shown that coverage 
is still very low regarding the atypically employed and those employed in the 
informal sector. The levels of benefits are set out in articles 65, 66, and 67 of 
the Convention. Interestingly, South Africa has not yet ratified this important 
Convention. 
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 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2014 Report op cit note 47 at 6-8. 
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 South Africa Retirement Fund Reform: First Discussion Paper op cit note 10 at 13. 
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▀ The Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention of 1967 requires 
each member state for which Part III (old-age benefit) of the Convention is in 
force to secure to the persons protected the provision of an old-age benefit, 
which covers the contingency for survival beyond a prescribed age, which 
shall not be more than 65 years or such higher age as may be fixed by the 
competent authority with due regard to certain factors.130 As indicated above, 
most retirement funds in this country pay retirement benefits from the age of 
60 years. The Convention requires the benefit to be in the form of periodical 
payments.131 This Convention is in favour of employees receiving retirement 
benefits in the form of pensions instead of lump-sum payments. A person who 
receives periodical payments is better off than one who receives a lump-sum 
and faces a high risk of squandering the money and being left with nothing in 
their retirement. Thus, periodical pension payments promote social security 
objectives better than lump-sum cash payments.132 South Africa has not yet 
ratified this important Convention. However, what is provided for in this 
Convention is generally also covered by the Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention. As indicated above, South Africa has already done 
more than what the Convention requires. 
 
▀ The International Labour Organisation Income Security Recommendation 67 
of 1944, even though not binding, provides guidelines which are very 
important for reforms in South Africa. It promotes universal coverage through 
social assistance,133 and further provides that social insurance should afford 
protection in the contingencies to which all employed and self-employed 
persons, together with their dependants, are exposed.134  
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 Article 14 and 15 of the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention of 1967. 
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 Article 17. 
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 Discussed under par 6.4 in Ch 6.  
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 At paras 28-30 of Income Security Recommendation 67 of 1944.  
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In terms of this Recommendation, the income security schemes should relieve 
want and prevent destitution by restoring, up to a reasonable level, income 
which is lost by reason of inability to work or to obtain remunerative work by 
reason of the death of a breadwinner.135  
 
▀ Other instruments that have important provisions on social security and 
retirement provision are the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) instruments, which are relatively new, namely the SADC Code of 
Social Security and SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. The SADC 
Code gives member states the duty to maintain their social security systems 
at a satisfactory level of at least equal to that required for the ratification of 
ILO Convention 102. It further requires each member state to progressively 
raise its system of social security to a higher level, which includes achieving 
meaningful coverage of everyone under the system – bearing in mind the 
realities and level of development in the particular member state.136 In terms 
of article 10, dealing with retirement and old-age, member states should aim 
to create an enabling environment that provides universal coverage for old 
people through social assistance, social insurance, or social allowances. The 
SADC Charter, on the other hand, promotes adequate social protection in the 
region.137  
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 Article 5 of the SADC Code on Social Security, 2008. 
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International instruments are without a doubt important in the development of the 
social security systems of the countries of the world. Even though most of these 
instruments generally lack serious enforcement or punitive measures, they 
nevertheless play a significant role as they guide state parties in their effort to 
provide social security protection to their citizens.  Even though an analysis of these 
instruments has shown that South Africa has done very well in certain respects, it 
should be accepeted that weaknesses that still exist in the system are an indication 
that the country still has a long way to go before the promise made in section 27 that 
everyone has the right of access to social security will be realised.  
 
7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXTENDING COVERAGE AND BENEFITS 
 
7.5.1 Overview 
 
The nature of South Africa’s social and retirement security system is such that only a 
certain section of workers is protected as the formal system offers protection only to 
those employed in the formal sector and who qualify as employees. The system also 
does not provide adequate protection of retirement benefits.  
 
A sound retirement security system should at least have the following elements:138 
 
 Comprehensiveness: the system must provide comprehensive coverage 
against all contingencies.  
 Universality: the system must provide access to all those in need of protection 
without any form of discrimination (for example on the basis of, race, sex, or 
nationality). 
 Adequacy: the level of benefits provided must be adequate. 
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 Human Rights Resource Centre of the University of Minnesota “Circle of Rights: Economic and 
Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource, Module 11, Social Security as a Human Right”, 2000 
(contents of section 5) accessed from http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/ 
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 Effective remedies: there must be access to speedy, affordable, and effective 
legal remedies for people aggrieved by adverse legal rules or administrative 
decisions.  
 
The pointers below are proposed by this study for policy consideration towards 
achieving comprehensive coverage and adequate benefits. 
 
KEY POLICY ISSUES 
 
 Extension of coverage to all categories of workers (a move towards universal 
coverage); 
 Improvement of the level of protection (adequate benefits);  
 Access to adequate,139 sustainable,140 and affordable141 retirement schemes;  
 Introduction of mandatory participation;  
 Introduction of mandatory preservation; and 
 A different approach of dealing with provident funds. 
 
These issues are addressed by the proposals made below. 
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 The system will be considered “adequate” if it provides benefits that are able to protect 
participating members against poverty. 
140
 The system will be considered “sustainable” if it is financially sound and can be maintained over a 
long period. 
141
 The system will be considered “affordable” if it is within the financial capacity of the workers. 
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7.5.2 A broader safety-net 
 
Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognises social 
security as a fundamental human right.142 Social security can be considered as a 
concept that should be distinguished from social protection. Social protection is a 
wider term and provides broader, more basic, and more comprehensive protection 
than social security, which in a country such as South Africa focuses primarily on 
employment-associated risks.143 Social protection aims to extend protection to all the 
members of the community, regardless of whether the person is employed or not 
and whether the person is employed in the formal or informal sector. It is more 
universal in approach.144  
 
Considering South Africa’s political history of discriminatory laws and policies, the 
adverse results thereof, and the proposals made by the Taylor Committee for the 
introduction of a comprehensive social security system, it should be accepted that 
this is the approach the country must take.  
 
In order to achieve this, South Africa must, among other things, ensure that:  
 
 It progressively works towards achieving universal coverage to protect 
everyone;145  
 There are savings vehicles that are accessible to all146 and which provide 
adequate replacement income;  
 An environment for the growth of other supplementary retirement savings 
vehicles is created; and 
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 Section 27(1)(c) affords everyone the right to access to social security, including if they are unable 
to support themselves and their dependants, and appropriate social assistance. 
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 Olivier et al Introduction to Social Security op cit note 27 at 11. 
144
 Idem. 
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 Section 27(2) of the Constitution obliges the state to take reasonable and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to have access to social 
security. The system is universal if it gives everyone access regardless of the employment sector in 
which the person is employed. 
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 The system must have strict rules to enforce participation, preservation, and 
annuitisation.  
 
South Africa’s vision with regard to the provision of social security is to create a 
system which will facilitate the development of human capacity and self-reliance 
within a caring and enabling socio-economic environmen147 – the approach which is 
being advocated by the World Bank. However, the government should realise that 
this can only be achieved if the majority of people are covered and also if the system 
has ways of pooling people into available savings arrangements. Under the Agenda 
for Action, the White Paper has universal access among its aims, and the 
government promises to introduce legislation and policies that will facilitate universal 
access to social welfare services and social security benefits in an enabling 
environment.148  
 
These objectives are most welcome as they demonstrate South Africa’s commitment 
to ensuring that everyone in the country is adequately covered and protected. The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, should be commended for 
providing the basis for comprehensive social protection in that section 27(1)(c) gives 
everyone the right to access to social security, and if they are not able to support 
themselves and their dependants, the right to appropriate social assistance. This 
shows a move away from a limited social security approach in that both social 
assistance and social insurance form part of the right guaranteed by section 27 of 
the Constitution. It should be accepted that factors such as the high level of poverty, 
the high level of unemployment, the current exclusions, the rise in informal 
employment, the nature of constitutional imperatives with regards to the right to 
social security, equality and equal treatment for all, and the promotion and respect 
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for human dignity149 no longer allow a narrow approach to social security provision in 
this country. 
 
South Africa’s efforts to work towards providing comprehensive social protection 
should be influenced by international law which promotes everyone’s right to social 
security. South Africa is in this regard also bound by the Constitutional provisions on 
how it should deal with international law. The relevant provision in this regard will be 
section 39(1) of the Constitution, which requires our courts, tribunals, or forums to 
consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
 
7.5.3 The state old-age pension  
 
At the moment, the state old-age pension plays a huge role in providing for people 
who were not able to make savings for their retirement and who satisfy all the 
requirements, including the means-test which ensures that only those who are poor 
are targeted. The means-test should not be abolished as social assistance should 
only be provided to those people who really need it. Removing the means-test will 
certainly increase the burden on the government’s social security expenditure.150 
Social assistance should only be for people who reach old-age and have never been 
employed in their life or were employed but with low salaries that did not allow them 
to contribute to retirement savings.  
 
7.5.4 A mandatory contributory (public and private) system for all those who 
are working  
 
South Africa has a well-developed private retirement security system by world 
standards. However, the system does not cater for all those who need coverage as it 
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 Olivier et al Introduction to Social Security op cit note 27 at 15-16; see also the Taylor Committee 
Report op cit note 72 at 40-41, where the Committee suggests that a wider multi-purpose notion of 
comprehensive social protection be adopted which will have certain merits for South Africa, as it 
incorporates developmental strategies and programmes which are more appropriate for a developing 
country such as South Africa. 
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focuses only on those who qualify as employees, and those who are employed in the 
formal sector of the economy. A public fund which would have accommodated 
everyone was never introduced, and in that way the system has created a gap 
between those who are in the formal sector and those in the informal sector and the 
self-employed. It is submitted that it is high time that a public fund should be 
introduced. Once established, it should be compulsory for every worker earning 
above a certain threshold to participate in the fund, unless such a person can 
produce evidence that he or she is already participating in another appropriate fund; 
for example, one established by the employer or industry. Thus, workers who are not 
members of any fund will be obliged to join the public fund, and those who are 
members of funds which do not provide satisfactory benefits or coverage, should be 
allowed to opt-out of those funds to join the public fund where the public fund 
provides better protection and adequate benefits as compared to the those funds. 
The government will be responsible to create the administrative framework for this 
fund. The introduction of a public fund will go a long way in ensuring that people 
save their money for their retirement. The aim of such a reform should be to assist in 
creating a comprehensive social security framework as proposed by the Taylor 
Committee, in which individuals are encouraged to save for income support in their 
old-age.   
 
It should also be compulsory for employers to establish retirement funds for their 
employees in return for tax relief. In the case of employers who for any reason 
cannot establish such funds for their workers, it should be compulsory for such 
employers to make arrangements for their workers to have access to a private 
pension scheme similar to the one in the United Kingdom. This scheme will be 
managed by the private industry but regulated by the government. It will take the 
form of a contributory plan providing a minimum benefit at exit. The scheme will pay 
pension, and death and disability benefits. Employees of the employer or industry 
which establishes a fund must be automatically enrolled into those funds or into 
employer-arranged private pension schemes. In other words, employers will have 
the responsibility to ensure that their employees have their own fund or that other 
arrangements are made for them, and where it is not possible to provide the latter, 
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SECURITY SYSTEM: 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
396 
 
that the workers participate in the public fund. There must be procedures to report on 
this compliance with the Deparment of Labour and employers which comply should 
qualify for tax relief. 
 
The self-employed and independent contractors should also be required to join the 
public fund and may only be exempted upon producing evidence that they are 
participating in other private funds and that the level of contributions and benefits in 
those funds meets the required standard. This should be linked to the SARS system 
for proper monitoring. The system should allow an option to opt-out from the national 
fund (the second pillar) and the second tier of the third pillar (as proposed in the 
model below) as is the case in the United Kingdom, in order to give workers a choice 
to join funds that they think will provide them with better service and benefits.  
 
If South Africa wants to improve coverage and the level of benefits provided by the 
system, compulsory participation is the way to go as a voluntary system has clearly 
not been able to attract people to save. A voluntary system is characterised by some 
unscrupulous and sporadic savings, and some people might postpone participation 
indefinitely.  
 
On the other hand, mandatory participation will call for a sound retirement security 
framework. People will also need more awareness about different retirement savings 
vehicles and their operations in order to make informed decisions about saving for 
their retirement. 
 
7.5.5 The mandatory preservation of retirement benefits 
 
One of the causes of insufficient benefits at the time of retirement is leakages that 
are allowed to occur prior to the actual retirement date. People who change151 or 
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 It is averaged that a person can change jobs between five and seven times in his or her lifetime. 
See in this regard Sanlam’s 2012 Benchmark Survey at 9 accessed from 
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lose jobs at some stage in their life withdraw the benefit and use it for other 
purposes. This affects the ultimate benefit a person will receive at retirement. People 
who resign because they have found another or better job somewhere else should 
not be allowed to withdraw the benefit and use it for other purposes as the benefit is 
meant for income replacement in retirement. It should be mandatory for such people 
to either transfer the whole amount to the fund of the new employer, or to keep it in a 
preservation fund as it is the case in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, 
members who have completed more than two years of service and who leave the 
scheme are required to either preserve the benefit or transfer it to another pension 
plan. South Africa should follow suit by putting in place laws that will enforce the 
preservation of retirement funds.  
 
This benefit should only be made available to the person when he or she reaches 
the age of retirement or at the age of 55 as with benefits paid by retirement annuity 
funds. It can only be in cases where the amount of the benefit is below a certain level 
that a person may be allowed to withdraw the whole benefit. A person who has lost 
his or her job should rely on unemployment benefits for survival. It should be in 
special circumstances such as where a person has reached a certain age, for 
example between the age of 50 and 55, and in circumstances where the chances of 
employment are limited, that a withdrawal is permitted. A person should only be 
allowed to withdraw a certain portion of the benefit if he or she goes for a certain 
number of months without finding a job and has exhausted his or her unemployment 
benefits. This also calls for a need to link unemployment benefits to retirement 
benefits. A person who goes for a certain number of months without finding a job can 
be allowed a maximum of two withdrawals from a preservation fund and up to a 
certain percentage, or can be given regular income until he or she finds another job 
and provided such a person produce evidence that he or she is actively looking for 
employment and that he or she is registered as a jobseeker with the Department of 
Labour. Regular pensions should be paid where the benefit is above a certain level, 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Benchmark Survey, accessed from http://www.sanlambenchmark.co.za/webadmin/ 
include/content/2011%20Stand-Alone.v2.pdf, last visited on 07 September 2015.  
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otherwise a cash lump-sum should be paid to that person. In this way, it will be 
difficult for people to access retirement benefits before they reach their retirement 
age, and this will go a long way in protecting benefits from being depleted way 
before the time and purpose they are meant for arrives.  
 
No retirement benefit and other benefits associated with it must be paid as cash 
lump-sums before the date of retirement, except in special circumstances since 
leakages defeat the objective of retirement funds. In the case of spouses and 
dependants of deceased members, both divorce benefits and death benefits should 
not be paid as cash, unless in cases where the benefit is below a certain level and 
therefore too little to be paid as a regular pension. Only part of the benefit should be 
paid in cash where the amount is above a certain level and the rest must be paid as 
regular pensions in the case of dependants and spouses who do not have any other 
form of income.  
 
However, spouses who are working and therefore have a source of income can be 
given a certain percentage of the benefit and the remaining benefit must be 
preserved to serve as a pension when the spouse reaches retirement age.152 It 
should also be accepted as correctly submitted by Liebenberg and Tilley153 that the 
preservation of pension benefits will only work if other social security mechanisms 
are improved. These would include improved protection and the provision for 
unemployment benefits. The longer people stay unemployed, the higher the chances 
of them being tempted or forced by economic hardships to use retirement benefits as 
income. This is the reason why there is a need for alternative insurance protection, 
which is in this case the Unemployment Insurance Scheme. The Unemployment 
Insurance Scheme should provide for improved benefits and for longer periods – 
taking into account the level of unemployment and poverty in South Africa. It cannot 
                                            
 
152
 See generally Deloitte “National Social Security Reform: Ensuring Nest Eggs Don’t Flee the Coop” 
2011, accessed from http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-SouthAfrica/Local%20Assets/Documents/ 
National_Social_Security_Reform.pdf, last visited 08 December 2014. 
153
 Liebenberg S and Tilley A “Poverty and Inequality Hearings Social Security Theme” (Background 
paper for South African national Non-Governmental Organisation (SANGOCO, the South African 
Human Rights Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality), 28 April 1998 at 26. 
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be denied that the level of unemployment in South Africa is a huge contributor to the 
low level of savings in this country. If the number of people who are employed in this 
country can increase, then the country will have more people saving for retirement. 
In its 2012 Benchmark Survey, Sanlam (Employee Benefits) reports that the majority 
of the respondents in the pension industry showed more concern about job security 
either due to previous or future threats of retrenchments. The Survey mentions 
issues of concern relating to factors that might directly or indirectly affect retirement 
savings and/or preservation of funds; namely the fact that many of the respondents 
were cash-strapped and finding it difficult to make ends meet, many led busy and 
hectic lifestyles, and there were also age and health concerns and high stress levels 
due to issues of finances.154 All these, however, should not prevent the government 
from introducing compulsory preservation as the benefits of having mandatory 
preservation outweight those of not having it at all.  
 
In the 2009 Benchmark Survey, Sanlam reported a high number of respondents who 
voted in favour of the preservation of their benefits.155 This is an indication that there 
is enthusiasm for mandatory preservation. 
 
7.5.6 Restricting participation in provident funds and compulsory 
annuitisation of benefits 
 
It should be accepted that for social security purposes, pension funds offer much 
better protection than provident funds, as provident funds have more disadvantages 
than advantages from a social security point of view. A person who receives a lump-
sum payment is likely to immediately use all the money on other things and be left 
with nothing for the remaining years of his or her life in retirement. This cannot be 
good considering the primary objectives of retirement funds. For this reason, 
provident funds should only be used to supplement pension funds. Thus, workers 
                                            
 
154
 Sanlam’s 2012 Benchmark Survey op cit note 153 at 9.  
155
 Sanlam 2009 Benchmark Survey at 9 accessed from http://www.sanlambenchmark.co.za/ 
webadmin/include/content/Sanlam_EB_Research_Survey_2009.pdf, last visited on 07 September 
2015. 
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should not be allowed to join only provident funds or to opt-out of pension funds to 
join provident funds. A worker may either belong to a pension fund and a provident 
fund, or a public fund and a provident fund, but not only a provident fund. 
Alternatively, there should be compulsory annuitisation of a certain percentage of the 
benefit a person receives from a provident fund. This will obviously align provident 
funds towards pension funds, which then raises the question of whether it will still be 
necessary to have provident funds. Better protection of benefits received from 
provident funds is required, otherwise provident funds will continue to be like 
ordinary savings vehicles provided by financial institutions, except for the different 
application of tax rules.  
 
7.5.7 The level of benefits 
 
Retirement funds in South Africa should target replacement values at not less than 
75% of a person’s final salary for those who belong to defined-benefits funds. It was 
reported by the National Treasury in its Second Discussion Paper for Retirement 
Reform that, according to the survey undertaken by Alexander Forbes,156 the 
majority of retirement fund members receive retirement income that was less than 
28% of their pre-retirement income. This is a worrying factor and does not offer much 
hope that benefits can be targeted at 75% of one’s final salary; not to mention 
anything closer to 100% replacement value, which has been achieved in the 
Netherlands. Retirement funds in this country are, however, targeting the 
replacement value in the case of benefits that include death and disability benefits of 
up to 70%.157 
 
Adequate benefits will ensure that a person is able to maintain the same standard of 
living he or she enjoyed before retirement. The mandatory retirement arrangements 
should also incorporate provisions for post-retirement medical scheme contributions, 
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 South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second Discussion Paper op cit note 39 at 
5 (in reference to Member Watch (Issues 1), Alexander Forbes 2006).  
157
 See the discussion under par 6.6.4.3 in Ch 6. 
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as well as other risks such as death and disability, where possible. This will ensure 
that retirement benefits continue to be used for the purpose which they are meant 
for. Benefits received by dependants in case a member of the fund dies should also 
be adequate, as insufficient benefits will not provide adequate protection and the 
dependants of the deceased may have to turn to the government for support. 
 
7.5.8 Minimum contribution rates 
 
Contributions to retirement funds must be at a rate that will push benefits to an 
acceptable level. It is stated in the National Treasury’s First Discussion Paper for 
Retirement Reform that the World Bank encourages contribution rates of between 
10% and 13% of a worker’s total annual salary.158 On the other hand, it is reported in 
the Second Discussion Paper for Retirement Reform that international practice 
suggests a higher rate of between 13% and 18% after tax, which comes to between 
11% and 15% of a person’s salary before tax.159 It should be accepted that 
contribution rates which average at 16%, as it is the case in South Africa, are 
adequate by international standards.   
 
7.5.9 The capping of administrative costs 
 
The issue of high administrative costs charged by administrators of private pension 
schemes has been raised many times by various Commissions and commentators. 
According to the Notes of the National Treasury on Strengthening Retirement 
Savings (an overview of proposals announced in the 2012 budget), high costs 
negatively affect retirement benefits. They also affect voluntary participation in 
retirement savings.160 Thus, it is upon the government through its regulatory reforms 
to control costs that fund administrators can charge. For example, regulation can be 
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 South Africa’s Retirement Fund Reform: The First Discussion Paper op cit note 10 at 13. 
159
 South Africa’s Social Security and Retirement Reform: The Second Discussion Paper op cit note 
39 at 15. 
160
 See National Treasury “Strengthening Retirement Savings (An overview of proposals announced 
in the 2012 Budget)” op cit note 95 at 3. 
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in the form of providing a ceiling above which administrators cannot charge 
administrative costs. This will help in ensuring that more money in the form of 
benefits goes to the members of retirement schemes instead of to administrators.  
 
7.5.10 Voluntary savings  
 
Individual private savings161 is another important component of a comprehensive 
social protection scheme, where people realise the importance of saving for their 
retirement and make efforts to join private savings schemes or retirement annuity 
funds offered by financial or insurance institutions.  
While occupational schemes are quasi-mandatory, private savings are voluntary and 
people who decide to use them can also decide how much they want to contribute 
upon receiving their risk assessment results and advice from financial advisors.  
 
People who are already members of retirement funds use retirement annuity 
schemes or other types of savings schemes to supplement their occupational 
pension or the provident fund benefits they will receive when they retire. These 
savings vehicles are also available to those who are not formally employed; for 
example those in informal employment and the self-employed. 
 
The obligation placed by section 27(2) of the Constitution on the government 
includes the adoption of enabling strategies to assist people to gain access to the 
right to social security through their own endeavours and initiatives,162 and retirement 
annuities and other savings vehicles, informal savings arrangements, and tax 
concessions for those who participate in retirement savings, are but a few examples 
of the enabling measures created by the government.  
 
                                            
 
161
 Discussed under par 5.6 in Ch 5. 
162
 See generally, De Vos P “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights: Social and 
Economic Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution” 1997 13 SAJHR 67 at 93-94. See also generally 
the discussion under par 5.2.1 in Ch 5. 
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7.5.11  Remedies or dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
Social security disputes must be dealt with by a specialised tribunal; considering the 
primary objective of social security, the adversarial nature of the court system, the 
time it can take for courts to resolve disputes, and the costs involved. The high costs 
of litigation will undoubtedly deplete or reduce the amount of benefit a retiree will 
receive in that a bigger portion of the benefit the person will receive if the court 
decides in his or her favour would go to legal costs instead of the member receiving 
and enjoying the whole benefit.163  
 
The South African retirement system provides a suitable dispute resolution 
mechanism in the form of the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator. However, it is 
important that access to legal services be extended especially for people in rural 
areas. Legal aid, legal clinics, and information desks should be readily accessible to 
the people.164 The Pension Funds Adjudicator must be given the sole responsibility 
of handling all pension-related disputes. The legislature should also establish an 
appeal body, and it should only be after the matter has been heard by this body that 
the parties who are still not satisfied can approach courts of law.    
 
7.5.12  Retirement funds regulation 
 
All occupational retirement funds must be regulated under a single piece of 
legislation and one regulatory body. At the moment there are funds that are 
regulated under separate pieces of legislation and outside the Pension Funds Act of 
1956. At times this creates inconsistencies and imbalances in the system. Members 
of retirement funds also as a result do not receive the same protection from the law. 
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 Discussed under par 6.10 in Ch 6. 
164
 See generally, Liebenberg S “Social Citizenship: A Precondition for Meaningful Democracy” 
Agenda, No 40, Citizenship (1999) at 64, accessed from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4066019 
(published by: Agenda Feminist Medi), last accessed on 05 August 2015. 
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7.5.13  The recognition of informal arrangements 
 
In addition to formal social security arrangements, there are also informal 
arrangements which play a significant role in providing support and other forms of 
security to individuals and communities. South Africa has many individuals and 
families who survive on the support and benefits they receive through informal 
schemes such as social clubs and stokvels. It is reported in the National Treasury 
First Discussion Paper for Retirement Reform that the majority of people who are 
economically active in South Africa gain some income from informal, irregular, or 
unregulated economic activities.165  
 
In a study on informal social security, Dekker argued that informal arrangements 
should not be seen as a concept separate from formal social security, and that the 
definition of social security should be extended to include informal social security.166  
 
Dekker goes on to suggest a new and broadened definition of social security as 
follows: 
 
“Social security comprises the provision of benefits (in money/kind/services/support) to 
members of society, households and individuals through public or collective (including non-
governmental, semi-formal, community and traditional) and/or arrangements to maintain a 
present living standard of human dignity by meeting basic needs and protecting against low or 
declining living standards arising from a number of basic risks, contingencies and needs.
167
  
 
Dekker has attempted to come up with a wider definition for the concept of social 
security which is accommodative of any form of social support to cater for social 
risks, contingencies, and other needs. Without dwelling too much on the definition, it 
should be accepted that informal social security indeed plays an important role in 
providing mainly the basic level of subsistence to individuals and communities.  
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The White Paper on Social Welfare states in its preamble that in order to adequately 
address welfare needs, an inter-sectoral reaction is required which needs the 
involvement of not only the government but also of civil society.168 This means that 
both the government and society are important role players in achieving extended 
coverage. Furthermore, the Paper states that social welfare refers to an integrated 
and comprehensive system of social services, programmes, and social security to 
promote social development, social justice, and the social functioning of the 
people.169 This confirms the approach the government wants to take in broadening 
social security provision in this country – as per the recommendations for a 
comprehensive social security system made by the Taylor Committee.170  
 
One of the government’s priorities in terms of the Paper is to develop a system which 
will establish partnerships between the government, communities, organisations in 
civil society, religious organisations, and the private sector.171 The family is 
recognised as the basic unit of society.172  
 
With regard to community development, the objectives of the government include 
developing family-centered and community-based programmes, encouraging 
voluntary participation in social and community programmes, and facilitating self-help 
and mutual aid support programmes.173 All these clearly indicate that the 
government accepts the fact that informal social security arrangements have a role 
to play in broader social security provisioning. It is therefore upon the government to 
encourage people to participate in such arrangements and to provide a regulatory 
framework that will ensure adequate protection to members of those schemes.  
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Recognition and regulation of informal social security arrangements will go a long 
way in providing people, especially those in the informal sector and those earning 
low salaries, with a savings vehicle which is not only well regulated but also 
sustainable. It should be accepted, however, that informal arrangements cannot 
serve as a stand-alone or independent source of protection during retirement, as 
they are generally not sustainable to provide long-term solutions to the needs of the 
people. 
 
7.5.14  An integrated approach 
 
South Africa’s social security system is at the moment fragmented as different social 
security risks are protected and regulated under various pieces of legislation, and 
are also administered by different government departments.174 However, most of 
these statutes do not speak to one another.  
It is high time that the government should bring together all social security 
arrangements under one administration and link benefits that are likely to interrelate, 
such as retirement benefits and unemployment benefits, to each other. The 
government needs to align all its income security protection arrangements, such as 
social grants and benefits provided in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Fund, 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Fund, the Road Accident 
Fund, and Retirement Provisioning, to each other. 
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7.6 PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
It should be accepted that even though South Africa can learn something from the 
systems in other countries, this country has a unique political, social, and 
developmental history which does not allow for an uncritical use of systems 
applicable in other countries.175 The system followed in South Africa must, among 
other things, address inequalities and the social and economic imbalances of the 
past. Thus social security strategies in this country should not only be 
accommodative of all the people living in this country but must also provide adequate 
protection and benefits that can protect people against social risks and meet their 
needs – some of which were created by the apartheid system. In order to cover all 
these and for a move towards comprehensive social security provision, a four-pillar 
model is suggested. 
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Figure 1: Four-pillar model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PILLAR 4 
Voluntary savings vehicles 
Defined contribution plans. Privately managed but 
regulated by government. To complement the 1
st
, 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
 pillars, rather than to replace them. 
 
Informal arrangements (to be well developed 
and regulated) 
Privately managed, but regulated by the government. 
Support systems include informal clubs, kinship 
networks, religious or community groups, and non-
governmental organisations. To complement the 1
st
, 
2
nd,
 3
rd
 and 4
th
 pillars rather than to replace them. 
 
PILLAR 3: 2nd Tier 
A mandatory private pension 
Employers who cannot establish retirement funds for their workers regardless of their size and sector they belong to will be 
obliged to provide them with access to a suitable pension scheme. Both employers and employees contribute. It shall provide a 
defined-contribution plan. It will be arranged by the employer, privately managed but regulated by the government. It will offer the 
option to opt-out. Pays a minimum benefit and it will pay other social risks in addition to a retirement benefit. 
 
PILLAR 3: 1st Tier 
A mandatory private occupational fund 
Participation is compulsory. Both employers and employees contribute. It provides a mixture of defined-benefit and defined-
contribution plans. It is established by the employer, privately managed but regulated by the government. Pays a minimum benefit 
and it will pay other social risks in addition to a retirement benefit. 
 
PILLAR 2 
A mandatory contributory public fund 
Compulsory and automatic enrolment for everyone who earns above a certain threshold, unless the person can prove that he or 
she already belongs to another fund which provides similar or better protection. Publicly managed and regulated. Both employers 
and employees contribute, supported by the government through general revenue. It will be in the form of a defined-contribution 
plan. It must provide a minum benefit and death and disability benefits. It should have an option to opt-out. 
 
PILLAR 1 
A universal non-contributory state pension 
Given to everyone who has reached the qualifying age of 60 and who qualifies in terms of the means-test. Publicly managed, 
regulated and funded by the government. 
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The first pillar, a state pension, is redistributive and aims to prevent poverty. A public 
pension fund, under the second pillar, will be mandatory to all workers earning above 
a certain threshold, and enrolment will be automatic unless a person can prove that 
he or she already belongs to another fund which offers better protection. It will take 
the form of a defined-contribution plan and will be supported by general revenue, 
namely contributions will be subsidised by the government to reduce the burden for 
low-income earners. Contributions made into the fund will be linked to earnings. The 
fund will pay minimum benefits and must also pay disability and survivors’ benefits. 
The third pillar is made up of mandatory occupational plans. Occupational schemes 
can either be sponsored by single or multiple employers (umbrella funds) and can be 
in the form of either defined-benefit or defined-contribution plans. All employers must 
establish retirement schemes for their employees or participate in multi-employer 
plans, and where the employer is not able to do so due to reasons that include the 
size of the business, such an employer must, being obliged to do so by the law, 
arrange a private pension scheme for the workers or ensure that all its employees 
join and participate in the public fund. Employers who comply should receive tax 
relief. Forcing employers to make special arrangements for their employees will 
create a second tier to the third pillar. Personal or private savings plans constitute 
the fourth pillar. Private savings schemes are voluntary plans and should together 
with informal arrangements play a supplementary role to the first, second, and third 
pillars, and may be used as top-ups to the second and third pillars. The government, 
even though not directly participating in this pillar, must create a sound legal 
framework to encourage people to make medium- to long-term savings. The 
government should provide incentives in the form of tax relief to those who make 
savings through private savings schemes. Informal arrangements should be 
recognised and regulated by the government as they also play a very important role, 
especially in black communities. These arrangements should mainly play a 
supporting role to the other four pillars, and should not be seen as the primary 
source of support during old-age as they are generally not sustainable.  
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7.7 CONCLUSION AND IMPORTANT POINTERS FOR CONTINUOUS POLICY 
CONSIDERATION 
 
South Africa’s occupational retirement system focuses on formal employment. Even 
though the majority of workers in the formal sector are covered by the system, there 
is still a high number of workers who are excluded. Clearly the system does not cater 
for all the workers in the country. Thus, even though coverage is high by 
international standards, especially for a developing country like South Africa, it 
should be accepted that the system is inadequate and exclusionary in nature. The 
system fails to provide adequate protection to retirement benefits; both before 
retirement and during retirement. The regulation of the system is also fragmented as 
provisions from various pieces of legislation apply to retirement funds.176 South 
Africa is in the process of reforming its formal three-pillar system to address most of 
the weaknesses highlighted in this study. It is important for South Africa to take 
serious cognisance of international human rights instruments and social security 
standards in its effort to reform its retirement system. Section 27 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa guarantees everyone the right to have access to 
social security. The section further gives the state the duty to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to progressively 
realise the right of access to social security for those who are not covered at all and 
those who are not adequately covered. The state is generally doing commendable 
work through its social assistance provision, where the elderly receive a 
meanstested old-age pension from the age of 60. The burden on the state to provide 
this pension is enormous as the majority of the people who are not covered by the 
present occupational retirement system and those who are not adequately covered 
rely on the state’s social assistance. There is at the moment an obvious lack of 
coordination between the state pension and the occupational retirement system. The 
state, private institutions and individuals177 all have a role to play in the development 
of a sound retirement system.  
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The state is obliged by section 27(2) of the Constitution to progressively introduce 
not only policies but schemes (such as the National Savings Fund) through which 
people can save money for their retirement, and to develop a framework within which 
private institutions and individuals will be able to actively participate. The framework 
created should ensure that everyone who is able to participate, does exactly that. 
The system must encourage people to save rather than to rely on government 
support. It must make participation compulsory as it has been obvious that people 
will generaly not save for their retirement if there is no law forcing them to do so. 
People who are working and can afford to save for their retirement, must to do so. 
Protection in this regard should by all means possible not provide for mere survival 
and must promote social inclusion, and preserve equality and human dignity. A 
society with an adequate standard of living is a society with human dignity.178 The 
introduction of a National Savings Fund and compulsory participation and 
preservation of funds is no longer an option but a must, considering the increase in 
coverage these changes will bring. A higher percentage of workers will be covered 
and this will relieve the state of some of the burden it is carrying at the noment of 
providing for people who would have been able to provide for themselves had the 
system allowed them to do so. Access to adequate protection and benefits will, 
among other things, protect and promote retirees’ rights to equality and dignity. 
Retirement benefits serve an income replacement role for employees who are no 
longer able to earn a salary through employment due to old-age.179 Retirement 
benefits also contribute towards reducing poverty within the families of the retired 
members and, in some cases, even within the communities in which retired 
members live.180 It is therefore important for the system to provide adequate and 
appropriate benefits and for the system not to discriminate against anyone regarding 
coverage and payment of benefits. The preservation of retirement benefits should be 
enforced to achieve acceptable levels of replacement rates.  
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On the other hand, private savings must be encouraged and informal arrangements 
should be recognised and regulated to offer some protection to those who participate 
in them. State pensions should continue to be used to promote equality,181 human 
dignity,182 and social inclusion by extending coverage to all those who, for valid 
reasons, could not join and participate in any form of savings.  
 
_________________ 
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